US AND THEM
Symbolic Divisions in Western Balkan Societies

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Editors’ introduction

This book issues from the project “Social and Cultural Capital in Serbia”, implemented between 2010 and 2012 by the Centre for Empirical Cultural Studies of South-East Europe. This project was carried out within the Regional Research Promotion Programme in the Western Balkans (RRPP), run by the University of Fribourg upon a mandate of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation.

While in the first year of the project our research was focused on the multi-dimensional social structure in Serbia, the resources (or capitals) social groups rely on, and strategies people pursue in their daily life, in the second year the primary goal was to identify the basic symbolic divisions in the Serbian society and discursive strategies used to construct, maintain, legitimize or contest these divisions. Using content analysis and discourse analysis we analyzed texts in three groups of media in Serbia: daily newspapers (the dailies Politika, Kurir and Danas), magazines (Vreme and NIN), and (semi)professional journals (Nova srpska politička misao and Peščanik) along with their websites, in the seven-year period from 2006 to 2012. We looked at how in these different types of media, aimed at different audiences, various kinds of symbolic divisions are instantiated – distinctions on the basis of wealth, morality, political orientation, gender and sexuality, ethnicity, religion, manners and taste, education, urbanity, or degree of “Orientalism”. Our primary interest lay in how these cleavages were constructed, represented and legitimized.\(^1\)

Since our research interests are predominantly regional in scope, we were interested in exchanging experiences with colleagues from other Western Balkan societies. To this purpose, the conference “Us and Them – Symbolic Divisions in Western Balkan Societies” was held on 7 and 8 July 2012. The organizers were the Centre for Empirical Cultural Studies of South-East Europe and the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory of the University of Belgrade. Nineteen papers were presented at the Conference, and a selection of these presentations make up the core of this volume. In addition, in the late 2012 a call for papers was issued which also brought us a number of interesting papers not previously presented at the Conference. In selecting the contributions to this volume, we have sought to encompass various theoretical approaches and a wide geographical distribution of the phenomena under study, in order to present the multifarious symbolic divisions, as well as certain sore spots, in the societies of the Western Balkans.

The study of symbolic divisions has a long tradition in the social sciences. Among the founding fathers of sociology, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber took keen interest in classification systems and symbolic boundaries these systems establish. While Durkheim focused on the relation of such boundaries to communal identity and the moral order in society [Durkheim et Mauss 1903;

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1 The results of these inquiries will be published in another volume which is forthcoming.
Durkheim 1995 (1912)], Weber was rather concerned with their influence on the emergence and reproduction of social inequality [Weber 1978 (1922)]. In Saussure’s wake, structuralism [Lévi-Strauss 1963 (1958)] developed a powerful framework for identifying and interpreting fundamental cultural binaries. Mary Douglas [1966] famously redefined the notions of purity and pollution, while Fredrik Barth [1969] saw the boundary between self and other, Us and Them, as the crucial element in the constitution of ethnicity. In sociology, the *problematique* of symbolic divisions was revived by Pierre Bourdieu [1977, 1979, 1991, 1997] who with his conceptual innovations of symbolic capital, symbolic power, and symbolic violence, as well as with his strongly culturalized class theory, created a solid base for the sociological study of symbolism for decades to come. Symbolic interactionism contributed the indispensable concept of stigma [Goffman: 1963] and a set of research tools for examining in detail how symbolic differentiation is worked out at the micro level of everyday life [e.g. Becker: 1963]. Michèle Lamont, with her pioneering post-Bourdieuian *Money, Morals, and Maners* [1992; see also Lamont and Fournier /eds/ 1992] launched the “study of boundaries” as an explicit and specialized area of sociological endeavor [Lamont and Molnár 2002; Pachucki, Pendergrass and Lamont 2007]. Since then, she has been working on an increasingly broad research program, recently termed the “comparative sociology of valuation” [Lamont: 2012] or the study of “cultural repertoires” [Lamont and Thévenot eds. 2000]. In close proximity to Lamont’s position, a Paris-based group headed by Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot has been developing a pragmatic sociology of justification [Boltanski et Thévenot: 1991]. In the US, the neo-Durkheimian “strong program in cultural theory” of Jeffrey Alexander and his associates [Alexander 2003, 2006, Alexander, Giesen and Mast /eds/ 2006] seeks to provide an alternative to Bourdieuan cultural analysis, assigning a much wider and more autonomous space for cultural structures and the creation of meaning in studying social realms such as inequality, politics, war, social change, or the social life of technology.

These and other authors, in sociology, anthropology, social psychology, and philosophy (such as Andrew Abbot, Paul DiMaggio, Norbert Elias, Richard Jenkins, Charles Tilly, Eviatar Zerubavel, to name just a few), continue to study symbolic boundaries as a basis for establishing class, gender, and racial inequality, in constituting social groups, in distinguishing and hierarchizing cultural and other practices, and in the shaping of collective and individual identities – from national, ethnic, and religious to gender and sexual.

Many of these approaches have been put to practice in the papers collected in this volume. In spite of all their variety in terms of ideas, concepts, methods, and substantive issues addressed, the papers also exhibit some unexpected but welcome similarities. To begin with, they are all interdisciplinary in character. Whether they combine cultural history and literary theory, discourse analysis
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and political philosophy, sociology and social psychology, or anthropology and media studies, none of them remains confined within the limits of a single discipline. This tells us something about the nature of symbolic divisions as a subject matter for scholarly research. Second, although starting from widely differing theoretical assumptions, all the papers assert some form of constructionism, as against an essentialist understanding of identities and groups which is quite common in Balkan studies. This is related to a third common point, which is the questioning of established knowledge on the Balkans and undermining of black-and-white renderings of social life in the region. Avoiding simplifications and easy generalizations, the contributions favor a carefully nuanced approach. They tend to point out the ambiguity and instability inherent in the production of symbolic divisions, and never forget to look at both sunny and dark sides of the phenomena under study. Just as positive potentials are sought in negative examples so the unintended consequences of well-meaning and politically desirable institutional change are highlighted. Similarly, against the grain of much of writings on the Balkans, which still prefer to focus on nationalism and the legacy of war, the contributions to this volume show convincingly that in these societies, just like in any other, many different kinds of divisions and cleavages are present. Some of them are benign, while some others are potentially no less hazardous than the much more (in)famous inter-ethnic antagonisms. But they all deserve serious study, because they shape the present moment and the future of Western Balkan societies. Finally, all the contributions, so to speak, take symbolism seriously – as world-creating, reality-constituting, rather than being just an epiphenomenon of some deeper structures. Yet none of them claims that the analysis of the symbolic exhausts the whole of social life: materiality, in the form of income inequalities, power differentials, and institutional structure is not left out of the picture. Instead, issues of production and reproduction of symbolic boundaries are consistently linked to questions of power, resistance, strategy, and struggle over resources.

The papers are presented in four blocks, three to four papers each. The first group discusses the issue of “othering” in the Balkans at the most general level, starting from the historical background up to the present day. Continuities and discontinuities in the mechanisms of producing the “other” are in the focus here: while some things have remained surprisingly similar over the centuries – like tying the image of the Other to the image of the Turk – some others have surged only recently as subjects of heated public debate, such as the status of LGBTIQ fellow citizens as a kind of “internal other” in most Western Balkan societies. In “Naming/Taming the Enemy: Balkan Oral Tradition and the Formation of ‘the Turk’ as the Political Enemy” Aleksandar Pavlović traces the formation of “the Turk” as the enemy in the Western Balkans around the middle of 19th century. Bringing together Schmittian political philosophy and literary studies, he
focuses on the transformation of the Balkan oral tradition under the influence of national ideology and political leadership. Using a combination of textual and contextual analysis, the author compares four versions of a Montenegrin epic song and shows that the growing impact of the emergent central political authority resulted in a shift in the way the enemy is depicted. From an emphasis on inter-tribal rivalries the hostility described in the song was increasingly framed in religious and ethnic terms, as stemming from the very “Turkishness” of the adversary. In other words, the clan or tribal enemy was transformed into the national/political enemy. Having showed the shifting positions of self and other in the subsequent versions of the “same” epic song, Pavlović concludes that no specific politics is inherent to Serbian epic tradition. Rather, nationalism was inserted in it during the process of publication and canonization in the first half of the 19th century. This leaves open the possibility of reading a different, less aggressive and less exclusive politics into it as well.

Another piece that seeks to uncover some of the historical roots of symbolic boundaries in the Balkans, Réka Krizmanics’ “Nation-Characterology of Dinko Tomašić” looks at a scholarly discipline now almost forgotten, but widely popular in the early decades of the 20th century. It was then that the Croatian ethnologist Dinko Tomašić introduced the distinction between the “plowman of the plain” and the “Dinaric warrior”, based on some ethnographic evidence but with strong evaluative overtones. The distinction has proved very useful for various actors in different Balkan nations for waging their own political and cultural battles all the way to our times. The heyday of reviving Tomašić, along with his Serbian counterpart Jovan Cvijić, was the period of escalating interethnic tensions in the former Yugoslavia starting in the late 1980s. These two early ethnologists are usually seen as rivals and as legitimating two opposed national projects, the Croatian and the Serbian one respectively. Krizmanics discusses in detail the commonalities and differences between the two approaches and points to the ways these have been taken up by Tomašić’s and Cvijić’s newly-born heirs in post-Yugoslav scholarship and politics.

Irena Šentevska in her “‘Anything but Turban-folk’: the ‘Oriental Controversy’ and Identity Makeovers in the Balkans”, discusses the debates over the “Oriental motifs” in Balkan popular music. Focusing on Serbian and Bulgarian cases, but also including examples from Turkey, Croatia, Romania and Albania, the author points to a host of similar features these debates share across the region. The longstanding controversy revolves around the fact that the music “tainted” by Oriental influences is widely appreciated by its numerous fans from the ranks of ordinary people, while being deeply detested and despised by intellectual elites, both nationalist and liberal. Even though music studies have long held that “authenticity” in music is a spurious notion and functions rather as an ideological construct, Šentevska shows how a tireless quest for the
“pure” national music has continuously characterized expert discourse on music in the various Balkan societies. The seemingly aesthetic debates have actually sprung from much deeper cultural understandings of “us” and “them”. For most Balkan nations, “them” are in the first place the Ottoman Turks who ruled the region for centuries and left an indelible, but strongly resented, imprint on the traditions and present-day cultural practices. In interpreting these processes, the author uses Bakić Hayden’s concept of “nesting orientalisms” to delineate complex grids of internal hierarchization of folk music and its fans within these various national cultural settings.

Anja Tedeško asks a slightly different set of questions. Her paper “The Invisibility of LGBTIQ [People] between Legislative and Social Aspects in BiH” reminds us that ethnicity, political affiliation and cultural ideology are not the only areas where symbolic boundaries and struggles to (re)define them arise. Gender identity and sexual orientation are often neglected lines of differentiation, especially in societies where the public agenda is dominated by other kinds of problems, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina. The author examines the contradictory effects of the legislation recently passed in BiH which was aimed at redressing gender inequalities and fighting discrimination. Although they represent a step forward in improving the status of women in a male-dominated society, such laws in practice tend to essentialize gender identities according to the binary heteronormative model. An even more serious problem is the gap between the norm and the practice within the local sociocultural context. The legislation is mostly imposed from the outside and motivated by a sort of Western “legal imperialism” insensitive to the local needs and constraints. At the same time, the everyday life of LGBTIQ people continues to be characterized by marginalization, violence, discrimination and inadequate legal protection.

In the second section, the three papers locate issues of symbolic divisions in particular, real-life sites, looking at how broader symbolic distinctions are inflected at the local level, how they are transformed by local histories and identities, and how they are manipulated locally in ambiguous strategies that sometimes contradict the grand narratives of nation and state at the macro level. In “Why do they call it Raška when they mean Sandžak? A case study of regionalism in south-west Serbia”, Ana Ranitović studies local reactions to regionalist policies implemented by the state in the border region of south-west Serbia populated by orthodox Serbs and Muslim Bosniaks. For historical, demographic and cultural reasons, this region has been caught in a chronic identity crisis, since no consensus has been reached regarding its history and even its name both across and within ethnic groups. The re-regionalisation process, recommended by the EU and launched by the Serbian state authorities in 2009-2010 has brought some positive results, but also generated heightened ethnic tensions between the different communities. Weaving geography, history, law, politics
and culture together, Ranitović examines symbolic borders – the ones people put up in order to separate themselves from each other, as well as the ones they imagine bound the territory they live in and from which they draw their identity. She bases her analysis on ethnographic material collected through fieldwork in Sjenica, Novi Pazar, Prijepolje, Nova Varoš and Belgrade. It is shown how a set of measures supposedly motivated by purely economic and practical concerns have quickly turned into a historicized, politicized, and emotionally charged debate, reproducing the symbolic boundaries between different local groups.

On the basis of ethnographic fieldwork, Ana Aceska in “‘Us’ and ‘Them’ in a Divided City: Symbolic Divisions among the City Dwellers in the Divided City of Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina” resists the widespread assumption that in ethnically divided cities there is no sense of togetherness and that the city as a whole is not a locus for self-identification and joint responsibility on both sides of the ethnic line. She argues instead that there is, or at least may be, a common “us” that city dwellers of different ethnicities construct jointly. She looks at the contents of a local monthly to document the narratives of this shared belonging which is at once symbolic, emotional and potentially political. Starting from a constructivist approach to identities and using the concept of boundary work following Barth, Jenkins, Cohen, and Lamont, Aceska argues that the “them” against which an “us” is erected is not always ethnically defined, as there are other possible forms of otherness. In her case, the most salient divide is the one between insiders-natives and outsiders-newcomers.

In his “Settlers, Natives, and Refugees: Classificatory Systems and the Construction of Autochthony in Vojvodina” Gábor Basch begins by remarking that although the notion of “autochthony” has become one of the main justifications for contemporary conflicts in the Balkans and elsewhere, it has not been the object of systematic studies as a social construction. He therefore sets out to investigate the construction of settlers and natives as social categories, both referring to the perception of autochthony, in two villages in Vojvodina, the northern province of Serbia. These categories are used by Serbian, Croatian and Hungarian inhabitants to claim their condition as “more native” than the others, in close connection with events in the distant or less distant past, such as the creation and collapse of states and empires, shifting borders, and demographic change. Unwittingly echoing Aceska’s argument, Basch shows that it is not at all times and in all contexts that the ethnic boundary dominates. At the very least, ethnic claims necessarily intersect with and are articulated in the language made available by a whole set of symbolic demarcations, contingent upon the history and politics of the given place. In the villages studied by Basch, the most important circumstances have been successive waves of immigration where each arrival of fresh settlers brings natives of different ethnicities closer together. In conclusion, the author points out the paradox that the histories of
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Vojvodina in their Hungarian, Serb and Croatian versions are very different but nevertheless mobilize the same constructs: expulsions, settlements, conquests and re-conquests, border changes and the constant contesting of these changes.

The three papers grouped in the third section of the volume use the methodological potentials of discursive and linguistic analysis to unpack the conceptual black boxes of ethnicity and nation. Instead of assuming national (and ethnic) identity as something known in advance, the authors ask how ethnicity is lived, talked about, experienced, embraced, and resented by ordinary people out there in the real social world. In the first paper, “The Complexity of Ethnic Stereotypes: A Study of Ethnic Boundaries among Serbian Youth” Tamara Pavasović Trošt sets out to fill in a gap in the scholarly literature on ethnic prejudice in the former Yugoslav lands. Although high degrees of ethnic distance among the young are generally found, the intensity, quality, and content of ethnic boundaries and stereotypes are rarely scrutinized. Pavasović Trošt presents the results of her study of teenage students in two Belgrade elementary schools, using both quantitative and qualitative methods and complementing sociological insights with fresh developments in psychology to arrive at a more adequate understanding of how ethnic prejudice works among the young in a post-conflict society. Applying the stereotype content model (SCM) which distinguishes between “warmth” and “competence” as two main dimensions of attitude towards an ethnic other, the author shows that the simple ethnic distance score may hide significant differences in content.

Vladan Pavlović and Miloš Jovanović’s paper “‘Language Nationalism’ vs. ‘Language Cosmopolitanism’: Divisions in the Attitudes towards the Relation between Language and National Identity” starts by questioning the received idea of a close coincidence between “language” and “nation”. Using a questionnaire administered to students of different departments at the University of Niš, the authors examine the respondents’ views on the strength of the link between linguistic and national identity (at the collective and individual levels), with this link being conceptualized theoretically as ranging between “language nationalism” and “language cosmopolitanism”. Pavlović and Jovanović look for correlations with a set of sociological variables and find that the expressed attitudes depend the most on the respondent’s religiosity and field of study. Somewhat surprisingly, place of residence and birthplace did not have an effect, while participants’ gender and parents’ education had a contradictory effect. In terms of interdepartmental differences, the hypothesis was confirmed that English language students would hold a more “cosmopolitan” attitude on the average than their colleagues from other departments and faculties, especially the students of history and mechanical engineering.

Davor Marko in his “Power Constellation(s), Symbolic Divisions and Media: Perception of Islam as a Personalized, ‘Minorized’ and Subordinated Part of
Serbian Society” aims to contribute to the ongoing debate on the role of media language in setting and reshaping symbolic borders in plural societies, focusing on the media treatment of the Bosniak/Muslim minority in Serbia. Linking language, media discourse and power in the theoretical and methodological framework of Critical Discourse Analysis, Marko comparatively analyzes two samples: “primary discourse” issued by the Mufti of Sandžak, Muamer Zukorlić, and another of “secondary discourse” of Serbian mainstream media coverage of these statements. Public language is used both by hegemonic structures and by the minorities resisting these. In the given case, both sides use the technique of othering when setting the border between “Us” and “Them” and the author targets the ways media language is used by the hegemon and by the marginalized groups, identifying especially the various tactics that both sides employ.

The final group of papers has a focus on Serbia, where the three contributions examine symbolic forces at work in the turbulent process of producing, or changing, the Serbian polity at this moment. Addressing the issue of symbolic divisions in Serbia Ana Omaljev’s “Constructing the Other/s: Discourses on Europe and Identity in ‘First’ and ‘Other’ Serbia” focuses on what is undoubtedly the most consequential distinction in terms of its political effects, and that is the story of the “two Serbias”. She explores the different views that actors identifying with one or the other positions have held with regard to the Serbian nation and Europe, as implicated in the confrontation between Self (Serbian Subject/State) and Other (Europe). The author deconstructs the representational paradigms used by both groups in the period after the change of regime in 2000. The most divisive topics have been the attitude towards the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the desirability of Serbia’s “European way”. These public debates among Serbia’s post-2000 elites are shown to refer to rearticulating the notion of “Serbianness” and the place of Serbs in Europe in order to legitimize these elites’ political decisions and foreign policy choices in the present. The key argument of the paper is that “Europe” is a designated sign of exclusion in these discourses. Methodologically, Omaljev follows the ideas put forward by authors such as Hansen, Fraser and Wodak that national identities are discursive constructions continuously (re)produced in the public sphere, and that this process always entails plurality of voices, contradictions and conflict rather than harmony.

In the next paper, Ivana Spasić and Tamara Petrović (“Varieties of Third Serbia”) continue the line of inquiry opened by Omaljev that concerns symbolic differentiations within the Serbian polity. They uncover a recent development, particularly visible since the mid-2000s, in the ongoing struggle between the rival ways of imagining Serbia. The trend is the quest for a middle ground, a conciliatory position between the First and Other Serbia, which is, sometimes explicitly and sometimes not, called the “Third Serbia”. Some actors previously
identified with the “First” Serbia, and a few from the “Other” one, have found this standpoint increasingly advantageous politically and defensible morally. While these shifts in many cases involve little more than a change in vocabulary, with the stands on some crucial issues (like the prosecution of war crimes or the treatment of minorities) remaining the same as before, Spasić and Petrović argue that the process is not insignificant. It may be read as signaling a changing political atmosphere in Serbia and marking a new stage in the consolidation of democratic norms and habituation to pluralism, even if it be just in the form of democratic etiquette. Words and symbols can never be irrelevant in politics, the authors conclude.

Closing the collection, “Political capital and identities of Serbian citizens” by Zoran Stojiljković questions the role of political culture, ideology and a set of habits of political behavior on the part of both elites and citizens in shaping the current condition and prospects of democracy in Serbia. Special attention is paid to the contradictory implications of social capital – there is trust and cooperation that makes problem solving easier at the collective level, but there is also the potential for developing nepotism, cronyism and “amoral familism” on the negative side.

We do hope that this book, given the breadth of topics it breaches, its interdisciplinary approach, its meshing of theory and empirical data, and its novel ways of looking at the social reality in the Balkans, will make an inspiring reading not only for students of the Balkans but also for all those scholars who are interested in symbolic divisions and symbolic aspects of social life in general.

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References


EXCLUDING THE OTHER IN THE BALKANS: FROM THE OTTOMAN TURK TO LGBTIQ
Abstract:
The article approaches the question of political views promoted by oral tradition through Carl Schmitt’s notion of politics as the distinction between friend and enemy. It focuses on four versions of “Perović Batrić”, a comparatively short Montenegrin song with a typical subject of blood revenge, documented during the first half of the nineteenth century in Serbia, Montenegro and Herzegovina. It is demonstrated that the only version documented without any impact of the ruling Montenegrin Petrović family from Cetinje displays explicit antagonism between the Montenegrin and Herzegovinian Orthodox Christian tribes and has no explicit antiturkish sentiment. In addition, two other versions written down from Montenegrin singers influenced by Cetinje as the political centre show the consolidation of political perspective and emphasize the hostilities between the Montenegrins and the local Turks. True political character of the enemy in the Schmittian sense, it is argued, is finally recognized only in the version of “Perović Batrić” edited by the Montenegrin bishop-prince Petar Petrović Njegoš II. In this song, the hostility towards Batrić’s adversary Osman follows not from his tribal conformity or his distinctive personality, but from his “Turkishness” as such. It is therefore argued that this recognition of the specifically political character of the enemy occurred under the increasing influence of Cetinje (as the political centre) on the representation of the oral tradition and that nationalistic elements in oral tradition mainly became associated with it, and inserted into it, during the process of publication and canonization of the oral tradition in the first half of the nineteenth century.

Key Words
Balkan oral tradition, “Perović Batrić”, politics, hostility, Carl Schmitt
Introduction: Politics as the Distinction Between Friend and Enemy

This paper examines the formation of the Turk as the political enemy in the Western Balkans around the mid-nineteenth century by focusing on the transformation of the oral tradition in the region at the time under the influence of national ideology and political leadership. I will approach this issue drawing on Carl Schmitt’s notion of the political. According to Schmitt, “a definition of the political can be obtained only by discovering and defining the specifically political categories” [1966: 25]. And such as “in the realm of morality final distinctions are between good and evil, in aesthetics beautiful and ugly, in economics profitable and unprofitable… The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy” [Schmitt, 1966: 26]. In short, politics for Schmitt is the distinction between friend and enemy.

Schmitt further distinguishes between the private or non-political aspect of the friend/enemy relation, on the one hand, and its properly political character on the other. Since, as he emphasizes, modern European languages do not differentiate between the two, he illustrates this difference by referring to the Latin etymology of the words: “The enemy is *hostis*, not *inimicus* in the broader sense… The often quoted ‘Love your enemies’ reads … ‘*diligite inimicos vestros*’. No mention is made of the political enemy” [1966: 28-9]. Schmitt considers the enemy only in his political aspect: “the enemy is solely the political enemy” [1966: 28]. Thus, only the concept of the political enemy belongs to politics and defines it.

This approximation between the concept of the political enemy and politics itself provides the broad framework for my topic. Essentially, I will follow the emergence of the political enemy in Montenegrin epic poetry in the first half of the nineteenth century. My aim is to show that this recognition of the specifically political character of the enemy occurred under the increasing influence of Cetinje (as the Montenegrin political centre) on the representation of the oral tradition.

The Basis of Montenegrin Social History

Since I focus here on the territory of the present-day Montenegro, where oral epic tradition was strongest and best documented, some further remarks are needed. In the early nineteenth century, the people of Montenegro still lived in a fragmented form of social organization. They were separated into various blood related clans of herders, further united in tribes on collectively owned and shared territory [Đurđev: 1953]. Although a certain recognition of their
common Serbian origin and history could hardly be denied, the tribes also nourished their distinctive local traditions and acted independently from or against other tribes.

What enabled members of the Petrović family from Cetinje to gradually establish political leadership was the fact that they held the hereditary position of bishop, whose jurisdiction covered more or less the entire territory of today’s Montenegro. Also, their tribe occupied the territory of Old Montenegro closest to the Adriatic Coast, and thus economically more independent from the Turks and protected from their direct influence by the shield of so called Brđani tribes on the east and the Herzegovinian tribes on the north. During the time of Bishop Petar I, from 1782 to 1830, the foundations of the state were laid. His followers, famous writer and collector of folk poetry Bishop Petar Petrović Njegoš II (1831-1851), Prince Danilo (1852-1860) and finally Prince-King Nikola (1860-1918), strengthened their influence on other tribes and further consolidated the state, which was formally recognized in 1878. But to create and maintain it, the Petrovićs had to overcome not only the neighbouring Turks, predominantly consisting, in fact, of the Islamized local population, but also internal tribal antagonism and particularism. The unwritten law of blood revenge played a special role in tribal separatism. This archaic custom demanded that any killed member of a clan or tribe must be revenged by the killing of at least as many people of the enemy clan or tribe. This often lead to the cumulative growth of killings on both sides, creating an atmosphere of general insecurity and generating brutal and long-lasting tribal wars and hostilities [Roberts 2007: 103-80].

I will examine a single song, comparatively short and focusing on the typical subject of blood revenge, to show how under Petrović’s influence the clan or tribal enemy was transformed into the political enemy. The song was first published as “Perović Batrić” in Vuk Karadžić’s collection of folk songs in 1823. This was at the same time the first collection that contained Montenegrin songs about relatively recent local events. Njegoš published a different version of the same song, called “The Revenge of Batrić Perović” (“Osveta Batrića Perovića”), in his collection of folk songs Serbian Mirror (Ogledalo srbsko) in 1846. Together with two other, unpublished versions of this song recorded on Cetinje in 1836, and in Herzegovina at some point after 1846, this gives us enough material to follow the emergence of the figure of the Turk as the political enemy during the first half of the nineteenth century.

All recorded versions have the same subject – Perović Batrić is captured by Ćorović Osman. He offers Osman a ransom, but it is declined and he is killed. Batrić’s brother gathers a company of men, ambushes and captures Osman alive. Now Osman offers a rich ransom, but the brother refuses it and revenges Batrić by cutting off Osman’s head. Vengeance is the crucial element of all the versions. After Batrić’s murder, it is the father who demands revenge and
reminds his son of its mandatory character. Also, it is essential that Osman is not just killed in an ambush, but that he is beheaded with the full knowledge of who his killer is and whom he revenges. However, although all the songs share these structural units, presentation of the events, evaluation of the characters and overall perspective varies significantly in different versions.¹

**Perović Batrić from Karadžić’s Collection**

It is interesting that in the earliest recorded song, entitled *Perović Batrić* in Karadžić’s 1823 collection, a Christian named Panto is the one who actually kills Batrić. Their antagonism comes from their different tribal affiliation. Batrić belongs to the Cuce tribe from the territory of Old Montenegro, and Panto is, like Osman, from the Herzegovinian tribe of Banjani. Panto intervenes in the moment when Osman almost agrees to spare Batrić’s life in exchange for the rich ransom. His explanation that all Batrić’s wealth comes from his pillaging of their tribe moves gradually through three spheres. In the beginning, he articulates what we could label as the sphere of luxury and identifies it with the Turks:

“The immeasurable treasure that he offers
This treasure he took from the Turks,
Seven miquelets that he offers,
He recently stripped from the Turks;”

“Što ti daje nebrojeno blago,
Uzeo je blago od Turaka;
Što l’ ti daje sedam dževerdara,
S taki’ ih je skinuo Turaka;”²

[Karadžić 1986: 24]

Panto neither claims nor recognizes any direct personal and ethnic interest on this level, and expresses it as independent and separated from him. His initial address to Osman thus aims at those possessions identified with the Turks,

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¹ This consideration of the various versions has special relevance in the study of oral poetry. Oral songs do not exist as fixed text, but more like the basic story-plot or sequence of events as I just described. Every singular performance is unique and depends on the individual singer, local tradition and conditions of the recording [see: Lord 1960].

² All translations into English are authors.
which serve as the foremost display of social and symbolic prestige and wealth. In other words, Batrić’s unforgivable crime is that he denies the Turks their social and military superiority.

In the second part of his speech, Panto moves on to the common level of mutual interests and belonging:

“Those necklaces and earrings that he offers,
He will get after capturing our daughters-in-law,
And strip necklaces and earrings from them.”

“Što ti daje v' jence i oboce,
On će naše snahe povatati,
Te će skidat’ v’ jence i oboce.”

[Karadžić 1986: 24]

Referring to “our daughters-in-law”, he exposes Batrić as their common threat. Panto also moves from the past to the future tense, which suggests that he is less concerned with the righteous punishment of Batrić for his previous crimes committed against the Turks than with the repercussions of Batrić’s future actions on the more communal and collective level.

Finally, this concern also applies to his family sphere:

“For offering the slave-woman from Cuce,
He will capture my daughter,
And give her for his ransom.”

“Što ti daje Cuckinju robinju,
To će moju ćerku zarobiti
Te je dati za se u otkupa.”

[Karadžić 1986: 24]

Therefore, Panto systematically presents Batrić as a threat to all social participants – he endangers both the domination of the Turks and Panto’s family security. The intersection of the two is recognized on the mediatory tribal level.
of common identification, as the protection of “our” sisters-in-law, meaning the females married to our tribesmen.

Certainly, neither tribal conformity nor hostility towards Batrić eradicates the differences between Panto and Osman or makes them indifferent to their respective social and religious positions. On the contrary, Batrić’s offer actually induces Panto to formulate the difference between them and to explicate their separate interests. The point here is that for Panto the highest effective level of the identification and recognition of common interests, the one that marks the horizon of his actions, is the tribal one.

However, we should not overlook the voice of Christian and national unity that appears in this song. Namely, the singer himself is not indifferent towards this fratricidal bloodshed. Thus, although Panto occupies a subject-position and owns a voice, his speech is introduced with the curse “To hell with Panto from Tupani!” (“Vrag donese od Tupana Panta”). Therefore, authorial voice clearly stigmatizes Panto for his disloyalty towards fellow Christians and his coping with the Turks. In other words, although the higher level of national unity is not operative in the plot, the singer himself recognizes it. This indicates the existence of the broader perspective that transcends presented events and unifies Christian characters on the higher national level.

Since it would take us too far to trace this voice in detail, let it suffice here to connect it with the views transmitted from the political centre. This particular song Karadžić recorded from the blind singer Đuro Milutinović in 1822 at Prince Miloš’s court in Kragujevac, the capital of Serbia at the time. Milutinović was born in Herzegovina and he settled at Prince Miloš’s court in 1808 after serving several years as the messenger between the Montenegrin ruler Bishop Petar I and the leaders of the ongoing Serbian uprising against the Turks. Milutinović was literate and quite knowledgeable and educated by the standards of his time. He was respected among his contemporaries for his national service and praised as the ‘living icon of the uprising’ (Durković-Jakšić 1952: 141-56). Thus, what makes possible the dual voice in this song is that it has been recorded from a literate, professional singer, an associate of Bishop Petar I and eager nationalist who has lived and sung outside the local tradition for more than a decade. Ljubomir Zuković, who wrote at length about all the songs recorded from this singer, concluded that a certain duality is typical of Milutinović’s songs in general:

“In Dura’s songs traditional characteristics of folk songs and collective views still dominate, but the songs also show the influence of the pedagogic work of Bishop Petar I, who tried to give new spirit and more modern national and liberating orientation to this poetry” [Zuković 1988: 143].
What makes this example particularly valuable is that here those two voices are obviously incompatible. Panto is accused of being a traitor but, paradoxically, at the same time given a voice that explains and justifies his actions and immediately disqualifies the implicit ultimate request and demand for national/religious solidarity that stands behind the curse. In other words, the immediacy of Batrić as a threat directs Panto towards Osman and their association on the tribal level. Certainly, Osman is recognized as privileged in social and financial status and wealth. But Panto also expresses certain expectations and demands, and reminds Osman of his obligations. Namely, Panto confronts his intention to accept Batrić’s offer for ransom that is, indeed, profitable for Osman, since it increases his personal wealth. But although Batrić is Osman’s captive, Panto denies him the right to make a sovereign decision over his life and to act solely for his own benefit. Osman is obliged to protect the interests of his fellow Turks, of the Banjani tribe, and finally of Panto himself. Thus, Panto confronts Osman, gives his speech and kills Batrić without waiting for an answer or a permission from Osman. Panto’s speech offers, therefore, a quite elaborate explanation of this loose tribal association that is, to be sure, not without its own internal antagonisms and tensions. Nothing remotely as elaborate as this tribal voice exists on the level of national unity, which is limited to the single authorial comment. To summarize, ambiguous relations among the characters and an overlap between the private and the public aspect of their actions dominate in the song, thus defying clear-cut distinctions and disabling political conceptualization of the enemy in the Schmittian sense.

Before moving to the song published in Njegoš’s collection, I will briefly mention two versions from Karadžić’s manuscripts, recorded in 1836 and sometime after 1846, respectively. Although both were collected from traditional tribal singers, their overall perspective is radically different.

**Perović Batrić from Karadžić’s Manuscripts**

A version with an even more explicit tribal antagonism between Christians is called “Again Perović Batrić” (“Opet Perović Batrić”) in Karadžić’s manuscripts. This song describes the members of the Perović clan not by reference to their tribal allegiance, but more generally as being from Montenegro:

“Young Montenegrins are looking at him  
And so he escaped to Montenegro...”
“Gledaju ga mladi Crnogorci … 
Pa uteče u Goricu Crnu”.

[Karadžić 1974: 38]

The song presents the vengeance of Batrić’s brother Vuk as directed towards the whole tribe, without explicit differentiation between Christians and Muslims:

“He gathered thirty Perovićs
With them he went to the Banjani tribe
To revenge his dear brother”.
He slashed thirty Banjani
All notable and valiant”.

“On pokupi trides’ Perovića,
Šnjima ode u pleme Banjane
Na osvetu mila brata svoga”.
On posječe trideset Banjana,
Sve boljega i valjanijega”.

[Karadžić 1974: 39]

However, the brother is still dissatisfied and continues the pursuit for six weeks until he finally kills Osman. The song concludes with a seemingly contradictory and unmotivated act. On his way home, Vuk meets his blood brother Marko Kovačević from Grahovo, who asks him whether he has revenged his brother. Vuk responds:

“In revenge for my sweet brother
I slashed thirty four
noteworthy members of Banjani,
and I brought Osman’s head with me,
But I haven’t found a head in Banjani
To match the one of my Batrić
Apart from yours, my dear blood brother:
Indeed, I will slash you today
In revenge for my sweet brother!”

“Ja osvetih mila brata moga,
Zanj posjekoh trides’ i četiri,
sve boljega iz Banjana, Marko,
I donijek sa Osmana glavu,
Al’ ne nadoh u Banjane glave
Kao bješe u Batrića moga,
Izvan tvoja, dragi pobratime —
Danas ću te, bogme, posijeći
Da osvetim mila brata moga!”

[Karadžić 1974: 40-41]

Marko thinks that Vuk is joking and offers him a drink, but Vuk cuts off his head in cold blood and returns to Montenegro.

It might seem that the demands of blood vengeance offer a certain explanation for this act. As Karadžić writes in the aforementioned book on Montenegro: “If the culprit is some irrelevant man, then the revenge is not performed particularly over him, but over some more respectable person” [Karadžić 1922: 44]. A similar situation is described by the famous warrior Marko Miljanov in his book *Primjeri čojstva i junaštva (Heroic Examples)*: “Such a custom it was to revenge even the worst of yours with the best, for if one would kill the poor for revenge, people would mock him” [1930: 49]. Therefore, the bare multitude of killed Banjani is not enough if the revenge fails to find an adequate match for the hero. Only after having killed Marko, is Batrić’s brother satisfied. However, no rationale can truly justify the killing of Marko, who is, as it appears, actually Vuk’s blood brother from the neighbouring Herzegovinian tribe of Grahovo and, as such, should be exempt from vengeance. The fact that they are blood brothers shows that no religious, ethnic, national or personal friendship and solidarity can disrupt the brutal economy of Montenegrin blood vengeance. In other words, no one, not even a blood brother from another tribe, is excluded as a possible foe and victim of the Montenegrins.

Thus, like the previous song, this version also fails to conceptualize the enemy in his proper political aspect. On the general level, we might say, the singer relates the song whose subject is the successful vengeance of the Perovićs, which would suggest his solidarity with the Montenegrins. On the other hand, the song also emphasizes the excess of the Montenegrin revenge and finishes with the explicit criticism of the Montenegrins, thus indicating the singer’s solidarity with
the Banjani tribe. Again, we see similar shifting and fluctuating friend/enemy positions and absence of their political conceptualization as in the first song.

It appears unusual that this version with explicit tribal antagonism is actually the most recent recorded one. The exact date of its recording is uncertain, but it was Njegoš’s decision to monopolize the songs and the singers during his preparation of the Serbian Mirror that forced one of Karadžić’s associates to search for the songs outside the territory of Njegoš’s immediate political control. The collector received it sometime after 1846, by all likelihood from the Herzegovinian peasant Stojan Kandić from Grahovo during one of the singer’s regular visits to the market in the coastal town of Risan in the Kotor bay [Karadžić 1993: 35].

On the other hand, the unpublished song recorded in Cetinje in 1836, entitled Perović Batrić in Karadžić’s manuscripts, explicitly praises the Montenegrins and elevates the events to the more general level of the conflict between the Montenegrins and the neighbouring Turks. Again, instead of specifying Batrić’s tribal allegiance, the singer describes him at the beginning as being “from spacious upland Montenegro” (“od prostrane lomne Crne Gore”). Accordingly, a company gathered by Batrić’s brother is not limited to the clan members: “He gathered young Montenegrins” (“pokupi mlade Crnogorce”). Also, the singer situates the story around Nikšić, which is a more urban area inhabited predominantly by a Muslim population and specifies that only the Turks are the subjects of the vengeance:

„There comes thirty Turks
From the white town of Nikšić“
(…)
“Montenegrin guns had fired
And killed thirty Turks.”

“Ali ide trideset Turaka
Od Nihšića grada bijeloga”
(…)
„Crnogorske puške popucale
I ubiše trideset Turaka.”

[Karadžić 1974: 37]
As in Karadžić’s published version, in this song Osman is also ready to accept Batrić’s offer, but here the complaint comes not from a Christian, but from the local Turks:

“Eight miquelets which he now offers,
Batrić stripped from the Turks;
Twelve necklaces that he speaks about,
They grabbed from Muslim women!”

“Što ti daje osam džeferdarah,
To je Batrić skinuo s Turakah;
Što ti kaže dvanajes’ derdanah,
To su oni s bulah ujagmili!”

[Karadžić 1974: 37]

Therefore, this version refines the revenge that progresses to the level of the Montenegrins in general: not in a national sense, of course, but as a common denominator for the tribes from the territory of Old Montenegro. Also, both Batrić and his avengers limit their actions only to the local Muslims/Turks. Consequently, no Christian characters participate on the other side and no mention is made of Montenegrin brutality over Herzegovinian Christians. Thus, the greatest difference of this version in comparison to the previous is the radically different portrayal of the Montenegrins. Contrary to the critique of their behaviour in previous versions, here the Montenegrins are openly glorified for their heroism. Certainly, the conflict still has only local meaning and importance, and its wider national dimension could hardly be recognized. Still, compared with the previous versions, this song evidently consolidates the political perspective in the specific context of the frontier tribes, dividing the characters into two hostile camps according to their religious allegiance and the territory they inhabit.

This version was recorded from Todor Ikov Piper, a tribal singer and not a Montenegrin in the narrow sense. Since his views differ from the ones previously described, we need to pay attention to the conditions of his performance to effectively explain this difference. Karadžić received this song directly from Njegoš. In 1836, Njegoš called for the traditional singer Todor Ikov to be brought to Cetinje, where under Njegoš’s supervision dozens of his songs were recorded and sent to Karadžić. In one letter to Karadžić, Njegoš describes him as illiterate,
uneducated “simple Serbian” (“prosti Srbin”). If indeed Todor Ikov was simple, he surely was clever enough to understand the demands and the profile of his audience. Singing his version on Cetinje, the religious and political centre of Montenegro, and in the presence of Njegoš, other members of Petrović family and local leaders, he made sure to perform it in a manner that would be appropriate and appealing to their ears.

**Perović Batrić from Njegoš’s collection**

Finally, the song “Osveta Batrića Perovića” from Njegoš’s collection, published in 1846, with its rigorous ethics and advanced level of religious and ethnic identification, seems to be an almost direct response to the tribal antagonism and particularism of the earlier versions.

This song goes further in the portrayal of both Osman’s inhumanity and Batrić’s heroism. Namely, while other songs simply begin with the fact that Batrić is in Osman’s dungeon, the version from Njegoš’s collection emphasizes that Osman caught him by deceit, offering him hospitality and fraternity and then breaking these sacred codes:

“Osman lured him on the promise of his good faith and fraternity.”

“Na vjeru ga Osman prevario, A na vjeru i na pobratimstvo.”

[Njegoš 1977: 20]

Also, after the disgraceful capture Osman brutally tortures his captive. Batrić pleads not so much for his life as for a dignified form of death:

“Osman Ćorović, my brother in God, slay me with the sword or murder me with the fire from a holster kill me as a warrior/hero, not through pains and torture! If you do not want to kill me, put me on ransom, you Turk”.
These lines develop two new motifs. The first is Batrić’s heroism – he is not addressing Osman to avoid death itself, but its dishonorable form – the proper death for a hero is by a sword or a gun, while torture belongs to traitors and criminals.

Another innovative element in this song is the negative presentation of Osman as representative for the Turks in general. Osman intentionally and sadistically humiliates his captive despite his plea. More so, Batrić’s opening words “My brother in God” (“Bogom brate”) indicate the sacred form of his appeal, so called “fraternity in hardship” (“pobratimstvo u nevolji”). According to the customs, when someone who is in trouble calls you a brother in the name of God, even when he is a defeated enemy that you are about to kill, you are obliged to obey his request and spare his life, because by this simple phrase he made you his blood brother. To what extent it applied to the actual state of affairs is a different issue, but this plea is a quite common motif in South Slavic epic songs. Thus their fraternity is activated twice, first through Osman’s offer and invitation, and then by Batrić’s plea. The singer explicitly refers to that:

“But the Turk knows no oath,  
He tortures his blood brother Batrić  
With even greater pains,  
And kills him through torture”.

“Ali Turčin boga ne poznaje,  
no Batrića muči pobratima,  
i muke mu više udario,  
na muke mu život izvadio.”

[Njegoš 1977: 21]
Unlike other versions, this song therefore particularly emphasises Osman’s evilness and blasphemy as a consequence of his religious background: ‘The Turk knows no oath’ (‘Turčin boga ne poznaje’). The Turk is, therefore, the enemy who cannot be trusted – he captures Batrić by deceit (‘on the promise of good faith and fraternity’ – ‘na vjeru i na pobratimstvo’), granting him security according to the sacred, universal laws. Furthermore, Osman’s evilness is identified in the first instance with his religious allegiance – he commits sacrilege because he is the Turk, an infidel who knows no moral and human laws.

This identification of the enemy on the religious level is systematically conducted throughout the song. Batrić’s brother comforts the father reminding him that he has seven more sons and indicates the possibility of the compensation for his life:

“If the old customs are followed,  
The Turks will pay us for Batrić.”

“ako bude staroga taliha,  
Turci će ni platiti Batrića!”

[Njegoš 1977: 21]

The father responds severely, calling him a girl (i. e. a coward) and reminds him that the only proper compensation is blood revenge:

“Hush, you girl in my dear son’s stead,  
Had all seven of you been killed  
And Batrić the sword remained,  
He would have revenged you all.”

“Muč, devojko, a ne mio sine,  
a svi sedam da ste poginuli,  
da je sablja Batrić ostanuo,  
Svijeh bi ve Batrić osvetio!”

[Njegoš 1977: 21]
Consequently, describing the brother’s revenge, the singer indicates the tribal conformity of his victims, but specifies their ethnicity: “and he slashes the Turks from Banjani” [“i siječe po Banjanah Turke”, Njegoš 1977: 21]. By analogy, explicit mention of the Turks from Banjani as the sole target of the revenge implies that the Christians from Banjani are, and should be, exempt from it.

Thereby in this context the revenge itself acquires new and distinctive characteristics. While other versions describe essentially tribal conflicts, Osveta Batrića Perovića insists on the figure of the Turk as a public, political enemy. The necessity of blood revenge is presented here as a general political message: there can be no reliance and no negotiation with the Turks, and no compensation except bloody revenge. In other words, the atomizing tendency of blood revenge is transformed into a device of unification and cohesion against the religious and ethnic enemy. Through the characters of Osman and Batrić, this version shows final establishment of a proper political distinction in Schmittian sense.

Thorough analysis of Njegoš’s editorial process and his personal contribution in the songs he published would require a separate investigation. Let it suffice here to mention that, unlike Karadžić, Njegoš gives no information about his singers and makes no field recordings. He simply says that once someone sung a good song on Cetinje, local scribes would record it [Njegoš 1977: 11]. In other words, Njegoš not only specifies that the songs were collected exclusively at Cetinje, but somehow implicitly confirms that they were written down only if they were appealing to the local political elite. Such an approach points to the political tendency of Njegoš’s editorial work and an intrusive approach to the songs he collected, both of which has been widely discussed in previous scholarship [Kilibarda: 1977: 485-90; 1998, Aubin: 1972, Lavrov: 1963, Putilov: 1982]. This suggests that his collection represents particular political views rather than actually documenting an oral tradition. In any case, what the previous analysis of the earlier and later recorded versions testifies is that this advanced political perspective was articulated only under Njegoš’s full monopoly over the entire procedure of the representation of the oral folk tradition.

It is at this point, as I hope, that the Schmittian dictum reveals its full relevance in this context. For Schmitt, the state is the place, and the birthplace, of politics: “The concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political” [1966: 19]. There is no politics prior to the state or apart from it.

**Conclusion**

A comparative analysis of the above versions shows the emergence of the political enemy in Montenegrin epic poetry during the first half of the nineteenth century. What disables this conceptualization in the two songs analyzed first
is, one could argue, the enemy’s ambiguity or, in another way, his immediacy and ubiquity. There is, as in the first song, the presence and domination of the local Turks, whose relations to their subjected Christians are ambiguous and uncertain. But there is also, on the other hand, the immediate threat from the adjoining Montenegrins, who can invade the household or suddenly transform from blood brothers into killers. The third and the forth song effectively avoid this problem by presenting exclusively the conflict between the Montenegrins and the neighbouring Turks. As indicated, Todor Ikov still presents nothing more than the local conflict, supplementing it perhaps with a certain implicit appraisal of the Montenegrin heroism in general. In his version, Osman and the Turks from Nikšić are foes of Batrić and his clan, and their hostility has no significant political implications. It is only in Njegoš’s edition that the true political character of the enemy is fully recognized. Hostility towards Osman follows not from his tribal conformity or his distinctive personality, but from his ‘Turkishness’ as such.

My conclusion also concerns the way this conceptualization of the enemy in Montenegrin epic poetry is achieved. Out of four versions analyzed, only the one recorded after 1846 was documented without the influence of or mediation from Cetinje. It displays an explicit antagonism towards the Montenegrins and has hardly anything to do and to say about the Turks. The three other songs show the increasing influence of the Petrovićs during the first half of the nineteenth century. In the earliest song, published in 1823, the impact of the political centre on the oral tradition is still weak and circumstantial. It was argued that this unifying national perspective is limited to the single authorial comment which is an external element that contradicts the prevailing traditional perspective. As indicated, Todor Ikov’s version from 1836 was already recorded under the direct supervision of the Petrovićs. It was performed on Cetinje in the presence of the ruler and his family members. But although it shows the consolidation of the political standpoint, the traditional singer limits his scope and the overall perspective to the local and tribal level. Finally, Osveta Perovića Batrića from Njegoš’s collection completes this process of Petrovićs influence over the entire procedure of the literary representation of local oral tradition.

This takes us to the more general question of the reasons and ways that made Serbian epics the national narrative during Romantic nationalism and, up to this day, such a strong source of nationalistic feelings. My lapidary answer to this question would be that there is no politics inherent to Serbian epic tradition, no politics of oral tradition as such. The politics of Serbian epic poetry is the politics associated with it, and inserted into it, during the process of publication and canonization of the oral tradition in the first half of the nineteenth century. Under the increasing influence of the political centre, in this period the field of Serbian epic poetry suffered, as Schmitt would say, “one of those
high points of politics” when “the enemy is, in concrete clarity, recognized as the enemy” [1966: 67].

This conclusion raises a number of questions – was it inevitable for the epic tradition to become associated with, and to become a source of, this kind of politics? Can we undo this process by rediscovering oral tradition without this drift? Is it possible to associate Serbian epic poetry with a radically different kind of politics, be it liberal politics or, which seems more productive to me, with the reconfiguration of the political field through the concept of friendship developed in Derrida’s *Politics of Friendship*? Of course, answers to those questions would require another journey. But on my account, the initial step for this journey is to present the epic figure of the political enemy as contingent and invented and thus to deny its necessity and unnaturalize its characteristics.

References:


Réka Krizmanics

Nation-Characterology of Dinko Tomašić

Abstract
The paper introduces the sociological-anthropological framework suggested by the Croatian sociologist Dinko Tomašić. He interprets the concepts of “plowman of the plain” and “Dinaric warrior”, subjects of the described division, as categories based on sociological examinations. He focuses on the carried lifestyle and the cultural heritage he attributes to the respective actors. Tomašić finds it possible to shape normative evaluations concerning the established categories and draws, at the end of the day, a black and white comparison.

For him, “plowman of the plain” embodies an idyllic way of life; the emphasis is on the ability of economic self-sustenance, the balanced power and emotional relations, which through excluding the spirit of competition provides the perfect circumstances for shaping a calm and organic peasant life. On the other hand, he attributes all the opposite features to the “Dinaric warrior”. This type is restless in seeking for power, which is a result of the shortcomings of his lifestyle and the impotence of the kuća in ensuring an emotionally stable environment, instead of disregarding competition, inequalities and appetite for power.

Tomašić borrows a substantive part of Jovan Cvijić’s approach and his writings show constant reflections on the findings of the Serbian researcher. The aim of the paper is to provide an analysis of Tomašić’s framework through the prism of the more widely known context of Cvijić. This angle of comparison sharpens the differences and commonalities in drawing the borders of the established categories. In addition, it reveals the superficial or non-convincingly argued differences in the works of Dinko Tomašić.

Key Words
nation-characterology, “plowman of the plain”, “Dinaric warrior”, cultural import
Introduction

The Croatian sociologist Dinko Tomašić (1902-1975) was republished at the dawn of the Yugoslav crisis of the early 1990s. His nation-characterology, the figures of the “plowman of the plain” and the “Dinaric warrior” were recycled to thematize wartime Croatian political discourse. Meanwhile, Serbian intellectuals also rediscovered the anthropo-geographical works of Jovan Cvijić (1865-1927) and shaped his findings and terminology for the same purposes. Ethnicized propaganda of both sides relied on these approaches, which had been elaborated up to 50 years before. After the dissolution, these works (among many others) became subjects of academic interest again. They were suitable for approaching the process of framing the picture of the other in societies [Loewenberg: 2003: 243-256].

With the emergence of the debates on orientalism and balkanism, rereading Dinko Tomašić became beneficial again. According to scholars who treat balkanism as a special subspecies of orientalism, his works fit into the ever ongoing balkanization discourse, which can be interpreted as part of a century-long intellectual debate.1

The aim of my paper is to examine the nation-characterology presented by Tomašić. I do it by comparing his findings with the results of Cvijić, since Tomašić positioned himself constantly as an opponent of the Serbian scholar. Relying on the Serbian and Croatian nationalist discourses of the early 1990s, the competition of Tomašić and Cvijić seemed unquestionable. These reinterpretations (of the Tomašić frameworks) will also be briefly addressed in the paper. However, my analysis suggests that the relation of the two original approaches was much less antagonistic than Tomašić himself communicated.

Understanding Tomašić

To get closer to the framework Tomašić created, it is necessary to consider some influential factors. First and foremost, it is important that he became politically conscious in the early years of the first Yugoslav state. He sympathized with the Croatian Peasant Party and shared the disappointment about its restricted political possibilities. The murder of Stjepan Radić2 and the royal dictatorship brought him even closer to populist ideas and inspired him to publish his own political thoughts in 1938 under the title Politički razvitak Hrvata. He passion-

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1 More on the balkanization debate in: [Todorova: 1997].
2 Stjepan Radić (1871-1928), co-founder of the Croatian Peasant Party, leading figure of the Croatian opposition in the first Yugoslavian state. He was murdered by a Serbian politician, Puniša Račić in the building of the Parliament.
ately examined the economics of the Balkans and framed suggestions to reform it as part of his sociological works.

The complexity of his view on Yugoslav society is partially a result of the adaptation of Antun Radić’s social concept. Together with his brother Stjepan, Antun Radić was a co-founder of the Croatian Peasant Party, hence he regarded peasants as a social factor. Radić ascribed peasantry the same cultural importance as to gentlefolk and aimed at creating a common public sphere for these two. What mattered for Tomašić most, was his concept of culture: according to Radić, “…culture includes the system of thinking (ideas, values, knowledge and beliefs) by which people live and behave, followed by a system of norms and patterns of concrete behavior and activities in society.” [Žmegač: 1995: 30] That is why circumstances of individual socialization mean for Tomašić the most important factor [Žmegač: 1999: 36].

Tomašić emigrated to the United States after the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1942-43. He became a respected scholar: he published papers in journals of high repute, such as the Political Science Quarterly, American Journal of Sociology, American Sociological Review, etc. He was also a lecturer at respected universities, including the University of Indiana. He was critical towards socialist Yugoslavia; in his last book (The Impact of Russian Culture on Soviet Communism, 1953) he tried to draw an overarching parallel with the social dichotomy he identified in the Balkans.

**Division of Balkan people**

Tomašić established two social categories of the Balkan peoples, the “Dinaric warrior” and the “plowman of the plain.” Their distinction, grounded on carried lifestyle, preserved values, family structure and the development of personality, are results of Tomašić’s sociological background.

For Tomašić, the plowman of the plain embodies the idyllic lifestyle. The basic unit of the plain society was the zadruga, which provided in itself a suitable moral code. For Tomašić, zadruga was a territorial and political unit, in which blood ties had a low importance. It was a self-sufficient and self-sustaining community. Almost all the property was under common ownership

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3 Antun Radić (1868-1919), founding father of Croatian ethnography.

4 Dinaric warrior as a concept was also part of the racial discourse in the interwar Yugoslavia. However, Tomašić clearly distanced himself from these approaches. As racial definition, Dinaric warrior was described as heirs of Illyrians and early medieval Croat settlers. [Nevenko Bartulin: 2009: 199-204].

5 Zadruga is a basic community in South Slav societies. It was noted for its primarily agricultural lifestyle and the division of labor. A zadruga usually consisted of members of an extended family.
and well-organized division of work enabled the community to work with the highest possible efficiency.

According to Tomašić, mutual dependence on one another created an atmosphere determined by power indifference. Although respect for the elders was common, they were not omnipotent in the community. The leader of the zadruja, the gospodar was not necessarily the eldest member of the community but the most talented “manager” was elected. Women were not second-class members of the community, they could elect the female leader of the zadruja, the gospodinja, who was responsible for all the children in the community [Tomašić: 1948: 149-162].

Lack of individual ambitions and certain aspects of gender equality provided for the members emotional balance and a harmonious way of life. The zadruja encouraged the people to aim at personal well-being. There was a certain privacy offered to the nuclear families through separate one-room dwellings, but common spaces dominated [Tomašić: 1948: 153-155].

Tomašić praises zadruja as a successful economic unit. In his opinion, the security provided by self-sustenance led to the fact that children were always welcomed, independent of their gender. Pregnant women were treated with tenderness and they were spared from work until no longer nursing. Until the age of 12, children were raised together and equally in the community and had no obligatory work. Obedience of authority and equality were encouraged, while any form of aggressiveness or fighting was discouraged. Education, training and disciplining were unquestioned tasks of the community, therefore, an intimate and deep connection was formed between parents and children. Children became adults at the age of 12 and occupied their position in the labor division and community life. Marriages were bound mostly inside the zadruja and built on the spouses’ mutual obedience. Everything was predictable, which increased the secure feeling and optimistic view of life of the plowmen and ensured long-term future of the zadruja [ibid: 166-186].

The picture of the Dinaric warrior is the complete reverse of the zadruja people. The basic unit of settlement was the kuća, a joint household, which was based on tribal and blood ties. Kućas were usually isolated in the mountains in a constant state of fear from external threats. They aimed at autarchy, but almost completely lacked agricultural activity and insufficient labor division led to serious dependence on crossroad markets. Kućas’s living based itself on collectively owed land, herds and certain additional agricultural implements. Inalienable property belonged to each father, but all the members had some private property to a lesser extent [ibid: 16-34].

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6 Gender equality is more about the lack of common domestic violence than other aspects here.
**Starješina**, the eldest male member of the community, controlled the life of the *kuća* whose figure is described exceptionally exhaustively by Tomašić. His role was crucial in this society where competing power-seeker members constantly tried to increase their private property and personal importance. It was almost impossible to misplace the starješina, because his power and decisions were not contestable. Paternal status and advanced age counted as ultimate sources of power. Eager power-seeking and importance of personal influence set the ground for an emotionally imbalanced atmosphere. Women were generally looked down upon, despite their constant hard work, which they even did instead of their husbands. Father-son antagonisms often evolved along the lines of economic interests or personal freedom-seeking. Conflicts among brothers were also common.

Families used to celebrate when a boy was born into their family, they accepted him as future warrior, who defended the *kuća* and carried the blood of his ancestors further. On the other hand, girls meant a heavy, temporary burden for the family, because members of the *kuća* used to marry outside their communities. This means that girls were raised to be members of a foreign family. Pregnant women used to interrupt work only at the very moment of the birth of the child and continued to work immediately after being capable of moving. Bringing up children was a private task of the parents and they were expected to treat them sternly and constantly discipline them. The father, in particular, was expected to maintain an emotional distance and beat his children, if necessary, to uphold his authority [ibid: 22-27].

In this way, children were socialized in an emotionally unstable environment, where violence was part of everyday life and the only way out was to gain individual power. This choice, naturally, was only available to male members of the *kuća*. Marriage and having at least one son could ensure a more or less convenient position for an adult man in the community, but he still had to obey the authority of elder members and had to suffer various sorts of humiliation (verbal, physical) from them. Limitless self-confidence and sadistic leanings were direct consequences of these circumstances. Adult men often left their home to gain honor in war or as bandits and to get rid of their father’s or *gospodar*’s supervision. Therefore *kuća* communities proved to be unstable and short-lived [ibid: 27-34].

**Contesting Cvijić**

Tomašić constantly cited and criticized the works of Jovan Cvijić in his publications. He tackled mainly the findings, but not the applied methodology. The categorization provided by Cvijić suggested already a conceptual framework,
which Tomašić partly applied. For obvious reasons, the two scholars could not have a long, real-time academic debate, but Tomašić emphasized his opposition against Cvijić even long after his death. Instead of detailed introduction of the entire approach of Cvijić, here I would like to concentrate on their commonalities and differences.

The most remarkable commonalities are connected to the applied approaches. With different accents, both authors represent a sociological-anthropological framework focusing on nation-characterology. This focal point results in an essentialist approach, which considers Yugoslav people as one, though divisible unit. The ethno-geographical approach also plays important role, but it is core only for Cvijić’s argumentation.

In fact, the sequence of differences is much longer; the most important ones are usually attached to exact political contexts and political commitment of the authors. Cvijić conducted his research in the Golden Age of the Yugoslav idea. He travelled throughout the Balkans in the last 20 years of the 19th century. The main idea he had in mind was to provide anthropological evidence of South Slav commonalities, which could serve as ground for the creation of a great Yugoslav state. Therefore, it is unequivocal that he tried to prove the similar character of the complete Slavic population of the Balkan Peninsula. Later, as an honored member of academic circles,7 Cvijić had also the chance to influence directly the Versailles settlement. He could apply his findings by claiming the border of the new state, additionally, he published pamphlets aiming at gaining the greatest territory possible [Kaser: 1998: 89].

Both authors sought to enumerate the most important cultural imports which arrived in the Balkans through the centuries. However, they see the actual process of acculturation differently. Cvijić describes an organic development, which derives from the constant appearance of civilizations and shapes certain zones of civilizations according to the actio-radius of the transmitter, and the period of time it was able to spread its cultural features. According to him, these civilizations are still traceable and he displayed them on maps as well [Cvijić: 1918: 470-482]. As for Tomašić, he underscores the very nature of appearing ideas (political, religious, etc.) and draws the history of the Peninsula as a permanent battlefield of opposing ideas, which changed from time to time [Tomašić: 1943: 888-903].

Cvijić focuses on the actual historical sources by claiming the most important role for the Byzantine Empire, the Venetian city republic, the Ottoman Empire and “Western ideas”, the latter is narrowed down to Catholicism and the Latin alphabet. He argues that the sea was the only way through which these ideas

7 He was president of the Serbian Royal Academy of Sciences, and rector of the University of Belgrade.
arrived [Cvijić: 1918: 477]. This argumentation excludes the Central European area from providers of significant cultural input to the South Slav people.

Cvijić defines this Central Europe with Austria-Hungary, which concept already clarifies the reason for seeking exclusion: to justify the claims for all the territories of the late Monarchy, which were inhabited by South Slavs. For that reason, he can afford to admit that there is a zone of civilization, Dalmatia, which was exposed to constant Western influences (in other words: cherishes a completely different cultural background from the majority of the population). Since he claimed that Western influences came from a completely other direction, this difference is insufficient to shape any criticism of Yugoslav territorial demands regarding Dalmatia.

Tomašić describes a long history of “struggling ideas”, which is a result of the conflict-provoking position of the Balkans: it is between the Western and Eastern worlds. He identifies conflicts between Hellenization and Romanization, Latin Christianity and Orthodoxy, Islam and Christianity, Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism, socialism and Western liberalism [Tomašić: 1948: 221-228]. He did not have such evident biases towards the Monarchy as Cvijić. However, he expresses his opinion that for Croatia the status of restricted autonomy (experienced until 1918) was even less favorable than the praxis of constitution in the first Yugoslav state [Tomašić: 1940: 592-593]. In a later work, he classified the Yugoslav area as part of Central Europe, which he defined as the entire area between the Adriatic and the Baltic seas. He supports this definition by claiming that people of this area shared all significant historical experiences [Tomašić: 1943: 889-892].

The effect of migrations on the inhabitants of the area is also judged differently. Cvijić applies the zones of civilizations approach again. For him, migration only played either a neutral or rather positive role but did not lead to the emergence of substantially different entities. Cvijić treats significant external influences as priority in shaping the mentality and culture of the Balkans. He also describes certain internal migrations, which played the role either of balancing or of accumulation. The importance of migration is highlighted, when he explains the rise of Šumadija Šerbs by carrying the South Slav idea. Cvijić’s reasoning is mostly supported by the migration of Serbs of Crna Gora to the North to whom he attributes the greatest stage of national consciousness [Cvijić and Foster: 1931: 674-677].

Evaluation of the effect of migration is completely negative in the case of Tomašić. Paying special attention to migration, he approaches it mostly at domestic level, since he is more concerned about the internal dichotomy he diagnosed concerning the Balkan people, than the arrival of foreign populations. He chooses a very narrow focus when he goes down to the micro level. He examines the question of migration from the point of view of the zadruga and joint
household. The low migration potential of the zadruga is definitely favored as opposed to the instability of the kuća. The negative understanding of the latter is partly explained by the high fluctuation of the members and incapability of economic autarchy. This normative evaluation derives from Tomašić’s populist concept, which sees the failure of kuća in the incapability of self-sustenance and the basis of recruitment of the urban strata [Tomašić: 1948: 17-22].

Cities gained more importance in the works of Tomašić, but also Cvijić addressed them. The latter could not completely deny the culturally heterogeneous composition of the cities. However, when discussing Serbia, he claimed the entire urban population to be purely Serbian (sic!), even though he mentioned Greek, Roma, Turkish, German, Jewish citizens, too [Cvijić and Foster: 1931: 680]. He admits the structural and developmental difference between Western and “Serbian” cities, but Cvijić describes them as organic parts of the Yugoslav nation’s body.

Tomašić treats cities as accumulations of the power-seeking Dinaric warriors, who are haunted by their restlessness and lack of emotional stability. Cities and the possible professions they offer (in the bureaucracy or gendarmerie, for instance) enable them to satisfy their appetite for violence and rule. The city opposes the zadruga tradition and endangers the very existence of it. By serving centralization and favoring industrialization, it hinders the free cooperation of peasants, therefore, Tomašić shapes a generally negative picture of them [Tomašić: 1948: 209-213 and 232-233].

The authors’ attitudes towards their established categories (plowman versus Dinaric warrior; Dinaric type, Central type, East Balkan type, Pannonian type) are different as well. Cvijić’s intention is to prove the utmost commonality of South Slavs, which is supported by underscoring the secondary importance of the definable categories. However, Cvijić cannot hide his personal preference for the Dinaric type, which, for him, possesses the complete set of South Slav values. Liveliness, intelligence, sensitivity, wide imagination, fostering individual and national pride are mentioned by him as core values [Kaser: 2003].

In terms of traits, the non-Dinaric South Slavs are not different, only less definite. Since the additional three categories also represent the same values, sharpened opposition is unimaginable and Cvijić himself does not express negative personal opinion on them. It is visible that a substantial part of the features corresponds with Tomašić’s Dinaric category. However, they gain credence since they are represented as evidences of state-forming capability.8

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8 One of the basis on Cvijić claimed the Serbian leadership in the Yugoslav state was their attributed high state-building capacity. Marko Živković, “Violent Highlanders and Peaceful Lowlanders. Uses and Abuses of Ethno-Geography in the Balkans from Versailles to Dayton”, University of Chicago. Available at: http://www.c3.hu/scripta/scripta0/replika/honlap/english/02/08zivk.htm
Tomašić’s framework is much more antagonistic. There is no attempt at gradualism, the Dinaric warrior and plowman of the plain (or zadruga) are positioned at two poles of a scale. Based on his populist worldview, he idealizes the rural zadruga lifestyle, which is oppressed by the type of aggressive Dinaric warrior, who lives on herding and banditry or migrates to the city. Any type of lifestyle, which differs from the cyclic life and work of peasantry, is something dangerous and alien from the “true values”, which are attributed exclusively to zadruga people. There is not a single positive feature attributed to the Dinaric warrior. Tomašić blames representatives of this type for every disappointment and failure the Yugoslav people ever witnessed. His evaluation is clearly normative, as Karl Kaser expressed it: he initiated “discursive hardening” [Kaser: 1998] in this debate, which was carried on by students of Cvijić later.

At the level of terminology, Tomašić could easily claim that he constantly opposed what Cvijić propagated, namely the dominance of the Dinaric type/warrior. Moreover, the approach of Cvijić was easy to thematize as an expansionist, pro-Serbian concept, with its clear sporadic statements on the ethnic constitution of his Dinaric category (two thirds of this category claimed to be constituted of Serbs) [ibid: 91]. Tomašić eagerly defended the zadruga as if this exact structure would have been under attack. He did not leave this conceptual framework throughout his debate with Cvijić and his followers. In terms of cultural features, Cvijić attributed a greater role to external influences. It is important to point out here, that Cvijić claimed the most important boundary to be the one between zones of civilizations of patriarchal regime (which he explained to be maintained by the zadruga system) and the Byzantine civilization. Cvijić respects the zadruga system regardless of ethnicity of its members and does not emphasize the intention of the Dinaric type to destroy this structure. Neither has he raised any criticism concerning it. When it comes to desirable political organizations and system for the area, Cvijić echoes the obedience and eager wish of the Balkan people for general democratic values to please the Great Powers and to underline the state-forming capability again.

The list of differences between the examined approaches of Jovan Cvijić and Dinko Tomašić is definitely longer than that of their commonalities. The authors’ opinions on the sources of cultural import, on the effect of migration and on the role of cities are significantly diverging. However, both of them remain caged in an essentialist discourse, which deprives these frameworks from the ability of multidimensional sociological explanation. The deep connection and compatibility between the two approaches is even more striking if we take the case of “Dinaric” (Cvijić) or “Dinaric warrior” (Tomašić) type. The label is the same and the content is very similar. The difference is in the inner logic: while Cvijić suggests gradualism, Tomašić describes two ends of a (moral) scale.
Distorted echoes

The scholarly interest in interwar essentialist approaches was rarely articulated in the communist federal state, which declared its aim at creating “brotherhood and unity” among its members. Tomašić, being in emigration until his death in 1975, and critical towards Titoist Yugoslavia, was hardly discussed at home until the dissolution of the state. In the rare cases he was approached, after withdrawing the view on his compatibility with Marxist dialectics, scholarly attitude changed to critical in the 1970s on the methodological level as well [Štulhofer: 1993: 984].

The antagonism of Tomašić and Cvijić re-entered intellectual discussions in the late 1980s. Indeed, its elements came to dominate academic discourse, despite the previous semblance of oblivion. The already diverging national narratives turned towards Tomašić and Cvijić as “natural” sources of self-justification. Nota bene, the 1980s was also the time, which witnessed “the replacement of the partisan generation by politicians, who had been born during or after the war, and who did not share a background of struggle against common enemies [Bakić-Hayden and Hayden: 1992: 6].

Overnight, methodological concerns disappeared and both Croatian and Serbian intellectuals utilized essentialist approaches, tailored according to their specific needs. This meant that categories became more clear-cut and absolutely ethnocentric. The original categories of plowman and Dinaric warrior faded away (even if the latter still appeared sporadically) to become substituted with (Orthodox) Serbs and (Catholic) Croats [Štulhofer: 1992: 299-313]. The fact that this setting is unable to cover the ethnically and denominationally more diverse regions (especially Bosnia) was usually overlooked [Bougarel: 1999: 159-160].

Essentialist nation-characterology was even projected into a larger dimension, when the Yugoslav area became depicted as the territory, where clash of civilizations was the everyday reality. By claiming, that Tomašić’s antagonistic framework means an “effort to offer a cultural explanation of events that are typically understood in strictly ideological, economic or otherwise reductionist…” [Mestrović, Letica and Goreta: 1993: 67] reasoning, pro-essentialist scholars opted for another type of reduction. In this way, the strongly ethnicized categories used in the nationalist discourses of the 1990s, which were claimed to have sociological background, and had less and less connection with the original ones, supported the sustenance of orientalizing approaches. The concept of ancient hatred, explaining the bloody wars of the 1990s, was clearly supported by this mindset; local elites and diaspora scholars (especially in the United States) consciously interiorized it as well. Both domestic and international audiences bought into this approach, delivered in various forms.
Summary

My goal was to introduce the sociological framework of Dinko Tomašić. To underscore his points I chose the strategy of contrasting his line of argumentation with Jovan Cvijić’s. The constant references to the works of the Serbian anthropo-geographer and the similarities both in applied methods and in content encouraged such an examination. I deliberately selected certain contrasts, through which I could exemplify the similarities and the differences, and even reappraise their significance. By tracing the main ideological and methodological influences on his works, a more complex understanding of Tomašić is possible. The strong reliance on Antun Radić guaranteed the inseparability of sociological approach and political involvement in his theory. His great popularity during the times of his emigration and the excellent opportunities of publishing and teaching made him an important Balkan-expert for decades in the US.

His contemporary approachability derives from recycling of his works in the past 20 years, as political and academic reinterpretations were published. The categories of Tomašić appeared in the Croatian nationalist public discourse before and during the Yugoslav Wars. It was a reinvention and a response at the same time, since the Serbian side also cited earlier academic works, Cvijić’s, for instance. But scholars also went back to the “tradition”, which is partly the framework Tomašić himself created and partly few elements only attributed to his works.

By condemning the “ancient hatred argument” as the (sole) explanatory factor of the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia, these antagonistic frameworks seem to disappear from intellectual discussion, or, at least, to lose academic credentials. However, when (rightly) underscoring the responsibility of media and international actors, one should keep in mind that for many years in the early 1990s, the line between academic publications and political pamphlets was very thin and porous when dealing with the vanishing Yugoslavia.

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9 A detailed overview on the factors involved is provided by Jasna Dragović-Soso, [2008: 1-39].


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Irena Šentevska

“Anything but Turban-folk”: the ‘Oriental Controversy’ and Identity Makeovers in the Balkans

Social identity lies in difference, and difference is asserted against what is closest, which represents the greatest threat.1

Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction

Jednostavno, narodnjaci su zakon.2

Mira Škorić

Abstract

This paper addresses the ‘oriental controversy’ in folk music of the Balkans i.e. the role of folklore and folk music in the symbolic divisions and identity ‘makeovers’ (national and cultural) in the region, with an emphasis on official policies of several Balkan countries – namely, Serbia, Bulgaria and Turkey – which took an active role in shaping and widening those divisions. With the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia and armed conflicts throughout its former territory, the already well-established discourse of ‘newly-composed contamination’ assumed a new political context. In Serbia, ‘invading hordes of janissaries’ which ‘disrupt

2 To put it simply, turbo-folk rules! Sav taj folk (All That Folk), Episode 1, TV B92, 2004, Author: Radovan Kupres.
the national soundscape’ with annoying ‘Anatolian howling’, etc. were no longer metaphorical expressions of musical dislike. The war was real and attempts at ‘de-orientalization’ of Serbian folk music obtained firm political ground. According to the ‘experts’ in the field, this is still an ‘ongoing process’. To describe the way folk music (its various genres – from ‘pure/ethnic’ to ‘contaminated/turbo’) is used as a vehicle of symbolic divisions within a single national culture, I propose a model of ‘nesting folklorismus’ (a tendency for each taste group to view ‘less authentic’ and ‘impure’ forms of folk music as more vulgar, tasteless and ‘un-national’ i.e. ‘foreign’).

The field of popular culture is all too often excluded from academic considerations – in spite of its power and efficiency in forging, adopting and disseminating the ideological stereotypes underlying the deep social divisions and ethnic conflicts (not only) in the Balkans. This paper argues that both for its overwhelming presence in the lives of ‘ordinary people’, and for its associations with the national culture and identity, folk music is subject to markedly intense processes of ‘re-fashioning’, according to the ideological, cultural and economic (political) interests of the present – thus becoming a powerful and malignant vehicle of symbolic divisions on both national and international scales.

Key Words
folk music, Orientalism, identity construction, symbolic divisions, nationalism

Southern Winds of Challenge
In her essay “Southern Wind of Change” Ljerka Vidić Rasmussen [1996] addresses the phenomenon of the Serbian-Bosnian music production Južni vetar (Southern Wind), which established a particular mode of ‘orientalization’ in Yugoslav folk music of the 1980s. Routinely attacked by the cultural ‘gatekeepers’ and advocates of ‘authenticity’ in folk music – as the most striking exponents of ‘oriental kitsch’ [Anastasijevic:1988] – the stars of Južni vetar (Dragana Mirković, Šemsa Suljaković, Sinan Sakić, Mile Kitić, Kemal Malovčić, etc.) nevertheless enjoyed enormous popularity and a firm ‘fan base’. The last days of socialist Yugoslavia (along with the collapse of its institutions) saw the ‘oriental’ aspect of this music identified with ‘otherness’ – a cultural threat for various ‘threads’ of the Yugoslav ‘ethnic carpet’. In a recent TV interview Šemsa Suljaković described the ‘media embargo’ they experienced at the high-points of their pop-
ularity: “Miodrag3 even kept us from giving our pictures (to the journalists) …
to prevent them from mocking and humiliating us … but, on the other hand …
we filled stadiums”.4 According to the popular ‘old school’ folk singer Predrag
Cune Gojković, the main ‘conduit’ of incorporation of Oriental music influence
into the Yugoslav ‘newly-composed’ folk music was the gastarbeiter (low-in-
come Yugoslav workforce ‘imported’ by wealthy Western countries – notably
Germany, as part of Willy Brandt’s Neue Ostpolitik) [Daniel:2007]. Being the
second largest gastarbeiter group in Germany after the Turks, the Yugoslavs
embraced ‘Turkish’ music as a common cultural denominator. Popular folk
singers from Yugoslavia frequently went abroad to entertain the gastarbeiter:
“I can tell you that those janissary, Khomeini-records (janičarske, homeinijevske
ploče) made locally by Miodrag Ilić sell far better in FR Germany with the Turks
than with our workers! And all those singers – Sinan Sakić, Šemsa Suljaković,
Kitić, they are far more popular in Istanbul than back home!” [Luković:1989].
“Viewed against the background of the general economic decline and ambiguity
of political direction in this period, the oriental controversy was no more than
the surface manifestation of what was euphemistically and hopefully called ‘the
political crisis’” [Vidić-Rassmusen:1996]. According to her, this controversy,
in retrospective, appears as a metaphor for Yugoslavia, “a casualty of its own
strategy: positioning itself politically and culturally between the West and an
imagined East, yet failing to reconcile the resulting overlap internally” [ibid: 116]

With the dissolution of socialist Yugoslavia and armed conflicts throughout
its former territory, the well-elaborated discourse of ‘newly-composed con-
tamination’ assumed a new political context. In Serbia, ‘invading hordes of
janissaries’ which ‘disrupt the national soundscape’ with annoying ‘Anatolian
howling’ as ‘our national misfortune’ – and similar constructs – were no longer
metaphorical expressions of musical dislike. The war was very real, and attempts
at ‘de-orientalization’ of Serbian folk music obtained firm political ground. In
a famous example, Serbian (opposition) MP Pavle Aksentijević (notable singer
of Medieval spiritual music), at a July 1994 parliament session, brought a tape
recorder to the podium and played a tape of a contemporary Iranian popular
song. Then he played a song by Dragana Mirković, prima donna of ‘turbo-folk’,
attempting to demonstrate that the tunes were almost identical. At the same
time, his political opponent, mayor of Svilajnac and representative of the Socialist
Party of Serbia (SPS), Dobrivoje Budimirović Bidža, was happily ‘bellydancing’.
Aksentijević concluded this ‘performance’ by quoting the ‘communist’ historian
Vladimir Dedijer: “We Serbs sometimes behave as if we were made (‘begotten’)
by drunken Turks” [quoted from Živković:1998]. This indeed meant that “the
sounds of Tigris and Euphrates should promptly be replaced with the sounds

3 Miodrag Ilić ‘Mile Bas’, leader of the band, often maliciously referred to as ‘Mile Teheran’.
4 Servis Karamela, BN TV (Radio Televizija Bijeljina), 2009.
of flutes and accordions (frule i harmonike) from the hilltops of Šumadija and valleys of Ibar and Morava\(^5\), “I’m still the same singer of folk songs who never entered other’s backyards, not in the least Islamic. There is nothing more beautiful than Morava and Šumadija”\(^6\) claimed the Serbian folk star Miroslav Ilić. All-Yugoslav pop icon Đorđe Balašević positively hated to see “urban kids, born in a big city, who sing narodnjaci, attached to a primitive, oriental music I despised for years” [quoted from Jansen:2005:127].\(^7\) Academic composer Ksenija Zečević opined that the “newly-composed music with oriental melismata transforms Serbs from a heroic, epic and warrior nation into melancholic and moody folk”\(^8\). In the media sphere, such anti-oriental sentiments more often than not translated into the programming straightforwardly: according to Zoran Đokić, manager of the ‘patriotic’ Radio Ponos launched in 1992: “there is no room for musicians who are not Serbs and melodies which are not Serbian”. Namely, “this Branka (Sovrlić) is not a Muslim, but her songs sound Islamic and we don’t play them. We do play Dragana Mirković because she is very popular, though her songs sound like zabavne and not too srpski” [quoted from Gordy: 1998]. On the other hand, the war-zone reality disclosed different allegiances: under the siege in Sarajevo, a market seller when asked why he sold the music of Svetlana Ražnatović Ceca, (in)famously retorted: “Art knows no borders” [quoted from Dimitrijević: 2001]. Similarly, the Serbian journalist Zoran Ćirjaković found himself in early 1996 the conduit for a number of Serbian turbo-folk albums requested by soldiers of the Bosnian Army – “Turbo-folk was the only Serb product that the suffering and almost ethnically clean post-war Sarajevo yearned for”\(^9\). However, animosities towards the ‘oriental melismata’ in Serbia did not recede after the signing of the Dayton Treaty, nor after Milošević’s ‘fall from grace’, for that matter. Another academic composer, Zoran Hristić, describes in a TV program in 2004 (in slightly derogatory terms) how the partying folk in Šumadija nowadays do not dance kolo, but ‘bellydance’, as if in a harem. “The manner of singing is ... like from a mosque ... The best howler is ... the top singer”. According to Hristić, this situation met a wall of silence from the institutes of musicology, Academy of Science and Arts and Academy of Music


\(^7\) In the same interview Balašević said: “I come from Novi Sad, which is on the other side of the border which separated the Ottoman Empire from Austria-Hungary. I have 500 years on my side”. *Ibid.*, 137.


“Anything but Turban-folk”: the ‘Oriental Controversy’ and Identity Makeovers in the Balkans

“as if that was none of their business – they were just appalled”10. In the same program, the turbo-folk star Džej Ramadanovski (commenting on the global ‘world music’ industry) dissented the narrow-mindedness of the local music business: “They (corporations) took everything Turkish, everything Arabic, put everything Indian on tape, wherever there is a Muslim head – they took it all. And that’s OK, and when we pick up something from the Turks … that’s no good, that’s Islam”. Thus the process of ‘de-orientalization’ of Serbian folk music continues. In a recent interview the manager of Grand Production and arguably the most powerful man in Serbian show business’, Saša Popović, claimed that he contributed greatly “to expelling the Turcism (turcizam) and other kinds of music that have nothing to do with our narodna”11. According to Popović, when Grand was launched in 1998 the music scene in Serbia was full of these ‘turcisms’, “full of Arabic melodies, Indian tunes, covers, thefts, all kinds of things… And it remained so until we created ‘Zvezde Granda’ (Grand Stars) in 2003. When we set up a contract with those kids and when we were able to control what they would sing, how they would sing and what records they would make, everything went in another direction. To cleanse the music from everything we found there was a far-reaching, responsible and, most of all, difficult job. It is still an ongoing process…”12

Magycal Mystery Tour of the Balkans: Sofia-Belgrade-Istanbul

According to Maria Todorova [Todorova: 1997: 164], there are two views of the Ottoman legacy in the Balkans: one is that Balkan nation-states and their cultures represent a complete break with the Ottoman past; the other argues for “a complex symbiosis of Turkish, Islamic, and Byzantine/Balkan traditions” that “on the level of popular culture and everyday life … proved much more persistent” [ibid: 180]. The first position, ‘the complete break’ model won out politically and has been transmitted and shaped by generations of historians, poets, writers, journalists, and other intellectuals – and, of course, politicians… Obsessed with the ‘golden (Middle) ages’ preceding the nation’s ‘fall from grace’, it left a void, a black spot in reflecting its existence under the ‘foreign yoke’ – ‘silent’ centuries “deprived of national glory” [Milosavljević: 2003:140]. The function of nationalist ideology as an individual psychological resource was ‘simply but

10 Sav taj folk (All That Folk), Episode 4.
11 Folk music
profoundly expressed’ to the anthropologist Andrei Simic some forty years ago by a shabbily dressed elderly man on the streets of Sofia whom he asked for directions: “I don’t know sir, but you see I am just a poor street sweeper, but thanks to God, a Bulgarian street sweeper” [Simic: 2002:142]

Alexander Kiossev argues that ‘the self-colonizing cultures’ (Balkan post-Ottoman nation-states included) engender two equally mistaken doctrines: 1) Westernization or Europeanization presenting the historical temporality as an ‘athletic’ competition, a running distance where the ‘civilizational’ drop-back (ascribed to the ‘Turkish yoke’) could be compensated for by ‘enlightened’ sprinting; 2) Nativism – searching, finding and ‘inventing’ the lost ‘authentic substance’ of the Nation (before it has been corrupted by Aliens), and then idealizing it in a bucolic manner. “This doctrine, of course, struggles against any new corrupting influences and gives birth to the most vehement nationalistic ideologies and dangerous sacralizations of the ‘native’” [Kiossev:1995]. Fashioning of this ‘authentic substance’ features prominently in all the discussions of ‘authenticity’ in folk music. Many authors, Simon Frith among them, doubt whether there is such a thing as an ‘authentic’ (autonomous) musical form in the first place, claiming that ‘authenticity’ operates here as a mere ideological construct.

Bulgaria offers perhaps some of the finest historical examples of such ‘social engineering’ of folk music and folklore. With its strong ties to the past and its potential for manipulating the national consciousness, folklore had been used to promote Bulgarian nationalism, socialism and ethnic unity (at the same time). The notions of ‘purity’ and ‘authenticity’ in the socialist era turned out to mean conformity to a unified (and officially mediated) image of Bulgarian folklore. In addition to incorporating traditional feasts into the official, ‘communist’ calendar (thus Gergjovden became Day of the Shepherds, Babinden became Day of Assistance in Child-birth, Cheese Sunday became Day of Parental Respect etc.) [Silverman: 1983], the government shaped the form and content of Bulgarian folklore through professional folk music and dance ensembles. The ensembles performed a new, Westernized form of Bulgarian folk music, supervised by the ‘cadre’ trained in classical music in the Soviet Union. Traditional lyrics of folk songs were re-worked by state poets into subtle political statements: e.g. in a number of songs in the Pirin Ensemble’s repertoire, the word ‘Macedonia’ had been replaced by ‘Bulgaria’. The inevitable result of such professionalization was that ‘amateur’ village performers began to see themselves – and were seen by others – as inferior. The emphasis on Thracian music contributed to forging the single Bulgarian ‘national music’ at the expense of regional music idioms.

13 “The ‘industrialization of music’ can’t be understood as something that happens to music but describes a process in which music itself is made …” Namely, it was technological developments that made our present understanding of musical ‘authenticity’ possible [Frith: 2007:94].
Moreover, at the waves of Radio Sofia one could hear folkloric ‘themes’ like this: “Stojan’s mother said to him: ‘Stojan, my son, Stojan go out my son, lead father’s oxen from the stall, plough the black earth and sow the white wheat’. ‘Mother, my dear old mother, you speak beautifully but, mother, I’m ashamed to plough with oxen. I’ll sign up at our new cooperative farm and become a tractor driver and plow deep furrows’” [ibid: 60]. Progressive industrialism, the goal of both liberal and Marxist philosophies, should have lead to “the withering away of nationalism” [Gellner: 1997:32], but that simply never happened. In Bulgaria (as indeed in other Balkan nations) nationalism meant extreme hostility toward the ‘Ottoman legacy’, “a conscious effort to belittle, ignore, distort, deride, and even negate” [Todorova: 1997: 183] the nationalist histories of the Balkan neighbors, and efforts to assimilate (or cause to emigrate) minority populations of Turks, Gypsies, Greeks, Armenians, Jews ... “Bulgarian politicians”, says Bulgarian musicologist Rozmari Statelova, “advise us to keep our selves separate from other nations, nationalities, and ethnicities, to treat them with animosity or at least with suspicion” [Statelova: 1995:43]. This nationalist discourse also set up a tension between the villages (where Bulgarian language, Christian Orthodoxy and folkloric cultural practices created both a similarity of culture and a ‘pure’ repository of national identity) and urban areas, where the Ottoman legacy involved ‘contamination’ with the foreign, non-folkloric, urban, oriental etc. In 1985 the Bulgarian government instituted a particularly draconian set of regulations aimed at the Muslim minorities in the country (Turks and Roma), including the forced changing of Muslim names to Bulgarian or international ones, outlawing ostensibly Muslim forms of cultural display (such as speaking Turkish and wearing a traditional style of women’s pants) – and playing Turkish and Romani music. (These policies led to some terrorist reactions on the part of the Turkish minority and their emigration to Turkey in large numbers.) In the highly charged atmosphere in the country, some music forms began to take on a symbolically oppositional character that they previously had lacked – notably rock music sung in Bulgarian and extraordinarily popular svatbarska muzika (‘wedding music’), with its megastars like Ivo Papazov (born Ibryam Hapazov). “In the politicized context of the late 1980s, this musical style became an icon of the possibilities of personal freedom and expression within a totalitarian regime and a harbinger of the political changes to come” [Rice: 2002:27]. Svatbarska muzika also challenged the dominant (and demographically false) discourse of the monoethnic nation-state. Chalga (Bulgarian version of ‘turbo-folk’) was a product of the ‘free market’ opportunities opening after 1989. In addition, “the movement towards the ‘local’ and the ‘indigenous’ in the 1990s might be seen in part as an echo of the ‘world music’fad” [Levy: 2002:221]. In an interview (2000) Evgenij Dimitrov, leader of the pop-folk group Ku-Ku Bend, described his generation’s attitude to narodna muzika: “Official music, official Bulgarian
folklore, was buttoned up and was like a museum. … People had a need to listen to music that was close to their hearts and souls, and so there occurred an influx of music from neighboring countries: Serbia, Greece and Turkey. This music was nowhere officially allowed or produced (in Bulgaria), but it was accepted with open arms by ordinary people ... The recordings were sold illegally in street stalls, in markets. They made pirate copies. People found every way to obtain them. ... In those days there was no local equivalent ... Perhaps for that reason we haven't been able to cleanse ourselves of borrowings, of this influx of Serbian, Greek and Turkish music. Even ten years after the democratic changes, the influence from there continues. They still copy many Serbian, Greek and Turkish songs, translated into Bulgarian. Simply they sound close and familiar to Bulgarians, so much so that they have nearly become native folk to them” [ibid: 32]. The Wikipedia article on Vasil Levski National Stadium in Sofia claims that the most successful concert in Bulgaria ever (and therefore at this stadium) was held in 1990 by the Yugoslav folk star Lepa Brena in front of 100,000 people14, whereas more recently Madonna (54 000), Metallica (50 000) and AC/DC (60 000) attracted far fewer visitors.

As for Serbia, folklore and politics were intermingled “from the very outset, namely, from Vuk Karadžić’s discovery (more precisely: depiction) of folklore as the backbone of whole national life” [Čolović: 1994:23]15 From the early days of independence, Serbian elites were focused on doing away with the Ottoman legacies and approaching the cultural circle of modern European states. The process of ‘de-orientalization’, however, did not always go smoothly: some old habits were not easy to do away with. For example, one of the leaders of the First Serbian Uprising (Milenko Stojaković) maintained a harem of 40 ‘wives’, while knez Miloš Obrenović had a Gypsy band Mustafa i njegova družina, just like his Turkish predecessors. Attempts at ‘de-orientalization’ intensified with the formation of the Kingdom of Sebs, Croats and Slovenes, while musicology remained a legitimate field of symbolical ‘cleansing’ of the national culture (involving a minority of ‘dissident’ voices16 which argued for superiority of Serbian music informed by oriental influence). On the other hand, composers like Petar Konjović, Miloje Milojević and Kosta Manojlović advocated purification of folk

14 “This record remains unbroken till date. The curiosity of the concert was the way Lepa Brena arrived at the stadium – by landing from the helicopter directly to the stage.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vasil_Levski_National_Stadium

15 For a more detailed discussion, see chapter “Folklor kao sredstvo legitimisanja nacionalnog identiteta”, [Čolović:1994:83-92].

16 According to Vladimir Đorđević this music was “more progressive and colorful, which results from respective crossovers” [Quoted in: Dimitrije Golemović: 1997: 183].

According to Dunja Rihtman Augušin [1978: 163 – 172], in the socialist Yugoslavia a specific kind of postwar urbanization brought rural immigrants to the centers of cities as representatives of new political and social power. Like in Bulgaria, folklore was highly valued as part of the national value-orientation: kolo and other folk dances were frequently performed in the city streets by both amateur and professional groups. In the 1950s two groups of phenomena had a strong impact on the relationship society – tradition: 1) with the industrialization in full swing, many predominantly young people from the rural parts of the country moved to the cities to work or study: they shared a dominant value, which could be best described as ‘urgent desire to get rid of the village’. In other words, to wipe out all traces of peasant origin and become urbanized as soon as possible. The desire was reinforced by the official ideology and agenda of development, which did not, at the time, rely on agriculture; 2) political centralism favored a unification of national and regional specific traits: devaluation of tradition manifested itself in the overwhelming sense of shame of ‘traditional primitivism’. Folklore and other expressions of folk life were even labeled as reactionary, banned from cultural programs as incompatible with (or even detrimental to) economic development. The 1960s saw democratization of social life resulting in new attitudes towards the ‘tradition’ (on national and local levels), aided by the Yugoslav version of market economy, self-management system and decentralization of political and social power.

Folklorismus ('second existence of folklore') became a particular kind of consumable good in the tourism and entertainment industries. Release of Lepa Lukić’s single Od izvora dva putića (1964) marked a symbolic beginning of the new era of commercial expansion of the ‘newly composed folk music’, additionally marking out the two “basic attitudes towards the rural, traditional and folkloric – stylized emphasis on those elements, and departing from them for the sake of greater psychological and linguistic realism”. Those in charge of the cultural policies of the socialist Yugoslavia (including the Adornian critics of mass culture) deemed the newly-composed folk music ‘in terms of value and character’ a caricature of mass culture and ultimate instance of surrogate for an authentic culture (opposed, as such, to the idealized notion of ‘pure, original folk songs’). Local musicological circles debated the “process of obvious de-nationalization of folklore”, and the unacceptable idea of “a possi-
ble Serbian (Slavic)-Oriental synthesis in new forms of expression, considering the overwhelming suppression of autochthonous musical elements”. The final product of this process was perceived as “fake folklore”—or, rather, “fakelore”. The process of ‘de-fakelorization’ of Serbian folk music (which, according to Saša Popović is “still ongoing”) was perhaps best wrapped up in a tongue-in-cheek remark by the ethnomusicologist Dragoslav Dević who criticized the overwhelming ‘peeling off’ of the multi-cultural layers of Serbian musical heritage: “well, let me put it this way: if we peel everything that was built in for centuries, our folk dancers will end up naked”.

The period of the Ottoman supremacy plays a specific historical role in all the Balkan countries. It is “the borderline, historical notch which serves as the imaginary line between the good and the evil, as a landmark, mythical frontier between what we are and what the ‘other’, our despised and eternal enemy, is” [Stojanović: 2010:27] … The ‘Turks’ thus perform a major historical-psychological function: “We can always rely on them when we need to answer why Serbia is under-developed, why it has problems with democracy, why its history is dominated by periods of authoritarian governments, why it is poor, why it has an undeveloped economy, dirty streets or public toilets in a state of neglect …” [ibid: 27-28]. Five hundred years under the ‘arch-enemies’ might always be conveniently perceived as a kind of ‘historical indulgentia’ or ‘a priori amnesty’. Accordingly, “if someone took away from us these ‘Turks’, we would be forced to finally confront ourselves and our own under-achievements” [ibid: 28].

Back to the present: that Serbia and Turkey share similar concerns about the ‘oriental’ aspects of ‘turbo-folk’ was recently confirmed by the Turkish ambassador in Belgrade, who was asked to evaluate the relations between the two countries. “He stressed that those were two related cultures bonded by centuries of common history, but he was nevertheless disturbed by the fact that certain music of ‘poor quality and oriental tunes’ was called ‘Turkish music’,

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20 Anastasijević [1988:151]. To illustrate his point this author analyzed Mitar Mirić’s song ‘Ne diraj čoveka za stolom’ (Diskos, Aleksandrovac, 1986).
22 Aleksandar Pavlović identifies three periods in the conceptualization of ‘enemy’ in the Serbian literary tradition: 1) early-Nemanjić period which saw the forming of the concept of the theological enemy (vrag); 2) post-Kosovo Battle era which modified this concept according to the new social reality, and 3) the mid-XIX century when the notion of ‘enemy’ was finally articulated in the sense of true political hostility in Carl Schmitt’s terms.Aleksandar Pavlović, lecture “Vrag i Turčin: privatni, teološki i politički koncept neprijatelja u srpskoj tradiciji”, Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, Belgrade, 20.02.2013.
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adding that they had a similar problem – only ‘they called this Iranian music’

or, rather, arabesk.

“Firstly, what is arabesk? No single, all-embracing definition is possible, since arabesk is, and means, a lot of different things” [Stokes: 2000:217]. Turkish definitions and explanations can roughly be divided into two basic categories: those in which the idea of Arab-influenced hibridity are significant (‘intellectual’ position) and those in which it is not (position taken mostly by musicians and fans). For the ‘intellectual’ critics, in sociological and historical terms, arabesk is the more or less disastrous consequence of certain processes of modernization and urbanization, in which state-led attempts to forget a Muslim and Arab past in pursuit of a secular and Western destiny ran aground. For the fans, the ‘Arabness’ is not an issue: arabesk singers are ordinary, suffering human beings. Like them, as outsiders from the Turkish provinces, they share uncertain destinies on the fringes of the big cities. “Arabesk is about love, separation, manipulation, betrayal, and hopeless dreams of glamour, wealth, and escape” [ibid].

Arabic musical influences were ascribed to the Turkish musicians engaged in the Egyptian film industry in the 1920s: their musical innovations were more visibly adopted in the 1960s (e.g. by the singer Suat Sayın). The application of the term arabesk is credited to Orhan Gencebay’s 1969 recording Bir teselli ver, although he has publicly and repeatedly disavowed it. The odium attached to arabesk by the state and intellectual commentators is such that most singers market themselves without reference to arabesk, preferring other definitions (halk, sanat, fantezi or taverna music). The leftist-Kemalist intelligentsia are keen to label contemporary Turkish pop as a kind of speeded-up arabesk, identifying the roots of both in the aggressive liberalism of recent decades. The notion of popbesk, which explicitly links the two, has gained some currency as a result.

The left critique of arabesk focuses heavily on the gecekondu25 squatter towns, identified as both the symbol and practice of urban disorder and unacceptably laissez-faire development policies. Arabesk is strongly associated with the gecekondu semi-urban proletariat and this identification was fixed in the 1980s through the notion of arabesk as dolmuş (shared taxi) music: “like the dolmuş, arabesk connects the rural, the semi-rural, and the urban, the periphery and the center, and like the dolmuş, arabesk possesses a kind of meandering vitality that seems to go simultaneously everywhere and nowhere – a perfect symbol of


24 As in Turkey, Israeli media continually marginalized the local counterpart of arabesk, mizrahi (‘Eastern’) music, for its ‘oriental’ associations.

25 Gecekondu (plural: gecekondular) is a house put up quickly without proper permissions, a squatter’s house, shanty or shack. Gecekondu bölgesi is a semi-legal neighborhood made of those gecekondular.
rapid but directionless and alienating social mobility” [ibid:222]. Arabesk is a worrying evidence of this new ‘hegemony of the periphery’. Moreover, Turgut Özal’s period26 was often referred to as one of arabesk politikasi, “indicating a certain populist cynicism, cultural confusion, and a deliberate turning away from the principles of Ataturk’s secular republik on matters relating to religion”.27

Arabesk singers are generally identified with the predominantly Kurdish southeast of Turkey and urban peripheries where migrants from this region settle. The Belgrade commentators of the Turkish ambassador’s complaint noted: “How convenient to move slightly eastwards all that is annoying! But this needs caution, because what we banned to the East may return to us from the West. You dispatch turbo-folk to Turkey and it comes back via discotheques in Vienna”.28

Nesting Turbo-folklorismus

The concept of ‘nesting orientalism’29 (a tendency for each region to view cultures and religions to the south and east of it as more conservative or primitive) was famously described by Slavoj Žižek in 1992: for rightwing nationalist Austrians the imaginary frontier is Karavanke: beyond it, the Slavic hordes rule. For the nationalist Slovenes the frontier is the river Kolpa: they are Mitteleuropa, while Croats are already Balkan, involved in the irrational ethnic feuds which really do not concern them. For Croats the crucial frontier is the one between them and Serbs – between the western Catholic civilization and the eastern Orthodox collective spirit – while Serbs see themselves as the last line of defense of Christian Europe against the fundamentalist threat coming from Bosnia and Albania.30 Moreover, this ‘imaginary cartography’ far outstretches the blurry (and ‘mobile’) frontiers of the Balkans.31 This mechanism, according to Žižek, discloses three forms of racism: 1) the ‘old school’ of unabashed rejection of the Balkan Other (as despotic, barbarian, Orthodox, Muslim, corrupt, Orient-

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27 ibid, 227. See also: Stokes [1992].
29 Milica Bakić-Hayden [1995]
31 “For many Germans, Austria is tainted with Balkan corruption and inefficiency; for many Northern Germans, Catholic Bavaria is not free of Balkan contamination. Many arrogant Frenchmen associate Germany with Eastern Balkan brutality – it lacks French finesse. Finally, to some British opponents of the European Union, Continental Europe is a new version of the Turkish Empire with Brussels as the new Istanbul – a voracious despotism threatening British freedom and sovereignty.”, Slavoj Žižek, “You May!”, 21 (6) London Review of Books, 18. 03. 1999, 3-6, at http://www.lrb.co.uk/v21/n06/slavoj-zizek/you-may.
tial …) in favor of true values (Western, civilized, democratic, Christian …); 2) ‘reflexive’ (politically correct) racism, confronting the Balkans as a site of ethnic horrors and tribal passions with the ‘neutral’ West and its ‘enlightened’ conflict resolution by negotiation and compromise; 3) ‘reverse’ racism, which celebrates the exotic authenticity of the Balkans and, moreover, plays a crucial role in the success of Emir Kusturica’s films in the West.32

In the regional context, ‘contaminated’ turbo-folk operates as a ‘symptom’ – “a conceptual category which aggregates connotations of banality, foreignness, violence and kitsch in order to provide a critical apparatus with a ready-made strategy of distancing”.33 There is another, mini-version of ‘nesting orientalism’ – each cultural ‘barricade’ is again seen as a defence against the east [Archer: 2009: 24]: Serbia must preserve its own integrity against ‘Turkish’ or ‘Islamic’ sounding music to prevent the ‘Tehranisation’ of Belgrade; in Croatia turbo-folk is associated with Serbia and its ‘inner Orient’ (Serbian ethnic minority) and must therefore be fought ‘by all means’.

In spite of the relative normalization of turbo-folk in Croatia (compared to the overwhelming odium back in the 1990s), it is still banned from the Croatian TV and radio channels (except in a parody form or slightly ‘Croatized’) and represents a cultural, social and political phenomenon non-recommendable for a wider audience. “Though merely symbolically present on the Croatian radio and TV, narodnjaci irrepressibly advance through their own channels, and all the more rapidly progress from shady pubs to the so-called elite clubs. It is nowadays quite normal to see a poster for a New Year’s party in a popular Zagreb tavern which, along with a detailed description of the gastronomic and entertainment menu, features a sign bez narodnjaka (‘turbo-folk-free’). However, this could be one of the last pockets of organized resistance.”34 Turbo-folk faces additional aversion from the camp of Croatian ‘true narodnjaci’. Duško Kuliš, folk singer from Hercegovina (self declared narodnjak) currently residing in Split, said that he can “more than successfully... position (his music) against aggressive, eastern turbofolk.” He referred to his new (12th) album as a “pure escape from turbo-folk” and described the damage from it in somewhat biological terms: namely, it has “infected our youth almost like the flu attacks the body with a weak immune system. And with my songs I avoid that”.35

32 Ibid.
33 Catherine Baker [2007:139], quoted from: Rory Archer, [2009: 24].
In addition to the Serbo-Croat dispute over turbo-folk, similar music forms perform similar scapegoat roles throughout the Balkan peninsula. A number of prominent cultural figures demanded from the Bulgarian parliament in 1999 ‘cleansing’ of the national soundscape of allegedly ‘bad’, ‘vulgar’ and ‘strange’ sounds coming from the ‘uncivilized’ practices of local Roma and Turks. In Romania, *muzică orientală* is criticized on similar terms for its ‘alien sounds’, ‘contamination’ and ‘banality’, mostly by “those who relish Western European and American popular music without seeing the irony within their own perception of what ‘foreign’ means” [Beissinger: 2007: 131]. In Albania “perhaps the most striking aspect of *muzika popullore* is how much Albanians love to say they hate it” [Sugarman: 2007:289]. The criticism revolves around three main points: 1) *shund* (garbage) / *kiq* (kitsch); 2) *katunarë* (peasant); and 3) *orientalizu* (oriental), *frymë turke* (Turkish) or *magjupsu* (Roma) [ibid]. In Kosovo, one can hear complaints like: “Albanians are a Western people, but this music (*muzika popullore*) had orientalized Albanians a great deal. The Serbs have imposed this music on us as to associate the Albanians with the Orient, fundamentalism, and the like. This isn’t our culture” [ibid:296]. Needless to say, in Greece, a derogatory term for the ‘decadent’ form of *laïkó* music is *skiladiko*, meaning ‘doggish’ or ‘doghouse’ music (associated with ‘Anatolian howling’).

As for the question of ‘purity’ of folk music (and therefore national culture), which, as we have seen, engaged many a sharp mind throughout the Balkans in the last 200 years or so, I would argue that it is possible to detect a system of ‘nesting orientalisms’ within a single national culture: here ‘oriental’ stands for ‘foreign/impure’.

In Serbia, it works as follows: evocations of the golden age of traditional folk songs (‘air-waved’ and processed by experts with conservatory degrees) reflect not only the process of ‘promoting’ folk (rural and small-town) tradition into ‘elite’ culture according to European models (folk culture claims the empty space of the non-existing elite culture), but also a specific ‘orientalist’ mechanism. In this case, the bearers of ‘otherness’ are not ‘Orientals’ (those on the lower civilizational stage according to the European value scale – national and ethnic ‘Others’), but those ‘among us’ who cannot appreciate the ‘true national values’. Thus, within a single national-ethnic complex a specific hierarchy of taste is established (‘*Narzißmus der kleinen Differenzen*’) according to the different perceptions of ‘traditionality’ of folk music. The top ranks of this hierarchy would be claimed by ‘elite’ (educated) folk music lovers, able to

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36 Ironically, established pop and rock musicians who had protested against censorship during communism, loudly cried against *chalga* “calling for new institutional control to limit its access in media space”. see Levy [2002: 208-209].

37 A famous Bulgarian composer said in an interview that *chalga* was the only thing that could make him emigrate from Bulgaria. [Rice: 2002: 38]
‘look farthest back’ in the national past and appreciate both the village- and old-town folklore. ‘Below’ them would be admirers of ‘old-school narodnjaci’ who respect the authority and ‘authentic’ values embodied by Lepa Lukić, Cune Gojković, Predrag Živković Tozovac, Toma Zdravković, Zvonko Bogdan...The next stage down the ‘ladder’ would belong to those who enjoy the ‘buttoned up’ newly-composed music performed by Miroslav Ilić or Merima Njegomir. The next one – to the fans of Lepa Brena as an iconic figure with a quite autonomous position in the Serbian show business and society at large. Then come the patrons of the ‘golden age’ of turbo-folk (Ceca, Dragana, Keba – ‘i, naravno’ – Džej...) and so on – down to the indiscriminate ‘omnivores’ of the current ‘genetically mutated folk’, contaminated by its inherent hybridity, foreign crossovers, Gipsy brass bands, hip-hop, high technology and ‘un-nationality’. The ‘true knowledge’ of what is good folk music thus becomes a solid part of what Stef Jansen calls ‘Serbian Knowledge’ – knowledge “held by all ‘good and real’ Serbs and only by them” [Jansen: 2003: 216].

**Conclusion: Narodnjaci and How to Deal With Them**

In the last 200 years Serbian political and cultural elites conceived modern development in terms of liberation from Ottoman / Asiatic influence and approach to Serbia’s ‘natural’ European / Christian environment, regardless of their political affiliations (slavophiles, conservatives, liberals, communists...). This common perception or recognition of a common element of political identity still prevails in the debates on the cultural, political and national identity in Serbia [see, Đurković: 2002: 271-272], not excluding the field of popular culture which is all too often excluded from academic considerations – in spite of its power and efficiency in forging, adopting and disseminating the ideological stereotypes underlying the deep social divisions and ethnic conflicts (not only) in the Balkans.

Both for its overwhelming presence (importance) in the lives of ‘ordinary people’, and for its associations with the national culture and identity, folk music is subject to markedly intense processes of ‘re-fashioning’, according to the ideological, cultural and economic (political) needs (interests) of the present. Certain musical genres are always prone to achieve a certain degree of notoriety. In the Balkan context, however, contemporary forms of ‘contaminated’ (over-exposed to foreign influence) folk music are especially liable to criticism from all political camps, acquiring a status of “ideological shorthand, not a genre of music” [ibid: 280]. In Serbia, the right-wing blames turbo-folk for corrupting the national
identity (and bad taste), and the left-wing for corrupted nationalism (and bad
taste). Both wings often share the impression that “the greater part of Serbia,
Asia and ‘Orient’ are indeed ugly, threatening, dirty, primitive and hopelessly
un-European places”.38

According to Ivan Čolović, the politics of ‘mutual recognition of cultures’
(their folkloric heritage included) must be criticized because it is founded on
the belief that irreconcilable differences between (national) cultures result from
their inherent, natural traits, and not as a consequence of segregation and forced
separation aimed at constructing each culture as a gravity field of particles
kept together by a centripetal force he calls ‘ethno’. This rhetoric (unlike the
straightforward racism) does not raise suspicion, but may (to the contrary) be
embraced as a model of ‘political correctness’ [Čolović: 2006: 310-311]. As long as
this understanding prevails (conceived by ‘intellectuals’, adopted by politicians
and disseminated by the media and popular culture), ‘contaminated’ forms of
folk music will be “our common garbage, impossible to deal with like the desert
storms” and “our common hereditary cultural desease” [Ugrešić: 2008: 195] –
banned eastwards in the times of crisis, but ever returning from the West in
the closed circuit of supply and demand of – ‘impurity’.

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“Anything but Turban-folk”: the ‘Oriental Controversy’ and Identity Makeovers in the Balkans


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Anja Tedeško

The Invisibility of LGBTIQ [People] between Legislative and Social Aspects in BiH

Abstract

It is important to analyze the historical relations between the mechanisms that produce discomfort, and the modalities of its accumulation in the social order. This paper aims at doing precisely that on the example of the socio-cultural context of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Paul Farmer has reminded us of the importance of analyzing “the processes of social production of suffering”, namely the “form of judicial violence produced by particular social arrangements and inequality”. The actors behind the LGBTIQ acronym are first of all individuals subjected to the historical events in Bosnia and their political and economic consequences. They share with other Bosnian citizens the tensions produced by the complex socio-political situation at present and in the past. But in addition to what they have in common with their fellow citizens, LGBTIQ actors have to live under the pressure of the heteronormative inculturation and subsequent naturalization. Strong links between political and religious institutions in Sarajevo have favored intolerance to diversity related to gender. Everyday life in Sarajevo is strongly influenced by a need for self-presentation and finding a place for oneself within the accepted identity categories. In this game of power, the three dominant religions play an important part. These influences further intersect with legislation, often imposed by the EU. This, however, brings just minor improvements in the situation of marginalized groups in BiH. Often, laws are adopted but remain inactive. Victims of discrimination often hesitate to seek legal help, either because such a request would entail public exposure of their non-heteronormative diversity or because many state employees do not know how to apply the regulations in actual practice. Remaining anonymous is therefore both a necessity and a choice. Yet it can also be read as a tactic used to survive in everyday life.

Key Words

LGBTIQ, everyday life, discrimination, invisibility
Discrimination and the Superficial Application of the Laws

In 2003, Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted the Law on Gender Equality. By doing so, the state sought to systematically solve the problem of discrimination on the basis of gender and/or sexual orientation in the various public and private sectors. The adoption of the Law was followed by a complex process of legislative adaptation at various levels of administration (nationwide, entity, canton and municipality), resulting in total prohibition of discrimination on grounds of gender and sexual orientation. This is the first law that explicitly stipulates such a prohibition. The law guarantees equality in various areas of life: education, economy, employment, health, culture, sport, the public sphere and the media. Protection may be extended to other domains, as determined by the governing body which applies the law. The legislators’ intention was only to make a law that would prohibit sexual discrimination. Unlike the definition of gender, sexual orientation is not present in the terminology and it is therefore subject to an incorrect interpretation.¹

In the practical part of the implementation of the decree, the abolition of discrimination is legitimized by an interpretation of man and woman as biologically constituted equivalents. With this, any diversification of the subjects is avoided, while at the same time the heterosexual normative paradigm is asserted. The binary protection of the gender and all of its roles and functions implied by the law is confirmed by the increased activity of the Equal Opportunity Agency. The formation of such a body on the national level theoretically means an important development for implementing this kind of legislation. However, regardless of its wide scope and expertise, the Agency focuses its work on the protection and promotion of equality on the basis of a subject’s biological gender, which is taken as an unchangeable category. By doing so the Agency neglects and omits the question of sexual orientation and gender identity. Its function is thus oriented towards the improvement of the position of women in a male-dominated society.

The next important legal act was the Anti-Discrimination Law. It passed through a similar application process as the previous law. The anti-discrimination act, passed in 2009, was clearly influenced by BiH’s 2008 request to be

¹ As Banović [2011:65] warns, “The intention of the legislator was first and foremost to prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender, because in all other articles only the word ‘sex’ [spol] is mentioned, and its definition provided in the section where important concepts are defined. The phrase sexual orientation is however not described in the law, which is not a good solution, because a new legal standard is being introduced but its meaning remains unknown to the state administration, the prosecutor’s office and the courts which are supposed to apply this very same standard.”
admitted into the European Union. This admission request meant that BiH would have to adapt to the European Union and its standards. The law was taken in conjunction with the sentence by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in BiH, in the case of Sejdić and Finci vs. BiH. The subject matter of the prosecution was the prevention of these two Bosnian citizens from running as candidates in the 2006 elections because of their ethnic and religious affiliation – namely, they did not belong to any of the three “constituent nations” in BiH. The Bosnian Constitution, defined by its rigid conception of ethnic identity, recognizes only two categories of citizens: the constituent peoples (Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats), and the so called other citizens, who do not belong or do not recognize themselves in one of the three groups. The Constitution in itself is a bearer of discrimination.

The anti-discrimination law however does not only prohibit discrimination based on ethnicity, language, or religion, but also on the basis of sex/gender and sexual orientation. This is the first bill that, in addition to gender and sexual orientation, introduces the protection of freedom of sexual expression. The rule of law can thus be interpreted as the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of identity or gender. The deficiency of this law is that it does not provide explicit definitions of “sexual orientation” and “sexual expression”. This deficiency can be attributed to the relative novelty of these standards and practical difficulties encountered by officials who apply these laws. This can lead to a restrictive interpretation and consequent denial of legal protection to certain LGBTIQ actors.

The two bills illustrate an attitude that is non-hostile and tolerant towards LGBTIQ actors. It is important, however, not only to read the laws but also to consider them in comparison with the everyday lives of LGBTIQ people, as well as to the Bosnian socio-cultural context. As has already been mentioned, the introduction of specific legislative protections occurred through external influence. Even though there is now a legislative opening about the LGBTIQ issue, there still persists a strong marginalization of these people, violence against them, and invisibility of the whole problem.

The difference between the practice and the norm stems from a paradox that is related to the democratic transition process in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the prospect of the country’s integration into the EU. This often results in imposing laws without taking realistically into account the situation in the Bosnian society. BiH’s laws adhere to the standards laid down by the European and American legal neo-imperialism. This legislative mobilization implies a default understanding of what is meant by discrimination under the declaration of human rights.

2 Dervo Sejdic is the president of the Roma association in Sarajevo, while Jakob Finci is the former president of the Jewish community of Sarajevo.

3 The foreign powers impose themselves onto the Bosnian way of life with a force that is comparable to the one that the postcolonial countries have experienced. The uniformity
rights. The concept of discrimination, as well as the laws which it determines, become an instrument of the West’s anthropopoietic forces, which impose through performative language a legislative framework that builds models of humanity on a global level, thus putting the heterogeneity of humans under the reductive and homogenized official legitimacy. The identities, which the anti-discrimination norm protects, are a “gathering place within the political discourse” [Butler: 1993: 130], through which the symbolic and real laws are expressed and modeled. Butler, discussing Žižek’s theory of the “ghostly promise”, warns us against the risks “that the regulatory mechanisms contingent to the production of the subject can be reified as universal laws, dispensed by the same process of discursive rearticulation they determine” [ibid: 133]. Given the political nature of the norms, it is legitimate to ask whether the application of the standards is consistent with their theoretical postulate and regulations. The Bosnian legislative investment confirms the fulfillment of the international agreement and the symbolic, relational meaning that the laws imply. Yet the freedom of expression that these Bosnian laws provide is implemented only on the theoretical level. Everyday life seems to be subject to different norms, which often inculcate fear in the LGBTIQ community and its representatives, disempowering them as subjects. The combination of fear and invisibility determines the non-recognition by the authorities of actual daily discrimination to which the LGBTIQ actors/people are subject.

The two laws we have been talking about – the 2003 equality bill and especially the 2009 anti-discrimination bill – have introduced the official recognition of discrimination into the Bosnian legal regulations. This actually amounts to a statement that Bosnians’ everyday life is subject to prejudice, stereotypes and discrimination. Even if we give the anti-discriminatory act a legislative

imposed by the West and other countries has not distanced itself from the colonialist policies of bureaucratic and administrative unification.

4 It is an anthropological concept that can be explained as the self-building process of social man. Anthropopoiesis is the set of all cultural practices and devices aimed at the forming and molding of individuals, based on the idea of each person’s own society. The socio-cultural forging is a reaction to the incompleteness that the human being carries since his birth. This process is not static nor is it bound to a single and exclusive outcome. The processes of anthropopoiesis are present anywhere in the world, regardless of the socio-political context in which the individuals are born. The ability of the subjects to relate critically to their “construction/constriction”, disassemble the vision in which the subjects would be fully subject to a predetermined reality and incorporated into stratified categorizations. Between the subject and its habitat there is always a two-way relationship. Luca Jourdan in his text on the plasmation of the subjects in socio-cultural contexts determined by the fragmentation of power and state, theorizes the importance of the analysis of the “relationship between the anthropopoietic forces and agency” [Jourdan 2012], thus introducing into the anthropopoietic paradigm the role and function of subjectivity. Jourdan’s words contextualize the relationship of reciprocation between subjectivity and reality which in turn is determined by collective and individual action.
value, the identity of groups and subgroups on which the discriminatory act is based is paradoxically strengthened. This reinforcement that occurs in relation to/intersection with the structural, institutional and systemic planes of the society, caused by the fact that this safeguard is not applied as it should be, further consolidates the meaning and the reiteration of the predicate that the discriminatory act enunciates.

Homophobia thus becomes the main determinant of how the LGBTIQ people/actors are going to be positioned within the society. Hence the legislative recognition does not necessarily represent an actual improvement in the status of LGBTIQ people. Instead, this status becomes stagnant due to a combination of factors. The law is enforced in a superficial way, which discourages most victims of violence and discrimination to file a complaint. Many LGBTIQ people/actors have come to accept these and other abuses. Often they are not even aware of the rights they possess. The decision not to expose the violence they are experiencing also denies the other citizens an insight into the condition in which the LGBTIQ people must live. The people of Sarajevo have little or no knowledge of the LGBTIQ situation in their city. So a lack of interest on the part of state institutions in upholding the anti-discriminatory legislation puts the LGBTIQ community in a position of weakness, making them less visible and more exposed to violence and discrimination.

Gender and sexual identities ought to be considered in the broader framework of identity issues as they are played out in the given sociocultural context. It could be argued that the daily life in Bosnia is strongly influenced by the need to prove oneself in comparison to other people. Thanks to the past conflict, identity is caught in a tension which is brought up through nationality, religion, or social and economic issues. The national ideologies of the 1990s have left a powerful mark on the way identities are constructed. Because of the difficulty with which the past is being forgotten identity mechanisms are producing a lot of strain in the recognition process. This strain transcends the institutional, administrative and bureaucratic levels and makes itself felt in the everyday human relationships. The individual is so subjugated by the constant demand to define oneself, to choose what he or she is, what he or she would like to be, and especially to know what is expected from him or her. This pressure is an organizing and ordering force in social relations. Among the LGBTIQ people/actors this tension is manifested by the stiffening of the personal identity which is often reflected in the decision to not profess their sexual orientation. Because of the heteronormative milieu, this personal trait becomes a secret. And as always, keeping a secret brings a whole set of problems, from the need to guard and protect this secret to the fear of the consequences that a revelation would imply. For all these reasons, one’s sexual orientation is one of the best kept
secrets, especially in places like Sarajevo, where powerful forces are active that are not very accepting of sexual diversity.

The display of diversity is often understood as a deviation from the norms. Often the interviewees used the term smetati which translates into English as “annoy” or “bother”. They used this term to explain the effect that the revelation of the secret produces. The term smetati is etymologically related to the word smeće, meaning “garbage”. Like garbage, the bodies that express this diversity are considered social rejects/waste, they are considered to be a nuisance. Something that exists around you, but that you actively strive to avoid. The difference of the LGBTIQ community, if viewed in this distorted manner, can become a means of discrimination from the part of the heteronormative majority. Often, the request for recognition is mistaken for a request for specific rights. In BiH there is a widely held belief that LGBTIQ rights are special rights, which are not in conformity with the norm. The fear is that if these “special rights” were granted, they would impinge negatively on the existing rights and destabilize heteronormative daily life. The fear of the unknown is hindering the process of learning what is really happening and is intentionally suppressing people’s diversity.

And the reality of the situation is this: LGBTQ people in BiH do not ask for any special or exclusive rights, but they do request the indiscriminate use of all the rights that a “regular” citizen would. According to BiH legislation, sexual orientation is not a criterion for minority. In BiH the status of minority is attributed only to social groups for reasons related to their nationality, language, religion, and their supposed ethnic affiliations. The LGBTQ actors/people are not, in theory, excluded from participation in daily social life. Their sexual orientation, which is the basis for a cultural diversification, is constantly subjected to a discriminatory dynamics. The discrimination is made official only after the public revelation of the secret, namely when the secret ceases to be such. At the same time though, when the revelation is made official, the legislative level should intervene and shield the victim of the discrimination. This doesn’t happen, however, and the sudden visibility of the subject results in certain discrimination without the legal protection. When things become official, then, it would be necessary to remove the “homophobic regime of the heterosexual matrix” based on the “model of heterosexuality” [see Cavarero in Butler: 1996], which also draws upon the power of the traditionalist and patriarchal forces in Bosnian society.

The recognition of diversity by the powers that be creates the category of sexual orientation. Such an agreement introduces into the language the typical discursive sequence contained in the concept of sexual minority. The heterosexual paradigm ascribes to sexuality a certain symbolism that establishes boundaries. The coming out in BiH denies the subject the secrecy he or she deserves, while
labeling them publicly and categorizing them as a minority, by sexual orientation and expression. This definition has no legislative value, but it does have a normative value at the level of social relations. Namely, it has value within the moral normativity (especially within the religious circles) that dominates the public sphere in Sarajevo. Sexual orientation and sexual expression are seen as pawns in the game of power between the various anthropopoietic forces of Sarajevan and Bosnian society.

The Everyday Life Amid Tactics and Strategy

The impossibility of LGBTIQ actors to fulfill social demands puts them in a position of disadvantage and transgression of the heteronormative symbolic norms. The transgression is not a free choice of the subject, but a response to a hardly attainable norm. LGBTIQ actors are placed in a position of marginality, which requires their silence. Invisibility forces them to devise means to cheat the system. A homosexual can hardly build a family in Sarajevo. However, this does not mean that there are no gays or lesbians with children. In most cases these children are a result of attempts to comply with the standards or to deny one's predilection. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, just a few LGBTIQ decide to come out publicly. Most instead use strategies and tactics that allow them to survive in anonymity. Invisibility is not an expression of passivity – it is a desire to normalize one's position, and therefore to be recognized on an equal footing with the others, without a conception of oneself as being subject to discrimination, denial or manipulation. Survival becomes the answer to the accusations of those who charge them with deviance and insanity. For religious institutions and traditionalists, homosexuals are one of the reasons for the undermined integrity of the Bosnian cultural heritage. The homophobic order produces strategies through which acts of discrimination and violence against LGBTIQ individuals and their social reality take shape. The oppressed bodies become spaces on which ethical and moral laws are engraved - bodies are intended to become a statement of diversity. Society inscribes its disagreement on the LGBTIQ bodies. Acts of violence expressed against a person are measures: “they are destined to imprint the force of law [...] to make a demonstration of the rules and to produce a ‘copy’ that would make the norm readable” (De Certeau: 2010: 203-206). The writing engraved on the body becomes a principle of social hierarchy that transforms individual bodies into social ones.

The LGBTIQ individuals are not the only ones who are subjected to these dynamic inscriptions of the law. The same holds for all other ordinary people who walk, live and consume products in everyday life in Sarajevo. The appropriation of the rights over the bodies, of the possibility to turn them into your own text
is one of the elements that keeps all ordinary subjects in the same position of subordinates. The difference between actors depends on the use of strategies and tactics. For Michel de Certeau, strategies are calculations of power relations that become possible when a subject’s will and power emerge as such within a setting. Strategies presume a place that can be delimited as the subject’s own and serve as the basis for managing the relations with an exterior. In contrast to strategies, tactics do not have this reliability, do not have “one’s own base” with clear borders by virtue of which “the other becomes a visible totality”. The only place given to a tactic is the place of the other. If strategy represents the victory of place over time, the tactic, by virtue of its non-place, depends on time. The tactic does not economize but plays with the events and turns them into opportunities, which seek to create possible advantages. It is in this sense that the tactics are the tacit, invisible products thanks to which the world of the consumers insinuates itself into the world of the producers: examples would include acts of talking, reading, cooking, or shopping.

De Certeauan analysis of culture allows us to interpret everyday life in polemological terms. Culture “articulates conflicts and alternately legitimizes, displaces, or controls the superior force” [ibid: 13]. The everyday becomes a cultural field, the scene of constant conflict – silent and almost invisible. With this in mind we could say that a walk (let us take a walk in the town as an example) contains in itself both a strategy and a tactic produced and used by the subject. Through this daily action, an ordinary person produces and organizes his or her own space. This kind of walk becomes a space of enunciation where the body and the movement of the feet produce a text, inscribing in space and time the gestures which veil and unveil tactics designed to partially re-appropriate the denied identity.

If the walker plays with the organization, the LGBTIQ actor “dares” because s/he exposes his or her will to the community. The walk of an LGBTIQ actor, especially of a couple, is subject to further constraints (limits, restrictions), especially physical ones, referring to the impossibility to freely express their emotions. This strain can transform some gestures, that would not normally be practiced by LGBTIQ actors, into a means of camouflage. For example, in BiH it is common for two men to greet one another by hugging and patting one another on the back (usually with the left hand) and kissing each other in the face. This conventional way of greeting then becomes a daily ritual for many gay couples. This interaction is socially acceptable, but often contains an additional coding, understandable only to the actors involved. If the actors play the role well, such gestures are taken by the rest of society as a usual and normal practice. Their decisions and attitudes in public become an expression of the request for legitimization, while the daily walk allows them to build, from their very marginality, new forms of political action that can produce significant
social change and organize their own space. Just as in the act of walking the body has a considerable mnemonic role, using the camouflage tactic is adapted to the socially normalized image.

In Western societies there is often a widespread conception of lesbians as masculine, angry, with short hair and, vice versa, gays as effeminate, always cheerful and with particular attention to the care of the body and personal appearance. The Sarajevo society is no different from that stereotyped concept of gender, where the non-heterosexual is superficially opposed to the normative vision of male or female. Being labeled as different means being exposed to daily prejudices. It is not only dress that is criticized and judged but also manners and conduct in public. This forces even those who come close to such stereotypes to attenuate their visibility so as to avoid judging glances. Although in Sarajevo society many prefer to adapt to the heteronormative demands, there are always people who cannot do it, or simply refuse to give in to this imposition. The LGBTIQ bodies can be understood as texts dealt with by historical subjects, who through daily interaction negotiate, exchange experiences, conflicts and self-representations, who are continuously questioning the prevalent dichotomous conception of social reality. This model does not do justice to the dynamic and irreducible complexity in which the actors are immersed.

It is especially interesting to observe the construction and denial of recognition in an urban space such as Sarajevo. During the war, the urban setting was transformed into a space of extermination. The city became a sort of battlefield for survival. Living became an outcome of strategies, often imposed, that deprived the subject of the freedom to choose. The hard work of survival and normalizing daily life as much as possible required ingenious tactics. Most of the time, the main goal was not to get killed. Decision, however, was made by accident, because the grenades were falling randomly. They, together with the snipers, were the uncontrolled constant, expression of a power indifferent to their existence. The citizens of Sarajevo became a dehumanized mass. The memory of the war is imprinted in the city space (bullet holes on houses, signs of grenades on the road, etc.). Although this memory has, by sheer force of habit, grown almost invisible to the townspeople, it is still highly visible to the visitors. These are the circumstances in which the past is still present.

In such a scenario, suspended between past, present and future, the citizens claim another ideological vision, imposed from the outside: the accessibility of undifferentiated consumption. On the one hand, the city space is studded with countless signs of capitalist corporations, inviting the city dwellers to spend their time dreaming of being able to access goods, often unattainable due to high unemployment. On the other hand, the city space is an expression of a consumerism that sometimes becomes almost insolent. The disregard for coexistence is expressed by filling outside space with waste. One could almost
dare to argue that the collective production of degradation, as well as the discrimination of the LGBTIQ subject, is the expression of an organic, structural suffering, produced by a story still in progress. There is no indication that if a society took care of the public space discrimination will disappear. In Sarajevo, there tends to be a strong division between private and public space. The outside disorder is opposed to the private, female-dominated family area, in which order and cleanliness rule. In BiH the dichotomous division between private and public, masculine/feminine is quite obvious, and to a degree determines roles and relationships. This dichotomous relationship is visible also in the role of appearance: care of oneself is important, and looking nice, clean and modest is often associated with noblest virtues to which a person can aspire, such as loyalty and honesty. A person is not judged by how he or she treats the shared, collective spaces, but by how he or she compares with oneself and with other people. This morality creates tensions that are reflected in many daily rituals.

Conclusion
Bosnia-Herzegovina, despite being incorporated in the international human rights regime, does not offer a real possibility to activists and NGOs to work towards a full application of human rights. The Bosnian institutions are not very good at respecting gender equality, even less the rights of LGBTIQ people. This inconsistency is perceived even by the public opinion, still largely influenced by the interpretations provided by religious and political leaders. The indifference of the public opinion to the issue of coming out for LGBTIQ people is still remarkable. The public interest in LGBTIQ issues is limited to events such as accidents, scandals, abuses which are exploited by the media.

These dynamics determine the folding in on itself of the LGBTIQ community. There are many contradictions and divisions within it. LGBTIQ activism in Sarajevo remains marginal and full of barriers, which further undermine the little support that the LGBTIQ community gets. A large percentage of LGBTIQ people in Bosnia-Herzegovina prefer to stay “in the closet”. Invisibility has become an ideal cover that provides protection and anonymity. In Sarajevo, the situation is slightly different. Many people move to the city in order to access the possibilities that the smaller towns do not offer. But even in the large city they may prefer to remain anonymous, trusting the security of the virtual world and meeting each other at private events. The taboo and denial imposed on their lives is subject to structural violence defined by Farmer as “that particular kind of violence that is exercised in an indirect way, which does not need an actor to be performed, but is produced by the social organization itself, and its deep inequalities” [Farmer in Quaranta: 2006: 7].
In BiH today a trend towards conformism may be perceived, favoring a society that complies with the religious ideologies. Power becomes morality. The complexity of interpersonal relationships tends to be reduced in the prevalent perception. There are underlying rules of common sense which are used to evaluate daily activities, such as manner of walking, clothing style, speaking, showing affection etc. There is reason to wonder whether this prevalent tendency towards cultural conformity is a consequence of war or not. The logic behind the defensive mechanism of the “us against them” becomes clearer once we take into account the events of the last twenty years and also the aforementioned stiffening of Sarajevo’s public attitude, to which the LGBTIQ people are intimately connected. Remotti observes pertinently how the discourse of identity is not only an expression of cultural impoverishment but in itself generates misery inside the person:

“A poor culture is a culture that too drastically reduces the complexity of relationships, fearing the future and its effects of alteration, and takes refuge is a mere classificatory order. Dramatically reducing the complexity, this process replaces the relations, the burns, the entanglements, the reciprocal implications with a purely dichotomous logic, ‘us’ and ‘others’, identity on the one hand (A) and non-identity on the other (non-A).” [Remotti: 2010: 136]

These arguments are very useful for understanding the dynamics of Sarajevan society, where the desire for stability leads to a conflict-ridden confrontation with the classifying social order. Invisibility is produced by the above-mentioned causes. The kind of invisibility of the LGBTIQ actors of Sarajevo is a product of the selection mechanisms that the society plays in order to pursue its own models of humanity. The different, the unwanted are forced to remain in this condition if they want to avoid repercussions. Deciding to fight against this approach has implications that many LGBTIQ are not ready to face. They remain anonymous and therefore move within a setting of their own choosing. Staying anonymous can thus be seen as both a necessity and a choice. Following the lead of De Certeau, this course of action can be considered as a plan that the ordinary subject can bend and twist so as better to survive, adapting to external expectations but also to his or her own needs.
Us and Them - Symbolic Divisions in Western Balkan Societies

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THE GEOGRAPHY OF SYMBOLIC DIFFERENCES: VILLAGE, TOWN, REGION
Ana Ranitović

Why do they call it Raška when they mean Sandžak? A Case Study of Regionalism in South-West Serbia

Abstract
This paper presents a case study of local reactions to the re-regionalisation process in the border region of south-west Serbia – home of predominantly Slavonic-speaking populations with both Orthodox Christian and Muslim religious affiliations. The region in question is often considered to be a ‘different historical space’, more Balkan than others, partly due to the long presence of Ottoman rule. Perpetual instability and the incapability or reluctance of numerous ruling empires and states to integrate it in their overarching identities have contributed to a chronic identity crisis in the south west of Serbia, where no consensus can be reached regarding its history and even its name, both across and within ethnic groups. The re-regionalisation process, as directed by the EU and carried out by the Republic of Serbia in 2009-2010, was perceived as strategically significant on all state levels, yet it also generated heightened ethnic tensions between different communities in the region. The process of defining statistical regions for the purposes of pre- and post-accession EU funds distribution morphed into a highly historicized and politicized debate in south-west Serbia, reproducing the symbolic boundaries existing between different local groups. Through an analysis of the effects of and reactions to the regionalization process in south-west Serbia, this paper inquires into boundaries of people’s worlds in symbolism and how these are manifested.

Key Words
ethnic boundaries, identity, regionalism, Raška, Sandžak
Introduction

During the height of public interest in the re-regionalisation process in Serbia, in the summer of 2009, the media frequently reported that the disparity between the most developed and most underdeveloped parts of Serbia is sevenfold. Numerous reasons could, thus, be heard in support of re-regionalisation – creating a more democratic regime, effective rule and balanced regional development along with satisfying the requirements of the EU and achieving eligibility for pre-accession funds. At the same time, however, there was, and still is a great fear among both those who are in favor of regionalism and those that are not, that stems from a belief that the redrawing of administrative boundaries carries with it the dangers of separatism, while any type of decentralisation is characterized as essentially “subversive” and a “continuation of Yugoslav politics”, the main association being the fate of Kosovo and Metohija. Thus, regionalism in Serbia would have to achieve all those above noted purposes while safeguarding the unity of the state and preventing any further separatist tendencies. The fact that these two are generally perceived by the public as mutually exclusive, serves as a good point of departure for discussing the challenges and conceptions of regionalism in south-west Serbia.

Like numerous other places, south-west Serbia has more than one history and more than one name. Stories, chronologies, legends and interpretations intersect and overlap just enough to show that a common ground for disagreement exists as different groups engage in a battle to claim as much of the ‘truth’ for themselves as possible. South-west Serbia as a concept lives only as an indeterminate geographical idea, but it takes different forms in the minds of its inhabitants and all those who speak about it. A transient south-west Serbia only becomes a clear structure when it is called “Raška” or “Sandžak”, in which case it brings to life a complex set of ideas and beliefs about origin, identity, practice, purpose and history. Due to this specificity of south-west Serbia as a ‘region’, I will focus on symbolic borders – the ones people put up in order to separate themselves from each other, as well as the ones they imagine bound the territory they live in and from which they draw their identity. Following a number of studies [(Cohen:1982b: 1-18); (Cohen:1986b:1-20); (Bouquet:1986); (McFarlane: 1986: 88 – 104)], I will look for “the boundaries of their [people’s] worlds in symbolism” [Cohen:1986b:2], ethnic ones separating people and those imagined to exist on the ground when one speaks of Raška or Sandžak.

1 The original Serbo-Croat spelling of the names of people and places has been retained in this paper.
South-west Serbia\(^2\) will be used as a neutral term in this paper, the intention being to denote a border area that most of its inhabitants imagine when they talk about the Serbian parts of Raška or Sandžak – the six municipalities of Novi Pazar, Sjenica, Tutin, Priboj, Prijepolje and Nova Varoš. Together they make up a geographically very diverse region that is among the most picturesque, but also the most economically underdeveloped in the Balkans encompassing a little more than 8000 km\(^2\). It is for the most part the home of a Slavonic-speaking population, some of Orthodox Christian and others of Muslim religious affiliation - Serbs and Bosniaks.\(^3\) Today, the first mostly speak of the region as Raška, after the name of the medieval Serbian kingdom that expanded on its territory, while for the Muslim population it is Sandžak, a word that reflects the five-century-long rule of the Ottoman Empire in the area and roughly corresponds to the Novipazar sancak\(^4\) that was established in 1867, encompassing territories in both Serbia and neighbouring Montenegro [Mušović:1979]. At the same time, the region is officially not labelled as either – instead, it is formally part of two counties\(^5\) that extend beyond the imagined boundaries of both Raška and Sandžak. Because I have placed a focus on relations across social boundaries in the context of the regionalisation process in Raška or Sandžak, an exclusive use of either of the two terms for the region would be inadequate - it is for this reason that the term ‘south-west Serbia’ has appeared as useful in denoting the territory I would like to focus on. The ethnographic material in this paper is based on fieldwork conducted in Sjenica, Novi Pazar, Prijepolje,

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2 The term ‘south-West Serbia’ is not one that is typically used for the area. In fact, it has begun to be implemented relatively recently, mostly in the speech and documents of non-governmental agents and foreign officials who wish to avoid seeming biased.

3 The word ‘Muslim’ has an ethnic connotation in the space of former Yugoslavia. As an ethnic label, it was made official by the 1963 Constitution which described Yugoslavia as a socialist federative community of equal nations and nationalities and added ‘Muslims by nationality’ as the sixth constitutional nation of Yugoslavia, instead of the initial five. When written with a capital letter, Musliman stands for a nationality, while in the lowercase form, musliman, it denotes religious affiliation. Although, the word ‘Bosniak’ was introduced after the breakup of Yugoslavia as a more adequate replacement, Muslim as an ethnic category still persists both in official documents and in everyday speech. For this reason, I will use the two terms, Muslim and Bosniak, as interchangeable in this paper. For a more comprehensive overview of ethnic terms in Socialist Yugoslavia, see Bogoljub Kočović [1998].

4 In the lowercase form, sandžak (from sancak in Turkish, meaning flag) stands for one type of administrative unit in the Ottoman empire, the county.

5 Novi Pazar and Tutin are in the Raška county, while Priboj, Prijepolje, Nova Varoš and Sjenica are in the Zlatibor county. Counties exist as ‘branches’ of the state government which execute those tasks of the state administration that cannot be carried from the state centre, such as policing, branches of the tax administration, etc. In practice, this means that counties do not represent units of decentralisation.
Nova Varoš and Belgrade from autumn of 2009 to spring of 2010, and during the autumn of 2012.

**Borders and Boundaries in South-West Serbia**

In anthropology there exist various types of borders and boundaries – symbolic ones, which separate “worlds of meaning” [Donnan and Wilson: 1999: 19] or determine membership in collectivities, such as ethnic, cultural or social, are usually referred to as boundaries. On the other hand, there are borders in the sense of geopolitical delimitations of space. Obviously the symbolic and geopolitical can be and often are aspects of a single boundary. Although primarily interested in state borders, Donnan and Wilson also speak of them more generally as “meaning-making and meaning-carrying entities, parts of cultural landscapes which often transcend the physical limits of the state and defy the power of state institutions”[ibid: 4]. This means that the social, cultural and territorial aspects of borders need not be mutually exclusive.

Regardless of the everyday contact between Serbs and Muslims in south-west Serbia over the centuries, they have not ceased to view themselves as two separate units and have been growing further apart since the violent breakup of Yugoslavia and the persistent deterioration of industry and the economy in the region. The underlying similarities the inhabitants of south-west Serbia share – linguistic and cultural ones along with citizenship, threaten to weaken their mutual distinctiveness to a certain extent, thus, the question of how one should resist such a dangerous assimilation is a prevailing issue in the area. The ethnic boundary between Serbs and Muslims persists in its existence, however, a problem we are faced with is the origin of this boundary – it is certain that it has not existed ‘forever’, and even more so that it has shifted in time. While Fredrik Barth’s ideas about how “norms of behaviour” contribute to the persistence of boundaries are useful [1969], he does not recognize the agency of people who conceptualize borders and boundaries, speak about them and cross them, nor their role in distorting them. Subsequent works have drawn on the ideas of Barth while criticizing him in certain aspects [(Cole and Wolf: 1974); (Wallman: 1978); (Cohen: 1982, 1985, 1986, 1987); (Okely:1983); (McFarlane:1986), (Jenkins:1997), (Donnan and Wilson: 1999)], providing valuable insight for the study of ethnic boundaries south-west Serbia.

That being said, the ethnic structure of south-west Serbia is problematic for analysis due to its complexity and the delicacy of questions related to origin and identity. The delicacy derives from the historical development of south-west Serbia during which the differing political constellations made first the transformation of native populations possible, and in the last, most recent phase
provided the possibility for people of different confessions “to declare themselves, in certain social and economic, cultural and political circumstances, as members of different nations…” - the problem comes in the second part of this exemplary quotation – “…even though their ethnic roots are the same” [Rudić and Stepić:1995]. This last statement, which asserts that all Slavonic-speaking Muslims are Serbs who converted to Islam, demonstrates the predominant Serbian view of origins and is typically the cause of conflict with those of Muslim religious affiliation.

For this reason, such discussions are avoided with an anxious care and have become confined to Serb-only groups or rare alcohol-induced arguments. When I asked a young imam in Sjenica what he thought of the idea that all Muslims are converted Serbs, he told me:

I congratulate you on this question. I have been longing for a while to have someone pose it to me, but no one dares. (…) You tell me that my great-grandfather was a convert and that I should go back to the ancestral faith. I do not want to comment on that, even… there might have been exceptional cases, but anyway, the basic point is that each individual should be allowed to determine who he is for himself. I am a Bosniak, I believe in that, that is my origin. Full stop. I will be accepted if I agree that I am a Serb Muslim, if I give up myself, my history, my ancestors…? I am sorry, but I am not capable of that. My great-grandfather lived here, just like yours did. What is the problem, then?

An old Serb, on the other hand, was more tentative as he sketched out the historical transformations that, in his opinion, took place in Sandžak from the height of Raška to the present day:

First we lived as Serbs among Serbs, then we lived under the Turks, and then with the poturica6 and under the Turks. After that we lived with Muslims [muslimani], then with Muslims with a capital M [Muslimani], then, finally, we now live with

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6 Poturica – Serbian name for those members of the native population who converted to Islam during Ottoman times.
**Us and Them - Symbolic Divisions in Western Balkan Societies**

*Bosniaks* – a total confusion! Can you imagine how confusing it is for us, especially those of us who have lived here for as many decades as I have? ... But, I ask, is this process ever going to end?

The length of this paper does not allow us to sketch out the historical transformation of identities in the different political entities south-west Serbia was part of throughout history, however, the great variety of ethnic terms expressed in the above statement illustrates the variability of those that are and were in use in the region. The Bosniak* national designation for Muslims in Serbia first appeared in a Serbian census in the year 2003, although the former terms ‘*Musliman*’ and ‘undeclared *musliman*’ were also available options. During fieldwork in the summer of 2009, I noticed that the cities of Novi Pazar and Sjenica were covered in posters sporting the Ottoman emblem of Sandžak and a picture of a couple dressed in Bosniak traditional dress, put up by the Bosniak National Council. The posters were calling people to register themselves in the “special voting list” of the Bosniak national minority, and in big red letters underneath explained it with the exclamation: “Confirm your identity!”. Most Serbs I spoke to referred to these posters with irritation. As one girl in her early twenties told me:

*I have many Muslim friends; I don't care about that [religion]. I hang out with people who are good people, that's what matters but what everyone seems to have forgotten. I mean, I don't like extreme-minded people, whether they are Serb or Muslim. And all these posters in town, they are not just pieces of paper, they have an influence. For example, the other night I was out with friends, and a Muslim friend of mine started speaking about that, and she said: 'We are a national minority!' 'So what?', I asked, 'you have the same rights as I do', and she replied: 'Yes, but I want my own country!'*

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7 Refer to footnote 3.
8 The first time that the Bosniak idea was concretely formulated as part of a national and political agenda was in the late 19th century during the occupation of Bosnia by Austria-Hungary. The revival of the Bosniak idea began with the sharpening of political conflicts in Yugoslavia in the late 1980s and was initiated by influential Bosnian Muslims from abroad. The Bosniak national name was accepted by acclamation at the ‘Bosniak Assembly’ that gathered together the Muslim political and intellectual elite in 1993, while international recognition came with the Washington Consensus in 1994. For a comprehensive analysis of the historical transformations of Bosnian Muslims, see Pisnon [1993].
9 See footnote 3.
Culture is an important aspect of boundaries and borders which function as institutions, processes and markers of identity and is seen by people themselves as such – as a source of meaning and a template for the valorisation of social life and social action. Similarly, the concepts of ethnicity, nationality and identity are not just ‘empty terms’ of no use – the concepts themselves have played a very significant role in the official determination of who exactly inhabits south-west Serbia and by what name - words and terms that began their lives in official ideology and as ink on paper have undergone a process of democratisation, and people came to view them as familiar and important. Throughout the process, a common belief emerged – belief in the correspondence between nationality, identity, culture and territory and that these can be bounded only within the state. While many people in south-west Serbia that I have spoken confirm that they do share a a distinct sense of regional identity regardless of religious affiliation, as well as that in the past they used to speak of the region using different terms, they admit that today they choose their words with more care. This is mirrored in the re-regionalisation process in Serbia which, as soon as it began, transformed into a political matter. The claims and arguments put forward as to how regionalisation should be conducted were modelled after a purely oppositional view of ethnic identities in south-west Serbia, as the following section will show.

The Regionalism Debate: a Political Matter?

The principal goal of regionalism in the EU is to reorganize the state according to the concept of subsidiarity and so aid citizens in the realisation of their interests and fulfilment of their needs on the lowest level of governance, within institutions that are closest and most familiar to them [Wilson:2000:146]. While the current political actors in Serbia may or may not support this design, the demands of the European Union are clear with regard to the Serbian goal of European integration – the Council of Europe sets the decentralisation of state and public authority and the support of local and regional autonomies as one of its principal goals. States that are up for EU candidacy are expected to synchronize their regional structures with EU standards within two years of signing the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. Although Serbia had not yet signed this agreement in 2009, it set out to implement all the standards beforehand in order to speed up the process.

One of the duties that Serbia faced in this sense was the creation of regions as vehicles for the dispersion of pre-accession and post-accession EU funds. These would be supervised by regional agencies whose main task would be to coordinate regional projects with the relevant governmental bodies in Belgrade and the EU. On the other hand, no directly elected regional authorities would
be established, at least not in the first phase, nor would the regions possess any type of political autonomy. Examples of EU countries show that the main factor in how regions were delimited was the estimated economic benefit, while popular claims to regional identities were for the most part ignored [See Parkin:1999]. According to public statements by all the relevant political actors, the regionalisation process in Serbia was not politically motivated, but instead solely served to allow access to money from EU funds and its even and fair distribution.

It was along these lines that the long awaited Law of Regional Development of Serbia was passed in the summer of 2009. Proposing a statistical division of Serbia according to the ‘Snow White and the Seven Dwarf’ Model, as it was jokingly called by the public, it represented a framework within which the whole of Vojvodina\(^{10}\) was to become one region, while the rest of Serbia was divided into six small regions. Officially, how the municipalities of Serbia were to be arranged among these six regions was yet to be determined by the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia and in accordance with EU standards. Unofficially, a lot of lobbying by Bosniak political parties paved the way for an already determined design against the objections of a number of Serbian NGOs from south-west Serbia, academics and presidents of a few municipalities who were against the break-up of current counties, and even more opposed to the idea of creating a region in which Muslims would make up the majority population.

In July of 2009, the politically active mufti Muamer Zukorlić\(^{11}\) established the Forum of Bosniak Organisations and Institutions in Novi Pazar, announcing that its first task would be aimed at modifying some of the key points of the Constitution of Serbia, namely, those parts related to the hymn and the preamble in which Serbia is described as the “state of Serbian people and all those who live in it”. In his words:

\[\textit{As an organisation that surpasses divisions between political parties, we will fight for the rights of Muslims and Bosniaks within the legal system of Serbia, and we will ask for Sandžak to be defined within the Constitution as a distinctive region with Novi Pazar as its seat.}\]^{12}

10 Vojvodina is the northern part of Serbia that borders on Hungary. It was an autonomous province from 1974 until 1990. It was reinstated as autonomous in 2010.
11 Mufti, in Arabic, is an Islamic scholar. The Muslim citizens of Serbia have two muftis who lead two official and mutually antagonist Islamic communities since their leadership split in 2007. On one side is the Islamic Community in Serbia (ISIC), led by Zukorlić from Novi Pazar, which is more inclined to look to Sarajevo as its centre; on the other side is the Islamic Community of Serbia (ISOC), led by reis-ul-ulama Adem Zilkić, which is oriented towards Belgrade and has its headquarters there.
On the same day that the Forum was established, it passed a Declaration against the violation of rights of Bosniaks and Muslims through discrimination and “further administrative disintegration of the Sandžak region”\(^\text{13}\) (FBOI 2009: point V) and ask that, “in accordance with the principles and standards of European regionalism in the process of decentralisation and regionalisation of Serbia, in future constitutional and legal decrees, the state bodies respect the uniqueness of the Sandžak region, which implies its integrity and capital in Novi Pazar”.\(^\text{14}\) However, none of the Bosniak parliamentary parties signed this Declaration. When Rasim Ljajić, Minister of Labour, Employment and Social Affairs of Serbia at the time and leader of the Sandžak Democratic Party of Serbia (SDP) which held three seats in the parliament, was asked whether there is a basis for a suspicion that ‘statistical regions’ represent an attempt to divide Sandžak definitively, he replied negatively and said: “It was already divided before this. We are fixing that now.”\(^\text{15}\)

At about the same time that the Forum was established, the leading parliamentary Bosniak parties – agreed to vote for the Law of Regional Development once they had secured guarantees from the Government that the six municipalities of Sandžak would be part of one region. Thus, the Law was passed in early July of 2009, prescribing the future creation of seven regions – Vojvodina, Belgrade, Western, Eastern, Central, Southern and Kosovo and Metohija – as well as laying down that the Government of Serbia will determine which municipalities belong to which region on the basis of recommendations of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (SORS) and criteria defined by the Law and in accordance with EU standards.

After several months of work on a decree that would determine the content of future regions, the SORS produced one that was then affirmed by EuroStat and passed by the Government in December 2009. Its content foresaw the creation of seven regions in Serbia, a framework within which Novi Pazar and Tutin would have been part of a the Central Serbia region, while the other four relevant municipalities of Sandžak would have fallen to the Western Serbia region, regardless of the agreement that the leaders of the two Bosniak parties made with their coalition partners. Why Bosniak ministers voted in favour of the Decree regardless of this fact is not known, yet, within days a wave of protest erupted from the members of some Bosniak parties and religious leaders, after which Bosniak leaders announced that it was all the result of a grave misunderstanding and that they would meet with the prime minister as soon as possible to discuss matters and changing the Decree. According to Esad Džudžević, president of the

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\(^{14}\) ibid., point IV

Bosniak Democratic Party of Sandžak, the reasons for their opposition to the proposed and accepted Decree were numerous, but, while he maintained that “it is crucial to put economic motives first”, he also asserted that the Decree represents a violation of the human and minority rights of the Bosniak community.16

In mid-January of 2010, I attended a round table which had been organized by a group of local Serb-led NGOs from south-west Serbia in order to discuss the actions that should be taken to counteract the possible influence of the approaching meeting between Bosniak parliamentarians and the Prime Minister of Serbia. A number of eminent Serbian academics were present, as well as the presidents of a few of south-west Serbia’s municipalities. The first point that was discussed was the content of the official statement created by the organizational committee of that group of local NGOs that was to be sent to the Prime Minister and hopefully published by the media, as a cautionary notice about the consequences of an improperly conducted regionalisation:

We warn that singling out four municipalities from the Zlatibor county and two from the Raška county, and their unification into one territory, the so called Sandžak region, has no basis in an economic, cultural, historical and any other sense, and that drawing up borders for it would represent a creation of borders of separation instead of borders of integration and understanding. It would be unacceptable for the Government to change its already taken decision due to pressure and blackmail and extract four municipalities from the Zlatibor county without the approval of Serbs in these municipalities, especially since Serbs comprise the majority in 3 out of 4 of these...

Once the declaration had been read out, several speakers took the stand. The academics present were experts in different fields, thus the audience could hear about the problems of the Bosniak idea of regionalisation from economic, historical, political, legal and other perspectives. For example, a law professor spoke about the criteria for creating regions:

The regionalisation story as it is presented, as European and universal, as an economic project and not a political one, is acceptable to me. (…) The criteria that have been officially determined are numerous, but national and minority ones are not among them. Insisting that the ethnic and national-minority criterion should come to the fore in regionalisation is anti-European and anti-constitutional. (…) I do not aim to awaken the national sentiments of those who live there [in Raška], but I do want to point out that Serbia can no longer be a polygon for experimentation with criteria that are not criteria for regionalisation anywhere else but here.

Minister Rasim Ljajić, as if in response to this, asserted that the suggestion to place all the municipalities of Sandžak into one region did not represent a “heating up of separatist tendencies” and that the idea of the “Sandžak state is a long gone story”. He continued:

There are many who are now trying to gain political points. The Bosniak nationalists are saying that this [the Decree] is proof that Serbia wants to eliminate and destroy Sandžak and marginalize Bosniaks, while Serbian nationalists maintain that someone wants to create a state. Autonomy is an already told historical topic that we do not need to return to. It is an impossible mission. It is imagined by a marginal and insignificant number of people.

As for what the motives actually are, he listed economic, industrial, transportation and practical reasons, assuring that regionalisation so conceived has no political dimension whatsoever.

A Region-Wide Frustration

In his address at the above-mentioned round table, the president of a municipality of south-west Serbia described the state of affairs there and the relationship of

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18 ibid.
the state officials and the media to ‘Sandžak’ as an idea. The words express great frustration and a sense of helplessness that was characteristic of the reactions of many people I spoke to in south-west Serbia, regardless of ethnicity, due to a feeling that their views are being disregarded and overlooked by important political actors in Serbia, making it all the more important to take action:

There is a great concern, a great anxiety, and there are many people who are disappointed with our ‘end’ [referring to south-west Serbia]. Many of them have already experienced certain things, we have a lot of refugees down there who have already gone through one exodus, and their fear is understandable. They are a bit confused, they have been calling me these days, asking why the opposition parties do not react to what is happening [the president in question is member of an opposition party]. Take the newspapers today – on the front page Ljajić is saying: ‘Sandžak – region, not state’ – which just shows that Sandžak as a state is being thought about; there is worry. (…) The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Erdogan goes to Novi Pazar and not Belgrade, then Vuk Jeremić [Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time] goes there to meet him, and when Erdogan says: ‘We are always glad to return to this region, I do not feel like a guest here but like a host’, Jeremić applauds him. Then Erdogan goes to Bosnia and forecasts the restoration of the Ottoman Empire…. In Belgrade they don’t hear this, at least not in a way that we do down there [in south-west Serbia] – we hear it differently and it all brings unease.

A little before the Bosniak representatives met with Prime Minister Cvetković, Serb representatives from Priboj, Prijepolje and Nova Varoš, municipal presidents and leaders of NGOs rejected the possibility of becoming part of a Sandžak region, describing it as preposterous. As a response, they threatened to organize road blocks and to ask for a referendum: “If the Government succumbs to the demands of the Bosniaks, we will announce a referendum!”, said the president of the municipality of Priboj, Lazar Rvović. On the other side, some Bosniak

19 In Nova Varoš and Priboj, Serbs comprise a large majority of the population, in Prijepolje a little more than 50% (SORs 2003).
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politicians stated that, if the Decree was pressed, a referendum would be organized in the municipalities of Novi Pazar, Sjenica and Tutin since the people there should also be allowed to declare whether they approve of this or that option, and added that the centre of the new Sandžak region would not need to be Novi Pazar, but that it could be Prijepolje. In addition, it was stated that they would be open to the possibility of introducing two official names for such a region, either Sandžak or Raška (ibid.). It was in this text that I first heard of such an initiative, since earlier demands were either to call the potential region Sandžak or a neutral name using a geographical term.

The fact that it is ‘statistical regions’ that are being discussed in all the noted examples is not obvious, and unless stressed, an uninformed reader would quickly lose it from sight. The suggestion to give a future statistical region two official names shows just how far away the political debate on regionalism strayed from “economic and practical criteria”. That ordinary people understood regionalisation as a very serious process, suspecting it has been designed by the ‘enemy’ to produce potentially long-term and disastrous effects, is apparent from the many reactions I came across to the messy politics of regionalism in Serbia. For example, the term “continuation of the breaking up Sandžak” has often appeared in the words of Muslims I spoke to, although it is uncertain what is exactly being referred to. When asked, respondents usually referred to the antifascist council ZAVNOS and the two year long “Partisan autonomy of Sandžak” during World War II, though most were uncertain when, why and who founded this council. A smaller number mentioned the Balkan Wars in 1912, which ended Ottoman rule in Serbia and that what is happening today is a continuation of that process.

A very small portion of Bosniaks reacted to the news of the Decree with fervour as strong as of the young man below. A supporter of Mufti Zukorlić, he was very open in telling me about his thoughts on the dangers that loom:

*It is high time that the people of Sandžak take over and do something for themselves before it is too late. If not, our politicians will lead us to disaster; they have betrayed their people and their homeland [Sandžak] by working for those who are*

21 In Sjenica and Novi Pazar, Bosniaks and Muslims make up over 70% of the population, in Tutin over 90% (SORS 2003).
22 ibid.
23 The Regional Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Sandžak (in Serbian, *Zemaljsko antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Sandžaka* or ZAVNOS), was the highest political and representative body in both Serbian and Montenegrin parts of Sandžak, formed to foster the national-liberation movement in World War II led by Yugoslav communists.
Many others I spoke to repeated similar things, such as: “We have to fight for our right to Sandžak”, “We can’t let them take Sandžak”, “The only option for us, if things are ever to get better, is Sandžak” while smirking at the Serbian use of “Raška” as a competing term. However, there were also those critical of the process. For example, one young man from Šjenica said: “Something is going on, we all feel it. And after all, all of a sudden we get to call ourselves Bosniaks, and we are even going to get our region. And everyone is so excited, they see there is a lot in it for them personally. It’s pretty ridiculous if you ask me.”

Most Serbs reject the term Sandžak with numerous explanations, though they all conclude that the most important reason is its political nature. One Serb from Novi Pazar, an education worker, said: “I personally think that the popular use of ‘Sandžak’ preceeds popular use of the ‘Raška’ name as a geographical term”. Regardless, he chooses not to refer to the area as Sandžak, and says, “Of-course, the term Raška was also used before. But in the recent past it has been used to counter the Sandžak term because ‘Sandžak’ doesn’t just describe the rich history of this area anymore, now it means politics”. A Serbian historian from Prijepolje quotes a similar reason to disregard the term ‘Sandžak’, but provides another solution: “I reject both names, both Raška and Sandžak. These are both political terms and I refuse to use either. I call my home Polimlje,24 which is a territorial designation and covers a broad territory that shares similar history and culture”. One Serbian official from Priboj stated: “If it is just economics, then what in the world do we, Priboj and Nova Varoš, have in common economically with Novi Pazar and Tutin? We can’t do anything together; we couldn’t even make a landfill together, let alone carry out a more serious project. There is absolutely no rational argumentation”.

In municipalities such as Šjenica and Novi Pazar, where the Muslim population is predominant in numbers, most Serbs expressed a fear that, should a region with a majority Muslim population be formed, they would be swallowed up within it: “The state has rarely shown any interest in this area anyway, imagine how it would be for us if the Bosniaks received more power? If this town became part of some ‘Sandžak’ county, I would have no choice but to move to

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24 Polimlje refers to the territory surrounding the basin of the river Lim, and includes the municipalities of Priboj and Prijepolje, in Serbia, and Bijelo Polje, Berane, Andrijevica and Plav in Montenegro.
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[the town of] Raška, Kragujevac, or even Belgrade, wherever I can get a job”. On the other hand, those from towns with a predominant Serbian population, such as Nova Varoš, were especially irritated with the whole process, since, as they said, they felt no connection, cultural, historical or economic, with most of the other Sandžak municipalities. A Serbian development worker from Nova Varoš there told me:

_I detest the claims that Novi Pazar is constantly making to Nova Varoš, never ceasing to mention that the Sandžak region would include us in it. Just because Nova Varoš was part of some historical county centuries ago, does not mean that we have anything to do with each other today in practical terms. We have no link whatsoever with Novi Pazar - we are tightly linked to Zlatibor and Užice. It’s a purely political claim and the very opposite of democracy._

In a similar vein, many Bosniaks also pointed to the difficult position of Sjenica due to the current territorial organisation in which this municipality is part of the Zlatibor county, and thus hours away from Užice, its administrative hub, instead of being part of the same county as neighbouring Novi Pazar towards which it naturally gravitates. The hope of all I spoke to, however, was that the new regional units would finally provide a long-awaited solution.

**Conclusion**

In spring of 2010, the government of Serbia announced that the Decree of December 2009 is inadequate, stating as the principal reason the uneven number of inhabitants in the seven different regions. In May of 2010, the Law of Regional Development was amended and five instead of the original seven regions were formed. The West and Central regions which the Decree had proposed were united into one - the ‘Šumadija and Western region’. Along with a large number of other municipalities, this region also encompasses the six thought of as Sandžak by Bosniaks, but it does not have a Muslim majority. The Bosniak ministers were officially satisfied with this plan, while their more radical counterparts saw it

25 Zlatibor is a big tourist centre to the North of Nova Varoš, while Užice is the economic centre of the ‘Zlatibor county.’

as yet another defeat for Muslims. On the other side, the mentioned group of local Serb NGOs, municipality leaders and academics, as well as some political parties from the opposition, stated that this was a victory for Muslim politics in Serbia and a clear demonstration of the government’s conscious neglect of state interests. However, there is at least one thing almost everyone agrees about: the new region is too big and developmentally dysfunctional.

Regional cultures, as Donnan and Wilson point out, have continually negotiated cultural frontiers [Donnan and Wilson:1999:11-12]. They take a ‘proactive’ role in the establishment of borders, affecting not only policy formation but also representation and reception. As we have seen, the inhabitants of south-west Serbia are increasingly aware of the delicate status of its imagined boundaires, its importance for who they are and the responsibility they have in contributing to how ‘their land’ is named, demonstrating their clear understanding of the place of power in ascription – of the role of dominance in the ability to arbitrarily name someone or oneself. The claims for defining south-west Serbia as Raška or Sandžak and the everyday use of these words today convey information about those who make these claims. The voices dictating where new regional lines should be drawn tell us the same and more – they open up the question of the changing nature of symbolic boundaries in south-west Serbia and power relations within it and towards the state centre.

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“Us” and “Them” in Post-War Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina

Abstract:
There is one dominant way of thinking about “us/them” divides in ethnically divided cities, which includes the implicit rather than explicit assumptions that there is no sense of togetherness among the city dwellers across the border and that the city as a whole is not a locus for self-identification and joint responsibility for the city dwellers on both sides. In other words, that the city dwellers do not construct common “us” across the border in ethnically divided cities.

This paper tries to challenge this dominant way of thinking. I argue that we need to critically examine these taken-for-granted ways of thinking about the divided city. The way to do this is to understand that identity, ethnicity and various other “we” are not what people “have” but that they are products of boundary-work. In this article I thus give an insight to the way people negotiate the terrain of their various social identities in the urban context to understand how the city dwellers on the other side in a divided city are part of the common “us”, too. I base this study on research conducted in the divided city of Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina. The empirical material forming the basis of this paper is comprised foremost of analyses of texts published in the local monthly magazine “Most”.

Key Words
“us/them” divides, ethnically divided cities, long-term city dwellers, post-war newcomers, post-war Mostar
Boundary-work in Ethnically Divided Cities

How do people in post-war ethnically divided cities construct their “us” and “them”? Are their “us/them” divides always ethnic and are they always constructed primarily along ethnic and religious lines? Are the city dwellers on one side of the city always the definite “others” to the ones on the other side or are there ways in which they construct a common “us”? In other words, can the city as a whole be a locus for self-identification and joint representation for the city dwellers on both sides in a post-war ethnically divided city? These are the questions I will address in this paper.

The initial assumptions would be that there is no situation or context in which the city dwellers from both sides of the ethnically divided city construct a common “us”, that there is no sense of togetherness among the city dwellers across the border and that the city as a whole is not a locus for joint responsibility and self-identification for the city dwellers on both sides. Such cities were divided in conditions of ethnic violence, most often overnight, and many of the city dwellers do not cross the border on a daily base. This initial assumption is also evident in most scholarly studies, in common thinking and in the urban planning strategies in these cities (particularly in the case of Mostar, which will be elaborated on later in the text).

And yet, the city is not only the contested terrain on which nation-states or, in this case, ethno-religious groups struggle for power, but it is also a locus of spatial practices, meanings and representations, a place of various economic and political activities, many of which existed long before the city was divided. Cities like Mostar, Sarajevo, Jerusalem, Beirut, Nicosia have been divided only for several decades, and often the same people that now live on “this side” or “the other side” lived in these cities long before those sides were formed, particularly in the case of Mostar. “Dividing” a city for the city dwellers is not as straightforward as these dualistic metaphors suggest, even though “this side” and “the other side” are formats deeply embedded in the language and everyday practices of the city dwellers. For the city dwellers on both sides, there must be many forms of joint responsibility or self-identification with the city as a whole, and many senses of togetherness and community that are not being rightfully recognized by analysts and urban planners.

In this paper I use the constructivist approach to identity-formation to discuss aspects of boundary-work in an ethnically divided city. In particular, I will describe how city dwellers negotiate their “us” and “them” in relation to the ethnic divides and the ones between long-term city dwellers and post-war newcomers in an ethnically divided city. We presume that “us” in ethnically divided cities is primarily “ethnic” for all city dwellers and that the natives/newcomers divide is never the primary format in which these divides are con-
structured. And yet, is this always true? The constructivist approach to identity formation assumes that ethnic and other “us/them” divides are not what people “have”, but are a product of boundary-work and depend a lot on the meanings that people give to them [Barth 1969, Jenkins (1996, 1997), Cohen 1985, see also Lamont (2000, 2002), Bourdieu 1984]. As Barth writes, ethnicity is not based primarily on shared culture and values but is defined in opposition to the perceived identity of other ethnic groups [for other similar perspectives see, for example, Horowitz 1985]. He also argues that ethnic groups are based on continual expressions and validations that enable a “dichotomizing” nature of ethnic boundaries and create a situation in which others can be identified as strangers and members of a different ethnic group. This situation “implies a recognition of limitations on shared understandings, differences in criteria for judgment of value and performance, and a restriction of interaction to sectors of assumed common understanding and mutual interest” [1969:12]. Jenkins [1996, 1997] advances this thinking on social identities, arguing that they always represent a dialectic relationship between internal and external definitions. Drawing largely on Cohen [1985], Jenkins adds that the members of one group must be able to base their belonging to that group on similarities between them and other criteria of community. Drawing largely on Barth [1969], he further argues that they must also have criteria for differences with other groups and, moreover, those others must also recognize their internal concept of similarities. Thus, “us” or “them” are categories of identification created by the participants themselves and are “produced” by people in their social interactions. Social relations are maintained across such boundaries and are based exactly on the nature of those boundaries to provide the dichotomized ethnic statuses. In view of this, cultural differences between ethnic groups can persist regardless of the inter-ethnic contact interdependence; what is more, social interaction is the foundation of ethnic difference. If the boundaries and the “us/them” divides that define a group are products of social interaction can change with time and are generated by interactions between people from different ethnic groups, then different places, spaces, and built environments certainly influence them. This means, in other words, that “us” and “them” can be also felt and attached onto places in various contexts, and that “us” can also be attached and mapped onto places on both sides of the divided city.

In this paper I thus ask how is boundary-work, namely the construction of “us/them” divides, constituted, represented and reproduced in the urban context. I write about the case of the divided city of Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina. In particular, I analyze the content of a local monthly magazine to understand the ways city dwellers construct common “us” across the border in an ethnically divided city. But before answering the questions that I pose, let me first turn to the ways the construction of “us/them” divides are being viewed in Mostar.
“Us” and “Them” in Post-War Mostar

Mostar was divided during and after the Bosnian wars (1992-1995) into two sides: the west side is now largely dominated by a population who identify themselves as Croats (Catholics), and the majority of the population on the east side is made up of Bosniacs (Muslims). Prior to the Bosnian wars and predominantly in the decades of Yugoslavia (1943-1992) there were mixed housing zones throughout the city.

In most research, common thinking and the urban planning strategies for Mostar, there is the implicit rather than explicit assumption that there is no sense of togetherness among the city dwellers across the border and the city as a whole is not a locus for joint responsibility and self-identification for inhabitants of both sides – in short, that the city dwellers on both sides do not construct common “us”. This is least visible in the scholarly debates. In many studies on identity-formation and place-making is it often implicitly taken for granted that the two ethno-religious communities live on two separate sides and that they link their stories to places on “their” side of the city only [see, for example, Magas 2006, 2007, Wimen 2004, Bieber 2005, Grodach 2002]. Yet, as this matter in particular is not a focus of any of these studies, this implicit assumption I am writing about cannot be taken as their weakness.

However, the situation in the urban planning strategies and the common thinking about these cities is different. In the press, on the internet, in films and photographs, the assumption that there is no sense of togetherness among the city dwellers on both sides is more present. As the skyline of the city unmistakably reveals the divisions in space (one side is dominated by minarets only and the other side by church bell towers), its image is made vast use of in the media. These images often juxtapose the cross and the bell tower of the west side with the minarets on the east side of the city. Often the sound that can be heard from the bridges of the river Neretva and beyond, which includes a digital mixture of a Muslim call to prayer and Christian tolling bells, is the background music for documentary films that have the post-war ethnic divisions as their main narrative theme.¹ Tourists are predominantly brought to the bridges in the middle of the city, as well as on the street that demarks the border line dividing the city, and guides often explain to them that this is a border separating two ethno-religious groups. Moreover, in the foreign press, Mostar has been most often compared to the divided Berlin. For example, only a few months after the war ended in December 1995, “The Economist” in June 1996 referred to Mostar as the “Balkan Berlin”, a city divided by ethnic hatreds and by the presence of

¹ For example: “About Mostar, the Bridge and Bruce Lee” by Sanja Puljar, Vanni D’Alessio, Eric Gobetti.
the Western powers along something like Berlin ‘four-power’ lines” [Economist, 22 June 1996, p. 48, quoted in Neil and Lord 2001:76].

The urban planning strategies have also often been based on the assumptions that city dwellers have “their” places on one side of the city only, that they attach and map their various “we/they” divides on one side of the city only and that there are no senses of togetherness and community across the border. After the war-time division of the city (1992-5), Mostar was the one of the most challenging projects in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina that many foreign urban planners, policy-makers and various international political and administrative bodies undertook. Their joint attempts resulted in the creation of a “Central Zone” and the reconstruction of the Old Bridge as an internationally imposed symbol of united Mostar [for more see Makas 2007]. As such, Mostar became one more example of how ready-to-go policies in divided cities involve top-down approach to creating “common” spaces. In Mostar these spaces did not reach their goals [see Bollens 2001, 2007, 2008, Bieber 2005; this will be further elaborated on in the second chapter of this study]. After the international experts left the city, the Central Zone never became recognized as such by the city dwellers themselves and the Old Bridge remained a symbol of unity only in CNN-type reports. Instead, a group of locals initiated their own common space – a bust of the martial arts film star Bruce Lee – which they promoted as a symbol of their shared childhood and the united city of the past that should stand next to the – according to them – over-politicized monuments that were erected after the war [Raspudic 2004].

And yet, as the city is also a place where people work, shop, commute and worship, the boundary-works among the city dwellers are not that linear and straightforward. Since the war, the border in the middle of Mostar is vastly restructuring the lives of the people: some of their pre-war friends or neighbors have moved to the other side of the city, their schools are now Bosniac-only rather than mixed, and some of their favorite pre-war coffeehouses are now different places altogether. The ways they adjust their lives to the urban space is not as linear as the dualistic metaphors of “this side” and “the other side” suggest. Are their “us/them” divides mapped and felt onto the places that are on their side of the city only? What does it mean to be rooted in a place called “our side” for them? Can then the whole city be the locus for joint responsibility and self-identification and are there not ways in which they construct a common “us” across the border? I will look at the textual content of the monthly “Most” to discuss aspects of these questions.
Methodology

The empirical material forming the basis of this paper comprises foremost of content analyses of texts published in the local monthly “Most”. This magazine is devoted to the urban change of Mostar and gives space mostly to contributors writing about the city. There is also space in the magazine for any news about local events or stories about city dwellers or local politics. Furthermore, there are also articles about all branches of the fine arts. The magazine is published by the Literary Society of the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton and has received many awards – one of the last awards, for “the best monthly magazine”, was received in 2004 from the association of the publishers of Bosnia-Herzegovina “Poslovne zajednice izdavača i knjižara Bosne i Hercegovine” (No: 99-100).2 As such, it is read by most locals and distributed in more than sixty cities in the country and in the world, as stated in Issue No: 10.3

A total number of 69 issues of the magazine were analyzed for this paper, published between 1997 and 2007, the year the last issue was published. The selection of the texts was made according to their relevance to the topic of research. Thus not all of these 69 issues are given as research data or quoted below, but only approximately 40, in which the editor refers to the “us/them” divides. The analysis does not extend to the whole content of the issues, but only to the editor’s note, a section usually two pages long which, in journalistic and sometimes lyrical and poetic ways, addresses the urban development of Mostar and many other issues. Conceptualized as such, the editor’s note is rather popular among the city dwellers. This popularity is reflected in the outrage generated by a change in the concept in 2007: after the editorial board of the magazine decided to replace the editor’s notes with a section featuring letters from fans and devoted readers, many readers disagreed with that change, as stated in the editor’s note of the Issue No: 123-124.4 The magazine was forced to re-establish the editor’s note in the next issue of the magazine.

In the following analysis of the data, quotations are given from the editor’s note in the issue of the magazine that is being quoted. The quotations were chosen from the editor’s notes in those issues of the magazine where the divide between the long term city dwellers and the post-war newcomers is mentioned or dominates the editor’s note, or where the editor explicitly refers to this divide. In most cases, the rest of the editor’s note (other than the quotation or narration given in this paper) is a wider analysis of the same topic that is being illustrated in the quotation, or some related commentaries. The references of the quotations

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2 http://most.ba/099100/004.aspx
3 http://most.ba/010/004.htm
4 http://most.ba/123-124/002.aspx
are given only to the electronic version of the issues of the magazine, as that way they are more accessible to the reader.

The focus here is limited only to the understanding of the common categorization systems people use to differentiate between insiders (rodjeni, long-term city dwellers) and outsiders (post-war newcomers). Thus, even though it is the content of one magazine that provides the data for this paper, arguments about the role of information technology and bureaucratic organizations in identity-formation and place-making will not be put forward.

“Us” and “Them” in “Most”: Constructing Sense of Togetherness Across the Border

The analysis of the data in “Most” shows that opposite to what is commonly assumed in the scholarly studies, urban planning strategies and in the common thinking, there is a consciousness of proximity and solidarity among the city dwellers on both sides in post-war Mostar, and that the city dwellers from the two sides construct a common “us” in particular situations and contexts. In this case, the analysis shows that the divide between long-term city dwellers and post-war newcomers is structuring the lives of the city dwellers more than the ethnic divide – there is a consciousness of proximity and solidarity among the long-term residents of the two ethno-religious groups on both sides in opposition to the post-war newcomers and an understanding that they form a common “us” in opposition to the post-war newcomers. Here, the “us/them” divides are mainly constructed along the lines of long-term city dwellers vs. post-war newcomers, and not along ethnic and religious lines.

Many examples for these divides can be found in “Most”. In a text published in 1999, for example, the author describes his idea of what Mostar should be like. Here the boundary-work between long-term city dwellers and post-war newcomers is not only implied, but very direct:

“I want a Mostar that belongs to its native people, especially those that live in foreign prosperity but imprisoned in their own nostalgias, who would give their own souls to the world for a piece of Mostar-ness – now you have people from Kakanj, Konjic, Siroki Brijeg and all the rest that should return to their pre-war places of residence” (No: 26-27).5

5 http://most.ba/02627/004.htm
The same is the case with issue No: 96. In this note, titled “Most-lovers and Most-haters”, the editor writes that only loving and supporting “Most” would mean loving and supporting the city, implying that the newcomers cannot do so. Again in issue No: 33-34 the editor identifies the future of the city with the popularity of the ideas published in “Most” and argues: “They say that Mostarians, regardless of where they are – are still most-ing [supporting Most], so the editor wants to believe that the city, even in this poor stage, ruined, but multiplied, extended along the meridians and around the world will keep its own authentic values and genuineness, its spirit of tolerance and neighborliness that was cultivated for centuries”. This quotation and many other parts of poems of local poets and city dwellers published in the magazine suggest that only the long-term city dwellers know the soul of the city. This is also expressed in a poem: “You had green eyes – they dug them; You had white arms – they broke them; You had a big heart – they plucked it up; You had a wonderful soul – we kept it for you” (No: 41),\(^6\) again referring to the long-term city dwellers, *rodjeni*. Another poem one written by the editor himself is: “…the city wants to un-Mostar itself. And I want it to be reborn, a new old city” (No: 118)\(^7\). Also in the very many poetic and academic descriptions of the city, only images of pre-war Mostar and localities that only the *rodjeni* know are being given as examples in the stories. This is one example:

“And even after so much insisting to divide Mostar, to mark the borders on the land, in the water and in the air, and besides all the attempts to destroy the Federation, the editor wants to believe that one beautiful day, soon, the streets of Mostar on the East and the West side will become lively again, hugging lovers with whisper verses on the (new) Old Bridge, there will be walkers on Rondo, the bells of Orthodox and Catholic churches will toll and in the same time the minarets of the Karadzozbeg and Dervis-Pasa mosques will issue their call to prayers, while Neretva and Radoblja in early spring will sing the anthem to the sun, the man and the stone” (No: 23-24).\(^8\)

In another group of editor’s notes, the *rodjeni* are portrayed as city dwellers that make “real” contribution to the life in the city. In a text published in 1999, for

\(^6\) http://most.ba/041/004.htm  
\(^7\) http://most.ba/118/002.aspx  
\(^8\) http://most.ba/02324/004.htm
example, the editor writes that in their attempts to make sense of the city the newcomers would just accept the post-war division of the city with the convenient excuse that they do not share the guilt for its division. They would just say that city was already divided in Sarajevo, Split, Lisbon, the article continues, whereas the rodjeni would bravely face it (No. 21-22: 2).9 The natives, unlike the post-war newcomers, even vote properly, as argued in the editor’s note in the issue No. 90.10 The long-term city dwellers, rodjeni, it is said here, would not give their vote for the many political representatives of today, who are unable to offer a political program that would go beyond nationalism and separatism, but they would rather vote for many notable citizens of Mostar from the past, who in various ways contributed to the development of the city and the urban life (No: 90).

In many texts published in “Most” the long-term city dwellers, rodjeni, are depicted as the only city dwellers that do not support the division of the city and the nationalist post-war rhetoric (see Issues No: 51-52,11 104,12 10813). Numerous statements throughout these ten years of publishing enforce this narrative: Mostar and Mostarians never wanted divisions (No: 84, p.3),14 tolerance and neighborliness are values shared by the majority of city dwellers (No: 51-52)15 and there is a peculiar spirit of the peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina that does not belong to the Bosniacs, nor Serbs, nor Croats, but to all of them together (No: 43-44).16 This narrative is supported by numerous stories from Mostar written in many of the issues that involve friendship, love and respect among city dwellers from both sides. In one of them, the contributor describes an event that happened in Mostar in one gathering of the local poets. Despite the organized accommodation and catering for all the participants, a Bosniac poet invited a co-participant, a Croat poet, to be her guest in her house during the event and she “treated her well, they exchanged their books and established a never-ending friendship” (No: 113).17 Another story that also involves a gathering of poets in 2001, when Mostar was still institutionally divided and the Old Bridge still not re-built, describes the opening night of the event when many

9 http://most.ba/02122/000.htm
10 http://most.ba/090/004.aspx
11 http://most.ba/05152/004.htm
12 http://most.ba/104/004.aspx
13 http://most.ba/108/004.aspx
14 http://most.ba/084/004.aspx
15 http://most.ba/05152/000.htm
16 http://most.ba/04344/004.htm
17 http://most.ba/113/002.aspx

113
native city dwellers from every side of the city were there and many words of united Mostar were exchanged and supported (No: 53).\(^{18}\)

Even though in the texts it is argued that many Mostarians would like the city to be reunited and the ethnic conflicts to stop, the stories that are provided as a support for this claim only include native city dwellers: “luckily, the majority of the Mostarians, those “rodjeni” believe that all those lines of division and all those numerous walls will one day become a heap of stones and mortar, which will be a symbol of shame to all future generations” (No. 120).\(^{19}\)

Another example is a text published in the year 2000, in which the journalist celebrates the work of the mayor of Mostar at that time who, unlike his political contemporaries, devoted his mandate to uniting Mostar and cultivated ideas of mutual respect and multiethnic cohabitation. The words of the mayor spoken at a public debate visited by the members of the two main ethno-national groups have a central role in the article – the mayor expresses how the greatness of a city is not measured by the number of city dwellers or the size of its plazas and boulevards, but by the extent to which it is prepared to accept ethnic diversities. With those words, the journalist argues, the mayor showed his support to the rodjeni, and “rodjeni to him are all those that despise hatred and divisions” (No. 35: 2).\(^{20}\) Another story published in issue No: 90\(^{21}\) involves three inseparable friends, one Serb, one Croat and one Bosniac. The story was first published in the daily “Oslobodjenje” in 1971 and revolves around a man (again a native) called Neno (a Bosniac) who every winter on the 15th of January swims in the river Neretva in Mostar to celebrate the friendship with his two best friends that he tragically lost – the Croat drowned in the river on that day and the other one, the Serb, who died later. This story of a great friendship between a Bosniac, a Serb and a Croat, as well as other similar stories published in other issues, for example No: 19-20,\(^{22}\) No: 35,\(^{23}\) No: 41,\(^{24}\) No: 51-52,\(^{25}\) No: 91,\(^{26}\) No: 123-124,\(^{27}\) contribute to the narrative in the magazine linked to the historical cohabitation and consciousness of proximity among the many nations that live in Mostar, usually supported by the long-term city dwellers, rodjeni.

\(^{18}\) http://most.ba/053/004.htm
\(^{19}\) http://most.ba/120/000.aspx
\(^{20}\) http://most.ba/035/004.htm
\(^{21}\) http://most.ba/090/004.aspx
\(^{22}\) http://most.ba/01920/004.htm
\(^{23}\) http://most.ba/035/004.htm
\(^{24}\) http://most.ba/041/004.htm
\(^{25}\) http://most.ba/05152/004.htm
\(^{26}\) http://most.ba/091/004.aspx
\(^{27}\) http://most.ba/123-124/002.aspx
These examples show that in the texts of the magazine “Most” the city dwellers have battled over questions of “us” and “them” in the post-war times, including the all-important one of who is a “real” Mostarian. In this boundary-work, as the texts show, there is a sense of community and togetherness among the long-term residents from both sides of the city and there are various modes of joint solidarity between them in opposition to the post-war newcomers. This suggests that senses of togetherness and community across the border in ethnically divided cities are possible, and that city dwellers in ethnically divided cities construct ways in which the city as a whole is a locus of joint responsibility and self-identification.

**Conclusion**

This paper showed that even though the division of Mostar is encoded in metaphors of “our side” and “their side” for the city dwellers, there is a consciousness of proximity and solidarity among the long-term residents of the two ethno-religious groups on both sides in opposition to the post-war newcomers. Thus, there is an understanding that individuals and groups on both sides actually share elements of identity and culture. In the texts published in the magazine “Most”, the city dwellers have battled over boundary questions, including the all-important one about who is a “real” Mostarian. The data presented shows that a “real” Mostarian is only the one who is *rodjeni*, or a long-term resident, and the main boundary-work in the construction of the “real” city dweller is not between the Bosniacs and the Croats, as assumed, but between the long-term residents and the post-war newcomers. The analysis of the texts showed that there is a sense of community and togetherness among the long-term residents from both sides of the city and that there are various modes of joint solidarity between them. The research moreover pointed out that the boundary-works that are constructed between the “real” city dwellers in the texts in “Most” are a result of mobilized kinship to maintain their links to place. The analysis, thus, suggests that in contexts shaped by the changing of political traditions or in times of major ethnic and political conflicts like the one in Bosnia, where downgrading and upgrading of social status happened nearly overnight, established city dwellers from the pre-war times in fear for their established positions retain moral possession over place to maintain their privileged statuses from before. The results of this study show that these long-term city dwellers among the Bosniacs (*rodjeni*) do not map and attach their various “we” onto places of a fixed (“their”) side of the city only – often they see the city as a *whole* and, for them, the whole Mostar (not only “their” half) is a locus of joint responsibility and self-identification. This solidarity among the long-term city dwellers across
the border is certainly a result of (but not only) the presence of the post-war newcomers in the city. As shown in the examples used above, they construct their common “us” in opposition to the perceived identities of these newcomers. This understanding challenges the taken-for-granted ways of conceptualizing the divided city that were elaborated at the beginning of this study. The borders, checkpoints or fences in the middle of the city do not necessarily mean that senses of togetherness and belonging cannot exist across the border. The people-place dilemmas in ethnically divided cities formulated as such, thus, suggest that there are neglected forms of togetherness in the divided city.

What is more, this study confirms once again the already established thinking in the social sciences that the notions of places of long-term residents – or in some contexts of native city dwellers – is very complex, as people now more than ever identify themselves or are being identified as having deterritorialized cultures and origins [Malkki 1992:24, see also Appadurai 1988, 1996, 1998, Malkki 1992, Rosaldo 1988, 1989, Salamon 2003, Elias and Scotson 1965]. In this case, the perception of space of these long-term residents among the Bosniacs is marked by one particular characteristic: it includes a notion of continuous spaces in the divided city. The space of a group in a city that has been divided after a war in which most of the city dwellers have been forcibly or voluntarily relocated, unlike the space of a group in a non-divided city, for example, can be discontinuous. The city dwellers in a divided city indeed can have no sense of togetherness across the border and the city as a whole might not be a locus for joint identification for the city dwellers from both sides (which might be the case of Jerusalem, rather than Sarajevo for example). These long-term city dwellers have maintained social and symbolic links with the long-term city dwellers on the other side of the city since the division, without having the same joint spaces from the previous times.

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Gábor Basch

Settlers, Natives, and Refugees: Classificatory Systems and the Construction of Autochthony in Vojvodina

Abstract

This paper is an ethnographic account, part of a broader study on-going since 2001 among the Hungarian minority in Serbia and its main objective is to investigate the construction of settlers and natives as social categories, both regarding the perception of autochthony. These are the categories used by Serbian, Croatian and Hungarian inhabitants of Maradik, a small village in Vojvodina, the northern province in Serbia, where each group claims to be “more native” than the others. This seems to be the case of local or “native” Serbians who claim that “they arrived first” in the period of the region’s resettlement, which took place after its re-conquest by the Habsburg Empire from the Ottoman Empire. These claims bear a striking similarity to the history and the foundational myth of the village narrated by local Hungarians, who complement their claim with references to Hungary’s “historical rights”, since the region was part of the Hungarian Kingdom before Ottoman rule. The same kind of argument is mobilised when the matter at hand is the most recent conflict between local people (Serbs and Hungarians) and the izbeglica or Serbian refugees of recent wars in Yugoslavia, settled in the village by the Serbian State in the late 1990s.

Considering that the opposition between natives and settlers shifted whenever the frontiers of States and Empires were altered, what must be understood is the process by which each group claims its “nativeness” – and, thus, ensures key and legitimate positions in the institutions linked to the State’s power – reproduces a set of social practices that results in the construction and consolidation of other collectivities as outsiders and non-natives. In conclusion, we explore how are the conditions of settlers and natives experienced, becoming a radical and explosive version of Elias’ “The established and the outsiders”?
Although autochthony has been transformed into one of the main justifications in contemporary conflicts, it has not been object of systematic studies as a social construction. Indeed, notions as ethnicity or immigration still prevail in scholarly writings as well as in media representations of conflicts all around the world. There has been a long process of naturalization of the idea that a certain primordial link exists, which could justify collectivities’ rights. Sometimes it results in systematic violent actions against groups perceived as strange to the nation, non-autochthonous, close to the figure of “traitors” or “enemies”, who can (and must) be eliminated or expelled under certain circumstances – as it indeed happened during the early 1990s in Rwandan genocide or in the territories of former Yugoslavia.

The present paper is an ethnographic account, based on a broader study carried out among Hungarian minorities in Csantavér (Čantavir in Serbian) and Maradék (Maradik), two villages in Vojvodina, Serbia, and its main objective is to investigate the construction of settlers and natives as social categories, both regarding the perception of autochthony. These are the categories widely used by Serbian, Croatian and Hungarian inhabitants of Maradik, a small village in Vojvodina, the northern province of Serbia, where each group claims to be “more native” than the others. This seems to be the case of local or “native” Serbians who claim that “they arrived first” during the resettlement period of the region, which took place after the region’s re-conquest by the Habsburg Empire from the Ottoman Empire. These claims bear a striking similarity to the history and the foundational myth of the village narrated by local Hungarians, who complement their claim with references to Hungary’s “historical rights”, since the region was part of Hungarian Kingdom before the Ottoman rule. The same kind of argument is mobilised when the matter at hand is the most recent conflict between local people (Serbs and Hungarians) and the izbeglica or Serbian refugees of recent wars in Yugoslavia, settled in the village by the Serbian State in the late 1990s.

Considering that the opposition between natives and settlers shifted each time the frontiers of States and Empires were altered, what needs to be understood is how the groups who claim to be “natives” – and, thus, the right to hold key positions in the state institutions – reproduce a set of social practices that result in the construction of other communities as outsiders, i.e., non-natives. How, at last, is the condition of settlers and natives experienced, turning it into a radical and explosive version of Elias’ “The established and the outsiders”? [Elias & Scotson: 1994].
These are the fundamental questions that will guide this paper. It intends to demonstrate how the processes of claiming autochthony are socially and historically constructed from the narratives and practices that institutionalise symbolic and political frontiers between “settlers and natives”.

Interpreting the Past: Local History and Founding Myths

Similar to some international media and scholarly accounts, the Hungarians from Maradék and Csantavér interpreted the recent wars in Yugoslavia through the memory of events and local images of World War II. In 1941, Germany occupied Yugoslavia and divided the territory as follows: in the south, one part of Macedonia was annexed to Bulgaria, and another part, including Kosovo and a part of Montenegro, was annexed to Albania under Italian control. Slovenia was divided between Germany and Italy, and an independent Croatian State was created. Serbia was split into several Serbian, Croatian and Montenegrin administrative units supervised by Italians or Germans. As for Vojvodina, the Germans split it into three parts, in accordance with its historical regions: Bácska (Bačka) was annexed to Hungary; Germany got the Bánát (Banat), administered by the local German communities; and the Szerémség (Srem) became part of independent Croatia [Jelavich: 1996].

Thus, in 1941, Csantavér was either liberated or occupied by Hungary, depending on one’s point of view. As told by the elders, between 1941 and 1945 the village had to get used to the presence of Hungarian and German soldiers, chetniks (Serbian monarchists), Yugoslavian partisans and Red Army Russians. Maradék, in the Szerémség, was put under the control of Croatia and became the stage for conflicts among ustashas, chetniks, partisans, and Hungarian soldiers who would depart from Novi Sad to make incursions into the province of Szrem.

Categories such as partisan, ustaša and chetnik were brought back to interpret and name the parts involved in the recent wars, i.e., Yugoslavians, Croatians and Serbs, by the media and the specialists interviewed by them, as well as by the locals. In interviews and conversations with Hungarians from both villages, their pleasure in telling and recalling some local events from World War II was clear. In contrast, recent events seemed to be surrounded by a deep tense silence. I was rarely told about situations concerning recent conflicts, such as the recruiting and enlistment of Csantavér men in the Croatian front and the fleeing of Croatian families from Maradék.

If the events of the last decade of the twentieth century gain meaning and interpretation through the lenses of World War II, the key to understanding
the latter is found in the even more distant past. Distant in time – wars and battles from past ages involving Turks, Austrians, Hungarians and even a wide variety of ancient peoples, such as the Romans, the Huns, the Sarmatas and the Avars\(^1\) – and also farther in space. The multiple references to the great empires that have dominated the region reveal that the villagers were conscious that their history and destiny were frequently sealed in foreign imperial political centres. In both villages, “local historians” (helytörténész is their Hungarian denomination), despite their lack of formal education as historians or social scientists, would research historical and ecclesiastical archives and organize reviews and publications in which issues relating to the origins of their villages were discussed, and presumed traces from the past, as Avar skulls, Turk coins and archaeological remains from the Roman Empire were presented. In Csantavér, one of the debates concerned some skulls found in the surroundings that, according to Rudolf Szedlár, were from the ancient Avar Empire inhabitants, before the coming of the Hungarians who had migrated for centuries through Asia. The skulls were supposed to indicate that the place has been inhabited since ancient times and, furthermore, once the Avar were expelled, the Hungarians would have used their housing structures, demonstrating their presence there before any “southern Slav”. As for Maradék, there were stories about tunnels going from Sremska Mitrovica - capital of the ancient Roman province of Sirmium - to the Fruška Gora, were the Roman would have been the first to grow grapevines to produce wine.

Such “native concern with the past” assumes a triadic configuration. On the first vertex are several nationalisms that during the wars between Serbia and Croatia, in the Kosovo conflict, and in other moments of the twentieth century, have employed history to justify and legitimize their actions.\(^2\) On the second vertex of the triad are the international media and a large share of the scholarly literature on the subject, which are constantly trying to unmask nationalist mythologies also through history. The “positive and scientific” data should demonstrate the fictional or invented aspects of the Serbian, Croatian or Albanian traditions by distinguishing concrete facts from nationalist mythologies. Finally, on the third vertex of the triad are the “natives” or locals – that were involved, but did not directly take part in the conflicts – whose tales, myths, sayings or more formal research used to explain the current situation, referring to history as well.

\(^1\) Similarly to the travelers’ accounts analyzed by Larry Wolff, the natives of the two Vojvodinian villages would explain the situation of heterogeneity by going back in history to ancient peoples described by historians such as Herodotus [Wolff: 2001].

\(^2\) One of the most striking examples comes from the Kosovo war, when the Serbs reclaimed the region for considering it the cradle of the Serbian nation; at the same time, Albanians also reclaimed original and historical rights over the territory. Besides the soldiers, Serbs and Albanians had historians, archeologists and social scientists pointing at the other’s “wrong” reading of a specific event: the Kosovo battle of 1389.
In the following paragraphs, I intend to show how the debates among Croats, Serbs and Hungarians in Maradék, and the reports on the Csantavér village, refer to an earlier presence in the place in question, which would lead to greater legitimacy in the naming of the village.

In Csantavér, the debate was about the existence of the village in the Middle Ages – previous to the Ottoman conquest – which would imply the “originality” or earlier presence of the Hungarians in that place, since the Serbs were living south of there at the time. In addition to the skulls and archaeological remains of villages that would have preceded Csantavér, there were two widespread theories about the name of the village that also point in that direction; these theories would have been based in the finding of ancient white bones in the surroundings. The name Csantavér would have derived either from “csont és vér”, (Hungarian for “bone and blood”), or from “csata és vér” (“fight and blood”). It is believed among the villagers that the bones found in the surroundings date from a period prior to the conquest of the region by the Ottoman Turks, the occasion on which the people living there would have abandoned the village. According to the local historians, after the Austro-Hungarian Empire re-conquered what would become present-day Vojvodina, they would have organized a new peopling through the settlement – controlled by Vienna, the political heart of the Empire – by bringing to the location people of different nationalities. So, if the inhabitants were Hungarian before the abandonment of the place, they should be the most legitimate inheritors of the village, considering all the different populations later settled there.

In the case of Maradék different population records and censuses from the past demonstrate a long term experience of the ethnic heterogeneity: in 1900, 839 of the 2157 inhabitants defined Hungarian as their mother tongue, 131 as German, 9 as Slovakian, 2 as Romanian, 1158 as Serbian and 18 people indicated other languages. Nowadays the village is populated by 1394 Serbs, 552 Hungarians, 105 Croats and 90 Yugoslavs.

In the midst of this past and contemporary heterogeneity, we can also observe a symbolic dispute for the earliest presence in the village through foundational myths regarding the naming of the village.

All the Hungarian versions of the process refer to the meaning of the name Maradék, which could be translated to English as “the Rest” or literally “Leftover”. For some of the villagers the foundation of Maradék lays in the remote past, “in the Ottoman times”, what imbues precise meanings to such ‘mementos’ as Turkish coins, swords and other utensils that can still be found in the forests of the Fruska Gora mountains or in the plots of the valley cultivated by the

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villagers. According to such a version, during a huge battle between Hungarian and Ottoman troops an ancient town was almost completely destroyed and devastated by Ottoman soldiers. According to one of oldest villagers, István Répássy, the battle had happened

A little before or a little after the historic defeat of the Ottoman army in a marshy curve of the Danube located approximately 20 miles from the village. By that time Hungarians were still glorious, not like now, and they won wars and battles due to their strength and courage and the help of God, who, in spite of it being summertime, sent freezing winds from the Fruska Gora, making the Ottoman army freeze and sink in the Danube. 5

After that the region had to face the vengeance of the Turks and they destroyed an ancient village, the name of which no one can remember. Only one house survived the devastation of this ancient village, which was reconstructed by our ancestors. And that’s why we call it Maradék.

For other villagers the origins of Maradék are more recent and are related to a partition of land made by a feudal lord who divided his possessions among his three sons. In order to guarantee equal shares one small plot remained ownerless and the Hungarian serfs who worked for the landlord were settled down and decided to call their village “Rest” or Maradék.

And, finally, a third version which refers to a period when all villages of Vojvodina had to change their names, and only one tiny village was left without a decent name, so they decided to call it Maradék.

While Hungarians refer to the village as Maradék, Serbs villagers use the name Maradik. According to their founding myth the village gained its name after

Mara and Diko were two young peasants who used to live in two separate valleys of the Fruska Gora mountains. One day, guiding the cows back to the households of their families, they met in the hill between the two valleys and instantly fell in love. Since their families were opposed to the union, they decided to escape. To mark the place of their first encounter they built their

5 The reference might be to the village of Karlovci, an important centre of Serbian orthodoxy and where the Habsburg and Ottoman Empire signed a peace treaty in 1699.
home on that hill. All of us are descendants of this young couple and to remember their names the village is called Maradik.

And there is a Croatian version which also refers to a young girl, Marin, so pretty that she was famous in all the county, so that the people who came to visit her started to call the place Marindik, which means ‘for the beauty’ of Marin.

One of the common features of the above-mentioned founding myths is the reference to the name of the village. While the first version explicitly claims an earlier presence of the Hungarian inhabitants, the second one assumes such presence in the region, since it is widely considered that only a Hungarian village would gain a denomination in their language. It is also interesting to realize that in all three Hungarian versions only villagers or peasants are referred as nationals, and not the landlords nor the nobility, which could as well be Hungarian, Serbian, Croatian or German – since they all have had political or economic control of the Srem district in different historical periods. It is also possible that the obligation to rename villages is related to one of the several changes of political and geographical borders, which, as we know, are often followed by changes in the official language and toponyms. On the other hand, the Serbian and Croatian versions do not present direct temporal or historical references, and as one of my Serbian informants told me “the important is to perceive that there were no Hungarians here by that time. They came in later”.

Settlers, Natives, Immigrants and Refugees: Classificatory Systems and the Construction of Autochthony

In the very beginning of the fieldwork in Csantavér I had to face a “mystery” suggested by the statements of the Hungarian villagers, to whom the village was “100% Hungarian”. According to the official 2002 census, 92,4% of the 7178 people living in the village identified themselves as Hungarians, and 546 were of “other nationalities” (Gipsies, Croatians, Bunejvci, and Yugoslavs). Nevertheless, in most of the interviews and conversations held with Hungarians, they emphasized the village’s “absolute Hungarianness”. In the words of Rudolf Szedlár: “Csantavér has always been and will be a Hungarian village. We are not the minority, we are the nation. The Serbs are the minority.” I must confess that statements like this were very intriguing to me: where are the 7% that did not identify themselves as Hungarians and remained under the “other nationalities” category? In answer to my insistent questions, the Hungarian interviewees from
Csantavér acknowledged that, in fact, “except for the gyüttmentek”, Serbs, called by them as öreg szerbek or őslakos szerbek, also lived there. The literal meaning of the first expression is “old Serbs”, and the second translates into “native Serbs”. The expression gyüttmentek or jöttmentek was used to name the war refugees of the ’90s and distinguish them from the dobrovoljác, Serbs settled as “voluntary settlers” after World War I.

The reports on the presence of the gyüttmentek revealed the tensions of the identity reconfiguration process experienced by the different groups in Vojvodina. If in Maradék Croatian families “left” (elmentek) under threats of expulsion, the expression gyüttmentek means something more complex, that includes at once the entire act of moving: the fleeing of a place or departure, but also the arrival to somewhere else. The expression literally means “those who came (gyütt- or jött-) and those who left (-ment)” but it could be better translated as “bum” or “vagabond”, and it is used offensively to refer to groups of Serb and Albanian refugees of the wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo. Aware of my interest in the Serb refugees, my Hungarian interviewees said it was very easy to identify these families:

“All you need is to go the market and look for the western or simply the better products. While we work hard to earn our daily bread they eat Swiss cheese and don’t have to pay their power bills.”

Others complained:

“The gyüttmentek get so much humanitarian aid that they don’t have to work. They don’t pay for power, the State is building them houses, but many won’t need them, because they [the Serbs] occupied empty ones. There are families coming back and finding their houses occupied.”

Another tragic aspect of the refugees’ presence in Vojvodina is the rejection they encounter not only by Hungarians, but also by some of the “native Serbs” and even by those named “dobrovoljác Serbs”. As mentioned above, the latter were settled after World War I, as the region ceased to be part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, on the edge of the Kingdom of Hungary. Before World War I,
Hungarians and Germans were the “State peoples”, and the Serbs, now called “old” or “native”, were the minority. After the definition of new boundaries through peace treaties, the region became part of the Serb-Croatian-Slovenian Kingdom, and the Serb became the “State people”. The new State tried to change the proportions of the different national groups and end the demographic predominance of the Hungarians in the area, by promoting new settlements, bringing in voluntary settlers, referred to as *dobrovoljci*, in Serbian. The elders, like uncle Sima or László Zabos, two of my informants, still remember the way in which the authorities took from us our best land, and each of the settler families, these *dobrovoljác*, received half of an acre in the village for a house, and nine acres of farmland. All the trouble began at that time, and up to now the children inherit their parents’ fights. The difference is that we used our fists, or, at most, knives; today they have taken weapons – the most sacred thing for Serbs after women, so much so that they give their Kalasnyikov ladies’ names.

After the clarification about the presence of “native Serbs” and war refugees in the village, I still had doubts about the location of the non-Hungarians mentioned by the census. After much insistence, I found out that the Serbs “*don’t live in this village, but in the surrounding villages of Višnjevac* (Višnjevac) and *Бачко Душаново* (Bačko Dušanovo).” These are two *dobrovoljác* villages settled at two extremities of Csantáver in 1926, and, even though these villages were officially part of Csantáver as distant districts, both places were excluded from Csantáver by popular geography.⁶ The Hungarians referred to Višnjevac and Bačko Dušanovo as independent villages, inhabited mainly by Serbs, and therefore dangerous territories for Hungarians, just as Zsednik (Жедник or Žednik), a neighbouring village inhabited mainly by vadrácok, described by János Oravecz as “*angry Serbs, those who make the wars and those in Zsednik are all Šešelj supporters.*”⁷

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⁷ I could never find out if this fear was due to Zsednik being known as a nationalist place or if there had been any open clashes with the people from that neighboring village, as some have suggested to me. When I found out through a magazine that the Zsednik train station was built in the 1940s by Hungarian seklars (*székelys* about whom I will say something
I could not find out if there was any name for the dobroljác by the time they arrived, but I believe they must had been in a position similar to that of the gyüttmentek then. In a sense, they are both seen by Hungarians as invaders or, using Norbert Elias’ [2000] category, outsiders. The difference from the situation Elias describes is that the dobroljác were linked to the government, even though they were classified as invaders. In a certain way, such fact inverted the relationship between the older residents – who claimed and still claim to be “natives” – and the new residents, constructed as invaders or settlers.

Contrary to what has been said about Csantavér, I did not find any reference to dobroljác Serbs in Maradék, where Serbs, Hungarians and Croatians live together. That might be explained by the fact that the Hungarians were not a solid majority in the village after World War I. Located a hundred kilometres or so from the border between Yugoslavia and Hungary, Maradék sharply felt the effects of the wars in Croatia (1991) and Bosnia (1992-4), the main battlefields of both being near Maradék. In 1991, the city of Vukovar (around seventy kilometres from Maradék), defended by the Croatian army and bombed by the Yugoslav army for three months, was totally destroyed. A year later, Bosnia declared independence and, at the same time, the Serbian communities lead by Radovan Karadžić founded the Република Српска (Republika Srpska – Republic of Srpska) at a place around fifty kilometres from Maradék. Both wars had a strong impact on Maradék. According to the reports, some Croatian families threatened by the Serb majority exchanged houses with Serbs in Croatia, themselves threatened and sometimes expelled from their villages by Croatian militias, while other families were settled in empty houses or bought or built new ones. Before the wars of the 1990s, Serbs, Hungarians and Croats lived on different blocks separated by the main street; during the 1990s the families of Serbian refugees who arrived in the village were rejected by local Serbs, who preferred to live on the Hungarian side. As Hungarians from Maradék said, “not even their Serbian brothers accepted the presence of these gyüttmentek.” Thus, while the relationship between Hungarians and refugees is inverse to the “established and outsiders” model of Winston Parva [Elias: 2000], the one between established Serbs (established for being there longer) and the gyüttmentek seems to be very similar to the model. Hungarians and “natives Serbs” in Maradék share rumours, suspicions and unkind comments on the refugee families, alleged to prefer living on humanitarian aid to working.

Further on, I commented with Csantaverians on my intention of visiting that village. A few hours later I met a group of men that, as they were worried about the “irresponsibility of my foolish plan”, tried to persuade me not to go. They relaxed only after I agreed for one of them to join me on the trip.
“If they were decent people they would work as everybody else or, now that the wars are over, they could go back to the villages where they came from”, said one of the informants. “If they didn’t go back it is because they have something to hide or simply are scared of going back. Some are scared, for sure, not because they were persecuted, but because they were the persecutors and now they are wanted by the police or the blue helmets”.

There also fell on the refugees suspicions of illegal activities, such as drug trafficking and connections with the mafia.

Very similar suspicions and gossip about the refugees circulated in Csantavér, which brought “invaders” from past times and those supposed to be the original residents of the village closer to one another. It was while organizing the interviews and the data from the field that I was able to notice variations in the notion of “we”. Thus, relating to the Serbs in general, as to the closer Serbs – e.g., the ones from Višnjevac and Bačko Dušanovo – the Hungarians used the personal pronoun in the sense of “we, Hungarians from Csantavér or from Vojvodina, equal to the Hungarians from Hungary”. However, when referring to the general “Serbs that made the wars”, there prevailed the “we” as the expression of local belonging, and that included Hungarians and “old Serbs”, thus bringing Csantavér and Višnjevac and Bačko Dušanovo together. The residents of the latter two villages were seen as “good workers that were up to the Vojvodina’s fame as one of the pantries of former Yugoslavia”, along with Slovenia, the richest republic in the former Federation. The refugees, in turn, were “bums”, a meaning already implied in the expression “people who live for free”, or were suspected of war crimes; in a word, they were outsiders.

Conclusion

In Csantavér and also in Maradék, the natives’ constant concern about the origins of both villages – the names and their meanings, the Middle Age antecedents, the first settlers, etc. – expressed, in fact, an effort to explain the current situation. Thus, for the Hungarian communities of both villages the land and its present-day heterogeneity become understandable through time and the memory of past generations.

Further, it is important to apprehend how the stories and the local categories, but also classifications, circulate around the same issue: the legitimacy of being there, of being “more native”. Such constructs could translate into a search for representations of “autochthony” that would protect the group from threats
of expulsion and possible changes in state borders by giving legitimacy to an “original presence”. In conclusion, these representations reveal quasi-structural tensions that are the consequence of a mismatch between nationality and citizenship, stories of settlement and expulsion, and the many juxtaposed relationships between the established and outsiders.

Paradoxically, the construction of “autochthony” or of a closer and older relationship with the land is followed by the perception that the history of Vojvodina: always was, and in a certain way still is, decided outside its territory, be it in the settlement promoter imperial centres – like Constantinople or Vienna, or in Paris, Trianon, Yalta, Potsdam or Dayton. These were the cities where the maps were drawn and redrawn; maps that ended Empires and created new States, but that also interfered in the relationship among the populations, constantly transforming and reversing local hierarchies.

It is important to realize that both the official and local histories of Vojvodina – considering its Hungarian, Serb and Croatian versions – are very different from one another, if not contradictory. The attribution of meaning to toponyms, etymologies, stories of migrations, of recent and past wars in not only a privilege of scholars and journalists - but also a constant worry for Vojvodinian peasants.

Even considering the availability of more open cosmopolitan narratives in urban centers, such as Novi Sad or Subotica [Jansen: 2008], recent minority-majority incidents [Bieber: 2006] suggest the persistence of a classificatory system, in which the focus is on the definition of natives and their non-native enemies.

Hungary, however, is no longer promising to my Hungarian interlocutors in Csantavér or Maradék. Harassed in Vojvodina, they feel like “second-class Hungarians” in the neighbouring Hungarian state, being always ready for the least desired jobs and valued only in the portraying of a mythic idyllic Hungary that does not fit their actual experience. We are even called Yugoslavs!, as they complained many times. They are, ultimately, foreigners. On the other side of the border, they feel like foreigners away from the land they were born in. It is perhaps in a new Europe, based on democratic values and institutions, that they may find a frame of reference for living with respect and tolerance. It is a Europe that does not seem far in the schoolbooks, but it is still just a promise for the residents of Csantavér and Maradék.
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THE VAGARIES OF ETHNICITY, RELIGION AND LANGUAGE
The Complexity of Ethnic Stereotypes: A Study of Ethnic Distance among Serbian Youth

Abstract:
Studies of ethnic distance among schoolchildren in the countries of the former Yugoslavia have pointed to consistently strong prejudice between members of the majority ethnic groups and ethnic “others”. In Serbia, schoolchildren have been shown to demonstrate high ethnic distance primarily towards Roma, Albanians, and Croats. However, the intensity, quality, and content of these stereotypes rarely receive attention. Utilizing a rare in-depth longitudinal survey of 400 seventh and eighth grade Serbian children, this study assesses ethnic boundaries both quantitatively, using the Bogardus scale, and qualitatively, using the stereotype content model (SCM). While ethnic distance scores shed light on the extent of ethnic animosity, they fail to capture the multi-dimensionality of children’s attitudes towards other ethnic groups. Responses to open-ended questions demonstrate that Serbian schoolchildren align stereotypes of other ethnic groups neatly along the SCM model (envied, despised, or pitied out-groups), providing compelling information about the mechanisms and discourses of ethnic divisions.

Key Words
boundaries, ethnic distance, stereotypes, Serbia, youth
Recent studies have found high levels of ethnic distance in schoolchildren in the countries of former Yugoslavia. In studies of Serbian youth, scholars have found that as early as third grade, children demonstrate strong animosity towards members of other ethnic groups, primarily Roma, Albanians, and Croats [(Opacic and Vujadinovic: 2004); (Petrovic: 2011)]. Given that these children were born after the wars of the early 1990s and thus have no personal experiences or recollections of the war events themselves, the question arises: Which factors engender and propagate ethnic stereotypes in youth? How can we better study ethnic stereotypes and disaggregate ethnic distance so as to fully comprehend the nuances of ethnic discrimination? Can recent psychological models and brain imaging help account for more extreme forms of ethnic animosity, such as bigotry and ethnic violence? This study attempts to bridge sociological and psychological knowledge about prejudice and stereotypes to provide a more nuanced understanding of interethnic intolerance.

Developments in psychological literature have further expanded our understanding of prejudice and discrimination, and this new research warrants attention from sociologists. Indeed, sociologists have begun directing attention towards new psychological studies of prejudice, discrimination, and stereotype content. “Little known to most sociologists, recent psychological research provides a new approach to understanding the sources of racial discrimination that compliments ideas from the new prejudice literature... [Implicit prejudice] provides an important new layer of understanding about the nature and sources of prejudice, discrimination, and racism” [Quillian: 2006: 323].

Studying the content of stereotypes, rather than the sheer extent of prejudice or discrimination, is necessary for a nuanced understanding of the inter-ethnic processes at work. Social psychological literature on prejudice has recently expanded notions of prejudice so that it can have distinct emotional profiles – stereotypes towards some groups can involve both positive emotions (respect, admiration) and negative emotions (dislike) [Taylor: 2007: 597-617]. This study helps us determine the complexity of these stereotypes through content coding of children’s narratives of other ethnic groups, understanding how a mix of positive and negative stereotypes can combine into distinct forms of prejudice.

Additionally, this study helps us understand more extreme forms of prejudice. While both sociological studies on racial discrimination in housing or employment markets and psychological studies on implicit prejudice do well in explaining the sometimes hidden dimensions of dislike and inclination towards preferential treatment of one’s group, neither have shed light on more extreme forms of prejudice. Mainstream research on prejudice “fails to explain the extremes of bigotry sometimes observed in the world but rarely in the laboratory” [Taylor: 2007: 598], and has not attempted to account for more specific forms of ethnic violence [Dutton, Boyanowsky and Bond: 2005]. This is further augmented by cutting-edge brain...
imaging studies which have shown that in certain combinations of stereotypes, the part of the prefrontal cortex of the brain which recognizes human beings is not activated, indicating dehumanization at a fundamental psychological level [Harris and Fiske: 2006]. Thus, examining children’s articulation of these stereotypes, particularly towards groups with histories of ethnic violence, might be critical for our understanding of the dynamics of intergroup processes. Indeed, as the subsequent content analysis of children’s narratives will demonstrate, studying the content of stereotypes, particularly in populations exhibiting high ethnic animosity (and already in young children), is highly relevant.

Further, the dimensions along which children categorize other ethnic groups provide a deeper understanding of how they justify certain kinds of behaviour towards these ethnic groups. Scholars of extreme ethnic violence have shown that mass murder on an ethnic basis is commonly accompanied by a belief that the ethnic group obtained unfair advantage in the past and symbolically restructures the group so that it is perceived as viral or cancerous; thus justifying social violence as revenge, and validating violence towards non-violent members of the ethnic group [Dutton et al.: 2005] It is well known in psychology that stereotypes legitimize antipathy towards out-groups. Legitimizing myths can maintain social inequity, and how these legitimizing myths are articulated by children is of relevance [(Kay et al: 2007), (Kay and Jost: 2003)].

In the following sections, previous studies of ethnic distance are reviewed, followed by the relevant literature on stereotype content. This is followed by the results of the study, which included two waves of surveys with 374 seventh and eighth grade children in two Belgrade schools. I first examine levels of ethnic distance, examining the extent and some determinants of ethnic distance (as measured by the Bogardus scale [Bogardus: 1925]. Next, I assess the content of the stereotypes (as measured by children’s responses to open-ended questions about each of the groups), in light of new literature on stereotype content, in which the severity of stereotypes depends on out-group classification as disgust, pity, or envy [Harris and Fiske: 2007]. The paper concludes with a discussion on the study’s implications on improving intergroup relations.

**Ethnic Distance**

Nationally representative ethnic distance surveys have been performed in Serbia in 2000, 2001, and 2006 (as well as in the former Yugoslavia before its disintegration in 1966, 1985, and 1995)\(^1\), allowing for rich historical and comparative

---

\(^1\) For the most authoritative ethnic distance studies, see: former Yugoslavia – Rot and Havelka [1973]; Djuric [1980]; Bacevic [1990]; Pantic [1991]; Serbia – Kuzmanovic [1994]; Biro: [1997], Sekelj [2000]; Popadic and Biro [2002]; Biro et al. [2002], Micevic [2005]; CeSID (2006);
Most studies of ethnic distance have generally portrayed a bleak picture of ethnic intergroup relations most nations of the former Yugoslavia. For Serbs, the groups with a highest preferred degree of ethnic distance were commonly Albanians, Roma, Muslims, and Croats, with Albanians always occupying the first place. Table 1 summarizes the results of the nationally representative survey of Serbian adults in 2006.

Table 1: Percentage of respondents marking “would accept” relationship with particular ethnic group in 2006, N=1634.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Albanians</th>
<th>Croats</th>
<th>Roma</th>
<th>Montenegrins</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>as citizen</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as colleague</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as neighbour</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as friend</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as spouse</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Relatively few studies have examined the degree of ethnic distance in youth specifically, although several recent studies have pointed to alarmingly high level of ethnic distance in Serbian children. A 2003 study of 208 third and fourth-graders and 242 of their parents found highest ethnic distance towards Roma (61% would exclude from city, 76% wouldn’t share desk, 70% wouldn’t accept as best friend), followed very closely by distance towards Albanians (61% would exclude from city, 71% wouldn’t share a desk at school, 68% wouldn’t accept as best friend), with Croats faring somewhat better (38% would exclude Croats from city, 49% wouldn’t share desk, 42% wouldn’t accept as best friend) [Mihic and Mihic: 2003]. Interesting in this study is that parents displayed much higher tolerance (as expected, because of social desirability), but in a similar hierarchy as for children: for a son- or daughter-in-law, 68% wouldn’t accept an Albanian, 58% wouldn’t accept a Roma, and 42% wouldn’t accept a Croat. The only difference was that parents were more tolerant towards Roma and extremely intolerant towards Albanians; while for children intolerance was practically the same for Roma and Albanians [ibid].

Additionally, ethnic distance surveys with youth were done in neighbouring countries as well, allowing for cross-national comparison. A study of ethnic dis-


2 Serbian Public Opinion Survey CeSID (Centar za slobodne izbore i demokratiju), 2006.
tance in Croatia in university students in 1992 [Malesevic and Uzelac: 1997] for instance, included two additional, more extreme, categories for social distance (the standard Bogardus scale most extreme category is “I would exclude them from my country”): “I would like someone to kill them all”, and “I would personally like to exterminate them all”. An astounding 15.3% of the respondents chose one of those two additional categories (1992) and 14.1% in 1993. Surveys were also done recently in Bosnia with juniors and seniors in high school, using adjectives (positive/negative stereotypes) about each of the ethnic groups, allowing for very interesting comparison [Turjacakin [2004].

Theorizing Stereotype Content

Psychologists have identified two aspects of social perception – warmth and competence – which combined represent two universal dimensions of human social cognition. The presence of these dimensions, both at the individual and group level, has been supported by a plethora of research, from experimental psychological laboratories to cross-national studies. “Decades of prior research support the importance (and constant recurrence) of the warmth and competence dimensions ... In the past five years cutting-edge studies of social cognition have firmly established that people everywhere differentiate each other by liking (warmth, trustworthiness) and by respecting (competence, efficiency).” [Fiske, Cuddy, and Glick: 2007] According the Stereotype Content Model (SCM), warmth and competence interact in ways that produce different affective responses to social groups: admired (high warmth, high competence), pitied (high warmth, low competence), envied (low warmth, high competence) and despised (low warmth, low competence) [Fiske et al.: 2002]. The warmth dimension predicts whether the impression is positive or negative, while the competence dimension predicts the extent to which the impression is positive or negative [Fiske et al.: 2007].

Pride: Groups that are both liked and respected (high warmth, high competence) elicit pride and admiration. In the US, these include middleclass people, Christian people, heterosexual people, and US citizens. [ibid]

Envy: Groups that are not liked but respected (low warmth, high competence) elicit envious stereotypes. This includes out-groups that are acknowledged to be doing well (for themselves), but their intentions towards the in-group are presumed not to be positive. Members of such groups are perceived as too competent, ambitious and hardworking, evoking envy, which can lead to resentment and social exclusion [Fiske et al.: 2002]. In the US, this includes rich people, Asian people, Jewish people, female professionals, and minority professionals [Fiske et al.: 2007].
Pity: Groups that are liked but not respected (high warmth, low competence) elicit paternalistic stereotypes. Members of these groups perceived as neither apt to nor capable of inducing harm to in-group members. Stereotypes towards members of pitied groups can include overtones of compassion, sympathy, and tenderness, under the right conditions [Fiske et al.: 2002]. In the US, this includes housewives, disabled people, and elderly people.

Disgust: Groups that are neither liked nor respected (low warmth, low competence) elicit contemptuous stereotypes. Disgust, a not-exclusively social emotion, is directed at people at objects that seem repellant [(Rozin and Fallon: 1987); Harris and Fiske: 2006]. In the US, this includes homeless, welfare recipients, poor people of any race, drug addicts, and undocumented immigrants [Fiske et al.: 2007].

Figure 1: Scatter plot and cluster analysis of competence and warmth ratings for 20 groups. Reproduced from Fiske et al, 2007.

Evidence for the four combinations is profuse, not only in representative samples of US adults, but has “fit every society that has been studied so far”, including 19 nations on 4 continents, and in-depth US perceptions of specific US groups (subtypes of older people, subgroups of immigrants, subtypes of gay men, and similar) [see, Fiske et al.: 2007].
More importantly, this categorization schema has been linked with discrete behavioral responses.\(^3\) As captured by the behaviors from intergroup affect and stereotypes (BIAS) map, warmth stereotypes are associated with active behavioral tendencies, including active harm (harassment) and active facilitation (help), while competence stereotypes are linked to passive behavioral tendencies, including passive harm (neglect) and passive facilitation (association) [(Cuddy, Fiske and Glick: 2007), (Cuddy, Fiske and Glick: 2008)]. Accordingly, envied groups induce passive facilitation but active harm; pitied groups induce active facilitation but passive harm, while groups low in warmth and competence induce both harm inclinations [Cuddy et al.: 2007]. For example, institutionalizing the elderly (pitied group) is active facilitation (institutionalization aids them) but passive harm (social isolation); while for envied groups, people might shop at stores of minority groups (passive facilitation) but under certain societal conditions might attack and loot those shops (active harm), which was historically documented in the cases of Jews during the Holocaust or Koreans in the LA riots [Fiske et al.: 2007].

\[\text{Figure 2: Schematic representation of behaviors from intergroup affect and stereotypes. Reproduced from Cuddy et al, 2007.}\]
Outside of the laboratory setting, the way groups are perceived, and particularly whether members of out-groups are dehumanized or not, are linked to distinct public policy preferences, thus stressing the relevance of studying SCM. A recent study found that threat and dehumanization of another ethnic group might actually induce overt support for retaliatory aggressive policies, even when respondents’ hawkishness, SES, and education level is taken into account [Maoz and McCauley: 2008].

Magnetic resonance imaging of the brain has been increasingly used in recent studies to detect stereotype and prejudice activation. These studies have found that for despised groups, judgments are made in a brain region anatomically distinct from social groups with social emotions (pity, envy, pride) [Harris and Fiske: 2006] and that in some cases, the part of the prefrontal cortex which recognizes human beings is not activated. Extreme out-groups do not promote mPFC activation as if they are not processed primarily as human beings, indicating that despised groups might be dehumanized at a fundamental psychological level [ibid].

Aside from magnetic resonance imaging studies, the emotion of disgust has recently attracted increased attention by psychologists, and has been found to be a critical factor in dehumanization of a particular ethnic group [Taylor: 2007]. Dehumanization is frequently studied by psychologists, as occurring in multiple ways: groups acting outside societal norms are excluded from other human groups [Bar-Tal:1989], on the grounds of moral exclusion [Staub: 1989], the belief that some groups operate beyond moral rules and values [Opotow: 1990] or perception of lesser humanity [Struch and Schwarz: 1989]. According to infra-humanization theory, people ascribe human essence and uniquely human emotions (love, hope, resentment etc.) to their in-group and are reluctant to associate them with out-groups [Leyens et al.:2003]. “Many forms of discrimination and bias may develop not because out-groups are hated, but because positive emotions such as admiration, sympathy, and trust are reserved for the in-group and withheld from out-groups [Brewer: 1999: 438]. Recent studies on in-group infrahumanization have also showed that dehumanized groups are believed not to experience complex human emotions or share in-group beliefs [Leyens at al.: 2003]. Infra-humanization, especially when accompanied by a feeling of disgust and contempt towards an out-group, might be a critical venue for research on ethnic conflict.

*Infra-humanization and nationalism are two sides of the same coin. Infra-humanization is always implicit (except in extreme cases). Nationalism is always explicit ... probably because of a supportive norm ... This norm may lead some people to express*
publicly nationalistic ideas that they do not share, because they think that these ideas are shared by others. This norm also makes legitimacy facile. The leap from patriotism to nationalism is indeed easy [ibid: 713].

Finally, the SCM quadrant of disgust warrants attention because of its connection to other psychological processes that might make ethnic atrocities more likely. While many traditional accounts of bigotry found in ethnic or racial atrocities relied on hate theory [see Sternberg: 2005], researchers have found that disgust might play an equal, if not more dangerous role in antipathy than hate [(Moshman: 2005), (Taylor: 2007)]. The social contamination hypothesis suggests that members of particular ethnic groups can be seen as a “a bearer of pollution or disease, a danger to the integrity and purity of an individual or group... disgusting, dangerous, and socially unacceptable.” [Taylor: 2007: 601]. Literature in this area has examined metaphors used for other ethnic groups such as disease, contamination, corruption, and frequently impurity. “The concomitant emotion for such an obsession is disgust ... The evocation of high levels of disgust may be a crucial motivational factor in bigotry and perhaps in the perpetration if intergroup atrocities.” [ibid] Thus, disgust as an emotion towards members of particular ethnic groups is of particular relevance.

Data and Methodology

The data for this study are drawn largely from a self-administered survey of youth in two Belgrade schools in December 2006 and June 2007. The sample consists of two Belgrade public schools, of the entire eighth grade in each school (four classrooms in one school and six classrooms in the other), and a control group of seventh graders (four classrooms), totalling 374 children. The survey was administered during class-time over a week period and all children present filled out the ethnic distance scale section of the survey. Most of the children filled out the open-ended section of the survey, except in a few classrooms where teachers did not allow enough time for open-ended questions, and for these classrooms, I have no qualitative data. The survey included a Bogardus ethnic distance scale towards seven ethnic groups, as well as a battery of open-ended questions about these groups. The responses considered in the qualitative analysis include ones on perceptions of one's own identity (What does it mean to be Serbian?), knowledge about relevant historical events and opinions about the ethnic groups from the ethnic distance survey.
The distribution by school, grade, and classroom and population demographics are shown in Table 2 and Table 3, respectively.

### Table 2: Distribution by school, grade, and classroom.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Classroom</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total 7th graders:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total 8th graders:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3: Population demographics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>48.66</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>46.52</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sex withheld</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first part of the study compares children’s responses to open-ended questions on ethnic groups with the level of ethnic distance. Social distance is defined...
as “feelings of unwillingness among members of a group to accept or approve a given degree of intimacy in interaction with a member of an out-group [Williams Jr.:1964: 29], and “an indication of how acceptable or objectionable various ethnic groups are in society [Marger:1994:83]. The measurement of ethnic distance, the Bogardus Social Distance Scale [Bogardus: 1967], is composed of seven questions. The survey itself is straightforward: the “distance” variables are arrayed as column headings, while ethnic group names are arrayed as row headings. Respondents are told to mark “all of the relations with [ethnic group] you would accept or prefer to have.” This means that respondents can choose to accept a member of a different group in the capacity of a co-worker, but not marry or be close friends with them. The choice continuum includes: marriage, close friend, neighbour, co-worker, speaking acquaintance, visitor to my country, would exclude from my country (Table 4).^4 For children, this scale is modified with appropriate categories: “would exclude from my country”, “would have in my city”, “would have as a neighbour”, “would share a desk with”, “would have as a teacher”, “would have as a best friend”, and “would date”.^5

Table 4: The choice continuum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original Bogardus scale (1925)</th>
<th>Modified Bogardus scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. would admit to close kinship by marriage</td>
<td>1. would marry into group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. would admit to my club as personal chums</td>
<td>2. would have as best friend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. would admit to my street as neighbours</td>
<td>3. would have as next-door neighbours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. would admit to employment in my occupation in my country</td>
<td>4. would work in the same office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. would admit to citizenship in my country</td>
<td>5. would have as speaking acquaintances only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. would admit as visitors only to my country</td>
<td>6. would have as visitors to my country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. would exclude from my country</td>
<td>7. would keep out of my country</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Bogardus scale is still widely used in sociological and psychological studies. It is utilized for measuring plethora of social phenomena: in hospital settings, health professionals, gender attitudes, and similar [For reviews, see Parrillo and Donoghue [2005] and Weaver [2008]. While it has been subject to some

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^4 The scale assumes a hierarchical progression between variables, a hypothesis that has been confirmed in methodological studies. However, I found that ‘would have as teacher’ category does not fit appropriately in children’s hierarchical structure, which is somewhat intuitive, as it implies more authority than the equivalent category for adults (colleague at work).

^5 For younger children, such as the 2002 study of 11 and 12-year olds, the scale’s most intimate relationship is “would have as a best friend”.
criticism [For a review of methodological cautions, see Weinfurt and Moghadam: 2001], and particularly recently due to the shrinking spread in scores, it has “remained paramount in the understanding of continuously oscillating feelings and attitudes about and among different racial and ethnic groups” [Randall and Delbridge, 2005: 104-5] and “remains influential and extensively applied, vivid testimony from the academic community as to its merits” [Parrillo and Donoghue: 2005: 259]. The greatest challenge of the scale is the difficulty of differentiating whether decreasing social distance (i.e. increased tolerance) among ethnic groups, as documented over the last 70 years, is a result of an actual advance in intergroup relations, or merely a reflection of increased political correctness and social desirability of appearing racially and ethnically accepting [Parrillo: 2003]. For example, while several studies [Parrillo and Donoghue: 2005: 260], laud improvements in interracial intimacy due to the dramatically decreased mean distances expressed towards African Americans in the U.S.⁶, other scholars note that prejudice now simply takes different forms: “At the close of the 20th century, group differences have changed shape rather than disappeared” [Waters and Eschbach: 1995: 420]. Further, the fact that many ethnic groups are still significantly opposed to other groups being their neighbours and marrying close relatives [Weaver: 2008], provides support for the notion that much prejudice, discrimination and inequality remains persistent and deeply-rooted.

The second part of the study involves coding of the open-ended questions about five of the groups: the in-group (Serbs), Croats, Albanians, Roma, and Chinese. Children’s responses to open-ended questions were coded in accordance with the SCM: the warmth dimension captures attributes related to perceived intent, including friendliness, helpfulness, sincerity, trustworthiness and morality, while the competence dimension captures attributes related to perceived ability, including intelligence, skill, creativity, and efficacy [Fiske et al.: 2007]. Thus, the codes for warmth included: fair, generous, helpful, honest, righteous, sincere, tolerant, understanding; while the codes for competence included: clever, competent, creative, efficient, foresighted, ingenious, intelligent, and knowledgeable. Opposites of these were used as codes for the low-warmth and low-competence categories. Responses were also coded for particular frames: friend vs. enemy, relational (referencing the in-group), nuanced vs. categorical, and positive versus negative descriptors. A word frequency count was also done for all of the surveys.

⁶ In 1926, the overall mean of the social distance score was 2.14 with a spread of 2.85; in 1946 the mean was 2.12 with 2.57 spread, in 1956 the mean was 2.08 and spread = 1.75, in 1966 the mean = 1.92 and spread = 1.56, in 1977 mean=1.93 and spread = 1.37, and in 2005 the mean = 1.45 and spread = .87 [Parrillo and Donoghue: 2005].
The Complexity of Ethnic Stereotypes:  
A Study of Ethnic Distance among Serbian Youth

Results

As expected, although in alarmingly high levels, students are most hostile to Albanians (76% of students would like to see Albanians excluded from their country), followed by Croatians (50%) and Roma (41%): see Figure 3. This data is similar with previous aggregate ethnic distance data from surveys done in the last few years, although to a higher extent than anticipated.

![Figure 3: Percentage of answers “Don’t want in my country”.](image)

The average aggregate ethnic distance score across the sample is 2.36, on a scale from 0 to 6, 0 being least accepting (“do not want in my country”), and 6 being most accepting (“would have as boyfriend/girlfriend”). The lowest (least tolerant) average score is for Albanians, .86, and highest for Montenegrins, 3.43. Attitudes towards Hungarians and Slovenians are more positive, as expected, but were used to obtain aggregate ethnic distance scores by child. Scores towards Bosniaks were dropped because most children confused the term: “Bosniak” refers to Bosnian Muslims, while “Bosnian” usually refers to Bosnian Serbs, and it was apparent that children interpreted the word both ways, thus obfuscating the score.
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for dependent variable. (Low score = low tolerance.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate Ethnic Distance Score</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic distance Albanian</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic distance Croatian</td>
<td>1.99</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic distance Roma</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic distance Montenegrin</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic distance Slovenian</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic distance Hungarian</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic distance Chinese</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Across the different categories of acceptance (would have live in my city, would have as a neighbour, would have as a teacher, would share desk with in school, would have a best friend, and would date as boyfriend/girlfriend), similar patterns emerge. Here it interesting to note that less than 5% of Serbian children surveyed would date an Albanian or Roma, and that the distribution is quite polarized for these two groups, while for Hungarians, Montenegrins, and Slovenians there is greater distribution across categories.

Table 6: Descriptive statistics for dependent variable by category.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Albanian</th>
<th>Croatian</th>
<th>Roma</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Montenegrin</th>
<th>Hungarian</th>
<th>Slovenian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>not in my country</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>city</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neighbour</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>teacher</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>school desk</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>best friend</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>date</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Additionally, regression analysis of the results indicates that the data resemble typical ethnic distance samples. For instance, as expected from a host of previous studies on ethnic distance, the variables correlated with ethnic distance were sex (girls were more tolerant than boys), school GPA and college entrance examination scores (youth with higher grades were significantly more tolerant [Hello, Scheepers, and Sleegers: 2006], and Social Dominance Orientation, which predicted an individual student’s aggregate distance score for all groups [Sidanius and Pratto: 2001].

While ethnic distance scores towards each ethnic group would indicate relatively similar levels of animosity towards Croats and Roma, for instance, examining qualitative responses to open-ended questions revealed highly interesting pattern and illuminating the multi-dimensionality of children’s attitudes. Stereotypes clustered in very particular ways, showing a completely different schema and content of stereotypes.

**In-group:** Being Serbian was associated with almost entirely positive adjectives: honest/wholesome/truthful (19), the best in everything (19), proud (18), a good person (17), smart/resourceful (13), hardworking (13), devout (10), loyal to country (8), friendly (7), fearless/brave (7). In terms of concrete actions or traits, being Serbian was associated with: loving your country (39), Serbian heritage/forefathers/roots (26), the Orthodox faith (19), being patriotic (19), having Serbian citizenship (17), culture/food (16), Serbian language and Cyrillic script (16), fighting/giving life for your country (14), celebrating a slava\(^7\) (9), being nationalist (8), not being afraid of war (7), and respecting differences (2). In describing what it means to be Serb, negative emotions or hostile emotions focused towards outgroups were expressed by only three respondents: being Serb meant to “hate Croats”, to “hate Croats, Shiptars\(^8\) and Muslims”, and “to slaughter Gypsies, Shiptars, and Croatians”.

**Albanians:** Almost diametrically opposite to descriptions of Serbs, Albanians were described as bad/the worst/evil (23), as people who multiply (19), are ugly (18), are islamiziced/Turks (15), Muslims (15), and are stateless or have no history (13). Feelings towards Albanians included ‘hate them’ (19) and kill them all (15). As expected by the literature, although more severe than anticipated, the adjectives used to describe Albanians included: lazy, filthy, tribe, savages, smell, inferior race, disgusting, pitiful, dirty, corrupt, don’t take baths, backwards, aggressive, rotten, dishonest, short, stubby. Albanians were also described in relational terms: want to steal/take Kosovo away from us (37), want to destroy us (19), want to kill Serbs (15), want a Great Albania (15). Among the entire sample, only 1 respondent gave a neutral response (‘they’re not bad’) and there were no

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7 Serbian Orthodox tradition of celebrating a family patron saint.

8 ‘Shipatar’ is a derogatory, albeit geographically correct, term referring to Albanians in Kosovo.
positive descriptors. None of the respondents provided nuanced responses or displayed any degree of identification; responses were entirely categorical (“all Albanians”).

Most responses towards Albanians included simply “I hate them”, and many of the respondents admitted lack of knowledge but nonetheless hate: “I don’t know much about them, but I hate them.” While about one third of the responses were explicitly descriptive and derogatory (“they are like savages, live in tribes, are in every sense backwards”, “they are short, stubby, and ugly and wear some ugly caps”), about two thirds of the responses in some way alluded to their ‘intrusion’, high birth rates (‘multiplication’) which lead to their invasion of Kosovo, and ‘forced takeover of Kosovo from Serbs’, aided by the West.

The Roma are also characterized by derogatory terms, but mostly relating to their living conditions and low socio-economic status. They are described as poor (25), dirty (18), lazy/don’t work (18), smelly (17), stateless (13). Other negative attributes include: crooked, no hygiene, uncultured, rude, thieves/thugs, beggars, ugly, uncivilized, don’t like to study, don’t try to succeed. However, they are also frequently described as good people, friendly, cheerful, and charming. Only a handful of respondents expressed negative emotions (“don’t like them”) and only 1 respondent used the word “hate”. Interestingly, none of the respondents described the Roma in relational terms. However, many children offered nuanced responses, articulating their dislike only of those Roma with particular traits (being lazy), but not of the entire Roma population:

“They are totally discriminated in Serbia, there are good and bad ones, like any other people.”

“They are prosecuted by everyone. I have nothing against those who work.”

“There’s a lot of them in Serbia. There are clean ones and there are also dirty (messy) ones.”

“If they beg then I don’t like them, and a few times I fought them, but if they are hardworking then they are ok.”

9 This supports previous research on adult Serbian stereotypes towards the Roma: they are considered lazy (60%), noisy (84%), quarrelsome (74%), and greedy (58%); however, they are also considered hospitable (73%), musical (93%), and ethnically tolerant (56%), and only 16% of Serbs would prefer to see them excluded from the country. See Djurovic [2002]
Also, some respondents overtly expressed pity and compassion: “There is a lot of them in my surroundings, I find feel both disgusted and sorry when I see how they lead their lives.”

**Croatians:** Apart from a very few descriptive attributes, Croats are mostly described in relational terms, or simply as enemies (20) or bad people (14). Nearly a third of the respondents described Croats as people who “don’t like us”, “hate us”, “don’t like the Serbs”, and another third stated just that “we hate each other” and “they hate us just like we hate them”. Very frequent descriptors were “they try to be different from us” (15) or explicitly calling them jealous, envious, or resentful (14). While many of the dehumanizing adjectives present for Albanians are absent in descriptions of Croats, 15 respondents said that “they should all be killed”, and eleven expressed hate. Purely descriptive adjectives appear rarely, but the ones mentioned include: inconsiderate, thugs, slime, parasites, spiteful, distorted, rude, ugly, liars, bloody, genocidal, livestock. A few of the responses, but not many, were nuanced:

“I have nothing against Croatians who have nothing against us, but I have a problem with Croats who have problems with me.”

“I know I’d kill [a Croat] if he swore anything at me. Otherwise I’d just hate him a lot.”

Nearly a half of the respondents answered the question “what do you know about Croats” not in terms of their known feelings, but in terms of what Croats thought of Serbs:

“They try to be as different as they can from us and to be more developed as a country.”

“They try to be different from us and to make their own culture and traditions, trying not to be similar to Serbs”

“They are taught from when they are little to hate Serbs.”

The **Chinese**, with whom Serbian youth would have had no opportunity for contact other than in Chinese markets, are mostly explained in merely de-
scriptive terms: there are “many” of them (more than a half of the respondents), are of the yellow race (31), sell cheap things (25), have slanted eyes (23), have an ancient civilization (20), and are little/small (17). Only a few respondents spoke in terms of feelings towards the group: “like them” appeared two times, “don’t like them” two times, “hate them” only once, and ambivalent feelings “I have nothing against them” three times. Positive descriptors included: friendly, good, proud, hardworking, cute, interesting history, smart, cool, nice. Negative descriptors included: poor, ugly, smelly food, look the same, eat cats and dogs, smell, disgusting, eat messily, cheap workforce, and dirty.

It was evident in the surveys that some children described Chinese from their knowledge (or media and textbooks) about the culture – an ancient civilization, different religion, difficult language, martial arts, good technology, rising world power – but some were referring to the Chinese encountered in Chinese market places, which are located in dilapidated parts of Belgrade and sell low-quality goods; and thus, the results of the coding are mostly mixed depending on which of these the respondent was referring to. The lack of experience with Chinese lead to many of the responses to have an amused/intrigued tone:

“They are short, yellow, talkative. They can exchange passports amongst each other because the rest of the world can’t tell them apart. And they have terrible food.”

“I find them cute with those cute eyes.”

“They are a funny people, they like their culture, very modest and friendly.”

“There’s a lot of them in our country because there’s no more space in theirs so they have to move to other countries.”

Very few respondents described Chinese in relational terms, except that they are “traditionally our friends” and that “a lot of them moved to our country.” Also, none of the responses were nuanced; all were categorical referring to the entire group.

When graphed using the warmth and competence ratings, the distribution shown in Table 7 appears\(^{10}\).

\(^{10}\) Numbers reflect percentages of all respondents with particular category coded. For instance, if a respondent merely included “I hate all of them”, this was scored for low warmth, but not scored for competence, and the competence % would not include this respondent.
The Complexity of Ethnic Stereotypes:  
A Study of Ethnic Distance among Serbian Youth

Table 7: Distribution by warmth and competence ratings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Warmth</th>
<th>Competence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbs (ingroup)</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>94% high warmth, high competence → admired</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>12% low warmth, low competence → despised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatians</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>59% low warmth, high competence → envied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>4% high warmth, low competence → pitied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>48% mixed; inconclusive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Discussion

Results from children’s open-ended responses clearly demonstrate multi-dimensional stereotypes, which would have been completely missed by the ethnic distance score. For example, the mean ethnic distance score towards Roma (1.85) was very similar to the score for Albanians (1.99), yet the content of the stereotypes, both in terms of the SCM and frames, was drastically different. Chinese were described as friends, Albanians and Croats as enemies, and Roma as neither, further validating their complete social isolation. Further, a complex and nuanced understanding was clearly present for the Roma, and to a lesser extent also for Croats, while it was entirely absent for Albanians and Chinese. These results certainly shed light on many psycho-social processes and possibilities for future projects to bridge inter-ethnic stereotypes.

A particular mismatch between ED scores and qualitative content analysis of survey data is evident in responses about the Roma: while responses are nuanced, frequently positive, and show individuation, there is nonetheless a worryingly high degree of ethnic distance (almost matching the level of distance towards Albanians). This is ever more so surprising considering that Roma exhibit none of the traits typically associated with high ethnic distance: they are neither threatening nor have ever laid claims on Serbian property: “[The Roma] were never in real conflict with any other ethnicity, they never demanded anything which might in the long run jeopardize [the majority] [Djurovic: 2002: 668]. A possible answer could be found in infra-humanization theory: infra-humanization occurs even when there is no conflict between groups, and cannot be explained by differential familiarity with the in-group and out-group [Leyens at al.: 2003]. The optimistic news is that infra-humanization does not occur when the ethnic group member is individualized (thus partially explaining why some Serbs have more positive attitudes towards Roma). However, non-infra-humanization of a concrete person in the outgroup does not mean generalization to the whole outgroup, indicating that the evidence of individuation in the sample
might not denote a solution for improving intergroup animosity [Gaertner and Dovidio:, 2000].

Additionally, the media and social climate during the time of the survey certainly play an important role. A concurrent analysis of Croatian media and Croatian attitudes towards Serbs and Muslims showed this effect dramatically: in 1992, when Croatian media were very anti-Serb but largely pro-Muslim, extreme aggressiveness (preference to have the entire group exterminated) towards Serbs was 15.3% while only 0.6% for Muslims [Malesevic and Uzelac: 1997: 294-5]. However, only a year later, when conflicts between the Croats and Muslims lead to an intensification of anti-Muslim messages in Croatian media, extreme aggressiveness towards Muslims leaped to almost 5% and general exclusion to 20%, a statistically significant increase (while aggressiveness towards Serbs remained about the same, at 14.1%). This is strong testimony to the effect of the media, as these respondents did not have any personal contact with Muslims during this period [ibid].

Additionally, as Harris and Fiske stress, social cognition always depends on context [Harris and Fiske: 2006]. Scholars have found that these stereotypes vary systematically as a function of the perceived state of intergroup relations, as well as the context in which groups are positioned, calling for a more functional examination of stereotypes in the context of intergroup relations [Alexander, Brewer, and Livingston: 2005]. Examining social context in this case seems particularly worthwhile, as individual-level attributes, such as right-wing authoritarianism, were not shown to be significant in explaining ethnic distance. This is aligned with previous ethnic distance studies in Serbia, which found that authoritarianism was not correlated with ethnic distance [Kuzmanovic: 1994]. This and similar studies concluded that other factors played a more important role, including the ‘social climate’ of the times [ibid: 254]. All of these findings indicate that it is not the fact that some youth are merely more disposed towards ethnic animosity and violence than others.

Further, this study provides insight into the social contact hypothesis. Psychology and sociology scholars alike have generally reached a consensus that social contact should increase tolerance, under certain conditions [Pettigrew and Tropp: 2006], and studies of social distance in particular have typically documented that “long-term social contact has a relationship with lower social distance” [Randall and Delbridge: 2005: 120]. Results of this study and levels of ethnic distance towards the Chinese indicate that social contact, in this context, might actually increase rather than decrease social distance. However, extensive social contact might be the factor influencing children’s positive stereotype content and their attribution of secondary emotions (happiness, joy, etc.) to members of the Roma ethnic group.
Finally, the results of the coding also displayed robust evidence of legitimizing myths. Legitimizing myths are attitudinal or ideological instruments which promote that subordinate groups deserve their inferior and subordinate status and thus justify and provide moral and intellectual legitimacy to the hierarchy and social inequality [Sidanius, Liu, Shaw and Pratto:1994]. In the surveys, this was evident in the way children used “knowledge” of history to justify their attitudes towards Croats and Albanians, and also in the way Roma were portrayed as deserving of their segregation and social isolation, by virtue of being lazy. Legitimizing myths, typically rooted in some (although not entirely correct) version of Serbian history, was most frequently used in discussion about Albanians:

“The rest of the world made them so that they would prevent Serbs from spreading to the south.”

“Their state was created to prevent Serbs from extending to the south of the Balkans. So they’re nothing and nobody. And they smell.”

“Their state was formed in 1912. with the intention of destroying Serbia.”

“They are an artificially created nation and they are helped by Americans.”

“They didn’t have a state until 1912, and they got it so that Serbia would be denied access to the sea. Now they want to get Kosovo.”

Apart from legitimizing myths, system justification also occurs by victim-blaming attributions, usually involving complementary stereotypes (poor and unhappy, rich and happy). Recent work, however, has shown that cognitively inconsistent stereotypes (“poor but happy”) are more likely to induce a perception of a fair and legitimate social hierarchy [Kay et al.: 2007] “As opposed to victim-derogating attributions, victim-enhancing ascriptions increase system justification by “subtly reminding people that every position in society has both advantages and disadvantages and that the system is fair.” [Kay and Jost: 2003] This kind of articulation is clearly evident in the children’s narratives about members of the Roma subgroup. (“They are mostly primitive but happy people”; “They are poor but charming”).
Implications for Improving Intergroup Relations

Most importantly, results of the coding revealed that attitudes towards Albanians fit very neatly (and worryingly) into the “despise” quadrant of the SCM model; in addition to the explicit disgust-related themes in the surveys. The attributes and descriptors for Albanians (comparing them to vermin, contamination, need for total extermination and similar) displayed clear evidence of dehumanization, which is consistent with Fiske et al’s work with brain imaging: as mentioned previously, groups that fit in the ‘despise’ quadrant were not found to active the part of the brain which recognizes human emotions. If disgust is indeed a critical component of more extreme forms of ethnic violence, policies for reconciliation “which focus on reducing disgust may be more effective than those which aim to diminish anger or fear” [Taylor, 2007: 614].

Scholars have indicated that education and economic opportunities can help [Fiske et al.: 2002]. In terms of education specifically, the way Albanians are portrayed in media and textbooks could be an important factor contributing to the anti-Albanian discourse present in Serbian youth. In a study of how blacks convicted of capital crimes are depicted in newspaper articles, authors argued that it is critical to examine the subtle persistence of specific historical representations (in their case, of Blacks as ape-like) highlight important processes of dehumanization of stereotyping [Goff, Eberhardt, Williams and Jackson: 2008]. Additionally, laboratory experiments examining the process through which stereotypes are learned have demonstrated that the way in which stereotypes are learned can affect the individuation of information towards a group member, which affects the way in which stereotypes are further used (whether in an assimilative or contrastive fashion judgment) [Hicklin and Wedell: 2007].

Important to notice is that the study also illuminated the fact that ethnic stereotypes are already very pronounced by 8th grade, indicating that interventions should be focused at earlier stages. No single prescription for enhancing education can be offered, though: education is shown to work in both ways – both in making stereotypes better and worse, with no uniform effect: while for the Chinese it deepened children’s understanding and allowed them to attribute positive traits and associations (ancient civilization, religion, culture, language, martial arts), for Albanians and Croats it merely provided the children with historical ‘facts’ (typically entirely misunderstood or misrepresented) to justify their hatred.

It is finally relevant to underscore the relevance of age of the respondents of this study. First, the survey was done during class-time with rambunctious 13- and 14-year old children, and as such, it remains to be explored whether a statement such as “I would kill them all” actually carries behaviour tendencies, or is simply a brash, easy, and “cool”-perceived response of teenagers. Further, as previous surveys indicate, ED scores towards the Roma and Albanians might
always remain low, even into adulthood. However, as they age, or with further education, children might adapt their stereotypes: extreme prejudice might diminish in adulthood as they gain a more complex understanding of the world and knowledge of other ethnic groups. A recent study found that young adults exhibit more biases than older adults because they perceive less similarity and distance themselves more from the out-group [Al Chasteen: 2005]. Research from developmental psychology would also lead us to expect that children’s ethnic distance might fall over time: with increases in children’s cognitive abilities (the onset of concrete operational thinking begins at approximately 7 years of age), there is a systematic decline in group-based biases and more attention to differences between individuals [(Aboud: 1998); (Doyle: 1988), (Nesdale: 1999)]. According to these studies, two cognitive processes occur simultaneously: affective processes (fear of the unknown and attachment to the familiar; children’s preference is based on skin color, language), and focus of attention (while young children mostly focus on themselves and their preferences and perceptions, older children focus on individuals who are liked or disliked for their personal characteristics) [Nesdale: 1999]. Observing the patterns and changes in stereotype content over time would provide invaluable insight into the question of lasting and behaviour-relevant attitudes of youth11.

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11 This study was completed in the form of the author’s qualifying paper for the Department of Sociology, Harvard University, 2008


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The Complexity of Ethnic Stereotypes:  
A Study of Ethnic Distance among Serbian Youth


Us and Them - Symbolic Divisions in Western Balkan Societies


“Language Nationalism” vs. “Language Cosmopolitanism”: Divisions in the Attitudes towards the Relation between Language and National Identity

Vladan Pavlović
Miloš Jovanović

Abstract

The paper analyses the attitudes of the students of the University of Niš related to the strength of the link between linguistic and national identity (at the collective and individual levels), that is, the possible dependence of these attitudes on a number of demographic variables, such as the participants’ education and vocational orientation, sex, ethnicity, their place of birth, the education of their parents, and their degree of religiousness. The research instrument used in this study was a designed questionnaire, distributed to the students during the 2011/2012 spring semester, at four faculties of the University of Niš. The aim was to investigate which attitude or orientation towards the relation between language and national identity would be identified as predominant in the student population – “linguistic nationalism” or “linguistic cosmopolitanism”. The statistical analysis of the data showed that the most influential demographic variable was the participant’s degree of religiousness, as well as, to some extent, the participant’s education and vocational training.

Key Words

language, nation, identity, language nationalism/language cosmopolitanism, attitudes towards the relation between language and national identity
Introduction

Ever since the end of the 18th century (the time of authors such as Herder, Rousseau, Fichte, and, generally, the time of the French Revolution), it has been believed that language identity is not merely one of the layers of (individual and collective) identity that is on a par with other layers of identity, but rather that it occupies the central place among the different layers of identity, that it represents the “mirror of the people’s spirit”, and that it guarantees the identity and the prosperity of the nations that were formed at that time [Bugarski: 1996b: 171-176]. Hence the popular belief, that is often undermined by empirical data but, despite that, continues to be present in our society (e.g. in the attitudes of far-right organizations in Serbia, as well as in the general population), that a “Holy Trinity” of language, nation and state exists, i.e. that the three are crucially interrelated and interdependent, most often in the following manner: one language – one nation – one state.

In that sense, this paper aims to explore which attitudes the students of the University of Niš (from the English Department, Sociology Department and History Department of the Faculty of Philosophy, as well as from the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, the Faculty of Medicine and the Faculty of Law) hold with regard to the given issue, i.e. to ascertain whether the given population holds the view that language and national identity are closely intertwined (which could be seen as an expression of its “language nationalism”), or that maybe such a close relation/connection between the two does not exist (which could be taken to represent its “language cosmopolitanism”). In addition, another aim was to analyse the possible connection between such attitudes, on the one hand, and various demographic variables, on the other.

The paper hypothesizes that the students of the English Department, on account of their education which necessarily makes them acquainted with other cultures through a foreign language and literature, hold views dominated by “language cosmopolitanism”, whereas the other students lean towards views that could be taken as indicators of “language nationalism”.

Theoretical Background

As terms such as value judgments referring to the relation between language identity and national identity (taken collectively and individually) are of great importance in the given paper, they will be defined here in greater detail.
Following Bugarski [2005; 2009] we consider identity as consisting of a series of components, including the following: 1) its levels: identity as humanity, collectivity and individuality, 2) its layers: ethnic, religious, professional, social, territorial, cultural, political, generational, gender as well as linguistic, national and other layers of identity, and 3) the degree of its strength, i.e. strong, medium and weak identity [Bugarski: 2009]. The aforementioned first level of identity - humanity, is not relevant for this study because it has no otherness – this paper does not compare the human race with other living beings. However, all the other mentioned levels (identity shared within a community as well as an individual’s unique identity) are closely related, and by intertwining with the aforementioned layers and levels, they constitute an extremely complex structure, whose elements are almost all socially constructed and which are subject to change (ibid). In this sense, we shall consider the linguistic and national identity to be types of layers of identity that may appear at the aforementioned levels of collectivity and individuality (as the levels of interest in this paper), and which may be manifested in the degrees mentioned above.

Popular (i.e. layman) attitudes to language (and the attitudes indirectly associated with national and language identity) were analyzed by Bugarski [1996a]. There they are defined as anonymous and widely accepted general attitudes on language and languages that are passed down from generation to generation, usually in the form of common conversational clichés [ibid: 164]. A certain part of this linguistic folklore, according to the same author, even when it comes to pure prejudice and superstition, is completely harmless; however, among them there are some that may have serious consequences, and which should not be ignored.

Bugarski classifies language attitudes based on three criteria: a) according to the subject, where the attitudes include an entire range of a language in general, via certain languages and dialects, to idiolects as individual speech; b) according to the type, language attitudes are classified into aesthetic, pragmatic, moral and social ones, and c) according to the direction, language attitudes may relate to one’s own or to a foreign language, dialect or idiolect. These divisions are closely related, and the author illustrates this point with numerous examples.

Moreover, he stresses that in all the listed attitudes there is a general tendency for declaring as normal everything belonging to us, whereas everything belonging to them is subject to ridicule or even anathemizing. Bugarski [1997b; 2009] also thoroughly analyzes popular beliefs regarding languages and nations, the “native” and “foreign” in a language, the social basis of linguistic conflicts and attitudes referring to language.

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1 Moreover, the concepts of people, nation, ethnic group/ethnicity, ethno-national consciousness and language are used in this paper in the same sense that Bugarski uses them.
The issues of a relation between language and national ethnic consciousness, the issues of the relation between language and a nation in time and space, as well as issues of ethnic characteristics and nationalism in language, stand out in particular as significant ones [Bugarski: 1997a; 2002]. Attention is especially drawn to the two following important facts. Firstly, no fundamental link should necessarily exist between a language, nation and state, and therefore an ethnicity may be constituted as a nation even if it does not have its own separate, standardized, national language that would be used by all the members of the ethnicity. And secondly, it stresses the attitude that language and ethno-national consciousness do not have to be inextricably linked, i.e. that the ethno-national consciousness may well develop without a national language, which, therefore, does not necessarily have to constitute support for and guarantee its preservation, nor need it constitute “the essential embodiment of the very soul for the ethnicity in question”. This is exemplified by a number of empirical facts, which, for limitations of space, cannot be cited here.

In that sense, an essentially romanticist, mystical and mythological attitude regarding the close connection between language, nation and state, i.e. the idea that overall identity may be reduced to the ethnical background embodied in the mother tongue, as well as the attitude that mankind is naturally divided into nations each having its own particular and unique character, where language is a guarantee for that uniqueness, may be called “linguistic nationalism” [ibid:60] And vice versa, for an attitude that denies the aforementioned, and that may be regarded as rational, cosmopolitan and future-oriented, in this paper we use the term “linguistic cosmopolitanism”.

Authors that also discuss the presented issues, would, among others, include: Edwards [2009]; Fought [2006]; Greenberg [2004]; Joseph [2004]; MacGiola Chríost [2003] and Fishman [1999]. They discuss issues referring to the relation between language, on the one hand, and national, ethnic and religious identity, on the other, as well as issues referring to the relationship between language, nationalism and ethnic conflict, both on the territory of the former Yugoslavia [Greenberg: 2004], and in other parts of the world (other listed authors), paying specific attention to their close connection and the consequences of that connection.

In addition, local sources that deal with similar issues include: Kovačević [2005 and 2004]; Đorović [2004]; Ignjačević [1998]; Vlahović [1997, 1990 and 1989]. These sources studied the attitudes of both students and the general population

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2 Regarding the abovementioned term (language comopolitanism) we wish to emphasize that the given author never used explicitly this term in its entirety, as opposed to the term language comopolitanism. However, he regularly in all of the specified places the term nationalism in opposition to the term cosmopolitanism, and therefore, for the purposes of this paper, we coined the phrase language comopolitanism.
“Language Nationalism” vs. “Language Cosmopolitanism”: Divisions in the Attitudes towards the Relation between Language and National Identity

– speakers of Serbian/Serbo-Croatian - regarding their relation towards foreign languages (e.g. the importance of foreign language learning and its popularity), their relation regarding the varieties of Serbian/Serbo-Croatian (i.e. the literary language/native speech), and similar issues.

**Methodology**

As a basic instrument for the research presented in this paper, a questionnaire was developed, which, in addition to questions about demographic details, consisted of a total of 19 statements with offered alternative (yes / no) answers. These statements have been created on the basis of the literature previously listed, as well as on the attitudes to the relation between language and national identity which can be found on the websites of the far-right wing organizations in Serbia, i.e. on the website of the Otačastveni pokret Obraz organization (www.obraz.rs) and the Srpski narodni pokret 1389 movement (www.snp1389.rs). Some of these positions are as follows: The native language of every nation contains the entire soul, history, everything spiritual and the creative ideas of a nation, A nation without its own language and state is doomed, and the like.

We were careful in formulating these attitudes in such a way that the respondents who “tend towards” either a “nationalist” or “cosmopolitan” standpoint constantly have to alternate between yes and no answers, rather than constantly (automatically) offer only one of the two answers.

The survey was conducted in March 2012 on a sample that consisted of a total of 665 students, 146 of whom were students of the English Department, 96 of the Sociology Department and 88 of the History Department, from the Faculty of Philosophy in Niš, 140 students of the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, 121 students from the Faculty of Law and 74 students from the Faculty of Medicine in Niš.

All the responses from the questionnaires were then entered into the SPSS program for statistical analysis. The preliminary analysis of the data revealed that with the interviewed students an almost general (non)compliance (80% or more) for a total of 7 standpoints, and that they therefore cannot serve as proper indicators of “linguistic nationalism” or “linguistic cosmopolitanism”, which is why they were not taken into account in the quantitative data processing. The responses of the participants to the remaining 12 standpoints were recoded so that a “nationalist” response to the proposed attitude scored 1, and the “cosmopolitan” scored 0. That was the basis for calculating “the index of linguistic nationalism” (hereinafter referred to as ILN), a term that has three related meanings: 1) at the level of every individual participant, it represents the

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3 These websites were accessed in September 2011.
total value of the recoded “nationalistically” directed responses of a participant to the views presented to him / her; and 2) at the faculty/department level, it represents an average value that is obtained by adding all the recoded values of the “nationalistically” directed answers of all the participants from a specific faculty/department and by dividing it by the number of participants from the faculty/department; 3) at the level of the entire survey sample, it represents the mean value calculated by dividing the recoded values of the “nationalistically” directed responses of all the participants from the sample by the total number of participants (hereinafter we shall always state which of the three meanings we have in mind).

Clearly, the value of the ILN in each of the three listed meanings ranged from 0 to 12, where a value closer to zero indicated that the participants tend towards “cosmopolitanism”, and a value closer to 12 indicated “nationalistically” oriented attitudes.

Thus the established ILN was then cross-tabulated with the following demographic variables: educational and professional profiles, sex, age, nationality, place of birth and residence, parents’ place of birth and education, the confessional affiliation of the participants and their attitude toward religion.

This paper in no way lends support to the thesis that the values obtained by the described methods of calculation represent any “absolute values”. On the contrary - they may simply indicate certain tendencies among the participants belonging to different departments and faculties.

The attitudes which for the purpose of the quantitative analysis were previously qualified as not discriminative enough, were, however, taken into account for the qualitative analysis of the data.

Analysis and Discussion

ILN mean value of the whole sample is 5.92, which would mean that the interviewed students hover between the “nationalist” and “cosmopolitan” pattern in their understanding of the relationship between language and identity. The participants from the English Department scored the lowest ILN mean values, and the participants from the History Department had the highest scores. The standard deviations of the mean values are relatively high. The data are presented in Table 1:
“Language Nationalism” vs. “Language Cosmopolitanism”: Divisions in the Attitudes towards the Relation between Language and National Identity

Table 1: The mean values of the ILN for the faculties/departments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faculty / Department</th>
<th>Mean value ILN</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
<th>min</th>
<th>max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mechanical Engineering</td>
<td>6.61</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td>6.44</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>4.43</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociology</td>
<td>4.98</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>7.42</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5.92</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When it comes to cross tabulating the ILN with the socio-demographic variables, the connection of the ILN and the attitudes referring to religion has proved to be significant, whereas the connection to the participants’ gender, age, place of birth and residence, ethnicity and denominational affiliation, their parents’ education and place of birth was less obvious. When comparing the ILN mean value for each faculty in relation to the gender of the participants, the results reveal higher “nationalism” among the male students, except for the Faculty of Philosophy, where the ILN mean value at all three departments is higher among the female students. The most consistent results, with an almost negligible difference, were obtained from the future lawyers, whereas the largest differences were determined between the male and female students of sociology and English. On the basis of the existing data, we cannot offer a more substantiated explanation of these findings. Only the following supposition might be offered for the lower level of “language nationalism” of the male students from the English Department, Sociology Department and History Department as compared to the female students: since a significantly greater number of female students study at the Faculty of Philosophy (which offers mostly “female” professions such as, for example, the teaching profession), it is possible that the young men who enroll in these studies do not belong to the “typical” group of men, as found at other faculties where we conducted the research: hence their more pronounced “language comopolitanism”.
### Table 2: The mean values of the ILN at faculties/departments in relation to gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Faculty / Department</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Mean value ILN</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mechanical Engineering</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>6.70</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>6.31</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>6.21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>2.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>6.60</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>6.36</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4.59</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>2.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociology</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>2.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>7.31</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>2.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>7.60</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>6.18</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>2.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>2.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When considering the ILN mean value concerning the students’ age, only those students between the ages of 20 and 23 were taken into consideration for the analysis. The data reveal different trends at the faculties/departments. While we find a constant decline in “nationalism” with the students of sociology with an increase in age (at the more advanced levels of study), with the law students the opposite was evident. The Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, the History Department, and, especially, the Faculty of Medicine, bring out the largest number of variations, and we cannot speak about any clear tendency towards one direction or another. The ILN mean value remains the most constant with the students of English, which is somewhat surprising, since the expected findings

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4 This makes up 82.10% of the total sample, and 87.36% of those who expressed their agreement/disagreement with the 12 statements on the basis of which the ILN is constructed. We must note here that a very small number of students aged 20 and 23 from the Faculty of Medicine made up this group - only 3 - and a small number of mechanical engineering students aged 22 (n = 9) and 23 (n = 6). In all the other cases, the whole sample consists of students aged 19-50, where the average age was 21.82, with a standard deviation of 2.26.

5 However, we cannot speak about a stronger correlation, given the low value of Spearman’s correlation coefficient ($\rho = -0.285$).
are that as the studies progress, the level of students’ awareness regarding the relationship between language and nation increases.

Regarding the 
ethnicty
 of the students, 96.4% of the sample consists of students who declared themselves Serbs, where the ILN has the same value as for the entire sample. The percentage of other nationalities6 is negligible (each less than 1%). Here we must mention that the highest ILN average score was obtained from the participants who did not give data on their ethnicity, and that this finding is repeated in all the analyzed variables, with the exception of religion and attitude toward religion, and we can ascertain some greater distrust to the conducted research among participants who displayed the strongest “language nationalism”.

When analyzing the relation between the place of birth and the ILN, no major differences in the average achieved score were determined (with a minimal deviation from the average for an entire sample) for the students born in towns, cities and large towns, which make up 94% of the participants. The percentage of the others is negligible, and no valid conclusions may be drawn regarding the effect of the birth place on the “nationalism” of the respondents.

When it comes to the place of residence, it was expected that with the increasing size of the community where the students reside, a decrease in “nationalism” would be found. However, these expectations were not met. Although the students who live in the country scored the highest ILN value (6.06), it is only slightly larger than that of the others, which make up a more significant percentage of the sample (e.g., in the case of a large city it is larger by only 0.14); therefore we cannot ascertain any regularity.7

The analysis demonstrated that the place of mother’s and father’s birth does not present any noticeable effect on the ILN value, whereas when it comes to parents’ education a surprising finding is that the average ILN value records a slight increase with an increase in the level of the education of the father, and in the case of the education level of the mother the ILN decreases when we go from elementary school, over to high school and university, recording a slighter increase in cases when the mother has a university degree. The findings are contrary to the assumption that the level of “nationalism” will record a decline among participants with highly educated parents.

Most of the students from the sample (67.8%) cited Orthodox Christian as their religion (n = 451), and their average ILN score was 6.26. Orthodox Christians from among the students of English and sociology have lower scores (4.88, and 5.56 respectively), whereas the Orthodox Christians from other faculties/departments have higher scores.

6 Those include: Bulgarian, Montenegrin, Yugoslav, Roma, Croatian and Greek.
7 Thus the only respondent who cited Belgrade as the place of residence achieves a relatively high score of 8 on the ILN.
Christians made up a significant percentage of the sample (n = 87, 13.1%) with an average ILN score of 5.87 and atheists (n = 25, 3.8%), who also had a lower average ILN value of 3.08 (the ILN value with both the “Christians” and the “atheist” varied in the same way as with the “Orthodox Christians” at faculties/departments). The incidence of other religions is negligible (less than 1% each). Students who did not state their religion (n = 67, 10.08%) had an average ILN score of 5.22.

The clearest relation was observed between the ILN and *the attitude toward religion* – the “stronger” the religiousness, the higher the ILN score. However, the standard deviation values are relatively high, and the low value of Spearman’s correlation coefficient (ρ = -0.28) indicates that there is no significant dependence between these two variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude regarding religion</th>
<th>Mean value ILN</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I am a firm believer and I accept anything that my religion teaches</td>
<td>6.89</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>2.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am religious, but I do not accept everything that my religion teaches</td>
<td>6.16</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>2.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I think about it, but I am not sure whether I believe or not</td>
<td>5.17</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>2.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am indifferent to religion</td>
<td>5.06</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am not religious, but I do not have anything against it</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>2.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am not religious and I am against it</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No data</td>
<td>6.17</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>2.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We shall also present here a possible qualitative analysis of students’ answers to two specific attitudes. Such an analysis may by itself further contribute to the achievement of the goal that was set at the beginning, and at the same time it provides us with the opportunity to pay attention to the attitudes which in the quantitative analysis did not prove to be discriminatory enough.

The percentage of positive responses to attitude № 1 of the questionnaire (*It is natural that every nation has its own national language and a national state*) at all the included departments/faculties is extremely large, and ranges from 85.4% at the Department of Sociology, to 95.9% at the Faculty of Medicine.

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8 It is very interesting that “atheists” from the History Department (n = 2) scored an average ILN value of 9.5.

9 There were cases of “Muslims”, “Catholics”, “Rastafarians”, “Deists”, “Manicheans”, “Maradonists”, “Agnostics”, and those who cited “patriotism” or “Serbian” as their religion (the last on the list are from the Faculty of Law and the History Department, Faculty of Philosophy).
These data may reflect the (average) extreme “linguistic nationalism” of the participants when it comes to this attitude, i.e. the idea of the tight relation among the nation, the language and the country, especially in view of well-known empirical facts (briefly referred to above) that often deny such a strong relation in practice. In addition, if such a strong “nationalist” attitude could possibly be expected from students belonging to non-philological departments, such an attitude may be considered surprising when it comes to students of English, who study in detail, among other materials, American, Canadian and Australian literature and culture, and are certainly aware of the fact that none of these three nations has its own national language.

The following attitude “Ijekavian pronunciation (as in the words mlijeko, vrijeme, dijete) should be excluded from the Serbian language as it is used by Croats and Bosnians (for example, in the following words odvjetnik, ispovijed) was included in the questionnaire under the influence of an actual event when ijekavian pronunciation became banned for public use in the Republic of Srpska, during the last war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (and shortly after the bill was withdrawn because people - native ijekavian speakers could by no means adjust to the new change). Moreover, it is worth reminding that the Eastern Hercegovinian ijekavian dialect together with the ekavian dialect of Šumadija and Vojvodina, constitute the basis of the Serbian literary (standard) language, thus every insistence on its expulsion from use could be considered a paradox. In that sense, it could be said that the positive responses regarding the abovementioned attitude, given by more than half of the Faculty of Medicine (66.2%), Faculty of Mechanical Engineering (55.7%) and the Faculty of Law (52.1%) students were quite surprising; at three departments of the Faculty of Philosophy this attitude got only minor support (42% at the History Department, 38% at the Sociology Department and the lowest was for the English Department - 32.3%).

**Conclusion**

The starting hypothesis proved to be meaningful: English Language students, as students of philology, regarding the issues concerning the relation between language and national identity, usually hold a more “cosmopolitan” attitude when compared to their colleagues from other departments and faculties (especially the students of history and mechanical engineering, and somewhat less students of sociology).

Female students at all the departments of the Faculty of Philosophy showed greater “language nationalism”, whereas male students from other faculties were more inclined toward “nationalism”. The age of the participants at the faculties/departments where the survey was conducted correlates conversely with the ILN, and only with the sociology and law students can we see a clear trend that
over the years they become less or more "nationalist" oriented. In contrast to our expectation, the students who were born or live in large Serbian cities do not have a significantly lower ILN score compared to those living in smaller towns and villages. As far as the parents’ education is concerned, it was found that the value of the ILN does not decrease among participants whose parents have a higher education.

Obviously lower ILN scores were recorded with non-religious participants, and with the variables concerning the attitudes toward religion a “regular” link was noted in direct proportion with the ILN, although no significant correlation coefficient was determined.

When it comes to the conclusions related to the above (very briefly) presented qualitative analysis of students’ answers to individual attitudes, we may say that the participants gave very interesting and sometimes extremely “nationalist”, but “cosmopolitan” responses as well, which, in addition, proved once again that students at the English Department, on average, have slightly more “cosmopolitan” attitudes towards the issues discussed in this paper.

At the end of this analysis, we would like to add that it provides us with the opportunities for further work, in terms of performing a similar study which would include older high schools pupils in Niš, the border areas of Serbia, etc. Such further studies would give more accurate results, which again might be of importance both at the theoretical level - in terms of further development of the theoretical and methodological approach to these issue, and in a more empirical sense, since we might discover some statistically more significant differences and correlations on a larger sample groups of participants, which have not been revealed in this relatively limited study. Finally, this type of research might have some practical effects, in terms of, for example, the introduction/filling in of the relevant teaching materials at the primary and secondary education levels so as to develop student awareness of the complexity of the relationship between the national and language identity.10

References:

Bugarski, Ranko, Evropa u jeziku (Beograd, 2009).
Bugarski, Ranko, Jezik i kultura (Beograd, 2005).
Bugarski, Ranko, Nova lica jezika – sociolingvističke teme (Beograd, 2002).

10 We wish to thank our colleagues Mihailo Antović, Dragan Todorović, Jelena Petković and Dušan Stamenković from the Faculty of Philosophy, as well as Vuk Milošević and Jelena Bašić from the Faculty of Medicine in Niš, Natalija Žunić from the Faculty of Law, and Miloš Tasić from the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, who helped us in conducting the research with the students.
Abstract

This paper aims to contribute to the ongoing debate on the role of media language in setting and reshaping symbolic borders in societies characterized with a high level of plurality. Following constructivist reasoning, it will highlight the active role of language used in media in creation and interpretation of our reality. Considering the power relations in each society and unstable equilibrium as a result of a struggle for power, this paper further claims that power lies in the hands of those who have the ability and means to create the messages and control the flow of information. Following the accounts of Foucault, Voloshinov and Fairclough, this paper claims that a demonstration of power could be measured through the hegemon's ability to take over the primary discourses (original discourse) and give priority to the secondary one (reporting discourse). Secondary discourse has been symbolically re-shaped along with the ideas, values, positions, ideologies, and certain goals of those who are in control of the flow of information and values. This control is usually demonstrated while reporting on others, particularly on powerless or marginalized groups. This theoretical frame will be applied in the case of Serbia and its Bosniak/Muslim minority, perceived by selected mainstream media and personalized through the statements of the Mufti of Sandžak, Muamer Zukorlić.

Key Words

media language, discourse, symbolic boundaries, others
Introduction

Symbolic divisions in societies have occupied the attention of many authors and scholars who study the immanent factors influencing boundary setting in each of these societies. Besides sociologists, anthropologists, scholars of culture, this paper acknowledges a significant impact of linguists in this field of research, especially those who apply the rules and principles of linguistics in the field of media. Apart from the works of Saussure, Voloshinov, Wittgenstein, Barthes, Lacan, Derrida, the theoretical foundation for the analysis provided in this paper represents the work of authors belonging to the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) school. The work of Fairclough, especially, will be elaborated on in this paper.

Following the main tenets of CDA, the starting assumption is that language is not neutral and that it has an instrumental value in the hand of those who use the language and control the flow of information and meaning(s) through media. Therefore, an ideological frame, under which media language is coined and shaped, is important. Also, this paper follows the logic and main premises of constructivism, where the power of language to “underpin the forms of action that it is possible for us to take” is fundamental and therefore a key feature of social constructions is recognition of the fact that different constructions of the world sustain different kinds of social action” [Burr: 2003:61]. Additionally, the language represents an area in which the struggles within society are reflected, especially struggles for power as witnessed by many post-structuralist or feminist authors [(Kristeva: 1984); (Batler, Laklau and Žižek: 2007); (Batler: 2000)].

Serbian society has long been characterized with divisions along many lines. One of the most significant is that between majority and minorities, where the latter term stands not only and exclusively for groups organized along national, ethnic, or religious distinctiveness, or for communities that are not numerous, but for groups characterized by limited access to power. In this sense, access to power, or - to be precise - the absence of it, determines one’s status along the majority/minority axis.

The aim of this paper is to deconstruct the current Serbian constellation of power in which the process of drawing lines and borders between those in power and the powerless has been conducted through the use of public language. What makes this use of language more distinctive is the fact that it is used by both hegemonic structures (structures in power) representing the majority in Serbian society and by minorities as a part of their rebellion tactic against the dominant system of values. In such a constellation, the primary voice of minority representative (represented by the figure of the religious leader of Bosniaks from Serbia, Muamer Zukorić) has been dramatically changed in the discourse of reporting generated by the Serbian mainstream media.
What is common for both discourses (the primary and the reporting discourse) is the fact that both sides use the technique of *othering* when setting the border between “Us” and “Them”. The majority of the statements of Muamer Zukorlić, the Mufti of Sandžak and the religious leader of Bosniaks from this part of Serbia, are controversial, direct and even insulting. In his speeches, Mufti usually refers to the unfavourable and marginalized position of his own group, pointing to the state of Serbia and politicians from Belgrade as occupiers and aliens, and sending messages of revolt and even threatening messages in order to change this hegemonic constellation in which his group is doomed to subordination. In his public appearances, at least four kinds of symbolic struggles against the Serbian hegemony can be recognized: first, a struggle for autonomy (“an autonomy for Sandžak would be a pillar of Serbia’s stability”),¹ second, political unity of Bosniaks in Serbia (Zukorlić puts the blame for the division among Sandžak Muslims on Serbian security services, which aimed to block the development of the Muslim religious and educational institutions created in the last 15 years), third, religious freedoms, and, finally, minority rights (“Bosniak Muslims in Serbia were exposed to constant ethnic and religious discrimination”).²

In order to analyse the secondary discourse - the reporting discourse of Serbian mainstream media close to various interest groups of the hegemonic bloc - this paper analyses nine articles published in six different print media³ from the 18th to the 23rd of February, 2012. Reports in the media contain reflections and reactions on the short video - “Muftijin emanet”⁴ (Mufti’s emanet) – posted on Muamer Zukorlić’s Facebook account on February 18th, 2012 - containing his statements about what would happen if anybody had “designs” on his life. The method of analysis will be based on the framework developed by Fairclough, a representative of the Critical Discourse Analysis stream (explained in Chapter 3).

The set of research questions I aim to explore could be divided into two groups. The first group refers to questions of a general or contextual nature and they are related to the position of the Bosniak minority and Muslims as a religious minority in Serbia. Therefore, I would like to contextualize this analysis by

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¹ These statements have been taken from the interview Mr. Zukorlić gave to the Qatari-based TV station, Al Jazeera, in 2010.
² Ibid.
³ Articles analyzed in this paper were published in moderate dailies “Blic” and “Danas”, dailies with a slight nationalist agenda such as “Večernje novosti” and “Politika”, as well as dailies under the direct influence of various political or business interest groups, such as “Kurir” and “Pravda”.
⁴ For example, there is a phrase in Arabic language, used by Muslims in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina “Allah emanet”, which refers to something that is in someone’s possession for a short time, to be entrusted to someone for a while, until things revert to normal. It could be translated as: “Until we see each other again, stay entrusted to God = Take care of yourself / Be safe”.

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answering the following questions - How does the Serbian context define the position of “Others” within the society? Why is the position of the Bosniak minority so particular? On the other hand, specific questions of interest for this paper are - How and why does a religious leader expropriate the position of his community to symbolically represent himself as a fighter for their liberation? Do the media find him attractive? How does he influence the media and how do the media react to his statements? Which tactics could be recognized while analysing media reporting? Therefore, the paper will specifically target how media language is used by the hegemon and marginalized groups, it will highlight the constructivist role of media language in defining reality and in reshaping the reality and power relations which exist within these groups.

Context: Power Constellation(s) in Serbia

In order to explain power relations in Serbia and how borders are drawn between various groups or blocs, I will rely on Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. In this sense, hegemony should be understood as the power over society as a whole, manifested or exerted by one group (bloc, class, ethnic or political elite) in alliance with other social forces. As an unstable equilibrium, it implies a constant struggle among blocs for domination and subordination, which takes various – economic, political, and ideological – forms [Fairclough: 1995: 76]. As Fairclough claims, the agents of hegemonic struggle are social institutions that present exclusive “ideological-discursive formations” (IDF). IDFs are institutionalized or formalized discourses, usually shaped and established symbolically in media discourse. Each group in society, including the dominant one and subordinated groups, has been labelled as a particular IDF. Therefore, dominant group(s) conceptualize their own IDF(s) around particular and exclusive perceptions, values and notions. Each IDF exhibits a tendency to present its own IDF as natural, desirable, dominant and “common to all” knowledge. To describe the struggle among various discourses, produced by IDFs in a certain society and the dilemmas that arise out of contradictions in social practices, Fairclough introduced the concept of “orders of discourse” as domains of hegemony and ideological struggle [Fairclough: 1995: 25-27].

Taking the Serbian case into account, we can identify at least three dividing lines along which the borders between “Us” and “Them” (in the context of this paper, “They” are Muslims or Bosniaks) could be set – ideological, religious and majority vs. minority line.

When it comes to ideological divisions, their roots could be found in the 1990s when the entire society, as well as the media, was divided between those who supported the regime of Slobodan Milošević and those who opposed it. This
division has been transformed into a paradigm of the “first” and “second/other” Serbia. While the former represents the backward and nationalistic part of Serbian society, the latter has been characterized as emancipated, citizen-oriented, anti-war voices, proclaimed in many public events and publications [(Čolović and Mimica: 1992); (Grupa autora: 2002)].

During the 1990s, the most influential media constituted the so-called “patriotic front“ with directors and editors-in-chief loyal to the regime of Slobodan Milošević, enabling him to control majority of media space. In the same period the so-called independent or oppositional media were supported mainly by international donors. These media tried to offer an alternative voice. After the democratic changes in 2000, successive governments in post-Milošević Serbia established a new media legal framework in accordance with European standards, but in practice the strong ties between the media and political actors remain in place. In recent years, the media have been facing new financial pressures and, as well as the trends of tabloidization and sensationalism in media reporting have also changed how public events will be perceived and blurred the strict lines between events of public interests and those that are not.

The religious aspect is also important, since religion understood in its traditional sense (as a marker of belonging) determines self-identity and out-group perception. Considering the fact that Orthodoxy plays an important role in shaping modern Serbian identity, it is important to delineate its relations towards religions that shape the identity of other, minority, groups, such as Islam in the case of the Bosniak minority in Serbia. What the majority of media users, who are non-Muslims as it is the case in Serbia, know and think about Islam is largely the result of what they see and hear in the mass media, rather than the result of personal experiences and opinions, unless they have alternative personal or social knowledge and opinions that allow them to challenge the dominant media discourses [(van Dijk, T.A.: 1991.); (van Dijk: 1987)].

In line with different perceptions and presentations of Islam that I investigated on a sample of divided media in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia [(Mariko: 2009); (Marko 2011: 196 - 200)], it is evident that the media, with different editorial policies (dominated by ethnic and political exclusivism), several trends

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5 This was noted by the Special Reporter of the UN Commission for Human Rights Tadeusz Mazowiecki. In 1994, he wrote that information encoded by the leading media in the states of the former Yugoslavia were created within the nationalistic discourse, where the dominant matrix of reporting contained insulting and offensive contents towards “others”. Source: Mazowiecki: [1994: 35].

6 According to the last census (from 2012.), almost 85 per cents of Serbian citizens declared their belonging to the Serbian Orthodox Church. „Taking this into account relations between state and its church could not be bad. They only could have some disputes in regard to specific issues...“, this was stated by the director of the Office for cooperation with churches and religious communities of the Serbian Government. See: „Bitka bez gubitnika“, NIN, May 23, 2013: 19.
in media reporting could be outlined. Firstly, Islam itself is heterogeneous and any dull presentation of this rich religious and cultural tradition is wrong and superficial. This is even truer when Islam is represented through its extreme forms such as terrorism. Secondly, an incomplete and partial presentation of Islam is additionally complicated by the fact that audiences of the mainstream media do not have, generally speaking, any real experience with Islam, either with believers who do practice it or with those who belong to Muslim culture. Thirdly, reducing Islam to personalized symbols of religious leaders or other distinguished persons or politicians, even if driven by the best of intentions, is fatal, and it diminishes all the wealth of Islam [Marco: 2011: 191-206].

This trend of reporting corresponds with the ideology of Christoslavism. Within this ideology, Prince Lazar was made a martyr in the battle of Kosovo and portrayed as a Christ figure. Therefore, his enemies, the Turks and metaphorically speaking – all Muslims, including the converts - are considered to be Christ-killers. In their version of the “Last Supper”, Serbian nationalists recognized their Judas - Vuk Branković - who betrayed Lazar and became the ancestral curse of all Muslims with Slavic origins. As an example of such ideology Sells mentioned Petar Petrović II Njegoš’s work The Mountain Wreath known for its sub-title - The Extermination of the Turkifiers (Istraga Poturica). For Njegoš, the ancestors of Slavic Muslims, who converted to Islam, forfeited their Slavic identity and became “Turkifiers” [(Sells: 1996); (Ajami: 1996)].

The last line of division significant for this paper is the one between the majority and the minorities. If we take the following markers of one’s minority status into account – number, cultural, national, ethnic and language distinctiveness, public recognition (through laws, by the majority), a will to preserve its peculiarities and access to power – it is in line with the main argument of this paper to focus on the last one. Access to power defines one’s majority or minority position, since it enables those in power to set the rules, to control, and to be able to subordinate others. In a strict and formal sense, power is always in the hands of (a numerical) minority, the elite. Generally speaking, the majority of citizens either individually, or organized along various groups (including those with minority status in Serbia), are always far from being able to share and control the power. In this sense, they are all minorities. National minorities in Serbia, including the Bosniak minority, are thus suffering double marginalization. First, in a symbolic sense, they do not share the most significant (nationalized) symbols of Serbian nationhood (anthem, eagle, flag, history, etc.), and in a more practical sense, in the political domain, they can be a part of the game only as joint-partners (through coalitions), and not as those who significantly influence the political game itself.
Concept: The Theoretical and Methodological Account

The analysis of newspaper articles provided in this paper is based upon the theoretical framework developed by Fairclough, a representative of CDA. Fairclough established his analytical approach following Voloshinov’s account. For Voloshinov, three salient aspects could be identified in regard to the distinction between “primary” and “secondary discourse” – first, typology of discourse representation; second, the overlapping, which represents only the ideational and interpersonal (or stylistic) meaning of the secondary discourse; and, third, contextualization of the secondary discourse within the primary one that interprets the way how it is controlled. Based on these salient features, Fairclough developed his own analytical framework of discourse representation, where he gives/introduces five parameters according to which the analysed text could be compared with respect to discourse representation. These features are mode, boundary maintenance, stylisticity, situationality and setting [Fairclough: 1995: 55]. For the sake of this paper and its analytical aim, two parameters – the mode and the boundary maintenance – will be discussed and applied in the analysis of selected articles from Serbian newspapers. This framework should be useful in detecting how these tendencies accord with the ideologies of news production. The main questions shaping my research interest are – What makes media decide what (not) to represent, and why they interpret and represent something in one way rather than another?

When it comes to the mode, Fairclough differs four significant modes of reporting as constitutive parts of each newspaper article. Besides Direct Discourse (DD), there are also Indirect Discourse (ID), Direct Discourse Slipping (DD(S)), and Unsignalled Discourse (UNSIG). For the sake of my analysis, I will use DD for direct citation, ID for paraphrase, DD(S) when related, but indirect topics are reported (comments from persons not directly involved in the event), and finally UNSIG where neither of above mentioned criteria could be applied, and where there is no direct and clear connection between the reporting discourse and initial one. According to Fairclough, what contrasts DD and ID are: the subordination of the secondary discourse using “that” clause, a shift from first or second person to third person in pronouns, shift of deictic (“here” becomes “there”), and backshift of tense [ibid].

When it comes to the second important parameter – boundary maintenance – it measures the extent to which the voices of primary and secondary discourse are kept apart or merged (in both directions, towards primary or towards secondary discourse). Fairclough emphasizes two aspects of boundary maintenance – incorporation and dissemination. When referring to incorporation, he claims it to be typical for the case when the secondary discourse (reporting discourse) is being translated into the voice of the primary one. The most common form
of incorporation is change in the interpersonal or stylistic meanings of secondary discourse. This could be illustrated with the use of vocabulary completely different from the one used in original text. When original text or the primary discourse is someone’s public speech or some public report, reporter or creator of the secondary discourse can change not only the words, but the ideational meaning as well [Fairclough: 1995: 58]. On the other hand, dissemination occurs when the voice of the secondary discourse directly affects the primary discourse and its initial meaning. Dissemination is closely linked with UNSIG, but could occur with other modes as well. Usually, dissemination and incorporation occur simultaneously [ibid: 59].

Discourses on Zukorlić

The primary discourse of this analysis is related to the video – “Muftijin emanet” [Mufti’s emanet] – posted on Muamer Zukorlić’s Facebook account, and later on YouTube, on February 18th, 2012. The video contains statements by the Mufti of Sandžak on what would happen if anybody had “designs” on his life. Zukorlić said:

> Anybody that might have designs on my life has a plan of his own, especially since we here know that nothing in Serbia happens without a plan. All serious liquidations that were ever carried out in Serbia were planned.

He further says that Serbian history shows that “liquidations happen as a result of plots, which usually go all the way up to the highest place in the country.”

> I think that they are aware that this question, along with me, has grown so big that to do so would be to play a dangerous game. There are some relations in our Sandžak tradition that have become obsolete in some nations. There is family tradition, the tradition of friendship, and a tribal connection, if you like, and there is also readiness to protect one’s own.

> This is such a powerful energy. Well, then, let me be totally frank - if such a thing did happen, I think that not a single Belgrade politician would dare to set foot in Sandžak for the next 50 years.
The video is accompanied with powerful music, and Zukorlić’s messages followed by footage from a parade of the B-H Army at a sports stadium. Also, in the last seconds, there are clips from the war of the 1990s showing soldiers carrying Army of BiH’s flags. This video and such a strong, direct and disturbing message were broadcast on the eve of elections in Serbia that took place in May of 2012 and Mufti, later on, was nominated for the President of Serbia.

What is interesting, when we analyse his statement, is the strong symbolic division between “us” (we from Sandžak) and them (state representatives, politicians from Belgrade) where he positions himself as the sole, crucial personality in the Self-group, representing his own life as the one which is the guarantee of peace and stable relations. Besides sending out concern for his own security and life, Zukorlić didn’t forget to warn politicians from Belgrade (in his interpretations, Belgrade is a metonymical equal to the state of Serbia) and he clearly demarcated distinctions between “their” habits (all serious liquidations in Serbia ever carried were planned) and “ours” (There are some relations in our Sandžak tradition that have become obsolete in some nations).

For the sake of my analysis, I will refer to articles published in five newspapers in Serbia from the 18th to the 23rd of February, all reported under the assumption that Muamer Zukorlić’s life is being threatened.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DD</th>
<th>DD(S)</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>UNSIG</th>
<th>Media</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Blic</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Danas</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Večernje</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Politika</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Kurir</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5 in total</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It was expected that mainstream print media would not transmit what Zukorlić said without providing someone’s else viewpoint or its own comment (in a form of reaction to the Zukorlić message).

Only in the cases of two articles published in the moderate daily “Blic”, almost half of the sequences (units of analysis within the newspaper article, usually separate paragraphs), were in (in)direct relation to the primary discourse. In the article published on February 20th, 2012, in “Blic”, the first half of the text is a combination of DD and ID modes of reporting, while the last two sequences of the text are DD(S), where other sources (politicians, police) are commenting not
the Zukorlić’s statement *per se*, but the validity of his claims. A moderate politician from Sandžak, Rasim Ljajić, a member of the Serbian Government, commented:

> Zukorlić has to support his campaign with lies, nationalism and hatred. The media report on it and that is the most important thing to him. He is like a contemporary folk singer striving for publicity. Positive or negative, it is not important to him.

Another article, also published in this daily, on February 21st provided a floor for some of Zukorlić’s opponents mostly (such as Meho Omerović, Aida Ćorović, Miljenko Dereta) to comment on the matter. This article widens the thematic scope, referring to Zukorlić’s previous radical statements.

> In the last four years, each Zukorlić’s appearance is a part of his campaign. He is ready to attract attention on a local level and wider. Since he failed to make a deal with the state to give him some privileges, he is trying to provoke national tensions. Instead of making solutions in Sandžak, he is provoking against the state. All that in order to present himself as a protector of Bosniaks in Serbia (Aida Ćorović).

An article published in the daily “Politika” on the same day shifted the focus of reporting further, mainly stressing the fact that Zukorlić himself is dangerous, since he is surrounded by his own paramilitary.

> Everyone has become accustomed to seeing Mufti Muamer Zukorlić and his security guards - or paramilitaries, as his entourage is increasingly being referred to. Even the normally restrained Minister Rasim Ljajić - obviously ticked off by the mufti’s skillfulness in attracting attention, this time by claiming that someone is out to assassinate him - said that Zukorlić was launching such a story in order to justify his paramilitary formation, which he passes off as his security contingent, while people keep asking themselves who those people are, in all those black jeeps following him.
When we consider boundary maintenance, it is more than obvious that dissemination dominates—in almost all of the cases the reporting tone of analysed media directly criticized Zukorlić and his rhetoric, while few latently criticized the state of Serbia for being his inspirer (“A Government Like This Needs a Mufti Like This”, Blic, February 21). A media discourse directly affects the primary one (Mufti’s short speech contained in the video).

As typical for dissemination, the most salient modes, besides DD(s), were UNSIG—the sequences within the newspaper article that are not directly connected with the primary discourse (Zukorlić’s statement in the video), referring instead to his previous statements, affairs, rumours, and scandals. This is the case with the article published in the daily “Politika” on the 22nd of February, (“Paramilitary surrounds Zukorlić”), where only the first paragraph refers to his video, but using the ID mode:

*Scenes in which the spiritual dignitary with the Ahmed cap cruising through Sandžak and Bosnia in SUVs followed by a legion of armed men, are no surprise to anyone any more.*

The next 12 sequences (thematic units) of the article are labelled as UNSIG, including comments of his political opponents, such as Rasim Ljajić, a member of the Serbian Government, Esad Džudžević, president of the National Council of Bosniaks, and Mirsad Jusufović, from the Democratic Party of Sandžak. While Ljajić commented it is “a reflection of the mufti’s desire for publicity, that it has nothing to do with the truth, and that it has been invented as a part of his election campaign”, Džužević was more direct:

*I was at last year’s commemoration in Srebrenica, which was attended by many high-ranking delegations from Serbia, Slovenia, Turkey... Mufti Zukorlić had by far the biggest security retinue and procession of SUVs. It stuck out like a sore thumb. And that is a regular occurrence in Novi Pazar and wherever else Zukorlić goes.*

Even more direct criticism came from the peace and NGO activist from Sandžak, Aida Ćorović, who claims:
He has his own paramilitaries, his own firing range, his own criminals, whom he parades, threatens anyone he wants, takes whatever he likes, and the government does nothing at all. When an ordinary person makes an ordinary misdemeanour, he or she gets processed right away, and that is OK. But it is not OK to have more than 50 charges for various misdemeanours and transgressions against Zukorlić and his men without a single one of them being processed. Then of course, Zukorlić always goes a step further, only to draw attention to himself.

Elaboration and Final Discussion

Taking the “Serbian Panopticon” and power relations within it into account, it is important to set the frame for analysis along various lines. Highly ethnicized, rooted in the tradition of the dominant Orthodox religion, self-perceived as unjustly suppressed by others (by international actors, by various types of “enemies” through its history), Serbian society clearly marks the “rules of the game”. The citizen of the “primary order” is Serbian, Orthodox, patriarchal, respecting tradition, being just, etc. All others are welcome, but they are still different, and, as such, partly excluded and subordinated.

Bosniaks living in the Serbian south, in Sandžak, are the third largest minority group in Serbia (with 2.02 per cent), after Hungarians and the Roma. Economic crisis, political divisions, confusion in the sense of belonging between Belgrade (official capital of the state), Sarajevo (spiritual centre), and Turkey (cultural centre), made Bosniaks, as a group, vulnerable to different kinds of manipulation. Therefore, the figure of Muamer Zukorlić is controversial for many reasons. He is a self-proclaimed representative of the Bosniaks living in the territory of Sandžak. He is both a religious and a political leader. Zukorlić expropriates the abovementioned reasons and overall crisis in the Serbian society in order to present himself as a sole symbol of Bosniaks’ resistance against the repression of the Serbian state. From time to time, Zukorlić reminds the Serbian public and its authorities of the still unsolved issues of the autonomy of Sandžak, the minority rights of Bosniaks, religious freedoms of Muslims, and political manipulations stipulated from Belgrade over this region and this group. But, what he is actually doing is a rhetorical tactic: using a “spinned” report about a

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8 Results of the census conducted in Serbia for 2011.
suspected plan for his liquidation, he does not miss a chance to send a warning, self-victimizing himself and the entire community.

Zukorlić is attractive for mainstream Serbian media and very often he himself or his statements initiate media coverage of issues related to Islam, national minority issues, religious freedoms, and decentralization in Serbia. In most cases, the tone of reporting is not positive, and topics are usually related to the “incidental” situations, as was the one analysed within this paper. Zurkolić’s statements could be read and analysed as a kind of subversive tactic, promoting a certain, particular, point of view in order to resist the dominant system of values and current hegemonic constellations in Serbia. Fiske would say that this kind of rebellion “may justify our righteous distaste for the system, but it offers little hope of progress within it, and only a utopian notion of radical revolution as a means of changing it” [Fiske: 1989: 105]. Therefore, Zukorlić’s struggle is rather more symbolic than essential. As some opponents and critics of Zukorlić explained, this is just part of his tactic to attract media attention for his own promotion, and – further – to distract media and wider public attention from real problems, including his illegal activities. At the same time, his misuse of discourse related to the minority rights and statuses essentially do not contribute to their re-discussion and improvement.

Analysis of newspaper articles provided within this paper has shown that the media in Serbia react to Zukorlić’s provocation, usually with a negative stance. None of the eight analysed articles were in line with the primary discourse (Zukorlić’s speech, posted on his FB and YouTube). The media, instead, shifted the focus of reporting, outlining either the nonsense of Zukorlić’s warnings, or commenting on his “ridiculous” position in Serbian public space. But, and this is important to observe, the media do not ignore him. Therefore, it is worthwhile discussing the exact role of Zukorlić in influencing media reporting and defining which topics will be on the public (political and media), agendas. We cannot ignore the fact that, following Zukorlić’s appearances and public speeches (however absurd they sound), media do report on the topics he puts on the agenda – autonomy of Sandžak, minority rights of Bosniaks, religious freedoms in Serbia, genocide in Srebrenica, etc.

In spite of the fact that Zukorlić is rather more of an exception than the rule, part of the mainstream media in Serbia used him and his behaviour in order to present an entire community as such. Labelling an entire group as such, enables the media (actually, their political mentors) to justify certain politics towards that group or region where that group is inhabited (such is the case with Sandžak). At least five different tactics of these media close to the hegemonic bloc in Serbia could be recognized and differentiated at a symbolical level:
A. **Indifference**, “if they (Bosniaks) do not consider themselves as part of the Serbian society, we would treat them as such” – this leads to ignorance, and further political, social and economic marginalization,

B. **Politics of justification**, Bosniaks or Muslims of Sandžak with such leaders deserve to be marginalized, or – this is characteristic to those media known as critical or oppositional – “such a government in Serbia deserves such a religious leader”,

C. **Blurring the reality** – which explains the kind of equilibrium and balance within society – inflammatory statements of the Mufti of Sandžak and the treatment of political issues of Sandžak as the most important, neglect the issue of economic underdevelopment and corruption scandals of politicians in power,

D. **Politics of differentiation** –“they (Muslims in Sandžak) could have their own Islamic community, their leader, but we (Muslims from the rest of Serbia, who are not ethnic Bosniaks) will have our own community and our own leaders”,

E. **Politics of rationality** –“Zukorlić is not a representative of all Muslims in Serbia, neither of all Bosniaks, he is rather a radical consequence of a long-term Serbian politics that neglected ethnic plurality, decentralized system of governance, position and right of minorities”.

**Conclusion**

Analysing the power relations and symbolic divisions between majority and minorities in the Serbian society, this paper aimed to discuss the role of media in establishing, maintaining and re-shaping such divisions. It followed the accounts of discourse analysis, emphasizing the constructive role of public (including media) language in setting the power relations and maintaining the position of those in power. Using the example of the Bosniak national minority and Muslims as a religious minority, personalized through the Mufti of Sandžak, Muamer Zukorlić, the aim of this paper was multiple – to analyse the contextual forces, struggles and divisions within Serbian society, with a focus on power relations within the majority-minority axis, to apply the theoretical accounts of Voloshinov and Fairclough in the analysis of mainstream media reporting on Muamer Zukorlić, and, finally, to analyse Zukorlić’s own rhetorical tactics and implicit messages of his provocative statements.

A noteworthy, interesting finding of this paper is a specific relation of the mainstream media towards Zukorlić personally and as a representative of a
minority group. Deconstructing his tactic as a kind of subversion, including his call for resistance to the dominant groups within the society, media consciously (or unconsciously) follow him up, reporting on issues and related topics that Zukorlić puts on the agenda. Each of the analysed media demonstrated how their reporting was influenced by Zukorlić’s statements, and neither took himself personally as a topic, but rather treated him as a symbol (negative or positive, radical or unusual) for issues such as the autonomy of Sandžak, religious freedoms of Muslims, minority rights of Bosniaks, or political divisions among Bosniak politicians.

Questions that are still open and need further elaboration are related to the necessity of such a controversial figure in public space, such as Zukorlić, to attract the attention of mainstream media and put certain issues and topic on a public and later on political agenda. Why do we need something unusual, or somebody who makes incidents to attract media attention for a certain topics? Which is the exact role played by mainstream media, to report, to comment, to discuss, to control, etc.? What are the main defensive mechanisms and filters (for the flow of information) of the discourse that has been considered to be the dominant, natural for majority in one society? When persons such as Zukorlić are the reasons or the causes to put certain topic on the public agenda, and when and for what reasons he has been used in discrediting of an entire community? The aim of this paper was also to open the floor for discussion of the role the public language in media plays in establishing, maintaining and re-shaping divisions within a society that is characterized by a high level of plurality. The majority vs. minority axis is just one of the possible divisions to be discussed and analysed, among many others, including political orientation, class divisions, identity politics, place of residence, etc.

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IMAGINING POLITICAL COMMUNITY
Constructing the Other/s: Discourses on Europe and Identity in the ‘First’ and the ‘Other’ Serbia

Ana Omaljev

“Integration and exclusion are two sides of the same coin, so the issue here is not that exclusion takes place but how it takes place.”

Iver. B. Neumann, The Uses of the Other

One of the essential characteristics of post-Milošević public space in Serbia is that the main actors are rethinking political identities and negotiating their meanings. The existing literature shows that representations of Serbian identity within the political discourses of the ‘First’ and the ‘Other’ Serbia are marked by extensive and frequent contestation. In these post-2000 early years of consolidation of Serbian democracy there was no political, social and cultural consensus on key questions such as the post-Yugoslav conflicts and war crimes, relations with the European Union and the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in politics. This research draws support from IR constructivist literature on the role of difference in identity formation. It follows Hansen’s approach in using the techniques of discourse analysis to denaturalise categories such as ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ by exposing them as the products of particular discourses. This research therefore examines the evolution of the ‘First’ and the ‘Other’ Serbia as political and societal discourses and explores how discursive strategies of Othering and Self-referencing are framed in the public sphere, paying special attention to the construction of representations of ‘Europe’ and ‘Kosovo’. I argue that the European Other is an essential part of the construction of the Serbian Self. This work, then, aims to identify the main issues which are raised in construction of the difference from the European Other and show how the alternative to
Europe is constructed. More specifically, it explores the way in which images of othering are framed within the on-going ‘Missionary Intelligentsia’ debate which was initiated in 2003 in Vreme, a weekly magazine, and how this discussion contributed to further political polarisation in Serbia.

Key Words

discourse, identity, Serbia, Europe, elites, Europeanization, representation

After the fall of Milošević, the groups self-identifying as the ‘First’ and the ‘Other’ Serbia opened an ongoing dialogue in the public sphere about the dissolution of Yugoslavia, obligations to the Hague Tribunal and the issue of Kosovo, amongst many other topics. In doing this, these two groups offered two different narratives of Serbian collective identity. In this respect, one of the main objectives of this article is to explore the practices of differentiation that ‘First’ and ‘Other’ Serbia actors hold with regard to the Serbian nation and Europe and as well as the inter-relationships that exist between these groups. By doing this, I explore all those practices of differentiation implicated in the confrontation between Self (Serbian Subject/State) and Other (Europe), and deconstruct the representational paradigms used by both groups, which are in Hamilton’s view, the whole repertoire of imaginary effects through which ‘difference’ toward ‘Europe’ is represented at any historical moment [Hamilton:1997: 223]. By incorporating the notion of ‘difference’ into the framework of Lene Hansen, this article reveals the intricate interplay between the construction of different identity discourses in the public sphere. To this end, Fraser finds that it is space in which citizens deliberate about their common affairs, hence, an institutionalized arena of discursive interaction [Fraser: 1990: 57]. In methodological terms, it consists of analysis of key intertextualities and discursive strategies selected from numerous sources. This constructivist perspective is rarely acknowledged in the literature on Serbia in international politics.

1 In simple terms, the names ‘First’ and ‘Other’ Serbia were mentioned for the first time in the volume edited by by Ivan Čolović and Aljoša Mimica called Druga Srbija (Beogradski Krug, Beograd, 1992). At the time the ‘Other’ Serbia meant a different Serbia, one that is anti-war, critical and civil. The expression the ‘First Serbia’ was supposed to be understood as the exact opposite: bellicose, pro-Milošević and nationalist. After 2000, the meaning of such code-names for these elite groups (consisting of professors, writers, media figures) changed into pro- and anti-Atlanticist, or pro- and anti-West/Europe in general.

2 The meaning of Europe, East, West are used here as classification of symbolic and politico-geographical spaces, which are never determined and fixed in time. The emphasis, though, is on the meanings that ‘First’ and ‘Other’ Serbia actors attach to these classifications.
On the other hand, much of the Serbian public sphere is dominated by actors claiming to represent directly opposing sides of an issue – e.g. ‘pro’ or ‘anti’ ICTY, pro- and anti-EU, and rural/urban dichotomies among other themes – thus, the debate appears both polarised and polarising (Obradović-Wochnik: 2013: 3). Scholarship on Serbia frequently describes it as a society divided between liberal and illiberal, or civic and uncivic values (Sabrina Ramet et al. (eds.): 2011: 3-4). Consequently, among the prominent themes in both ‘First’ and ‘Other’ Serbia discourses are the subjects of ‘serbophobia’ (as the gaze from the outside world) and ‘un-serbness’ (as the version of the ‘traitors within’). Although often couched in social and cultural terms, the driving force behind these ‘cognitive divisions’ (See Sprinker (eds.): 1993: 12) was and is political. As a consequence of that, these public debates among Serbia’s post-2000 elites refer implicitly or explicitly to ‘rearticulating’ the notion of the Serbian nation and its place in Europe and history in order to legitimise their political decisions and foreign policy choices. As the result of that, the questions of whether Serbia is European and ‘who Serbs ought to be’ have been at the heart of debates among public figures, intellectuals, journalists, writers and distinguished scholars.

Rather than simply identifying the ‘First’ and the ‘Other’ Serbia as two monolithic constructions of identity, I investigate how this difference is located in spatial and temporal constructions of identity. In this sense, Waever points out that in the light of Europeanization in Central and Eastern Europe, a frequent occurrence is the construction of the Other as temporally progressing towards the (Western) Self (Waever: 2001: 21). This is a central point in these development discourses as well as in discourses of democratisation and human rights. The issue of whether Serbia belongs to Europe (and indeed the European Union) or not remains highly contentious in elite discourses, regardless of the actual state of Serbia’s relations with any EU countries. To this end, during the course of the last two decades, some parts of Serbia’s intelligentsia have continuously questioned whether Serbia belongs to Europe and consequently have questioned Serbia’s EU candidacy on essentialist grounds.

National Culture as a Discourse

It terms of analysing identity, this paper takes Wodak’s position as a point of reference. She claims that nations are mental constructs which nationalised political subjects perceive as discrete political entities (Wodak et al.: 2009: 3). Additionally, if we assume that the nation is, as Anderson states, an ‘imagined

3 This topic gained significance, especially in the recent years. See Zapata-Barrero and Triandafyllidou (eds.) [2012]; and Howarth and Torfing (eds.) [2005].
community’, then ‘traditions’, ‘heritage’ and political identities are always presented as contextualised [Anderson; 1991: 7]. In this respect, Hall notes that

“national culture is a discourse4 – a way of constructing meanings which influences and organises both our actions and our conception of ourselves.” [Stuart Hall: 1997: 613]

Thus, my assumption is that national culture and identities are produced and reproduced, as well as transformed and re-constituted discursively. This implies, as Hansen states, that conceptualisation of identity exists through continuous re-articulation by competing discourses [Hansen: 2006: 6]. In simple terms, identity is not categorical, but always relational, and is given through something which it is not. Crucial to this approach is the fact that identification as a process always requires a significant Other for subsequent self-definition.5 In this sense, Hall points out the concept of narrative identity:

“Identity is a narrative of the self; it’s the story we tell about the self in order to know who we are. We impose a structure on it. The most important effect of this reconceptualization of identity is the surreptitious return of difference. Identity is a game that ought to be played against difference.” [Hall: 2007:15]

The concept of identity in the human social context generally is open and dynamic rather than static. In this respect, according to Rumellili, the relationship between identity and difference is complicated by different notions of identity that can be inclusive or exclusive [Rumelili: 2004: 36]. Also, in the same sense, the associated notions of difference can be constructed to be acquired or inherent [ibid: 36]. When viewed through this prism, Serbian national identification practices operate through the marking of either acquired or inherent difference towards Europe. Here, I apply this concept of identity to political science, in order to further explore whether Serbian identity is constructed to be inclusive or exclusive within the ‘First’ and the ‘Other’ Serbia post-2000 public debates.

4 This thesis adopts definition of the discourse as understood by Foucault: ‘way of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledge and relations between them’ [cited from Chris Weedon: 1997: 108].

5 Among many other sources see Barth [1969]; and Eriksen [2010].
Moreover, the process of marking a difference requires a ‘constitutive outside’ that enables it to define an ‘inside’ [Hall: 2007: 15]. Because of this link, Reicher argues that these multiple versions of identity each relate to a different set of practical ambitions and interests [Reicher and Hopkins: 2001: 21]. This being the case, it is essential to analyse the process of contestation occurring in the debate between the ‘First’ and the ‘Other’ Serbia. I employ the techniques of discourse analysis to denaturalise categories such as ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ by exposing them as the product of particular inclusive or exclusive discourses.

The Question of Difference Towards ‘Europe’

There is critical scholarly examination recently directed at the meaning and uses of the term Europe – a power understood as being able to change mentalities and cause political action. I argue, following Delanty, that it “cannot be regarded as a self-evident entity: it is an idea as much as reality” [Delanty: 1995: 1]. Research has been done in the field of representations of ‘Europe’ and the nation in current and prospective EU member states. For instance, research on Britain’s relationship with the EU can best be described as ‘half-detachment’, in which Europe is a Significant Other for the contemporary British, yet without being the source of fear or inspiration [Ichijo: 2008: 24]. Regarding Greece, there is an apparent tension between tradition and modernity as a result of the process of modernisation. In this respect, Kokosalakis and Psimmenos argue that Greek culture understands itself as a bridge between East and West [Kokosalakis and Psimmenos: 2003: 154]. In contrast, the representation of (Western) Europe is framed in inspirational terms in Italy, because Europe has been perceived as a model of civic community which is absent from national politics. Triandafyllidou rightly points out that in Italy, identifying with Europe was seen as providing the common civic basis necessary to consolidate the nation’s unity [Triandafyllidou: 2008: 271]. Similarly, Barbullushi suggests that in the Albanian case Westernization was a matter of survival and the positive identity of Europe was, then, constructed along spatial lines — as a space of security — as well as along temporal lines, which is, in terms of leaving behind the Ottoman past and joining European modernity. [Barbullushi: 2009: 89]. In the Serbian case, I argue that there are several interacting constructions of ‘Europe’ which compete, supplement or overlap with each other. However, survival, both territorial and in terms of identity, is articulated in a manner which is not compatible with or inclusive to Serbia’s democratic and Western statehood.

Moreover, in the aftermath of the regime change in 2000 the newly elected democratic government did not manage to form a democratic political culture which reconciled the Serbian recent past with Western statehood. This devel-
opment, I argue, was caused by two general factors. Firstly, pro-democratic elites together with echelons of the ‘Other’ Serbia did not manage to form a set of positive narratives on Europe for a modern, post-authoritarian Serbia, and secondly, the issue of Kosovo, as ‘the most expensive Serbian word,’ remains at the forefront of political debate, and also featured prominently in the debate on ‘Europe.’ Thus, ‘Europe-talk’ gained relevance in the light of the process of EU integration, but especially in the light of the EU’s insistence on ‘technical dialogue’ between Belgrade and Priština as a precondition for the process of integration. Therefore, I argue that in Serbia, as in the case of other Balkan countries, a process of othering Europe is very relevant as the core identity narratives are written with the West in mind [Triadafilopoulos: 2000: 155]. In this sense, the post-2000 re-construction of Serbian national identity is ‘projected’ onto European value system, and this projection has an ideological underpinning since, as Strath finds, no projection is ever non-interested/non-ideological [Strath: 2000: 3]. From this follows my key argument that in Serbia ‘Europe’ is a designated sign of exclusion in these discourses rather than sign of inclusion as was the case in South, Central and Eastern Europe. In what follows, I investigate this tendency and explore further the practices of differentiation in the ‘First’ and the ‘Other’ Serbia public debates. Also, this is done through the analysis of the inter-relationships that exist between ‘First’ and ‘Other’ Serbia groups of actors.

‘First’ Serbia Discursive Strategies in the Texts on ‘Missionary Intelligentsia’

The analysed discussions on ‘Missionary Intelligentsia’ mostly unfolded in the bi-weekly magazine *Vreme*, covering the themes of actual and moral responsibility for the Yugoslav conflicts, including the Kosovo war in 1999, and compatibility with the perceived value system of Europe. Following Dragović-Soso,
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I argue that the debates in *Vreme* exposed two deeply opposed visions of the role played by the West and Europe in Serbia’s democratic transition [Jasna Dragović-Soso: 2013:, 2]. Yet, I add that the legitimacy of liberal or nationalist discourse is dependent on how political elites shape their personal strategies and goals to be congruent with existent boundaries of the Serbian collective space and subsequent constructions of identity. In this sense, I put forward that the core discursive strategy in the ‘First’ and the ‘Other’ Serbia discourses on ‘Europe’ is the creation of designated signs of inclusion and exclusion through the construction of in- and out-groups. In continuation of the text on ‘Missionary Intelligentsia’, Antonić builds the illiberal front arguing that ‘they’ (‘Other-Serbians’) are in combat against ‘us’ as

“Thereir priorities continued to consist of the fight against greater-Serbian nationalism, conservatives, traditionalism (the Church and the Academy of Sciences), monarchism, the ‘Ravna Gora’ movement, bourgeois morality, aimless legalism, etc.”

Through these constructions, Serbian discursive actors are involved in an on-going process of identity formation: creating degrees of difference towards ‘Europe’ and ‘Europeans’. I suggest that the ‘Missionary Intelligentsia’ debate from 2003 ‘rearticulated’ the basic identity narratives and the anti-liberal discourse which had been proclaimed by the Milošević era elite, and set them in a new context. In addition, this on-going debate about the character of Serbian society took centre space domestically, but is also aimed at foreign audiences. Thus, simultaneously, I argue, that these debates resulted in the re-conceptualisation of the ‘discourse of non-interference’. In the text, Antonić contended that they (‘Other-Serbians’) face ‘resistance from their surroundings’; as the ‘people’, the ‘wider community’ rejected them. In general, in the author’s words, they “despise society as whole; and make attacks against their own people.” Antonić clearly sets out his view of the position promoted by the ideology of the ‘missionary intelligentsia’:

9 Slobodan Antonić, “Misionarska inteligencija u današnjoj Srbiji”, in *Vreme*, no. 631. 5 February 2003. 32.

10 ‘The people’, (Serbian: ‘narod’) was a significant word in the Milošević discourse, as it seemingly encompasses ‘the entire Serbian nation’.


12 This term has a pejorative meaning, and implies servility to ‘foreign powers’. Not long after the article was published the term forced its way into public and was frequently used.
“Of course there is no longer a single party that dictates policies as was the case before in communism. What we have instead, pursuing the same aim and functions, are certain NGOs dealing with human rights or certain institutes for democracy based in Washington DC or Brussels. Using their annual funding programs for certain local media, NGOs and trade unions they set the priorities for various campaigns that are imposed on the Serbian public: facing Serbian crimes in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo; reconstruction of Serbia as a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural state; combating terrorism, only the one aimed against the US, that goes without saying; the rights of Roma, the gay community and children with special needs; humane treatment of animals, etc.”

From Antonić’s argumentation, it is clear that ‘First’ Serbia’s attempt to construct the ‘Other’ Serbia as the ‘enemy within’ is in relation with the construction of ‘Europe’ as a ‘foreign factor.’ In that way, the author creates a new political identity for the group that share his views through the re-articulation of certain elements of the old Milošević discourse on the nation, Serbian identity and the West. But, what are the traits, characteristic, qualities, and features which are attributed to ‘Serbs’ in the text on ‘Missionary Intelligentsia’ and from what perspective or point of view are these nomination strategies, positive or negative predications of the Self and the Other, and arguments for or against ‘Europe’ expressed? Antonić argues that

“the first group ['Other-Serbians'] wants to turn Serbian citizens into Europeans, whereas the other group ['First-Serbians'] wants to let them live according to their valid customs that are no less European than any others.”

Regarding the further analysis of the text, the core strategy in terms of ‘First’ Serbia discourse on identity is the stable construction of the in- and out-groups. Antonić argues that ‘Other-Serbians’ are

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13 Ibid. 33.
I put forward that the identity/difference boundary that was established in the 1990s ‘First’ and ‘Other’ Serbia discourses continued to exist in different frame. As shown below, in this common strategy of perspectivation, the ‘Other Serbia’ is constructed as not only threatening to the ‘real, authentic, genuine Serbian identity’ in general terms, but also as a danger to ‘their own people’, as they might send an ‘open invitation to ‘civilised foreigners’ to come and occupy the country.’ In this negative identification, the ‘First’ Serbia discourse continually compares the ‘Other-Serbians’ with the ‘European aggressor’ and finds it to be self-identified with everything that is different, strange, aggressive and threatening, i.e. Europe. Additionally, by posing questions of whether there is such thing as ‘missionaries’ in Serbia and what the acceptable degrees of patriotism are, Antonić positions particular liberal ideology as something that ‘the Serbs’ should naturally fight against. By doing this, Antonić tries to carve a third road for himself and his group of like-minded intellectuals by attempting to portray the existence of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ nationalism in Serbian society. Indeed, in the text on the ‘Missionary Intelligentsia’ he follows up on the discursive strategies of exclusion that had dominated the public sphere in the 1990s, yet at the same time he and other public actors try to differentiate themselves from the authoritarian nationalism.

At this point, it is significant to argue that in the ‘Missionary Intelligentsia’ text ‘Other-Serbians’ are constructed as not belonging to the Serbian Self, but as belonging to the European Other. They are constructed as ‘home-grown missionaries’, ‘rejected by the wider community’, as they think that society is ‘far too broken for a meaningful democratic transformation.’ They are ‘domestic tyrants who wish to serve, please, flatter, and pretend, while in fact there is

17 Ibid. 33. In 2008, Antonić defined this phenomenon with the concept of culture war: ‘It is a war led by a segment of the cultural elite against certain values and the content of such a war is denial or slighting of certain cultural values, its main form is humiliation, ridicule and cynicism directed against the principal symbols and their bearers.’ Slobodan Antonić, Kulturni rat u Srbiji: Ogledi o kulturi “druge” Srbije - od Marka Vidojkovića do Radomira Konstantinovića (The Culture war in Serbia: Essays on the Culture of ‘Other’ Serbia - from Marko Vidojković to Radomir Konstantinović) (Zavod za udžbenike, Belgrade, 2008). 10.
18 All these code-names can be found in Antonić Slobodan, “Misionarska inteligencija u današnjoj Srbiji”…, 34.
this other desire here, for freedom, dignity and authenticity. Additionally, in
the texts of ‘First’ Serbia actors ‘Other-Serbians’ are presented to have views
according to which ‘[these] primitive people of Serbia are essentially anti-mod-
ern and anti-European and as such are collectively diseased by nationalism’. As
presented above, various strategies are used more or less implicitly to construct
the difference between these two groups, between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’.

‘Other’ Serbia Discourse on Serbian Identity and ‘Europe’

In the next section, I analyse the main argumentative strategies on ‘Europe’
employed in either ‘Other’ Serbia civic society or official state discourses. During
the 1990s, ‘Other’ Serbia actors were mostly from the circles of Serbia’s liberal
intelligentsia and the unifying factor for them was that they refused to endorse
the nationalist ideology, offering a civic identity instead [Dević: 1997: 56]. In
the aftermath of the bulldozer revolution of 2000, the actors behind the new
democratic government used ‘Europe’ in their speeches as a definite promise
of modernisation, democracy and stability. In this sense, Edmunds points out
that the concept of ‘Europe’ was instrumental in the new regime’s discourses
and their construction of a new democratic national consensus, beginning with
the liberal middle ground [Edmunds: 2007: 199]. The official state discourse was
constituted by reformers and soft-liberals from the Democratic Party, including
former president Tadić who has repeatedly stressed that Serbians are ‘entering
Europe with [their] identity’:

“We spent twenty years legitimising our national politics, and by
that I don’t mean just the civic one. Even today we are trying
to enter Europe with our identity, which implies legitimising
our national goals.”  

On the other side of the democratic political spectrum, Vesna Pešić, considered
to be a hard-line liberal, expresses the view that decisions on Europeanization

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19 Ibid. 34.
were never made and that Serbian society is not ready to modernise.  
21 She named the Serbian Orthodox Church as the main culprit for this state of affairs:

“The Serbs have looked into history and do not recognise any of the current events. They have lost the connection with modern civilisation and hope that by some miracle this civilisation would collapse. The pillar of this kind of thinking is the Serbian Orthodox Church. It has become an institution that decides which citizens can and cannot exercise their civic rights. The banning of the Belgrade Pride parade in 2011 is good evidence.”

In similar respect, Vojin Dimitrijević inquired what is meant by the word ‘West’ and argues that the cultural model and values such as democracy, rule of law, human rights and economic liberalism, are no more just western as these are ideals that have by now been accepted by almost everybody in the east of Europe as well.  
23 Dimitrijević poses the question of whether the ‘pro-Eastern’ intellectual, if he or she exists, is somebody who would be against all the values listed earlier, concluding that this would make ‘pro-Eastern’ intellectuals only those who support values based on non-European civilisations.  
24 More importantly, Dimitrijević claims that what is really being referred to is the political West (the ‘Western Bloc’), a concept that became obsolete in 1989.  
25 The statement above, made by a human rights lawyer, is exemplary of ‘Other’ Serbia discourse on identity and ‘Europe,’ in which Serbia is expected, in normative terms, to became part of the EU/Europe through convergence of democratic values and culture over the next decade.  

Moreover, it is clear that in Serbian symbolic geography, as Živković states, ‘Europe’ remains the most proximate source of ‘civilisation’.  
[Živković: 2011: 44]. In this sense, it is pertinent to investigate the continuity with the identity narratives of the nation (Self) and of Europe/the West during the early 1990s according to the alternative voices of ‘Other’ Serbia. Back then, they were consistently criticizing Milošević’s policies, claming that the Yugoslav wars were not


22 Ibid. 1.


24 Ibid. 56.

25 Ibid. 56.
happening ‘in their name’. The concept of ‘Other Serbia’ first came into being with 1992 journal of the same name published by NGO Belgrade Circle. The Saturday Sessions which represented a vital core for the political and cultural life of the so-called ‘Other’ (in this sense different, non-nationalistic) Serbia, were envisioned as opposition to the militaristic nationalism of Milošević’s regime, to its ‘xenophobia and populism’.

Thus, how was the ‘Other Serbia’ imagined in the discourse of the Belgrade liberal intelligentsia from 1992? Is ‘Other Serbia’ even possible? To this end, anthropologist Ivan Čolović suggested that the expression ‘Other Serbia’ became a motto for all those who sooner or later came to see the dangers of the nationalist policies.

In this sense, writer László Végel evoked that:

“I admit when I first heard about the ‘Other’ Serbia paradigm I thought of a liberal state free from the grip of ideology and nationalism and retrograde doctrines of historical mythology.”

In terms of definitions, Ljubiša Rajić provided the key sentence of the ‘Other’ Serbia’s programme by claiming: ‘while we were arguing (the ‘Other’ Serbia), they were busy distributing weapons (the ‘First’ Serbia).’ However, the pattern is not clear, nor is it clear whether the ‘Other’ Serbia was a project, something positive that was planned and would be constructed in the future, i.e. a political promise? On the other hand, how did these actors evaluate their own Serbian-ness? In this respect, Pešić asked if perhaps the ‘Other’ Serbia is just a mirage:

“Is the ‘Other’ Serbia the same intelligence in a different mind, as the opposition politicians would like to see it; or a new direction, as moral critics would like to see it? Or is it the creation of a new cultural space, as independent intellectuals would like to see it? The ‘Other’ Serbia is built around the porosity of its concept, or better put, it deliberately creates this porosity by doubting that it is Serbia at all. Its culture used to be created by people

26 For the collected essays and their political contexts in the early 1990s, see Čolović and Mimica (eds.), Druga Srbija (Beogradski Krug, Beograd, 1992).


28 László Végel is a writer and a theatre critic.

29 Végel [1992: 49].

30 Rajić [1992: 59]
marked with a stamp of Europe, the stamp of universality and uniqueness of the continent on which Serbia lies. That stamp also marks these pages describing the ‘Other’ Serbia that we are inventing today.31

Here, I put forward that ‘Other’ Serbia actors produce and construct their discourses, but at the same time these actors are themselves products of the values, norms and social exclusion that exist in those discourses. In this way, ‘Other’ Serbia political and societal actors help construct and further strengthen the normative framework of the ‘First’ Serbia in which they operate. I put forward that anti-‘First’ Serbia identity constitutes the behaviour of these actors, but at the same time it also constrains it. Therefore, if ‘Other’ Serbia actors doubt they are ‘Serbia’ at all, then they intensify and further strengthen the discourse of Self-Othering. In connection to this, it is pertinent to state that until the end of Bosnian war in 1995, certain ‘First’ Serbia actors perceived anti-war activists as ‘anti-war profiteers’, as ‘anti-Serbs’ and thus traitors.32 In the nationalist discourse the archetypal traitor is linked with the urban liberal intelligentsia who are ‘deracinated traitors to the nation and the mercenaries of the West.’33 To this end, I argue that the word ‘traitor’ is placed at the centre of both discourses. The use of terms such as ‘hero’ and ‘traitor’ is inextricably correlated and spans the entire history of this region. In this sense, in his 1992 text Filip David34 accepts the accusation but overturn the concepts:

“The only remaining option for us is to become traitors. That means that we should betray the system that invokes war and hunger, where people live in a fever, constantly fed by hatred, while being paranoid and obsessed with their own grandeur at the same time [‘First’ Serbia]. To be a traitor in that kind of system is the least that any moral and honourable man should do.”35

31 Pešić [1992: 69].
32 For the list see Živković [2011: 241].
33 Ibid. 241.
34 Filip David is a Serbian-Jewish author and was a long standing drama editor of the Serbian National Television (RTS). He was also one of the founders of the ‘Belgrade Circle’.
35 Filip David, “Biti izdajnik”, in Čolović and Mimica, (eds.), Druga Srbija..., 5.
To this end, Živković points out that the motive of treason is endlessly invoked in inter-Serbian political struggles, and as it resonates with the Kosovo-inspired epic-ethos, the ‘traitor’ can take an archetypal role [Živković: 2011: 187]. Therefore, in their own discourse the ‘Other-Serbs’ willingly position themselves as traitors of nationalism. Here, my aim is to briefly examine whether patterns have changed in the post-2000 public sphere, or if the ‘Other’ Serbia discourse follows the same established patterns of Self-Othering. After 2000, writer Vladimir Arsenijević,36 associated with the ‘Other’ Serbia, argued that taking partial responsibility for what the Milošević regime had done to the democratic opposition and the other nationalities in Bosnia and Kosovo almost made him into an inverted nationalist.37 Arsenijević thus implies that a consequence of the change of regime was that the ‘Other’ Serbia and the democrats took responsibility for the acts of the Milošević state during the 1990s. According to Arsenijević, this means that the ‘Other’ Serbia is being dragged into the nationalistic narrative again:

“I have always refused to be identified by my national identity, I am only a Serb by accident, that is my premise.”38

Many liberal intellectuals had the same concerns revolving around the question of ‘What it means to be a Serb’ in post-Milošević Serbia. In other words, these actors wanted to defend themselves by not taking responsibility for Milošević’s wrongdoings, as they were part of the network that had fought fiercely against the regime. In this sense, I suggest that the ‘Other’ Serbia discourse constructs ‘the Serbs’ as collectively responsible for Milošević’s policies, but not themselves, as they are the ones who fought against it. On the other hand, the ‘First’ Serbia actors continue to engage with the nationalist stereotype of Serbs as the ultimate victims of Yugoslavia, their different regional neighbours, Europe and the victims of the West in general. As argued above, despite the centrality of the notion of the ‘nation’ and ‘national integrity’ in the ‘First’ Serbia discourses there is a minor departure from the previous Milošević discourses. In fact, in their post-2000 political discourse ethnic nationalism was not constructed as detrimental to the interest of the Serbian state and nation, but, as argued, the difference was drawn between ‘good’ (patriotic) and ‘bad’ (radical) nationalism. In this respect, a similar rift occurred in ‘Other’ Serbia discourses on the

36 Arsenijević won the 1994 NIN-award in January 1995 for his first novel In the Hold.
37 Vladimir Arsenijević and Andrea Pisac,”An Accidental Serb”, in 38 Index on Censorship, 2009,140.
38 Ibid. 141.
nation and the past: hardliners encouraged a radical break with the ideological heritage of Milošević, while soft liberals accepted the politics of ‘cohabitation’ with ‘First’ Serbia.³⁹

Finally, this analysis shows that the ‘Other’ Serbia civil actors’ lack of ability to appropriate a model of political community that would create a favourable link between ‘Serbia’ and ‘Europe’. I put forward that the perceived harsh politics of conditionality made the ‘Other’ Serbia elites question whether the pro-European parties intended to tap into already existing pro-European public sentiment and in that way further promote Europeanization. Their appeal to follow the ‘European path’ was endangered by the democratic elites deciding to build their political programmes and manifestoes around the line of the ‘Other’ Serbia rift.⁴⁰ As a result, in my view, the European idea in Serbia was never developed completely and was not fully internalized. Following Subotić, I argue that this came as a consequence of the ‘Other’ Serbia’s inner disagreements over the role played by the EU and the West in general in Serbia’s democratic transition.⁴¹ It is safe to suggest that the post-Milošević political and cultural elites of the ‘Other’ Serbia have attached various meanings to ‘Europe’ as well as to the Self (the Serbian state), which are re-articulated from older discourses from the 1990s into the new political ones. In ‘Other’ Serbia texts, the Serbian state (the Self) is represented as not European (civilized), and the favourable link between ‘Europe’ and ‘Serbia’ is absent. As argued above, these particular identity narratives originate from the dominant discourses of the Milošević years. In this respect, the legitimacy of ‘being European’ has been measured against the criteria of fulfilling the EU conditions for candidacy and membership [Subotić: 2011: 321]. To this end, this study asserts that the political elites constantly re-interpret and re-articulate elements of these identity narratives in new political contexts and in ways which strengthen ‘First’ and ‘Other’ Serbia ideological positions within the discursive/political field.

³⁹ Arguably, that discourse can be traced to the rhetoric of soft liberals Vuk Jeremić and Boris Tadić. Also, this was evident from coalition negotiations and politics of cooperation with Dačić’s SPS, the party formerly ran by Milošević, that Tadić’s DS led in 2008.

⁴⁰ The division was apparent in the party politics as the soft liberal narrative about the past is best represented politically by the Democratic Party of Boris Tadić, and the hard-liner position by the Liberal Democratic Party of Čedomir Jovanović.

⁴¹ Subotić [2011: 320-321]. For further material on this topic, see Milosavljević [2003]; and Dragović-Soso [2013].
Conclusion

This chapter considered ‘Europe’ as a structuring discourse: an identity which structures ‘First’ and ‘Other’ Serbia narratives on the nation, past and historical realities. Following Delanty, I argue that what matters is not the representation of the Other as such but the actual nature of the difference between Self and Other that is being constructed [Delanty: 1995: 5]. Thus, I find that the difference attributed to ‘Other-Serbians’ in ‘First’ Serbia’s texts is almost natural and essential: deeply rooted in history, religion, culture and civilization. In this sense, the ‘First’ Serbian Self not only choose to remain outside the European Self, incapable by nature of assimilating itself, but also willingly decides to stay outside and ‘free’ from European hypocrisy that ‘Other-Serbians’ not only embrace but are an active part of. Such in-group biases is a very common form of ideologically based strategies of positive Self and negative Other presentation [Van Dijk and Wodak: 2000: 45]. In this respect, the degree of difference constructed by Antonić in the ‘Missionary Intelligentsia’ text is civilisational, as ‘Other-Serbians’ are constructed as not part of the Serbian Self, but part of the European Other.

On the other hand, it can be said that within the ‘Other’ Serbia discourse, the ‘First’ Serbian Other is assigned a highly derogatory difference from the European and ‘Other-Serbians’. Older stereotypical images are still being overtly produced, in the same unmitigated manner as before 2000. Negative identification is almost strong enough to make ‘First’ Serbia the ‘ultimate Other’ to being ‘European’ in Serbia. In this negativity, the nationalistic Other emerges as a subordinate sign, a would-be internal source of destabilization, existing within the identity of the dominant sign, that is a European/civilised identity. This is how the Serbian candidacy for EU membership is initially perceived by many, including Srdja Popović, as ‘proof of possible reformation.’42 The mere existence of ‘First’ Serbia, the nationalist Other, today in Serbia, disturbs the ‘civilizational order’, simply by being Other/there. In addition, the supporters of the European idea in Serbia construct the European Other as having a tradition of tolerance towards other nations, religions and customs, all the values that Serbia lacks itself. In the construction of ‘Serbia’ the emphasis is, in contrast, often placed on a lack of tolerance and the presence of hate speech. However, as analysis of the texts has shown, the ‘Other’ Serbia discourse offers a negative Self-presentation and positive Other presentation and more often than not instrumentalises the balkanist image of ‘barbaric Serbia’. Through negative presentation of the Serbian Self (e.g. ‘the people who have broken the most basic civilisational norms’)43 ‘Other’ Serbia discursive actors emphasise

42 Srdja Popović, “Čas anatomije” (Anatomy Class), in Peščanik, (Jun 2007).
the positive values attributed to the European Other. The negativity attached to ‘Serbia’ coupled with the positive representation of ‘Europe’ further generates hierarchical power relations which construct the superiority of the European Other and the inferiority of the Serbian Self. In other words, the Serbian Self is not only perceived as different, religiously fanatical or brutally violent, but is also inferior when compared to the European Other.

To sum up, here, I have applied the concept of identity to political science, in order to explore whether Serbian identity is constructed to be exclusive within the ‘First’ and the ‘Other’ Serbia before and post-2000 public debates. In addition to this, when understood in this sense, the Serbian national identification practices operate through the marking of inherent difference towards Europe, either being constructed as superior or inferior. As argued above, the Serbian case shows that these several interacting images of ‘Europe’ which compete with each other, but none of these images are articulated in a manner which is compatible, inclusive or identical with Serbia’s democratic and Western statehood. Instead, my analysis shows how images of ‘Europe’ became a self-imposed exclusion. Finally, unlike most empirical studies of discourse analysis, I was here concerned with contestation where both parties characterize each other and themselves in their texts. In this way, what has been analysed here is often the missing link for understanding how perceptions are mediated through discourse. Thus, this analysis contributed to a deeper understanding of how boundaries and the difference between the ‘First’ and the ‘Other’ Serbia and ‘Europe’ are maintained.

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Abstract
The concept of “Third Serbia” has recently been offered within the public arena in Serbia as the alternative to the former division into “First” and “Other” Serbia. Yet a whole array of ways “Third Serbia” is discursively constructed hides behind this single name. What they all share is an explicit call to overcome divisions and cleavages, which are perceived as overdrawn, artificial, and/or removed from genuine concerns and interests of the Serbian society. There is also a moral claim implied, since what is proposed is presented as better, more viable and more honest than the previous dichotomy. The various facets of “Third Serbia” will be explored based on analysis of a corpus of media texts.

Key Words
Third Serbia, First Serbia, Other Serbia, symbolic divisions, social cleavages, discourse

The “two Serbias” and their Alternative
To speak of “two Serbias” has already become a commonplace. According to the received interpretation, the phrase denotes two camps, or two political and ideological standpoints, and their respective carrier groups, into which the Serbian public opinion has long been divided.¹ The division can be traced back to the very beginning of the 1990s, when a group of intellectuals gathered in the Belgrade Circle began calling themselves “the Other Serbia”. This was meant as

¹ See also Omaljev, this volume.
an explicit rejection of the regime’s policies and the dominant ideological and cultural paradigm. In 1992 a collection of talks given by various participants at the weekly protest meetings of the Circle was published (Čolović and Mimica / eds./ 1992). The very title of the book, The Other Serbia, put the phrase on the map.

The “other Serbia” saw itself as civic, cosmopolitan, urban and cultivated, critical of the war and war crimes. By using this name it sought to set itself apart from the “first Serbia” – supposedly nationalist, authoritarian, and primitive, identified with Milošević’s regime, and guilty of committing, supporting and justifying crimes. The binary terms were thus first coined as Other Serbia’s self-identification. From there, they spread into the broader public as well, along with their relatively consistent clusters of symbolic meaning.²

After 2000, however, and particularly towards the end of the century’s first decade, the figure of the “Third Serbia” has made itself increasingly present in the public space and seems to be more and more attractive as a rhetorical position. Third Serbia emerges as an attempt to go beyond the division that is perceived to be artificial, unproductive and elitist. Against this, the Third Serbia presents itself as the “real”, majority Serbia. As such, it has already entered the Serbian edition of Wikipedia:

As a reaction against the division of “First” and “Other” Serbia, the term “Third Serbia” often appears in intellectual circles and among critics. The term intends to include a majority of citizens [Serb. “u koju se ubrajaju najveći broj građana”], who do not want visions of different Serbias and reject the division they consider artificial.³

This quote indicates the main features of the Third Serbia, and at once illustrates its ambiguities. In this brief definition supplied by the anonymous editor of the Wikipedia entry “Other Serbia”, beside pointing to the reaction against the di-

² There is a comparatively rich academic literature on the topic: e.g. Popov (ed.) [2000]; Gordy [1999]; Jansen [2005]; Đerić [2005]; Ribić [2005]; Naumović [2009]; Živković [2011]; Bilić [2012].

³ “Druga Srbija”, Wikipedia, Serbian edition: http://sr.wikipedia.org/sr/%D0%94%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B3%D0%B0_%D0%A1%D1%80%D0%B1%D0%B8%D1%98%D0%B0.

⁴ In Serbian, the sequence Prva-Druga-Treća Srbija sounds much more natural than the English First-Other-Third Serbia, since the adjective druga can be read as both “other” (the alternative or opposite of something) and “second” (ordinal number, the place in a row between the first and the third position). The English translation on the other hand uncovers quite clearly the polemical and contested nature of the naming itself, which remains partly hidden in the Serbian version. While the original self-designation of the Other Serbia was
Varieties of “Third Serbia”

vision as the new term’s defining feature, the spokespeople of the Third Serbia are described as intellectuals and critics. Nevertheless, immediately following is the assertion that it is “a majority of citizens” who make it up.\footnote{In the Serbian original the ambiguity of the phrasing is even stronger, since the words “u koju se ubrajaju najveći broj građana” (apart from being grammatically less than perfect) can be read both as a passive construction – most citizens are placed in the Third Serbia by somebody else, or as an active voice – most citizens place themselves in the Third Serbia.} And indeed, the Third Serbia assumes its most elaborate forms in statements given by intellectuals, political analysts and pundits, who however claim to be speaking in the name of citizens, i.e. the “people”.

When the Third Serbia is constructed in more strictly political terms, it focuses on the disunity of the Serbian political community and strives toward a kind of reconciliation and consensus that would heal the supposedly forced, unnatural fragmentation. Yet this is by no means all that is inscribed into the figure of the Third Serbia. Depending on the context and the speakers, it can be built from many different elements. For this reason it is better to speak of a whole variety of third Serbias rather than one and only. Some use the language of culture, some of social inequalities, and some of ideology. Appeals to establish the Third Serbia are issued from different institutional places and aimed at different audiences. In this paper we examine the bases, ways and strategies of constructing the Third Serbia (and its purported adversaries), the arguments justifying it, the targeted addressees, and – insofar as it is possible – the intentions and consequences of these constructions. We start from a sample of texts referring to the “Third Serbia” drawn from printed and electronic media after 2000.\footnote{The initial sample was created for purposes of the research project “Social and Cultural Capital in Serbia”, implemented by the Center for Empirical Cultural Studies of South East Europe, Niš, in the framework of the Regional Research Promotion Program of the University of Fribourg. The sample included 28 issues of each of the weeklies Vreme and NIN published between 2006 and 2012 (4 issues per year) selected using the principle of randomly generated numbers (www.random.org), as well as 5 issues of each of two important political-intellectual magazines, one conservative and one liberal – Nova srpska politička misao and Peščanik FM. For the present analysis, the sample has been expanded to include all issues of Peščanik FM, texts appearing on websites pescanik.net and nspmr.rs featuring references to the “Third Serbia”, and texts from other electronic and printed media containing the same reference.}

\textsuperscript{5} Intended as an alternative beyond which no “third” is envisaged, when Third Serbia emerged it automatically reinterpreted Druga as “second” rather than “other” – as simply a position among other positions, a possibility, a point on the ordinal scale. In order to keep the usage consistent, we will be translating druga Srbija as other Serbia (rather than second Serbia), although in some specific instances it may strike the reader as slightly odd.
The Common Features of Third Serbia

Since the Third Serbia arises as a response to the division into two Serbias, the first level at which its varieties may be distinguished is how this division is to be transcended. There are two basic modes: fusion and double refusal. One possibility is to put synthesis in the foreground: “both Exit and Guča”; “both nation and democracy”; the other is to emphasize rejection: “neither First nor Other Serbia!”.

So some Third Serbias are constituted positively, as “both/and”, where both sides of the pre-existing dichotomy are embraced. Both of them, it is said, are equally necessary “halves” that only together make up Serbia as a whole. It cannot be complete without any of these parts:

*I find it difficult to accept the phrase of the “two Serbias”... No matter how different their opinions are, I believe they both stem from good intentions and a desire for Serbia to prosper. They just have different approaches.*

The other way is negative, when the Third Serbia is built by rejecting both options as wrong: “neither/nor”.

*Although the policy “Europe has no alternative” is nonsense, this by no means is to say that the traditionalists are right. ... There is the Third Serbia.*

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7 Exit is a summer rock festival held since 2000 in Novi Sad, popular among young people from Serbia and abroad and emblematic of the “modern”, pro-Western and cosmopolitan cultural current in Serbia. Guča, a place in central Serbia, is the site of another annual festival, of traditional Serbian trumpet music. With its populist, folksy appeal, Guča is often taken as the expression of “Serbianess” in its inward-looking, anti-modern and anti-Western form. A simple juxtaposition of the two symbolic places is however no longer possible, since Guča has in recent years also attracted growing numbers of foreign guests, as a sort of touristic, heavily exoticized world-music event.


The Third Serbia will make sense only if it never becomes like the First and the Other Serbia.\textsuperscript{10}

Regardless of the way in which it is set up, every elaborate Third Serbia implies, more or less openly, a certain moral claim. Its advocates claim to be offering something better, more truthful and more honest than the previous dichotomy. For instance, more often than not the Third Serbia is presented as optimistic, of positive spirit:

A whole series of good news ... should be taken as the starting point to change fundamentally a social pattern whose radical primitivism was built on a culture of loss and powerless spite ... This breeze is dissipating the poisonous smokes of malevolence, bitterness, powerless anger and hatred against the more successful.\textsuperscript{11}

One of the reasons for pride and optimism is certainly the world-famous tennis player Novak Đoković, the most incontestable hero of Third Serbia.\textsuperscript{12} Thanks to him, it is argued, after a series of defeats for state and society “something nice has finally happened to us”.

The nation “keeps its fingers crossed” for the man who made it possible to say with pride where they are from.\textsuperscript{13}

Today Novak is Serbia, the Serbia that we missed and that the whole world missed, the Serbia of a positive spirit, optimist, smiling, persistent, responsible and proud. ...He is here to be a different kind of Serb in the world and at the same time a citizen of the world in Serbia.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{12} The identification is made very clearly on the front page of Vreme No. 867, of 16 August 2007: it shows Novak Đoković celebrating a victory and, next to his name, the caption: “The Third Serbia”.
\textsuperscript{13} Slobodan Georgijev, “Lice drugačije Srbiije”, Vreme 867, 16 August 2007, 18–21, at 21.
\textsuperscript{14} Srđan Šaper, “To je nova Srbija”, Vreme 1063, 19 May 2011, 10–11, at 10–11.
Đoković is important for the Third Serbia especially because of the “image of Serbia in the world”. Like in the case of many other peripheral European nations, the way Others see Serbs influences quite strongly the way they see themselves. This especially holds for their image in the eyes of the most significant and powerful Other, the civilizing Center, the West. However, the intended audience of Third Serbia advocates is not this “world” at all but is rather located inside the nation. The discourse of Third Serbia is most often also the discourse of identity: Serbia, it is said, can and must keep its specific identity, and at the same time be compatible with the “world”. Novak Đoković is a perfect symbol of such Serbia, which weds modernity and tradition, the national and the global, patriotism and cosmopolitanism, the Cyrillic script and Wimbledon.

Our global phenomenon, Novak Đoković, represents the Serbia of the majority. ... This is the Serbia that recognizes itself in Nole as he proudly raises his three fingers, and who, although he speaks many languages, knows that it has never been and never will be shameful to write in Cyrillic. ... [H]e is a modern traditionalist in the best sense of the word.

The next and related point is the self-ascribed temporal orientation of the Third Serbia. Unlike the First and the Other, hopelessly stuck in the 1990s, with their very names conjuring the events from the (ugly) past, the Third Serbia corresponds to the present times and is turned toward the future. One of the reasons why this is so is that it is open to the challenges of the new social context and the pluralism that goes with it:

In the imposed black-and-white reality some other colors are hidden, and none of them is gray. But to talk about this multicolored face of social life is almost taken as indecency. It undermines the fixity of the black-and-white staleness.

15 Good recent analyses of this dependence can be found in: Volčič [2005]; Radović [2009]; Simić [2010]; Greenberg [2011]; Živković [2011]; Petrović [2012].
Furthermore, the Third Serbia is realistic, truthful, straightforward; it calls a spade a spade:

_The Third Serbia as a term exists although it comprises just a handful of people. ... These are the people who see Serbia as it really is – and it is f...d up. And as the only truly realistic prospect they see a final collective departure to hell._18

True, in this last example the Third Serbia is even more depressed than the older two. But this is not necessarily in total contrast to the cheerful Third Serbia of Novak Đoković, because both interpretations meet in a fundamental claim: they both present themselves as more accurate, more adequate, closer to reality than either the First or Other Serbia.

**The Landscape of Third Serbia**

As has already been said, the Third Serbia is not a single entity but rather a landscape, filled with quite disparate sights and sounds. These are meant to satisfy multifarious and often incompatible desires. We will first present a brief overview of this diversity.

In the general framework that we have just outlined – the Third Serbia being something that is neither the First nor the Other, something that is different from and better than either – various elements are foregrounded as the mainstays of its identity. For example, the Third Serbia may be seen as primarily a *silent Serbia*:

_In the meantime we have all become sick of the political wailers and tricksters from the first and the other Serbia. The moment any major issue regarding the state, politics, or civilization is raised, we immediately witness an aggressive and sharp polarization – the first against the other, with no mercy. ... Yet the first and the other feed and support each other, however much they be in conflict, because only together can they survive. And it will remain so as long as those who refuse to be pushed into_  

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either camp keep silent and suffer. For how much longer can the third Serbia just sit and watch what the first two are doing?19

A very frequent motif in the varieties of Third Serbia is the criticism of the self-righteous elite that revels in fault-finding but keeps the people and their interests effectively excluded from public discussion. So next to the silent Serbia we find the hungry Serbia:

Nowadays mainly two Serbias are discussed – the one for which Europe has no alternative, and another one which lives in myths. There is, however, a forgotten Serbia, pushed to the margins of life. Wishing to provide vivid testimony of such Serbia, last fall and winter we accompanied Red Cross activists in their tour of the villages between Maljen, Kablar and Rudnik, visiting people who hadn’t received a visit in years.20

Furthermore, while politicians and intellectuals waste time bickering, the mass of citizens falls mainly into the passive, undecided Serbia, totally uninterested in ideological divisions:

Now the challenge is much greater – to wake up from deep and heavy abstention the electoral body which has lost trust in politics, democracy and elections themselves. This is the challenge of the third Serbia that is now facing the democratic political parties still geared predominantly towards their party interest and lucrative positions and privileges.21

Serbs living abroad say that the real Serbia, the Third Serbia, is precisely with them, as the diasporic Serbia:

There is also the Third Serbia. ... Its majority is in diaspora. ... [T]his is genuine Serbian aristocracy. These people are better educated than those in the Other Serbia, they speak foreign languages better, have better manners. The Third Serbia is far more sophisticated than even the Other Serbia, let alone the First one.22

A rare attempt to found the Third Serbia on an explicit opposition to a specific ideological option is the following instance of defining it as the non-communist Serbia:

The First and the Other Serbia feed upon each other... They are actually the same. These are old buddies from Tito’s pioneers’ mornings at Dedinje, trips along the paths of communist heroes, Marxist days while students... With the help of political and media manipulations they have managed to divide the Serbian people into followers of one or the other side, to convince us that ... apart from them, there is and cannot be a Third Serbia, but that we must choose between the two. And this is the greatest achievement of their life.23

Two Routes to Third Serbia

When we focus on a more concrete level, the one that involves the actual political life in Serbia, we can see two paths by which the Third Serbia is built. One comes from the direction of the First Serbia, which is now cleansed of its embarrassing baggage (authoritarianism, condoning war crimes, lack of culture etc.) and presented as something new and completely different – as the Third. The second path derives from an internal evolution of the Other Serbia, where by taking distances from what is perceived as surly negativism some authors come closer to the ideas of the Third Serbia.

23 Boško Obradović, “Treća Srbija... ”.
Route No. 1: the Postmodernized First Serbia

On this road, an almost necessary step in constituting the Third Serbia is to attack the Other Serbia labeling it aggressive and extremist. By this move a formal balance is struck between the two Serbias as two polar extremes, with the Third placed between them.

Representatives of the “two Serbias” are the representatives of one or the other of the cleft “national soul”. ... Although this division is being abused and overemphasized, particularly by the so-called “other” ... it has some grounds in reality. ... Interestingly, the representatives of that aggressive Europeanism as a rule show many negative traits of the Balkan mentality they try so hard to escape from (vulgarity, arrogance, ideological dogmatism, intolerance...).24

The Other Serbia is accused of elitism, bigotry, extremism, radicalism, intolerance. In addition, some attributes are now ascribed to it that were previously associated with the First Serbia, such as vulgarity and haughtiness. By the same token, the values on which the Other Serbia raised itself are dismantled, so that the Third Serbia remains as the one which is truly cultivated, tolerant and open-minded.

The founders of the “Other Serbia” in the early nineties were respectable university professors, decent, serious, poised people. Today, some of its most outspoken representatives actually compete in vulgarity, insults, cynicism and sexual-verbal exhibitionism. A very sad retrogression indeed.25

The figure of the pseudo-cultural man is ... today represented by the provincial cosmopolitan – citizen of the world who sympathizes with everyone and anyone, except for his boorish neighbor who listens to folk music.26


Some details have recently dashed the illusion of the bourgeois glamour, good taste, and sense of tact amongst the missionaries, who in public pretend falsely to be civilized Europeans.27

Then how are we to explain that this intelligent and successful woman, of whom no one can possibly say that she is not “urban”, with a “feeling”, does not march in the same column with the Other Serbia and its militants? Maybe precisely because her “urbanity” is not snobbish, and her “courage” is not grant-supported, opportunistic. ... Maybe precisely because she is decent. ... Maybe precisely because it is Mirjana Bobić Mojsilović, and not they, who represents the image of the genuine Belgrade – open, smiling, modern and sensitive. Of Belgrade as we remember it from the best of times, before the war and before it was usurped by all these zombies, furious, invidious, vain and mean, sporting badges that say: “I’m urban”, “I’m the center of the world” and “Let me tell you”.28

It should be noted here that this process of, let us call it, reversal of Bourdieusian cultural distinction, whereby the Other Serbia is stripped of its monopoly over “culture”, is something completely new in the Serbian discursive space. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, education, sophistication, urbanity, being cool were associated with a liberal, antinationalist political attitude.29 Until not long ago, the other side of this binary, routinely ridiculed in this type of symbolic conflict, never bothered to contest this distribution of cultural merit. It didn’t need to, since it legitimated its own position by a thoroughly different kind of argument. These times seem to be over now.

In parallel with reinterpretating the character and habits of the Other Serbia, a discursive reconstruction of the First Serbia is undertaken in order to translate it into the Third. The First Serbia is thus relegated to the past:

29 This symbolic association is documented in all relevant studies: Jansen (2005:109–167), Živković (2011: 76–93, 115–143) and others speak of the mid-1990s; the project “Politics and everyday life” of the period immediately after Milošević’s fall from power (see in particular Spasić 2006: 159–161); and that the combination is still in force in the mid-2000s is shown, for instance, by Simić (2009).
Under the former regime the belief took hold that there were two Serbias. The “First Serbia” was, roughly speaking, the ruling one, mostly authoritarian, militarist and xenophobic. The “Other Serbia” was pushed into the opposition, mostly democratic, peacemaking and pro-European. And there was some truth to this picture.30

But nowadays the First Serbia no longer exists, except in the deliberately mystifying statements of the Other Serbia. What some malicious people continue to label as the First Serbia, the argument goes, is actually moderate political right underpinned by a conservative cultural outlook, perfectly normal in any civilized country and an indispensable and constructive participant in the debate on identity and strategic goals of the nation. In a word, it is Serbia’s other “wing”:

What has happened in Serbia after October 5 is what happens in all other democratic orders. Democratic and pro-European forces have split into two wings, totally natural and equally needed by any democratic system. They are very different from one another, but they are both democratic and both European.31

In postmodernity, after all, sharp distinctions lose their edge and clear identities their essence, so that the one-time First Serbia is now just a pool of symbolic fragments that float freely and combine with other fragments to produce novel, hybrid positions:

Since we live in postmodern times ... it is completely legitimate to frame this story of culture in a relaxed key. As identity schizophrenia is a lasting historical phenomenon and we are therefore forced to accept it as given, it can be used as a basis for building a pluralist, tolerant culture and cultural policy. ... A postmodern cultural policy would, for a start, pay its respects to both Guča and Exit as symbolic representatives of folk and Western elements, respectively, of the Serbian cultural industry.32

31 Ibid.
32 Branko Radun, “Kulturna ’Pink’ strategija”, at 204.
But the truly central moment of transforming the First into the Third Serbia is the placing of Serbian nationalism in the acceptable frames of the “new times”. Accordingly, Serbia has the right to claim what everybody else is already granted.

*I refuse the thesis that the biggest problem of Serbia today is Serbian nationalism.33*

*Serbs are thus denied the historical right to refer to their authentic national interest and a feeling of collective responsibility and guilt is imposed upon them.*34

In order to achieve this, it is necessary to shed off the burden from the 1990s, especially the issue of war crimes ascribed to Serbs.

*Whether the civil war in the former Yugoslavia could have been avoided, what was the role of international power centers in provoking and expanding this war, how democratic or not this regime was, what were its economically sound measures and what were the bad ones – these are very complex issues which cannot be solved by labeling but only through serious analysis, which is so sorely lacking.*35

... *A Manichaean and all-explaining dogma that all that is going on is to be interpreted with only two concepts: “Serbian nationalism” and “Serbian crimes”.*36

*Unlike the Other Serbia, the Third Serbia believes that there was no voluntary exodus of Serbs from Croatia but a brutal expulsion instead. And, unlike the Other Serbia, the Third Serbia keeps firmly in its memory the massacre of Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia.*37

35 Boško Obradović, “Treća Srbija...”.
36 Slobodan Antonić, “MBM i druga Srbija...”.
37 Vladimir Konečni, “Prva, druga i treća Srbija”.
Here we find no explicit denial that the crimes were committed. Rather, the whole topic is being circumvented by pushing it one discursive level up, where it is discussed indirectly, in the form of quotes (this is something other people talk about – the people who insist on the crimes, who ascribe them to Serbs etc.). Or it is proclaimed an issue so serious and intractable that nothing can be said about it at all. Perhaps what the authors “really” wanted when using this strategy was to dismiss Serbian war crimes altogether. But we cannot know, since it is not transparent in the discourse. What can be seen there is an effort to neutralize the issue and remove it from sight. The form has been picked wisely, because it emanates rationality and moderation: what could be more reasonable than a refusal to take a stand on complex problems before they are subjected to “serious analyses”? The strategy relies on a (rather realistic) assumption that the readers of these texts, probably not social scientists by profession, will be unaware of the fact that on all the issues listed in the quote above – from whether the war was avoidable to Milošević’s economic policies – thousands of pieces of very serious academic inquiry have been published, at home and abroad, in the past twenty years.

Route No. 2: Offshoots of Other Serbia

The second path is less frequent. It reflects the distancing of some (self)declared members of the Other Serbia from “their own” extremists and fault-finders:

What we read in Peščanik and in Pečat [a conservative nationalist weekly] from one issue to the next is so much alike. ... These are two distant poles, but they share this incredibly narrow way of thinking ... And in the middle remain all those who are reserved, who think it is better to keep one’s mouth shut, because it is not easy to deal with either side. One calls itself patriotic, the other calls itself democratic, while in fact both are very much afraid of the option where the democratic and the national may meet in something that would be neither nationalism and xenophobia nor a democracy understood as totally non-national.38

38 Statement by Sonja Liht in: Jovana Gligorijević, “Boris Tadić i klub neodgovornih intelektualaca”, Vreme 1118, 7 June 2012, pp. 12–17, at 14. Sonja Liht is a major Other Serbia figure, as the head of the Fund for an Open Society for many years and in her other functions, while the weekly Vreme was – and in a way still is – an important mouthpiece of the liberal, anti-Milošević, antinationalist standpoint throughout the 1990s and early 2000s.
In this quote the same mechanism is used as in Route No.1: two poles (or extremes) are posited, between which are said to be those who cannot be heard because of the clamor produced by the two opposites. Although this “middle” is here not explicitly named the Third Serbia, it is there, in the encounter of the democratic and the national. The chief characteristic of the Third Serbia created by Route 2 is the criticism of the self-righteous “fault-finding” and elitism of some portions of the Other Serbia, supposedly totally disconnected from social reality.

They don’t care at all, what matters is that they have it their way. They criticize from a lofty position, placing themselves beyond critique, which makes their criticism immature, self-defeating and unconnected to reality.39

Beside being grumpy, the radical Other Serbia exudes defeatism and negativity, and derides the optimism and positive energy of ordinary people. In the following quote we meet again the zombies featuring in the Route No. 1, though the phrasing is now somewhat milder:

The last figure who in the political skies radiated this positive energy and optimism was Zoran Đinđić. Interestingly, those who most radically claim the right to interpret his legacy are precisely those who emanate defeatism the most, support the policy that the best option is to let it all, including Kosovo, just go to hell, and openly ridicule the outbursts of popular enthusiasm provoked by some small successes.40

Between the two roads for constructing the Third Serbia, there are some differences in strategies. While in the Route No.1 we see a much stronger effort to performatively describe (in detail and with much passion) the Third Serbia as something new and different, the Route No.2 is less elaborate and basically consists of just marking its distance from the “excesses” of Other Serbia, as if

39 Sonja Biserko in: Jovana Gligorijević, “Boris Tadić...”, at 15. It is somewhat surprising to see this strategy applied by the longtime president of the Serbian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, a person that most advocates of Third Serbia, of either route, would recognize as the incarnation of the “extremist” Other Serbia.

40 Dragoljub Žarković, “Gem, set i meč lopta...”, at 5.
they were saying: “we no longer want to be depressed and angry, now the time has come to think positively”. Yet in both cases the same moral claim is present: we demand, and offer, something better, more authentic, honest, useful, lively and timely than the used up “two Serbias”. In both paths, also, the Third Serbia is constituted by attacking the Other Serbia – with the difference that in one case the whole of it is attacked, while in the other only its “extremist” part.

**Response of the Other Serbia**

The Other Serbia for its part contributed to the increased public presence of the new discursive frame by entering actively into the debate, in response to statements propounding a Third Serbia, either by Route No. 1 or 2. One of the earliest articles that provoked turmoil was a column by Dragoljub Žarković, the editor in chief of Vreme, published in Politika in late 2005. The agitation was connected to the established status of Vreme as an Other Serbia media outlet. In this context, its longtime editor in chief joining the ranks of detractors of the division into two Serbias, and in a piece written for a hopelessly mainstream and government-friendly daily, was an act with specific political weight. Žarković writes:

> Whenever arguments are lacking the thesis of the “two Serbias” is invoked. As if these two words were capable of explaining everything, as if introducing this statement struck a final blow to the antagonist – either you are a primitive nationalist or a traitorous foreign mercenary. Surely, (at least) two Serbias exist; but wait a minute, what’s so curious about it? I don’t quite get it how a natural social phenomenon has grown into a stereotype that one Serbia is conservative and ugly, while the other is reformist and beautiful. ... As it happens in politics, some people came to believe that after October 5 only the Other Serbia would exist. Now they are annoyed by the very nature of the society.

The discussion was continued in a number of texts published a week later in NIN, Vreme’s main rival. For example:

This “revolutionary-liberal” thought divides Serbia from Serbia, the “other” from the “first”, because the “first” does not understand that discontinuity is everything! The “first” does not see and does not care that the “other” is small and null - if it is not measured by its own conceited self-image alone. ⁴²

A response ensued in the radio program Peščanik:

...The question must be asked why the discussion of the two Serbias has now been revived. Raising this issue always somehow turns out to be an attempt to silence, minimize, humiliate, spit on and eventually eliminate this so-called Other Serbia. ...[T]his whole thing has appeared first in Politika, where precisely Peščanik is cited as the worst possible example. Then it was welcomed with enthusiasm by NIN, where a huge enquiry has been undertaken, with many wise men telling us what they think about it. I’m asking, is the other Serbia really the biggest problem of Serbia today? ⁴³

The other text going viral was a mini-series in NIN on the well known historian and liberal NGO activist Latinka Perović, described as the “mother of the Other Serbia”. In this long article, which appeared in mid-2006, rather harsh phrases can be found about both the “mother” and its alleged offspring:

Some of the people we talked to demanded anonymity, for the sake of an old friendship. Asked why no representatives from the ‘other Serbia’, including himself, agree to talk in public about this extreme segment of the civil scene, one of the interviewees said: “People (in the ‘other Serbia) are afraid of them. ... They resemble a sort of secret society, which has power, and people are afraid of being discredited”. ⁴⁴

Peščanik retorted in kind:

> If you read Politika and NIN and that scandalous article about Latinka Perović, the mother of other Serbia they call her, you are simply dumbfounded – what this guy is talking about. It is a kind of police manner, all these deep throats talking to him. ... At some point in the text we from this other Serbia were supposed to recognize ourselves and see who this spy is actually. At first I thought this author doesn’t exist at all, that he was a made-up name. But then people told me – no, this guy really exists, he used to work at B92.45

Here we can see that the Route No. 2, although less trodden, is not insignificant, because it has contributed to diffusing the discussion of Third Serbia as an option for self-positioning in the present times. The response of the Other Serbia to the attempts at realignment by former comrades is just as unambiguous as their reaction to the texts representing Route No.1. First of all, the Other Serbia recognizes the actors of the Third one quite clearly.

> It all began with the first and the other, and of course this has eventually led to the invention of the third Serbia, which is somewhere between the first and the second. This is a topic discussed quite often nowadays, and predominantly in the media that are in some way connected to the current government. These are Politika, NIN, Nova srpska politička misao.46

> You can see this quite clearly if you read NIN and the main daily, which is Politika.47

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45 Vesna Pešić in: “Treća Srbija”, transcript of the radio program Peščanik No. 253, of 12 May 2006: http://pescanik.net/2006/05/treca-srbija/. Radio B92 was the most prominent media outlet of the Other Serbia during the 1990s (see Collin 2001). After 2000 it has grown into a powerful media system with its own TV station, becoming increasingly commercialized but retaining a generally liberal orientation.


47 Vesna Pešić in “Treća Srbija”, http://pescanik.net/2006/05/treca-srbija/.
In terms of contents, the response of the Other Serbia (or, more precisely, its part labeled “radical”) to the proposed Third Serbia is rather uniform. In almost all the texts and public statements the same targets of attacks on the Other Serbia, and the same main lines of defense, are identified. Attacking Other Serbia is pointed out as a major goal for the protagonists of the discursive construction of Third Serbia. The question of the extremist label applied to the Other Serbia is central.

And all these people who formulate this whole idea of the third Serbia, which is supposed to be between these two extremes, when they are faced with the choice which of the two is worse, will very often point to the Other Serbia as a lot more terrible and much worse. ... At any rate, a consequence is that the Third Serbia actually legitimizes the First one, because it delegitimizes the Other and depicts it as something extreme and unacceptable.48

The Other Serbia consistently rejects this label and recognizes in it a strategy to legitimize the First Serbia and an attempt to thwart the efforts to modernize the society.

Restauration has taken place by installing the “third Serbia” in power. It calls itself the “democratic nationalism” and has gathered around the incumbent premier, Vojislav Koštunica [the year was 2006], and his Democratic Party of Serbia as the pillar. The “third Serbia” engages in marginalizing the modern Serbia by proclaiming it extremist and dangerous.49

In the eyes of the Other Serbia, the actors and the roles are unambiguous. Equally clearcut is their picture of the social space. Under the attacks launched by the Third Serbia, the Other Serbia will never say it is defending itself alone; rather, it is defending the entire society, by upholding antinationalism as a moral principle and prerequisite of democracy. Third Serbia attempts to reframe nationalism

48 Jovan Byford in: “Nazad u boj za narod svoj”.
and make it more palatable are met with utter incomprehension by the Other Serbia, which takes upon itself the role of guardian of the moral order and of the distinction between good and evil. It argues that extremism is out of the question when resisting war crime is on the agenda.

*Yes, it is this lovable Serbia, this good nationalism ... this vegetarian crocodile, which is now offered as a compromise middle solution. We shall not accept these extremists, we are angry with them and with those war criminals. But if we take a better look, these antifascists and these denouncers of war criminals can also push things too far, and very much so. Let us eliminate both and establish an acceptable, compromise, Third Serbia which will cover its teeth and smile sweetly and charmingly.*

It follows that the so-called Other Serbia “extremists” see the advocates of the Third Serbia as “relativizers”.

*Then this moral relativism is brought in. When you tell them that something isn’t fair, they say – Watch out, this is missionary, moral fundamentalism. When you say – You can’t ask whether Ratko Mladić is a hero or a murderer, they say – No, no, your position is too exclusive. They seem to be claiming that we should all find a third, middle position, that Mladić is a heroic murderer or a murderous hero. This is nonsense.*

The hard core of the Other Serbia also refuses to let go of its own cultural Other. It has no taste for Third Serbia’s “postmodern” cultural policy. Guča and Ceca – the trumpet festival and the emblematic turbofolk star – continue to be unacceptable. Cultural distinctions remain crystal clear.

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If Serbia is to be changed by those who are equally happy with the philharmonic orchestra as well as with Ceca, no thanks. ... They say, you are the civil Serbia, you are dividing Serbia into two, three Serbias, we have had enough of divisiveness. For God’s sake! enough with unity, let us mix in some reason... After so much talk of the two extreme Serbias ... we are now supposed to take the middle road, where Vladeta [a very urban-bourgeois styled university professor and conservative politician] will take us to Ceca’s concert. And that’s great, that’s, like, a safe road to Europe. Well, you know what, they make me sick.\textsuperscript{52}

This nonsense can survive only if everything else is silenced. If you turn the trumpets from Guća on to the maximum, nothing else will be heard.\textsuperscript{53}

Convergences?

To sum up, from the perspective of the Other Serbia matters look rather simple and straightforward. But from a different, less committed viewpoint the story of the Third Serbia could be viewed in a more neutral light, as a sort of welcome break in the continuous pressure to take sides, as if saying: before, we used to have two sides, now a third one is emerging, so what can be so bad about it?

It is advisable to beware of spurious equilibria here. If we are to interpret the Third Serbia adequately, especially its version stemming from Route No.1, we must go back to the beginning, that is, to the way the “two Serbias” were set up in the early 1990s. Ever since then between the “two Serbias” a constitutive asymmetry has persisted. They are not “two sides”, balancing each other as discursive opponents, like two weights on the same symbolic scales. Moreover, it could be argued that this way of reducing them to a common denominator, as two complementary “extremes”, is by itself a strategic move in the performative production of the subject purportedly only talked about. To say that opposite from the Other there is a First Serbia which is its mirror image plays into the hands of those who would like to keep aloof from the First but to retain from it everything that is dear to them.

The Other Serbia is the only one which has been constituted both from within and from without. Using the terms of Richard Jenkins’ [1997] identity theory, it is the only one where internal definition and external categorization, or group

\textsuperscript{52} Andrej Nosov in: “Sumnjivo lice” transcript of the radio program Peščanik No. 277, of 12 January 2007: http://pescanik.net/2007/01/sumnjivo-lice/.

\textsuperscript{53} Srđa Popović in: “Plan B”.
and category, coincide. The First Serbia has never been an embraced self-identity; who has ever said of themselves, “I am the First Serbia”? This has always been a label – more or less insulting – applied to somebody else. It was the Other Serbia which, creating itself, created the First one. Viewed from this angle, the Third Serbia can be interpreted as the First that can now finally accept itself.

Nevertheless, as we have seen, this is not the only kind of Third Serbia present in the public arena. Though these varieties have much in common (such as the urge to look for a middle ground between the extremes, coming to terms with the “new times”...), the most reliable line of demarcation is the treatment of the crimes committed in the 1990s wars. To put it simply, the critical question is whether nationalism is just accepted as a valid option (Route No.2), or an additional step is taken, by relativizing war crimes (Route No.1).

The dilemma arising from these considerations is: do the results of Routes 1 and 2 converge? To what extent do former enemies really meet at a “middle”, common ground? At this moment it is difficult judge. Many things are changing, and will be changing, due to the shift in the overall framework for discursive production caused by the change in power at the presidential and parliamentary levels in 2012. For the time being we are inclined to conclude that insofar there is convergence it remains superficial. All Third Serbias take more or less the same direction, but do not necessarily end up at the same spot. There is no shared Third Serbia.

What does remain significant enough to deserve further discussion is the fact that this type of discursive-political strategy becomes more and more desirable over time, and that so numerous and so different actors find it advisable to take it up.54

Pluralism and Unity in a Democracy

The current debate over Third Serbia could also be read as another vain and unproductive skirmishing of old rivals, so frequent in Serbian political life, when there is a lot of hassle but in fact not much is changed. Such an interpretation would undoubtedly have some merit. Still, we do hold this debate indicates, however awkwardly, a real and important issue: the issue of managing pluralism. Is there – and, if there is, where is it and how to recognize it – the boundary between destructive, conflict-producing cleavages in the political community and, on the other hand, a “normal” diversity of political options and worldviews? And the twin question: where is the boundary between the necessary mutual tolerance and consensus about the rules of the game enabling coexistence of

54 Almost too good to be true, on the very day the Serbian version of this paper was published the founding of a new political party was announced, called – the Third Serbia.
different options and, on the other hand, totalitarian, imposed unity? This, of course, is a key issue in contemporary political theory which goes far beyond the limits of this article.

In the Serbian context, and within a more culturally minded approach similar to ours, the topic has been discussed by a number of authors. Naumović [2005, 2009] has studied systematically what he terms the “quasi-ethnic identity splits”, calling attention to the anti-democratic potentials of the practice of symbolically excluding the opponent from the very political community, as well as the similarly anti-democratic effects of the abuse of phrases about “Serbian disunity” which allegedly has to be healed at any cost. Gordana Đerić has also monitored the discursive production and reproduction of symbolic divisions (most elaborately in: Đerić [2005].55 Simić [2009], Greenberg [2011] and others document the survival of cleavages after 2000 as well.

Against this backdrop, the escalation of the debate about the Third Serbia possibly signals a shift in the language of political positioning in Serbia. Barring conservative organicist fundamentalists, who happily self-declare so and have lately been condensing into a recognizable political subculture, all that belongs to the intellectual and political mainstream insists on a self-legitimation based on “democracy”. In other words: there are very few people today who would be willing to say they are in favor of abolishing democracy and political parties, of a return to the villages and into the medieval symphony of church and state. Actors are vastly more numerous who want to present themselves as the “center” and defenders of democracy.

And since the defenders come in all sizes and shapes, the same holds for various menacers from which democracy is said to be defended. The Other Serbia sees in this role, as it has done over the past two decades, the authoritarians and anti-Europeans. The emergent Third Serbia on the other hand sees precisely the Other Serbia as the main danger threatening the achieved democratic standards:

The “Other” Serbia would love to have a little revolution here, but not to call it that if possible, so that it can arrest people according to its own “personal opinion”, and that “crisis headquarters” can come back. The building of the rule of law and entrenchment of democracy is an unbearably slow process for a “country that has no time to waste” and fails to promise that in politics those who fail to win votes in an election can rule.56

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55 Đerić [2005: 180-185], for instance, offers a list of identical rhetorical strategies, or “rules of discursive mystification” in her parlance, that she finds at both sides of the identity conflict in Serbia.

56 Slobodan Reljić, “Zamke revolucije koja traje”.
In this way some politically marginal options are recommending themselves, outside of democratic procedures, as the only guarantors of democratization of society. ... Also, the confrontation of the “other Serbia” with all other political options implies an abolishment of political pluralism and promotion of forced uniformity of opinion.57

It could be argued that there is not much cognitive added value in all this, since it is commonly known that “democracy” is nowadays on everyone’s lips, as a mere rhetorical manoeuvre without content. Still, we believe that this data is not trivial. First and more generally, the form and substance of democracy, as well as the way it is invoked, are always locally colored and shaped by domestic political history and circumstances. Therefore this kind of rhetorical game can be a useful heuristic point of entry into some deeper structures and processes in the political life of a society that we may wish to grasp. Second and more specifically, it is not insignificant that appeals to preserve the hardly won democratic achievements in Serbia gain impetus precisely at this political moment. To enlist pluralism and tolerance to one’s own side is now perceived as politically advantageous by a much more varied set of actors than twenty or even ten years ago. With some interpretive optimism, this process could be read through the lens of Jeffrey Alexander’s cultural political sociology, as a consolidation of the “discourse of civil society” which is the symbolic master-code in force in democratic political communities [Alexander 2006].

But as the original formulation of the theory already warns, the “civil discourse” as the language of communication does not necessarily imply civil outcomes. Alexander uses the American political history to show that the “binary code” of the discourse of civil society has been used also to repress, deny rights to and exclude whole categories of people from the civil sphere. In the case analyzed here, similar ambivalences obtain: while most varieties of Third Serbia speak the liberal language of mutual tolerance of different opinions, for some of them the precondition for such tolerance is the renunciation of the supposedly useless and divisive debates about the past, particularly about the legacy of violence and crimes from the 1990s, which are now “finally to be left behind”. The hope remains that, as time passes, praising pluralism will from primarily a rhetorical stratagem become habituated and internalized by Serbian political actors as an imperative of democratic politics.

Varieties of “Third Serbia”

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Political Capital and Identities of Serbian Citizens

Zoran Stojiljković

Abstract

The analysis focuses on the complex relationship between (1) undeveloped political capital, i.e. civil culture of citizens, (2) the specific constellation of interests and powers in the society produced by lines of social and political divisions, and (3) efficacy of institutions and chances for consolidation of democracy. In the existing ambivalence of possible outcomes, chances for democracy to “take root” are increasing with a growing culture of citizens’ trust and tolerance, along with their participation and “practicing” of democracy and resulting growth of the credibility of civilian and political actors and institutions. “Democratic deficit”, on the other hand, is the result of accumulating negative values. Partito-despotism (Goati), with widespread nepotism and cronyism, and spread of corruptive channels and connections and even politicization of crime and criminalization of politics are sufficiently illustrative examples. Even more negative consequences are produced by the devastating effect of exclusive national identification and conflict between confronting nationalisms, in other words, the absence of a culture of dialogue.

Key Words

social capital, confidence, participation, identity, democracy
An Initial Premise on Political Capital and Profiles in Serbia

Making an initial distinction between political ideology and political culture is methodologically very important for the discussion of political behavior and citizens’ choices.

Although separate phenomena, political ideology and political culture largely overlap in terms of content. They are distinct in the sense that ideologies are formal, explicit and relatively consistent definitions of a political community, usually established by the elite, while political culture is the explicit and relatively inconsistent understanding of a political community by its members.

In fact, political elites and party ideologies which offer and promote to prospective voters structuring of the political and ideological space “from the top down” represent one side, while structuring “from the bottom up” of citizens’ political and ideological orientations under the influence of their social, economic, demographic and cultural characteristics represent the other.

Characteristics of political capital – whether authoritarian tendencies, anomy and dimensions of political alienation or, alternatively, political competence and involvement of citizens, are those “mediating” variables which are presumed to be able to at least partially explain the interrelationship between socio-economic status and socio-cultural identities with specific political and ideological orientations and party preferences.

Furthermore, political ideology may be defined as a set of mutually related moral and political positions and values concerning society’s developmental objectives and methods to achieve them. Ideology helps explain why people do what they do, organizes their values and beliefs and channels political behavior, i.e. necessarily contains its cognitive, affective and motivational component. The question “Do common people have any ideology?” is in fact the question as to the extent to which they possess cognitive organization, an affective and motivational component and capacity for action.

Studies and empirical research in Serbia and in the region tend to corroborate the thesis about domination of submissive-participant, mixed and transitional type of political culture, with a prevailing submissive moment in the dominant segments of the electorate. Its features include, among others, collective identity (national), paternalism of the authorities, clientelism, egalitarianism and statism, in other words, the perception of the role of the state as a tutor which should nurture and take care of its subjects “from the cradle to the grave”. It appears to be an amalgam of social-nationalism, which the audience demands over and over again, like an evergreen, particularly at times of crisis.
Attitude to the government in the submissive political climate is characterized far more by the formal support or individualistic indifference than by substantiated criticism or support.

The prevailing attitude in these political cultures is prevailing distrust of the holders of inputs: the media, trade unions and employers’ organizations, NGOs and, in particular, political parties; more precisely, a lower level of trust in these than in traditional state institutions, “output agents” – the military, police, judiciary, even government and administration.

Not infrequently, social relations, political behavior, and even the logic of voters’ choices in these, still largely traditionalist societies, are characterized by amoral familism (Banfield), the behavioral style and values which observe societal goals, norms and institutions through the optic of familial, friendly and native-region and ethnic relations, and thus become an obstacle to wider public participation and at the same time represents the basis for political corruption.

Social Capital and its Democratizing Political Functions

The Notion of Social Capital

The popularity of the concept of social capital over the past three decades is primarily based on the reception of works by authors such as Bourdieu, Coleman, and Robert Putnam.

Relying on the works of Tocqueville and Weber, Robert Putnam defines social capital as a form of efficient social organization based on the unity of its three components:

1. moral obligations and norms;
2. social values, especially trust in actors and institutions (trust in society); and
3. social networks, especially voluntary civic and political associations [Putnam:2003].

Thus, while physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital to individual characteristics, social capital refers to connections among individuals – social networks and resulting reciprocity and reliability norms. Civil status and virtues are actually most powerful when they are based on social capital,
when they are incorporated in a dense network of reciprocal social relations. Networks of connections and influences – passive social capital – make a kind of “bank of valuables” that can be activated as needed. Putnam very plastically argues that “most of us get our jobs because of whom we know, not what we know — that is, our social capital, not our human capital” [Putnam: 2008: 22].

Social capital is in fact created, maintained and increased by the basic characteristics of social life — formal and informal, horizontal and vertical networks of relations which individuals enter into, the norms governing them and established relations of trust which enable individuals to jointly work more effectively toward achieving their shared goals.

Social Capital, Politics and Democracy

The fundamental question by which this phenomenon is introduced in political science is: Can effectiveness of social capital refer to groups and societies in the same way as it refers to individuals who can deal more easily with their problems?

The main idea of Putnam’s theory of social capital is the explanation of the way social capital favorably influences the development of the community. A high degree of development of social capital makes dealing with problems encountered within all societies possible. In political science this is termed the dilemma of collective action. “The dilemma of collective action would probably not emerge in the world of saints, but general altruism is a quixotic precondition for both social action and for social theory. If the actors are unable to commit themselves mutually, they have to give up many opportunities for mutual benefit – sadly, but rationally” [Putnam: 2003].

Therefore, in order to survive and develop, society has two alternatives. Individuals, or community as a whole, may solve their problems through mutual cooperation, trust and support, otherwise, the state, via repressive instruments, may regulate relations in society. Putnam, of course, advocates the first option and concludes that societies in which social capital enables voluntary cooperation and the accomplishment of common goals are particularly stable.

In the book “Bowling Alone” Putnam mentions several mechanisms by which social capital creates positive effects. Firstly, social capital enables citizens to more easily deal with collective problems. Secondly, social capital “oils the wheels” which enable communities to make unimpeded progress. “When people have mutual trust and when they are in constant interaction with their fellow citizens, everyday chores and social transactions pass much more easily.” Thirdly, social capital helps expand awareness about the many ways in which our fates are related and, hence, socially involved people become more tolerant, less cynical and more emphatic to the plight of other people. Networks as
part of social capital serve as conduits of useful information that assist us in accomplishing our goals [Putnam: 2008: 378 – 380].

Francis Fukuyama, on the other hand, believes that the main function of social capital, i.e. the presence of high degree of trust, is to increase economic efficacy of society while simultaneously decreasing “transaction costs”. “In societies with high level of trust, performing a job costs less, such a society is more capable of organizing innovations, because high degree of trust enables the existence of high diversity of social relations … The effects of social capital, of course, are not solely associated with the economy. Thus social capital “appears … as a necessary assumption for proper functioning of … political institutions”. “If social capital is abundant, market and democratic policy would be successful …” “A country with low level of social capital would not only probably have small, weak and inefficient companies, but would also suffer from pervasive corruption of its civil servants and of inefficient administration.” [Fukuyama: 1997: 333–353].

**Dark Sides of Social Capital**

On the other hand, social capital may have numerous dark sides. Informal associating into clans and coteries may thus distort and even destruct democratic institutions.

> **Amoral familism, nepotism and cronyism** – schemes of family and friendly relations may result in an inability of society to establish public institutions.

Expansion of corruptive channels and relations and even *politicalization of crime and criminalization of politics* are also sufficiently illustrative examples of negative aspects of social capital.

The disruptive effect of exclusive national identification and conflict of opposing nationalisms, i.e. absence of bridging social capital can produce even more negative consequences.

Positively understood social capital implies values such as frankness, mutuality, trust, solidarity, and hence readiness to cooperate. “Deficit of social capital” [Fukujama: 2004] on the other hand, is the result of an accumulation of negative values and often results in informal linking and action, also on the basis of solidarity and trust, but in the aim of gaining illegal advantages and benefits for the association, such as exemplified by political coteries, corruptive networks or Mafia and terrorist groups.
Particular civility implies solidarity and cooperation, but only of members within the association, while their attitude to members of other organizations is neutral or even hostile. Democratic civility relates to generalized positive attitudes that members of the organization have toward all citizens [Šalaj:2007].

**Dimensions and Types of Social Capital**

Operatively, analytically observed, social capital has its three constitutive levels of establishment which logically build one upon the other.

**Social Identities**

The first is the process of social identification, i.e. grouping of individuals with specific dominant forms of social and political identities such as professional, gender, generation or else family, local-regional, national, confessional or political (ideological) and party identity. Every one of us, besides the process of personalization, emancipation and autonomy – development of individual identity – is, at the same time, faced with an open dilemma of defining hierarchy and selecting collective identities. Collective identity is built upon a sense of affiliation and (un)conscious acceptance of group rules and norms underlying social identification and consequently established sense of togetherness.

Although “postmodern condition” (Lyotard) is largely characterized by the process of pluralization of identities and hence, according to Bauman, the postmodern problem primarily relates to how to avoid fixation rather than to the establishment of identity. There are three dimensions of group identities relevant for the definition of citizens’ social capital.

The first one is rank and the relevance that citizens themselves associate with specific forms of group identities. The second dimension is the influence of certain established social identities on the formation of positions. The third dimension is tension and mutual potential conflictedness of various group identities which, in different combinations, make up a modern, largely pluralized, variable and unstable identity.

**Formal and Informal Networks**

The second level of development of social capital is schemes of support and connections established within formal and informal networks and channels of relations entered into by individuals and groups.
Informal networks include contacts with family, neighbors, co-workers and friends, who may belong to the same or different age, status or national and confessional groups, they may be open or, according to certain criteria, more or less closed.

On the other hand, formal networks of connections imply presence and activity in political and civil society organizations in the wide array from political parties, trade unions, church committees to sports, environmental or self-help groups. As a rule, simultaneous presence in a number of organizations strengthens networks of connections and increases social capital.

The possibility of relying on one’s own social connections is, particularly at times of crisis and/or transition, a very important aspect of ensuring social capital. A socially insufficiently networked person is a person who cannot rely on his/her own social networks when in need of help and support. In this framework, reduced social capital leads to poverty and social isolation and to reduction of social capital and enforced retraditionalization.

Trust in Actors and Institutions

Trust as a key dimension of social capital represents the complex and multidimensional phenomenon epitomized in the dynamic unity of a range of elements of support, positive attitude, identification and reputation in the citizens’ attitude to social and political actors and institutions.

The key attitude of trust which creates and maintains a group and increases citizens’ social capital refers both to their horizontal ties – social trust, and to vertical relations – the social pyramid which measures citizens’ political trust in key social and political actors and institutions. At the same time, vertical social trust shows the extent of absence/presence of bonding social capital which, for example, connects voters with political leaders.

Within horizontal, social trust one may distinguish between generalized trust in people in general, who may be in principle trusted or not, and particularized trust in groups with which and individuals with whom we are in contact.

Societies mutually differ by the fact in terms of whether they have established and the extent to which they have established a culture of dialogue and trust (Lipset). In this regard, trust is not only a moral, but also an economic and political and cultural category. Offe defines trust as “the belief that others will contribute to my well-being and refrain from inflicting damage upon me”. Offe lists four fundamental values that institutions must promote to enjoy trust: truth-telling, promise-keeping, fairness and solidarity [Offe: 1999].

Relations of (dis)trust on the horizontal plane, depending on whether they are established between members of the same (or akin) groups or groups that
differ in terms of their main characteristics, form the foundation of Putnam’s division of social capital into *bonding* (intragroup) and *bridging* (intergroup) social capital.

Societies with a pronounced, predictably high level of intragroup, bonding and a prominently low level of intergroup, bridging capital are unstable, conflicting and divided societies.

A more general, principled hypothesis might even be formulated: that racial and ethnic and religious heterogeneity and pronounced political polarization are accompanied by lower levels of civil social trust. The problem is particularly aggravated in post-conflict areas which also feature relative economic underdevelopment, such as the former Yugoslavia. Bosnia-Herzegovina is thus, unfortunately, widely listed in the literature as the paradigmatic example of society with bonding but without bridging social capital, and only the latter enables stabilization of complex communities [Šalaj:2007].

The Social and Political Capital of Serbian Citizens

At the end of 2009, a decade after the cessation of armed conflicts, the mildest form of ethnic distance in Serbia – unwillingness to accept that members of certain ethnic groups live in Serbia at all – was revealed by respondents, members of the majority, Serbian, nation, as follows: two in five for Albanians, one in four for Croatians, one in five for Bosnians and Roma, 15% for Hungarians and 12% for Montenegrins. According to the findings of this CeSID survey, nearly one in two Serbs keep access to informal social networks through socializing and visits closed for members of minorities in the case of Albanians, one in three in the case of Roma and Croats, one in four for Bosnians, one in five for Hungarians and one in seven for Montenegrins – the latter probably as the effect of “dissociation”.

On the other hand, the “vertical axis” of trust – citizens’ affirmative attitude to political and civil actors – is their key resource and guarantee of legitimacy, rating and credibility. Bonding social vertical connections which connect individuals with various positions and resources of power – *bonding social capital* – fosters political participation and strengthens citizens politically, while reducing clientelism and the overconcentration of power.

A positive attitude of identification with and (voting) support of certain actors are the main currency in politics, as well as in civil society organizations.

At the same time, characteristics of political behavior – established relations of civil and political dialogue and trust or indifference or even active opposition are among the major elements of the overall political culture of society.

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1 CeSID, October 2009, 17-18.
Institutions are being continuously tested for their legitimacy. An important element of their legitimacy is a “culture of trust” in their purpose, manner of operation and effects. Trust cannot be reduced to a solely psychological relation, it is also an eminently political, moral and even economic category.

The culture of trust is a sort of social resource, or capital, that we use in making bets on the contingent actions of others. The larger the pool of trust, the more bets and the higher bids we are ready to make, and the higher risks we are willing to accept.2

The culture of distrust (or the culture of cynicism), on the other hand, is characterized by a pervasive climate of suspicion.

In the last twenty-odd years in Serbia, distrust in social institutions, particularly political ones, has been, with rare and short-lived exceptions, so high that it raises the issue of survival of the state and even of society itself. Therefore, how can a society function if no one trusts anyone, if no one enjoys credibility?

For example, in 2010, in the midst of economic and social crisis, the key currency of citizens’ trust was, as expected, sparsely distributed between social and political actors and institutions. Political institutions and actors fared the worst in this ranking a decade after the changes of 2000. Political institutions are obviously facing a profound crisis of legitimacy as citizens demonstrate distrust in relation to all of them without exception much more prominently than trust. This situation is only comparable with the latter half of 1990s, the time of the complete delegitimation of Milošević’s regime.

### Political Divisions And Identities

In an attempt to more precisely define the structure and content of ideology, Lipset in his classical work “Political Man” defined a two-dimensional structure of political values based on the distinction between economic values (which relate to distribution of wealth and income in society) and cultural values (which relate to individual freedoms and social order).

Cultural and economic values may be found in different combinations, thus certainly making the field of politics and political ideologies complex and autonomous.

In a more precise analysis of political and cultural assemblies, many authors stress that values of traditional ethics (the conservative view on relations between men and women, sexuality, life and death) in empirical surveys are

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most frequently equated with authoritarian tendencies (which imply aversion to cultural difference and a rigid concept of social order).

Based on these findings, it is argued that both moral traditionalism and authoritarianism are primarily related to the right-wing in the political spectrum, which of course does not mean that a combination of traditional authoritarianism with (leftist) egalitarianism in the distribution of wealth is impossible or even rare.

**Political Values and Party Affiliation**

A CeSID survey conducted in February 2010 reveals an extremely complex map of political culture in Serbia.

The first step in the study was the analysis of acceptance of six values from all three key social cleavages: attitude toward ethnic minorities and decentralization (historic-ethnic cleavage), attitude toward traditionalism, sexual minorities and membership in the EU (political-cultural cleavage), as well as attitude toward a market economy (functional, interest-class cleavage).

The second step was classifying the answers into five clusters (value structures) on the basis of which Serbian citizens could be categorized as being modernists (19%), conservatives who are undergoing modernization — “modern” conservatives (19%), who provide support to changes and reforms, autocrats (21%) and nationalists (15%), who objectively oppose them, and the undecided (26%). Finally, in the third step of the analysis, four value profiles (clusters) were compared with respondents’ party identification.

The average citizen of Serbia is an ethnically tolerant (71%) traditionalist (64%) who is more inclined to decentralization (39% : 27%) and the EU (39% : 25%) than against them, while harboring serious dilemmas about accepting a market economy (31% for and 21% against, with almost half undecided) and homophobic (49%, with one fifth tolerant and one third undecided).3

Even more indicative are the findings on the extent of acceptance of competing political ideologies — social-democratic, Christian-democratic, conservative, liberal, as well as nationalism and communism. Among approximately one half

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3 The results of the survey indicate that the Democratic Party (DS) relies on the support of modernists and modern conservatives, who account for four fifths of the voting pool of this party. Support to Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) comes dominantly from modernists and to Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) from autocrats. Supporters of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) come almost exclusively from the ranks of nationalists and autocrats. Supporters of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) are completely divided, with autocrats and nationalists nevertheless outnumbering modernists and modern conservatives (CeSID, February 2010, 17-18).
of citizens who have reached some level of conceptual understanding of politics, by far the largest majority (two fifths) prefer social-democracy.\footnote{Otherwise, DS with 32\% has the highest share of social-democrats in the total number of supporters, followed – somewhat surprisingly – by DSS and G17 Plus with 29\% each. The second “backup” ideology for DS and G17 Plus supporters is liberalism (10-14\%), while Christian-democracy is the second choice for DSS supporters. SPS supporters are almost completely divided between the acceptance of communism and social-democracy, with somewhat higher share of neo-communists (27\%:24\%). Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) followers are equally divided (one fifth each) between liberalism, social democracy and Christian democrats. Within just a half of voters of the Radical Party who can formulate their position, equally represented (15\% each) are supporters of social democracy and nationalists. Social democracy is the second-ranked ideology only among the LDP supporters. Within this party, liberalism enjoys twice stronger support than the social-democratic concept (47\% : 23\%) (CeSID, December 2006).}

In an attempt to interpret these findings, the thesis proffered by Wegener [2000] appears particularly inspirational and accurate: the issue of legitimacy of democratic institutions in post-communist, transition countries may be reduced to the concept of social justice and different perceptions of citizens of these countries about social justice and its political and ideological presenters, taking into consideration that social-democratic concept is recognized and preferred in Serbia.

However, the key role in the classification of parties, and of the electorate as well, is played by divisions based on historical-ethnic and cultural-value cleavages. In accordance with these, parties may be classified into national-conservative and civic-modernist groups. The correlation between the national-civic (historical-ethnic) and traditionalism-modernism (cultural-value cleavage) axes is extremely high (C=0.7), with the national matching the traditional and the civic matching the modern. Hence, with some simplification, one may speak of a single axis: traditional (conservative) nationalism – civic modernism [Komšić, Pantić and Slavujević, 2003: 176].

On the other hand, results of research in our country corroborate the thesis that a poorly disseminated, temporary and “artificial” division between the left and right is still dominant in Serbia.

Indirect argument for this thesis is the presence of an apparent political paradox – most of the electorate shows “leftist sentiment” in terms of their preferred option and economically, but at the same time vote for parties in the center or right.

Hence, apparently unexpectedly, social affiliation in a narrower, professional-class sense does not determine the preference for the left or right to any significant extent, because this division has been established relatively late and has for a long time been overshadowed by – insufficiently related with it – national and political-cultural divisions.
Understanding and accepting democracy

Where democratic values are concerned, the findings of research suggest that although those advocating return to the old and restoration of an openly democratic order are rare and isolated, democracy has not yet become “the only game in town” (Juan Linz).

Through reinterpretation of the findings of surveys, three major positions can be formulated.

1. There is widespread discontent with the functioning of frail institutions and actors of multiparty competitive democracy, as well as with its developmental effects. At the same time, parties are deprived of any significant measure of trust and credibility.

2. Very widespread, potentially dangerous and destructive is the position that “in certain situations undemocratic government is better (more efficient, more successful) than a democratic one”. At the same time, democracy is the key value and highly ranked goal only if accompanied by economic development where most of the population is out of the zone of poverty and unemployment.

3. An additional problem is the dominant belief that we as a society and people are not “mature enough for full democracy”. Consequently, this is a society unable to withstand authoritarian distortion of democracy, populist demagoguery and “enlightened absolutism” or advocating of the rule by the firm hand of a caring head of household (father), in other words — “soft paternalism”.

On the other hand, there is an increasing need for the establishment of a responsible and competent political elite, capable of fostering and channeling dispersed democratic energy and capacities. Otherwise, Serbia and its citizens are hardly likely to make a decisive turn toward a certain future.

If we would finally attempt to briefly summarize the findings, to define the dispositions and views of Serbian citizens, we would first have to state that two out of three citizens are dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy, the results of privatization and overall situation in society. The past decade has only brought about another wave of impoverishment, this time under the direction of “Euro-compatible” elites ready to carry out further neo-liberal reforms presented as a necessary part of the process of accession to the European Union.

Consequently, more than one out of four respondents believes that Serbia is ruled by criminals almost to the same extent as by all the “legal and legitimate” political actors and institutions together. One out of five citizens thinks that
real power “does not reside here”, that it comes, instead, from major actors of
the international community. 5

Nevertheless, democracy, which citizens are very critical of (vacillation, endless
debates, poor management of the economy, weaknesses in establishing order) is
still for almost half of the citizens “better than any other form of government”.

Two-thirds of citizens, against the opposition of nearly one fifth of “hard-line
liberals”, opt for a socially responsible state, for a significant role of the state in
providing relief and protection for the poor, old, infirm and the unemployed.
Accepting the policy of state social transfers is an expression of a difficult situa-
tion, but also the heritage of the culture of solidarity, even of widespread statist
syndrome. A similar distribution of values is observed when it comes to free
elementary education and health care.

However, the citizens of Serbia are completely divided into roughly three
equal groups: those who are against, for and undecided when it comes to inter-
ference of the state in the management of the economy and justification of state
assistance to cultural establishments and art production as opposed to leaving
them to market rationale and criteria.

Of course, Serbia has many faces and citizens’ views differ considerably
depending primarily on their political choices, age or ethnic affiliation, or ed-
ucational level and social status.

This rough sketch of the social and political portrait of Serbia shows that it
is still deeply divided, that it has at least four different faces. One is resolutely
turned to the future, the second one looks back to the past. The third face is
undecided, it would like to move toward its future, but is continuously wonder-
ing and looking back, believing that this is one of the ways to reach the desired
destination. The fourth one is silent, it stopped questioning the things that are
happening to us long ago.

All mutual arrangements and changes in the balance of power are still in
play and anything is possible in Serbia, in the short run. As a rule, those who
belong to the future – younger, better educated, with higher social status – are
more prone to democracy and entrepreneurial risk.

Instead of a Conclusion

A dominant impression, largely corroborated by the results of empirical research,
is that among the citizens and among political actors in Serbia the crisis has only
exacerbated the dominant state of mental disorientation, political confusion
and ideological cacophony.

After the changes of October 5th, 2000 Serbia is experiencing the phenomenon of citizens’ withdrawal from the public sphere, which in turn restricts their influence and further democratic transformation of society.

The reasons for citizens’ passivity and abandonment of their civil rights should be primarily sought in widespread discontent with transitional changes started on October 5th, 2000. Political conflicts within “pro-reform” political elites, cartelization of politics and widespread distribution of political spoils, accompanied by corruption, along with broader reasons – crisis and further increase of poverty and social exclusion – underlie the anomy and the sense of disorientation.

Citizens’ view that involvement in any form of activity is useless is certainly the consequence of such a situation.

The reduction of social capital and citizens’ energy is not only the result of extremely limited trust in political and social actors and institutions or of poverty and social exclusion, but also of the operation of broader social processes. As in the developed world, present-day (urban) Serbia is experiencing the process of the creation of a “post-civic generation”. Factors such as pressure relating to time and money, both in the case of unemployment and in the case of overemployment, change of jobs and place of residence, the influence of passive entertainment are all at work in Serbia, too.

The accumulation of these reasons, along with a weakening of democratic values, leads to the dominant state of mind according to which solidarity, public interest and benefit and philanthropy in the current context of “crony” or “tycoon” capitalism represent only a Romanticist illusion or a fairy tale for the naïve.

Sztompka mentions a number of possible empirical indicators of distrust: gambling – the popularity of games of chance, emergence of casino chains; spread of corruption, nepotism, favoritism; craving for paternalistic care – a strong ruler and simple solutions to economic problems, which all open doors for all kinds of populists and demagogues. There are still expectations typical of the old regime, that the state is responsible for all aspects of economic and social life and should therefore solve all our problems. Perhaps the strongest sign of the overall distrust in the sustainability of one’s own society is the decision to emigrate. A phenomenon similar to emigration is withdrawal from participation in public life (internal emigration).

For example, according to Rose-Ackerman, almost endemic corruption is a coping strategy in the face of untrustworthy, dishonest officials. Paradoxically, a deeply corrupt regime usually operates with a high degree of reciprocal, affect-based trust. The corrupt official is an untrustworthy and dishonest agent of the public interest but a trustworthy friend and relative. Connections may help people over difficult patches in their day-to-day lives but do not appear to be
contributing to long term reform of state administration or to the consolidation of democratic structures [Rose-Ackerman:2001: 48].

However, the withdrawal of citizens is not a solution for the current social and political crisis in Serbia. In order to successfully carry out a democratization process in a society, as Zoran Djindjić also argued, there must be a norm in the value system of that society to live democracy as a form of everyday life.

That would also mean that it is necessary to create a social climate and culture in which networks of contacts, activities and influence – social capital – would not be a privilege of just one in ten citizens, those from the ranks of transitional winners. Perhaps the best example and illustration of this are Scandinavian countries, where developed social capital and generalized trust in people exist hand-in-hand with well-being and a high level of equality.

This logically brings us to the question: How can democratic values and spirit of tolerance and dialogue be anchored and strengthened?

A part of the answer lies in the commitment to also promote and disseminate basic democratic values, of course in a different context and through democratic practice. The programmatic basis, as well as methodological mainstay for this “enlightening” position is provided by the belief that political culture and its fundamental value contents is where the principal incentives for citizens’ political action are to be sought. This reflects its invaluable importance for the political and social processes as a whole.

There are three dimensions of politics relevant to political education: (1) the relationship between politics and democracy, (2) the relationship between citizens and (plural) identities, and (3) an understanding of the relationships of cohesion and differences in society.

By raising the issue of establishment and development of democratic discourse and plural and dialogue-based civil identity and culture, as well as by critical renaissance and renewal of the spirit of solidarity and social cohesion, Serbia and its citizens and political actors create an opportunity to pull themselves out of lethargy and spiritual and even political-ideological provinciality.

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6 At http://www.colbud.hu/honesty-trust/rose/pub01.pdf
7 This text is the result of the author’s work on the project “Political Identity of Serbia in Regional and Global Contexts” (registration No.: 179076), which is being carried out within the Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Belgrade, financed by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Serbia.
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