CONFERENCE

US and THEM
SYMBOLIC DIVISIONS IN SOCIETY IN SERBIA

The Centre for Empirical Cultural Studies of South-East Europe
The Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory of the University of Belgrade

Saturday July 7th – Institute for philosophy and social theory, Kraljice Natalije 45, Belgrade

9.30

Registration

9.45

Opening of the conference

10.00 – 11.45

Session I: The First, the Second and third Serbias

Nikola Samardžić, PhD, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade
"The East" and "The West" - a Simulacrum of Division in Serbian Culture and Politics

Ana Omaljev, University of Reading, PhD candidate
Politics of Othering: 'First' and 'Other' Serbia's discourses on Identity and Europe

Bogdan Zawadewicz, Institute of Social Sciences, University of Warsaw, PhD candidate
The Development of Serbian Postcolonial Cleavages after 2000.

Marko Savković, Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
Division founded on ignorance: the social perception of NATO and Russia in Serbia

11.45 – 12.00

Coffee break

12.00 – 13.45

Session II: The First, the Second and third Serbias (part two)

Stef Jansen, PhD, Social Anthropology, University of Manchester
Going somewhere/nowhere to go: post-Yugoslav worries about existential mobility

Slobodan Naumović, PhD, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade
New Serbian film(s): cultural intimacy, symbolic boundaries and the production of quasi-ethnic identity cleavages in contemporary Serbian cinematography

Davor Marko, Media plan Institute, University of Sarajevo
The language of "difference" and the religious "other" in media discourses of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia

Ivana Spasić, PhD and Tamara Petrović, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade
Third Serbias

14.00 – 15.30

Lunch

16.00 – 17.30

Session III: Us and Them in the cultural policy of Serbia

Vesna Đukić PhD and Aleksandra Kostova, Faculty of Drama Arts,
University of Arts Belgrade
Us and Them: the employed and the unemployed in culture

Nina Mihaljinac, University of Arts Belgrade, PhD candidate
The culture of disagreement – the contemporary visual arts scene in Serbia

Ivana Volić, Faculty of Drama Arts, University of Arts Belgrade, PhD candidate and Ivana Inđin, MA, Archive of Photography, Zrenjanin
The public and the civil sector in culture – is there room for cooperation?

18.00 – 19.30

Promotion of the monographs "Social and Cultural Capital in Serbia" and "Social and Cultural Capital in Western Balkans societies" of the Centre for the Empirical Study of Culture of Southeast Europe

20.00

Dinner

Sunday July 8th – Institute for philosophy and social theory, Kraljice Natalije 45, Belgrade

10.00 – 12.00

Session IV: Symbolic divisions and social stratification

Predrag Cvetičanin, PhD, Centre for Empirical Cultural Studies of South-East Europe and Jovana Dimitrijević-Savić, PhD, Faculty of Philology and Arts, University of Kragujevac
Perception of social divisions in Serbia by members of elite groups

Tomasz Zarycki, PhD, Robert B. Zajonc Institute of Social Sciences, University of Warsaw
The intelligentsia versus the middle class: The conflict between the rank and class-logics of social stratification in Poland

Zoran Stojiljković, PhD, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade
Political capital and identities of the citizens of Serbia

Danijela Gavrilović, PhD and Nemanja Krstić, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Nis
Capitals in "Politika"

12.00– 12.30

Sandwich and coffee break

12.30 – 14.30

Session V: Strategies and tactics of identity construction

Branimir Stojković, PhD, Faculty of Political Science, University of Belgrade
Homeland identity and globalization

Slaviša Raković, Centre for applied European studies, Belgrade
In the haze of Serbian Orthodoxy

Anja Tedeško, University of Torino, MA student
LGBTQ actors in the Bosnia and Herzegovina quotidien

Vladan Pavlović, MA and Miloš Jovanović, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Niš)
The traditional and the modern in the attitudes towards the relationship between language and identity of students at the University of Niš

14.30

Conference closing

15.00

Lunch

Nikola Samardžić, PhD
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, Serbia

I

"The East" and "The West" - a Simulacrum of Division in Serbian Culture and Politics

The two decades that have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union were not enough for Serbia to take a unique, clear orientation in foreign policy that would primarily contribute to the quality of institutional and social reforms. Russian myth, the traditional belief of belonging to a specific civilization, alienated to the European modernism, and the Serbian post-Soviet paradigm during the process of the Soviet and Yugoslav disintegration, remain an important, however not the sole layer of convictions that have contributed to maintain the authoritarian political and economic management. Regardless of its official "European" orientation, Serbia is currently an important official Kremlin trenched stronghold, among a few remaining black holes in the common European institutional space. Still unstable relations with the neighbors, recalls for the need of abolition of borders and regulations established both in communist and nationalist era. Serbia is not an isolated example, of the "elites" assured of their "European" or "pro-Western" qualities, while simultaneously denying the values of economic, political or cultural freedom. One Paul Krugman avoids warning on foreseeable consequences while advocating the increasing public spending that may lead not only to fiscal pressures and the budget deficit, but also to the further development of authoritarian political tendencies already seen in the current Russian model of state capitalism, uncontrolled government spending, corruption and political pressure. One of the major dilemmas of the modern world in this matter remains, whether academics and intellectuals who participate in public policy legitimization, rather than in its creation, abolish the global authoritarian tendencies, facing their own dismissing experienced during the "neoliberal" era? In this sense, not forgetting the continuity of communism and nationalism, both essentially pro-Russian, the values system in local Serbian politics remains unclear and undeveloped.

I

Ana Omaljev
PhD Researcher, University of Reading, UK

Politics of Othering: 'First' and 'Other' Serbia's discourses on Identity and Europe

One of essential characteristics of the post-Milosevic transition in Serbia is that the main actors are rethinking political identities and negotiating their meanings. The existing literature shows that the representations of Serbian identity within the political discourses of 'First' and 'Other' Serbia are marked by extensive and frequent contestation. In these early years of consolidation of Serbian democracy there is no political, social and cultural consensus on key questions such as the pace of transition, post-Yugoslav conflicts and war crimes, the relationship with European Union, role of Serbian Orthodox Church in politics and many others. This research draws support from literature on identity and Europeanization, representation of traditions and narratives, which are not just invented but also actively negotiated within post-Milosevic Serbian society. This paper follows Lene Hansen's approach which offers a deconstructive analysis of the way identity is constructed within the discourse. Thus, it examines the evolution of 'First' and 'Other' Serbia as political and societal discourses and explores how discursive processes of Othering and Self-referencing are framed in the press with special attention to the construction of representations of 'Europe' and 'Kosovo'.

Methodologically, this paper defines political realties mentioned above as internal to the discourse. Critical discourse analysis offers practical tools for a study of how the political identities have been thought out, written, re-written and spoken within the discourses of the 'First' and 'Other' Serbia. This paper offers an account of the dichotomy of their relationship (friend/enemy) and this highlights the pillars of politics of Othering: the Self, the Other and the degrees of Difference embedded between them. Therefore, this research aims to understand the way 'First' and 'Other' Serbia discourses *produce*, *construct* and *materialise* imagery surrounding terms such as 'Europe', and 'Kosovo' and how these reflect on Serbs' self-identification.

I

In empirical terms, the academic significance of this paper lies primarily in the research of liberal and illiberal concepts and value and belief systems that exist within the different social strata in Serbia. More specifically, it explores the way in which the images of othering are framed within the ongoing 'Missionary Intelligentsia' debate that was initiated in 2003 in a weekly magazine VREME, and how this discussion contributed to the further political polarisation in Serbia. It draws on extensive analysis of press and media excerpts in order to investigate two opposing narratives and political orientations of the elites, their perception of identity through primordial or instrumental lenses, and their standpoints on 'Europe' and mutual views on each other, all of which are highly under-researched. The questions this paper specifically addresses is what it means to be a 'Serb' and/or 'European'; or to be labelled as 'anti-Serbian'; and how the concept of 'traitor' or a 'patriot' is constructed within the 'First' and 'Other' Serbia discourses on identity. In general terms, close analysis of the quality press shows how the politics of othering makes the distinction between US and THEM and further contributes to the contestation of Serbian political identities.

Key words: *discourse, identity, Serbia, Europe, elites, Europeanization, representation*

I

Bogdan Zawadewicz

The Development of Serbian
Postcolonial Cleavages after 2000.

The aim of the paper is to reconstruct the main lines of political divisions that occur within Serbian public discourse and are created around the attitude towards the center (either to the West or Russia) as a point of reference.

Despite the institutional change that took place in 2000 and the democratization process which started at the same time, Serbian political cleavages still has a symbolic, postcolonial character and are determined by the attitude towards the center. The argument on the meaning of the center as a key element of postcolonial socio-political cleavages in Serbia will be examined through analysis of public discourse and the policy of state institutions. Simultaneously, I will try to reconstruct the historical context of these cleavages and explain the reasons of their persistence.

In my paper, I intend to present the main actors of Serbian public life (the so-called "First" and "Second" Serbia) and their institutionalized forms (representatives), i.e. political parties. By applying the institutional theory (discursive institutionalism) I will try to prove that the basic factor which preserves and strengthens symbolic, postcolonial political cleavages in Serbia is the state institutions. On the one hand the actors involved in the public discourse legitimize existing political cleavages, on the other they are influenced by functioning institutions (feedback relation).

Research sources which will be analyzed are press articles, scientific publications, official state documents (trade and political agreements) and the programs of political parties.

Marko Savković
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy

I

Distinction based in ignorance: the social perception of NATO and Russia in Serbia

If we are to believe what decision-makers say, Serbia has no intention of joining NATO. It, however, must cooperate with this organization. In this manner the reforms taking place through the application of NATO standards will continue, while Serbian armed forces will contribute to its operations. This cooperation in providing solutions to global challenges, as representatives of the nomenclature are fond of saying, is imminent. As one of the states created in the region of the former Yugoslavia, Serbia is committed, if not coerced by this historical "inevitability", to participate in the safety "umbrella" the visible portion of which is made up of member troops stationed at one of the many military bases in the Western Balkans region.

Studies of public opinion, however, indicate that the Serbs "do not like" NATO. The newer history of this organization, emphatically interventionist, is unacceptable in a context determined to a large extent by the trauma suffered some 13 years previously. The antipodes of NATO is Russia. The social perception of this state in Serbia is generally positive: its interests are interpreted as being benign, its relations with Serbia judged to be historically good. In the light of the world economic crisis, Russia is an increasingly desirable economic partner. There is the impression that we are ready to "trust" this state. Leading representatives of the nomenclature hence feel themselves to be freed of the burden of rationality when they act.

Similar to this relationship, until the Kosovo crisi, was the one with the European Union (EU), uncritical and apologetic. It was accompanied by an internalization of norms. The nomenclature made do with introducing the *acquis* and its sporadic application.

It is my intention in this paper to "unmask" a symbolic distinction – the one between drawing nearer to Russia and further Euro-Atlantic integrations (of which NATO is the ultimate expression) – and reveal it to be a social and political construct weakly founded in the reality of

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international relations. In this, I will rely on the analysis of the discourse of the key representatives of the nomenclature, as well as significant empirical materials. I will show that social perception of both actors is, in actuality, erroneous and, further, that the key to overcoming this rift is not solely in the hands of the decision makers.

Key words: *Serbia, Russia, NATO, social perception, distinction*

Stef Jansen
Social Anthropology, University of Manchester

II

‘Going somewhere / nowhere to go: post-Yugoslav worries about existential mobility’

Loosely based on ethnographic research in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Serbia, this presentation is an initial attempt to spell out and understand patterns of social division related to existential mobility—that is, the degree to which people have a sense that their life has a direction and is moving forward. Building on the early work of Pierre Bourdieu in Algeria, I address questions of ‘temporal dispositions’, in particular the unequal distribution of the ability to project a proactive orientation towards the future, and the way in which this is related to one’s insertion in particular institutional frameworks. Where Bourdieu speaks of people’s initial encounters with a particular self-proclaimed modernising project, imported by French colonialism, I approach similar issues from the other end of the story: how does the demise of another self-proclaimed modernising project, the one represented by Yugoslav self-managing socialism, affect temporal dispositions? Elaborating on Bourdieu’s insights with the help of the work of his student Ghassan Hage, I focus on the importance of a sense that one’s life is ‘going somewhere’, and its opposite, a sense of having ‘nowhere to go’, of being stuck. In general, explorative terms, I try to understand the unequal distribution of a sense of existential mobility against the background of the temporal structures of both remembered Yugoslav socialism and of the projected ‘road to Europe’.

II

Slobodan Naumović, PhD
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade

New Serbian film(s): cultural intimacy, symbolic boundaries, and the production of quasi-ethnic identity cleavages in contemporary Serbian cinematography

The paper uses the example of socially engaged films created in the post-October 5th period to examine the usefulness of the categories of cultural intimacy (Michael Herzfeld) and symbolic boundaries (Michèle Lamont) in the analysis of the cultural production of political and social divisions in Serbia. These are divisions which can, at worst case, take on the form of quasi-ethnic identity cleavages, within which political opponents from one's own community are experienced, publicly represented, and treated as being utter strangers in an ethnic, that is, national sense. Cleavages such as these, as the most extreme consequences of the practice of othering, come into being when particular political actors wish to maximize gain from already existing cultural, ideological, or political differences, in which case they, with the help of appropriate cultural policies and other symbolic strategies, can reify and essentialize them as quasi-ethnic/national, and willfully stymie the reaching of compromise political solutions. The paper starts from the premise that an engaged film production in small and incompletely commercialized cinematographies can be analyzed in the context of fitting in with, that is, fighting against the dominant cultural policies. Films are, within such an approach, not considered reducible to political ideas which inspire the authorial approach, but such ideas, that is, their visualizations are considered active factors in public communication, capable of influencing contemporary reality, that is, capable of producing the intended (and, in some cases, unintended) social consequences, specifically here social divisions and identity cleavages. The sample analyzed for the usefulness of the concepts proposed is made up of films created in the post-October 5th period that are also characterized by an ideologically motivated polarization of the main protagonists, which can be linked to different cultural policy projects

(list of films: Kordon, San zimske noći, Optimisti, Medeni mesec, Zavet, Miloš Branković, Hitna pomoć, Obični ljudi, Turneja, Sveti Georgije ubiva aždahu, Četvrti čovek, Srpski film, Šišanje, Parada, Klip, Ustanička ulica).

Key words: *cultural intimacy, symbolic boundaries, quasi–ethnic identity cleavages,, cultural policy, Serbian cinematography*

Davor Marko
Media plan institute, Sarajevo University of Sarajevo

The language of "difference" and the religious "Other" in media discourses of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia

The assumption that the dominant (mainstream) media in every society express the values and trends created, accepted and further reproduced by the majority (or majorities) entails several conclusions which I intend to analyze. First, this majority-oriented image of the society in which we live is symbolically mediated by the media. Second, minorities are an integral part of such an image of society, but "they" are always "Other", always different, inferior, marginalized, that is, they are always solely the subject of reporting and they are rarely given an active role in this process. Third, in reporting on minorities the media use a particular language – the language of "difference" or the language of "otherness" – which encompasses a wide range of qualitative expression. From politically correct reporting, gender sensitive language, terminological selectivity, to the use of expressions which can take on different context-dependent meanings (denotative vs. connotative meaning).

On the basis of an analysis of past media practices and reporting by the mainstream media on minorities, my intention is to explore in particular the phenomenon of the treatment of Islam as an object of media reporting in the media of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. On the basis of past experience, it can be inferred that Islam and Muslims are perceived as "Other" in the media, regardless of which of

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various symbolic guises Islam is being reported on in: famous people (religious leaders), the context of incidents (conflict in the Middle East), visual pieces (mosques, city panoramas, massacres, etc), or the dominant political context (as is the case with ethno-politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina).

It is my intention to create a comparative analysis of the treatment of Islam in mainstream media in Serbia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina on the basis of analysis of media content in which Islam and Muslims are reported on, with the presupposition that in the qualitative sense this perception will be influenced by the socio-political organization of these states which differ in that in one of the two Muslims, Bosniacs, are a national minority and an organized religious group (Serbia), while in the other they have the status of a constituting people, they are an organized religious group, but they are also in the minority position in parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina where they are not in a position of power (Republika Srpska).

Ivana Spasić
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade

Tamara Petrović
Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory of the University of Belgrade

Third Serbias

After 2000, and particularly over the past few years, the figure of "Third Serbia" – meant as a response, alternative, or resistance to the formerly dominant division into "First" and "Second" Serbias – has become highly visible in public discourse. Indeed, it seems to be increasingly attractive as a rhetorical position. This paper will look at why this is so, as well as at the ways different types of "Third Serbia" are discursively constructed. For, in spite of a single term, there are a variety of "Third Serbias" rather than one. What they all share is an explicit call to

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transcend cleavages and extremes – usually associated with the "First/ Second Serbia" division – that are perceived as overstated, artificial, self-interested and/or removed from real concerns and interests of the Serbian society. In that sense they all involve a certain moral pretense, claiming as they do to be offering something better, more truthful, authentic, and fair than the said dichotomy. They can also be said to share the same emblem – Novak Đoković, as the uncontestable hero of "Third Serbia". Everything else may vary – building blocks, strategies of construction, institutional locations, and targeted audience. Some Third Serbias are being constructed negatively, in a "neither/nor" move, while some others prefer a positive, "both/and" strategy; some speak predominantly the language of culture, others of social difference, and still others of politics and ideology. Apart from a few special cases, where nonpolitical elements play significant roles in the internal constitution (such as the Third Serbia of diaspora, Third Serbia as the hungry people vs. arrogant intellectuals, the silent Third Serbia etc.), in more strictly ideological terms there are two main paths whereby Third Serbia is being built: from the direction of First Serbia, by shedding unwelcome baggage (of crimes, political authoritarianism, and primitivism) and self-presenting as *something completely different;* and by an evolution from within the Second Serbia, through distancing from its own "taliban" , perceived as peevish extremists. Whether different starting points overdetermine also different views of the end point, or the two paths lead to a truly common ground – self-described as "a Serbia that just wants to live" – remains to be seen. Analysis will be based on a corpus of media texts containing an explicit reference to "Third Serbia".

Key words: *Third Serbia, First Serbia, Second (Other) Serbia, symbolic divisions, social cleavages, discourse*

III

Vesna Đukić, PhD
Faculty of Dramatic Arts, University of Arts in Belgrade

Aleksandra Kostova
UNESCO MA Studies of Cultural Management and cultural policies in the Balkans

Us and Them: the employed and the unemployed in culture

Despite an undeveloped econometry, lack of clear indicators for measuring the contribution of culture to economic development and of clear cultural policy in the field of creative economies, there are studies in Serbia indicating an increase in the number of employees in the culture industry and its input to Serbia's GDP. On the other hand, a large number of unemployed generates increasing poverty, which will have the greatest impact on the young as changes in the labor market forsee longer retention of the older population in employment. Therefore, the basic question to be asked is whether, in the future, social divisions between the employed and the unemployed in culture will increase at the expense of young, educated, innovative and creative people who could through their professional engagement contribute to a faster economic development of Serbia. A specific opportunity for this is offered by creative economies through the opening of new jobs outside the existing production in traditional industries which are becoming less and less feasible and which cannot offer a sufficient number of job openings for the entire work-able population. There is likewise the question of the role of cultural policy in these processes. Does cultural policy have the capacity to engage with a markedly different employment policy from the existing one, and on a more general basis, does it have the capacity to undertake a policy of human resource development in culture which encompasses a wide range of engagement – from a policy of formal education and lifelong learning adapted to new economic and social circumstances in the country and the surrounding region, to employment and rewarding? That policy is not practiced by the state at all today. The state likewise does not keep evidence (potentials in Serbia have not even been mapped), nor is there any active policy of motivating

creative economies despite the fact that the Ministry of Culture has a department in charge of contemporary creation and creative industries. In other words, is it possible that perception of culture as a consumer is evolving in Serbia into perception of culture as a producer, which would remove at least one factor which generates unemployment and poverty from the field of culture?

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Key words: *policy of human resource development, creative economy, economic development, employment, unemployment*

Nina Mihaljinac
PhD student at the University of Art, Belgrade

The culture of disagreement – the contemporary visual arts scene in Serbia

The paper "The culture of disagreement – the contemporary visual arts scene" in Serbia is the result of research into the system of contemporary visual arts galleries in Serbia, realized by the author in the course of 2011. The focus of the paper is on the issue of (alleged) division of the scene into groups of the "quasi-traditional" and the "quasi-progressive". Through an analysis of the current situation from the (post)postmodernist standpoint, which can describe the global state in the field of arts and culture, as well as from the standpoint of the political environment in transitional Serbia, the paper aims to reveal the pernicious influence of "divide and conquer" politics on the development of contemporary artistic production and Serbia's cultural system. The expression "culture of disagreement" points to one of key problems, not of the visual arts scene alone, but of the overall culture system,that is tied to issues of constituting and representing national identity and the social phenomenon referred to by the author as *pop-elitism*. Relying on contemporary art theories concerned with the autonomy and status of the arts, the paper maps the echoes and conflicts resulting from the application of the paradigms of modernism and (post)postmodernism visible on the

contemporary visual arts scene. On the basis of conclusions reached concerning the symbolic division of the scene, guided cultural policy theory and management in culture, recommendations are provided for improving the work of cultural organizations in Serbia.

Key words: *contemporary Serbian visual arts, pop–elitism, culture of disagreement, postpostmodernism, cultural policy*

Ivana Volic, MA
PhD student at the Faculty of Drama Arts, University of Arts

Ivana Indjin, MA
Ogledalo - Center for Initiatives in Culture

The public and the civil sector in culture – is there room for cooperation?

The existence of a civil society is the basis for the building of a democratic, modern state. Civil society is made up of citizens who act in a manner that is non-violent, civilized, tolerant, as individuals and as members of various associations. As such, citizens have an influence on the naming of problems extant in society and they are ready to engage themselves in their resolution. The organizations of a civil society (non-governmental organizations, the non-profit, third sector), albeit involved in the political field, do not have the power to directly influence decision making and the realization of activities resulting from these decisions. Partnership between the public and civil sector makes possible, for the former, the introduction of innovation in terms of content, doing business, organization, management, and, for the latter, conditions necessary for the production and public presentation of their activities, as well as the credibility in the expert and general public.

The third sector in the field of culture is made up of organizations involved with drawing attention to, constructive and credible criticism of negative phenomena in society, artistic creation and activism aimed at proposing solutions to existing problems. In this way, the

sector represents not only cultural capital through which creativity, innovation, creation, local cultural values and contemporary cultural expression are expressed, but also social capital which influences the creation of a civil society.

The third sector requires systemic and social support for ensuring conditions necessary for its production and public presentation, which should stem from the public sector. It, however, is not present to the extent necessary for the survival of the third sector and its continued active engagement. This is manifested in the insufficient presence of the third sector in decision making and creation of laws pertaining to culture, the disactuating attitude of state institutions toward programs by third sector organizations, and contempt for existing laws which regulate relations with the third sector. The paper will consider the position of the third sector in the field of culture through the analysis of existing laws and their application, documents concerning the allocation of the budget for culture, as well as the conditions under which the production and presentation of programs/projects of the third sector is carried out.

Key words: *civil society, public sector, third sector, culture, cooperation*

IV

Predrag Cvetičanin, PhD
Centre for Empirical Cultural Studies of South-East Europe

Jovana Dimitrijević-Savić, PhD
Faculty of Philology and Arts, University of Kragujevac

Perception of social divisions in Serbia by members of elite groups

If the focus of research in the first year of our project "Social and Cultural Capital in Serbia" was the study of struggles aimed at the acquisition of material resources and the strategies used in these struggles, then in the second year the focus was on symbolic practices through which symbolic and social boundaries among social groups are established and the classification struggles for the imposition of one's own representations about the social world as dominant.

The starting point in our research in the second project year were Bourdieu's conception of classification struggles and a modified version of Michelle Lamont's framework for the foundations of symbolic divisions in American/French society presented in her study "Money, Moral, Manners" (Lamont: 1992). In our analyses we started from the distinction between US and THEM on the basis of: 1) economic wealth; 2) morals; 3) political orientation ("cosmopolitans" and "patriots"); and 4) culture/manners, with sub-distinctions between a) the educated and the uneducated; b) the urban and the rural/ or the recently urbanized; c) the symbolic "European" north and the symbolic "Oriental" south of the country.

Our paper provides an overview of perceptions of social divisons in society in Serbia by members of elite groups: politicians, university professors, artists, NGO activists, based on data obtained through semi-structured interviews. Ten members of elite groups from Belgrade were interviewed, eight from Novi Sad, three from Niš and two from Novi Pazar (twenty-three in all). The paper presents an outline of the divisions identified, with particular attention paid to naming the conflicting sides and the argumentation used to defend one's own side in clevages. Finally, a reconstruction of the map of basic division in Serbia, as seen by the interviewed members of elite groups, will be attempted.

Key words: *perception of social divisions, classification struggles, symbolic boundaries, elite groups in Serbia*

Tomasz Zarycki
The Robert B. Zajonc Institute for Social Studies (ISS), University of Warsaw (UW)

The intelligentsia versus the middle class: The conflict between the rank and class-logics of social stratification in Poland.

The paper will draw on the approach to social stratification in Central and Eastern Europe proposed by Eyal, Szelenyi and Townsley in their seminal "Capitalism without Capitalists" (1998). In their perspective, Poland along with Hungary, could be considered as a case of double stratification order. As I will argue, the pertinence of the rank logic in Poland can be related to the crucial role of the noble heritage, which has critically shaped the symbolic system of the Polish national culture. In early XX century the intelligentsia has taken over the dominant role of the weakening nobility and reinstated its symbolic assets and means of symbolic domination. In effect cultural cleavage symbolically derived from the opposition of the nobleman and the peasant (the lord vs. boor) still dominates in contemporary Poland over other cleavages, including the economic one. This results in persistence of the intelligentsia as a social elite and weakness of other elite identities, in particular those defined in mostly economic terms, like the middle-class identity. The paper will argue about the crucial role of the intelligentsia identity in Poland and show how discourses about it demise may be paradoxically interpreted as proofs of its strength. The paper will discuss selected mechanisms of symbolic domination of the intelligentsia. Among them will be the control over the definition of citizenship, including patterns of being "good citizen", civil society and patriotism. Others will include the intelligentsia's ability to define norms of "good taste", civility or Polish forms of being "cultured", "European" and "Western". The above mentioned mechanisms may be interpreted as the intelligentsia ability to control the key dominant forms of cultural capital as it was defined by Bourdieu. Their power may be related to thesis of dominance of the cultural capital over the economic capital and the key social cleavage in Polish society.

Key words: *Poland, cultural capital, intelligentsia, middle class, rank–logic, nobility.*

Zoran Stojiljković, PhD
Faculty of Political Sciences, niversity of Belgrade

Political capital and the identities of the citizens of Serbia

In this paper I aim to lay down the foundations for a comprehensive study of the political dimension of the social capital of the citizens of Serbia. The focus of the analysis is on the complex relationship between the undeveloped political capital of the citizens, the specific constellation of interest and power in society and the efficacy of institutions and chances for the consolidation of democracy.

In the paper I start from four indicators of the political dimension of social capital. The first and widest one is made up of (lack of) readiness to participate in the resolution of social problems. The second indicator relates to citizens' self-assessment of their ability to understand the political scene and events, as well as of the level to which their political influence is actualized. The third indicator is the degree of (dis)trust which citizens display toward civil and political actors and institutions. A high degree of trust speaks in favor of "good health and fitness", and a low one of a sick, weak, conflicting society and social and political elites lacking in credibility. Starting from de Tocqueville's emphasis of the significance of civil and political associations in the fight against the "tyranny of the majority", but also the alienation of political institutions, the fourth indicator is the citizens' activeness in political parties and organizations and campaigns, and, in particular, the different established party-political identities. The central issue of this part of the analysis is the question of the nature of the relation: social identities – political divisions – politico-cultural and ideological orientations.

In the present ambivalence of possible outcomes, chances for democracy to "take" grow with the growth of a generalized, bridging and bonding capital of the citizens, with their contemporaneous participation in and "practice" of democracy and the attendant growth of the credibility of civil and political actors and institutions. The "democratic deficit", on the other hand, is the result of the culmination of negative values. Amoral familism, that is, nepotism and cronyism and the spread

of corruptive channels and ties and, even, the politicization of crime and the criminalization of politics are sufficiently illustrative examples. Even more negative consequences result from the destructive action of an exclusive national identification and conflict of contending nationalisms, that is, lack of the culture of dialogue.

Key words: *social capital, trust, participation, identity, democracy.*

IV

dr Danijela Gavrilović and Nemanja Krstić
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Capitals in "Politika"

Our article is part of the research project "Social and Cultural Capital in Serbia" which studies social and symbolic divisions in Serbian society and the structural basis of these divisions.In the second year of the project we devoted ourselves to the study of classification discourses – particularly public discourses produced in and by social institutions, political and cultural elites, and the media. Using content analysis and discourse analysis we analyzed texts in three groups of media in Serbia: the daily newspapers ("Politika", "Press" and "Danas"), magazines ("Vreme" and"NIN") and professional (or semi-professional) journals ("Nova srpska politička misao" and "Peščanik"). For a five year period, from 2006 to 2011, we sampled 50 issues of the daily newspapers (ten per year), 25 issues of the weekly magazines (five per year) and five issues each of "Nova srpska politička misao" and"Peščanik" and conducted our analyses on this corpus.

   In this paper we present the results of our analysis of 50 issues of the daily newspaper "Politika", sampled for the period from 2006 to 2011. Following up on Bourdieu's conception of capital, we have undertaken an analysis of the appearance of their various forms: economic, social, cultural, and political capital, each operationalized through a range of categories, with the idea of encompassing all relevant forms specific

to this social context. In our analysis we note the frequency of occurrence, the carriers of the capital, the actors who legitimize the social use of capital by putting forward various opinions of social phenomena in which the use of capital is clearly visible, as well as the direction of the attitudes pronounced. The analysis, although yet to be completed, points to conflict between different social groups, carriers of different types of capital.

Our analysis aims to contribute to a wider understanding of the uses of capitals, their carriers, the ways in which they function and, furthermore, the way these forms of social behaviour are evaluated by relevant social actors, experts and public opinion.

Key words: *social capital, political capital, cultural capital, economic capital, media*

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Homeland identity and globalization

Homeland identity has a formative role in the shaping of an individual's relationship with his own people and others and is situated somewhere between primary (family) and secondary (school, the media...) enculturation frameworks. Unlike national culture, which aims to be unique (cultural cannon), homeland culture is plural because it is aimed at regional and local, autochthonous values. These values represent a safeguard against civilizational uniformity and are a guarantee of the maintenance of cultural diversity, not only within nations, but also at the European, continental level. They were cast aside for a long time, evidence of which is the mainly pejorative meaning of the adjective *provincial*, although they represent the very core of folk culture. To the extent to which the educational system and communications system in a particular society, but also at the planetary level (globalization) has become universal, these differences are relativized and local cultures weaken, but they never disappear completely. It is precisely thanks to a homeland identity that the difference between *one's own*, *strangers* and *foreigners*, important for understanding the nature of intercultural communication, is established. The importance of homeland identity in the contemporary world questions to a certain extent the process of globalization, one of the aspects of which is a very high degree of migration, which involve ever greater numbers of people in an ever increasing number of countries. The significance of homeland identity is significantly reduced for those who have moved from place to place in childhood and while growing up. Such a person is, as optimists would say, a cosmopolitan, while pessimists would see such a person as someone uprooted. The truth, as is the rule, is somewhere in between.

Key words: *homeland identity, provincialism, globalization, cosmopolitanism, up-rootedness*

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In the haze of Serbian Orthodoxy: *turning to "ancestral faith" and the break with institutional Orthodoxy - the experiences of four former committed believers of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC)*[*]

The paper considers connections between contemporary apostasy from the Serbian Orthodox Church and the dynamics of the SOC both as an institution and as a "community of the faithful". The paper is the result of research into the *road to Orthodoxy* and the experiences of four individuals, mutual acquaintances, who in the 1990s found "refuge in a search for sense" in Orthodoxy, but, towards the end of the previous decade, decided to abandon institutionalized religion and to move from the so-called theological-ecclesiastic model of Christian religiosity to an alternative model which *negotiates* between Christianity as doctrine and un-religious life-styles and "life philosophies", as they are colloquially termed.

Four individuals, now past their thirties, spent their twenties in life with the Church only to, due to changes in belief due to socialization in circles beyond the Church, the nationalism of the Church and affairs within it, decide to stop considering themselves members of the SOC. Two of the four are from former communist Serb-Montenegrin families (baptized as adults), while the other two are from traditional-folklore Orthodox families, but, as they themselves say, families "unlearned" in doctrine (baptized at birth). All refer to "true" acceptance of Orthodoxy as *obraćanje veri [turning to faith]*. One of the four interviewed spent over 12 years in a Serbian monastery, which he left because of "hypocrisy, nationalism, lack of education and greed", while the remaining three regularly attended church, observed the rules of fasting, went to confession, attended church gatherings during a period of ten years, but distanced themselves after, in their words, coming to confront the "rigidity and totalitarianism" of the SOC. Three of the four today

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[*]   The opinions put forward in this paper are the author's own and do not necessarily represent the opinions and program policy of the Center for Applied European Studies.

consider themselves to Orthodox Christians, but not members of the SOC, one is a self-styled Christian without a Church.

Once torn between the conservativeness of institutional Orthodoxy and the *modernity* of their social environment (friendship groups, networks of people with similar interests, etc), the four former members of the SOC testify that the SOC today is a community which, as they say, is having problems integrating cosmopolitan worldviews and which is incapable of dealing with modernity and the diversity of contemporary society.

Key words: *Serbian Orthodox Church, theological Orthodox Christianity, folk Orthodox Christianity, religious conversion, apostasy*

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LGBTQ actors in the Bosnia and Herzegovina quotidien

The aim of the paper is to attempt an analysis of everyday practices of certain actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina and an interpretation of silent repressions. What is the quotidian of a regular person – an anonymous actor (Michel de Certeau) – labeled as LGBTQ in the Bosnian quotidian? What are the accepted operative logics for the normalization of one's own position within a tenaciously hetero normative society?

According to Douglas (M.Douglas), the body can be used as an indicator of social boundaries which are always uncertain. Using the body and its rituals, on the part of actors, in a non-normative way expresses concern of the rest of society for the extant boundaries of the community, which causes fear that their transgression may endanger its identity and survival.

LBGTQ individuals, that is, their bodies are the subject onto which society marks its own disapproval, turning them into witnesses of difference. This personalized interpretation of others and of the self is expressed through everyday consumption and use of shared urban space, through various cultural and popular products, for example, *sevdalinke*.

An ordinary person, in particular an LGBTQ actor employs mechanisms of everyday "poaching" (M. de Certeau) as a response to the conflicts of everyday life which are part of the overall "structural violence" (P. Farmer), expressed through "everyday negation" (S. Cohen).

This personal micro-resistance of LGBTQ actors is evidence of maladjustment to the boundaries which are an expression of the tendency of Bosnian-Herzegovinian society to close itself off in some hypothetical traditional confines, which is a reflection of a destabilized "identity" after the drastic events of the 1990s. The analysis was undertaken on the basis of fieldwork carried out in Sarajevo from May 2011 to the present.

Key words: *LGBTQ, repression, social boundaries, Bosnian–Herzegovinian society, "poaching", consumption, cultural products, quotidian*

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The Traditional and the Modern in the Attitudes of the Students of the University of Niš Towards the Relation Between Language and Identity

The paper presents the results of a poll carried out among the students of several faculties of the University of Niš at the beginning of the spring semester 2012, on their attitude towards the relation between language, on the one hand, and national and individual identity, on the other hand. The basic aim thereby was to establish whether the students take the view that language, on the one hand, and national and individual identity, on the other hand, are closely intertwined. If so, such a standpoint could indicate that the given population has traditional and local-oriented outlooks. If not, they could be argued to have modern and global-oriented views. In addition, the paper undertakes to analyse the given outlooks in relation to a number of demographic variables, including those peratining to the sex, ethnicity, the place of birth, the education of parents and the types of religiousness of the students polled.

Key words and Phrases: *language, nation, identity, the traditional / the modern, language attitudes.*

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