SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CAPITAL IN WESTERN BALKAN SOCIETIES

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Prepared within the framework of the Regional Research Promotion Programme in the Western Balkans (RRPP), which is run by the University of Fribourg upon a mandate of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, SDC, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. The views expressed in the papers are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent opinions of the SDC and the University of Fribourg.
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Introduction

The volume “Social and Cultural Capital in Western Balkan Societies” came into being as part of the project which the Centre for Empirical Cultural Studies of Southeast Europe has been realizing within the Regional Research Promotion Programme in the Western Balkans (RRPP) for the past two years. It represents the first attempt to involve other researchers into a discussion of the topic which was the object of our study.

Our project could be viewed as the application, in general terms, of the Bourdieusian model to the study of transition and social stratification in the transitional period in Serbia (and wider in the Western Balkans region) – something similar to what Eyal, Szelényi, and Townsley did for Eastern and Central Europe in their work “Making Capitalism without Capitalists” (1998). To be taken into account, of course, are the differences in historical and social circumstances under which transition is taking place in the Western Balkans region, which have led to different assumptions and different results in relation to their study.

However, what is common to these studies is the conception of multi-dimensional social structure, in which, in addition to economic, social and cultural capital play an important role in establishing and maintaining social inequalities. Such a perspective also makes possible the application of the same theoretical model in the study of Western Balkan societies since the pre-socialist period, through the socialist period and in the post-socialist period. In this web of interactive factors (capitals), what has changed over the course of history is the “dominant principle of domination”. That is, change has occurred in the relative value of particular resources (economic, political, social, cultural capital) which has been followed by transformation of the institutional system through which the results of social struggles have been institutionalized. The post-socialist period in Western Balkan societies has brought a new appraisal of economic capital and the struggle of proponents of political and political social capital, on the one hand, and global cultural capital, on the other, for dominance in society.

Precisely this struggle between the proponents of the key resources of the order disappearing (political capital and political social capital) and of the order coming into being (global cultural capital) represents the focus of our analysis. Through it we follow the relationship between social and cultural capital in various domains: in everyday life, in institutional arenas, ultimately to the testing of hypotheses on the crucial action of the Bildungbürgertum (intellectual bourgeoisie) or the model of political capitalism in transitional societies.
The more specific goals of our research project, “Social and Cultural Capital in Serbia”, have been: a) to ascertain how different classes and social groups in Serbia differ in terms of resources (economic and, in particular, social and cultural capital) on the basis of survey data; b) to reconstruct the strategies which the citizens of Serbia use in everyday life (relying on a combination of resources available to them) – principally on the basis of data collected through in-depth interviews and focus groups; and c) to analyze the social and symbolic struggles of the holders of different types of capital in everyday life in Serbian society and at the institutional level – on the basis of focus groups, interviews and analyses of secondary sources. Some of these topics are dealt with in the contributions published in this volume.

The majority of contributions published in this volume were presented at the conference “Social and Cultural Capital in Western Balkan Societies”, jointly organized in June 2011 by the Centre for Empirical Cultural Studies of Southeast Europe, the Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory of the University of Belgrade and the Centre for South-East Studies of the School of Slavonic and East-European Studies of the University College London. But the purpose here is not to present an exact rendition of the course and content of the conference, but to open up a debate on various topics and expand our knowledge of the forms of power which structure Western Balkan societies.

Although the starting point for our team was the post-Bourdieuian, in this volume we did not limit the range of approaches to the study of capitals. Hence, in considerations of phenomena linked to social capital we find equally represented approaches connected to Putnam’s and Coleman’s conception, economic/development theories (Becker, Glaeser, Temple, Fukuyama), or network theories of social capital (Nan Lin).

This volume contains eleven contributions. In her contribution Suzana Ignjatović presents the history of the concept of social capital and reviews all the relevant sociological and economic theories, as well as approaches within network theory, the focus of which is the analysis and practical application of the concept. The increasing frequency with which the concept of social capital is being used in political discourse since the 1920s and the increasingly common policy of actuating, developing and strengthening the social networks of individuals and families as a precondition for the success and stability of modern democracies.

Smiljka Tomanović questions the role of expressive social capital and instrumental social capital in the shaping of the social biographies of youth with differing social backgrounds relying on data obtained through a long-
term qualitative study with two groups of young people of working class background from the outskirts of Belgrade and middle strata background families from the central zone of Belgrade. The author devotes special attention to the influence of family habitus on defining educational and employment goals, to which the use of expressive and instrumental social capital is ancillary, as well as the significance and meaning ascribed by young people and their parents to these forms of social capital.

Starting from Bourdieu’s and Colman’s concept of social capital and Becker’s understanding of the new household economics, Mirjana Bobić analyzes demographic statistics and the results of four representative sociological studies which question the demographic regime in power in contemporary Serbia, as well as factors which played a role in its becoming established and which shaped it in the course of the first decade of the 21st century. The author shows that the development of marital-familial habitus and bio-social reproductive strategies in Serbia are still primarily dependent on familial networks today, hence the claim that the stability of traditional values, which continue to define relations between marital partners, as well as their gender roles and practices, can be explained precisely by the predominance of traditional forms of sociability (greater presence and development of bonding capital as opposed to bridging capital). The contribution draws attention to cohabitation and extramartial families, which differ in a sense from marital unions, but their generally low level of social capital is viewed in the context of their social marginalization.

Slobodan Miladinović considers the negative dimension of social capital which includes the possibility of the appearance of corruption, discrimination, nepotism and organized crime and views it as a function of a closed-off and rigid social structure, centralized government, concentration of control of important resources in the hands of a small number of people and the inexistence or insufficient development of democratic institutions, above all the justice system. Miladinović questions all of his presuppositions through an analysis of the mechanisms of use and distribution of social capital in the socialist and transitional period of Serbian society.

Marta Kołczyńska uses data obtained through the World Values Survey to compare the influence of socio-economic and political determinants on the trust citizens place in democratic institutions – parliament, the justice system and political parties – in Western and Central Europe, on the one hand, and East Europe and the countries of the Balkans, on the other. A comparative analysis of quantitative data takes place on two plains. It encompasses the questioning of the connection of declared trust...
and the features of a particular country (rate of economic development and quality of democracy), as well as the connection between trust and sociodemographic characteristics of individuals. The author’s complex approach points to a number of different directions for further explorations of the East European and Balkans region.

The contribution by Jelisaveta Vukelić and Irena Petrović presents the results of two case studies in two cities in Serbia – Bor and Pančevo, which have extensive ecological problems. The two authors attempt to explain the absence of any kind of collective action among the citizens of Bor and Pančevo starting from the assumption that citizens’ low level of ecological activism in these two cities is conditioned by their insufficiently developed social capital, that is, the absence of norms of reciprocity in their community and weak links to other members of their community. The contribution may be read as a warning that such a trend in the sphere of ecological activism significantly reduces any possibility of systematic environmental change.

Natalija Žunić and Danijela Gavrilović’s contribution deals with women’s groups as a source of social capital. The basic question which concerns them is whether women who are organized into groups or networked produce society-wide social and cultural capital or whether they work on strengthening a “women’s worldview”. The object of analysis are women’s groups which have functioned on the territory of Serbia since their beginnings in the 1970s until the present. A second important question posed by the contribution is whether such groups or networks connect women and men through the interests of the community to which they belong, changing the shared social millieu or whether they separate them and close off women’s and men’s networks, which then realize their own, particular interests.

Ivana Spasić and Ana Birešev in their contribution The State as the Great Classifier aim to explain why the state appears in the discourse of social classifications of the citizens of Serbia as the only legitimate classifier of people, capital, objects, and practices and why the citizens, albeit aware of the responsibility of state bodies for many adverse phenomena and irregularities in various spheres of society still consider the state to be the ultimate adjudicator and undisputable authority when it comes to questions of valuing and classifying. In the analysis of the current attitude of the citizens of Serbia toward the state the authors rely on Bourdieu’s theory of the bureaucratic field, political field and field of power, as well as on his concepts of social classifications, classification struggles and symbolic violence.

In the contribution Trust and legitimation: the case of Serbia Danijela Gavrilović and Miloš Jovanović attempt to use an analysis of results
obtained through questionnaires and focus group interviews in the study “Social and Cultural Capital in Serbia” (2011) to uncover values on the basis of which the citizens of Serbia legitimize their behavior and the establishing of connections with other people. The contribution considers issues such as whether people are led in social engagement by collectivistic or individualistic values, the degree to which they share trust, the degree to which the values respondents accept are the basis for traditionalistic social relations and whether these could be an impetus for a democratic organization of society.

In her study of the practice of using volunteers in the National Museum in Belgrade, Višnja Kisić points to the benefits to the museum, the volunteers themselves, visitors and the wider community which can be had from a well-thought out and realized volunteer program. The author proposes that the success of the volunteer program be measured through an assessment of the degree to which capacities, that is, physical, human, economic, social and cultural capital of all actors involved – the museum, volunteers, audiences, and the community – are improved, hence the criteria mentioned are applied in an analysis of the effects of such a program initiated in 2009 in the National Museum in Belgrade.

The proceedings end with the contribution Constructing a Cultural Map of Serbia by Predrag Cvetičanin, Jasmina Nedeljković and Nemanja Krstić. The contribution presents a comparison of the results of the surveys “Cultural Needs, Habits and Taste of Citizens of Serbia” undertaken in 2005 (1364 respondents) and “Cultural Practices of Citizens of Serbia” of the Centre for the Study in Cultural Development from 2010 (1490 respondents). Through the application of Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) the field of cultural practices in Serbia (in 2005 and in 2010) was constructed, its basic dimensions were identified as was how it related to socio-demographic variables (education, age, income, wealth, gender, region of residence) which were superimposed on these cultural maps. The contribution points to the specificities of the field of cultural practices in Serbia and deviations in relation to Bourdieu’s model.

We hope that this edited volume will not only throw fresh light on phenomena which we encounter every day in our societies, but also be a reliable guide for those who are fairly unfamiliar with the societies of the Western Balkans, showing them vividly “forces” actively shaping these societies.

The editors
The concept of social capital in academic discussion and in public policy

Abstract

The paper aims to provide an overview of contemporary theories of social capital. The concept of social capital was introduced into academic discourse at the beginning of the 20th century, but it became popular at the end of 20th century. The paper presents a short history of the concept (authors Hanifan and Dewey). The central part of the paper focuses on current theoretical developments. The main three lines of the theoretical conceptualization of social capital are presented: three dominant authors (Bourdieu, Coleman, Putnam), economic/development theories (Becker, Glaeser, Temple, Fukuyama), and network theories of social capital (Nan Lin). Three dimensions are briefly discussed in all the above theories: definition, paradigmatic framework, and methodology. The concluding part of the paper deals with another distinct issue with regard to the concept of social capital, its popularity in public policy and political discourse at the end of 20th century.

KEY WORDS: social capital, academic discourse, public policy

History of the concept

There are many definitions of social capital. Yet, theories of social capital do have some shared elements. What they all have in common is best described by John Field: Relationships matter (Field, 2003: 1). All theories of social capital discuss about social agents, resources, and relations between agents, but they differ in terms of which aspects they emphasize, which terminology they use, which general paradigm they rely on as a framework. Theories differ in terms of whether they emphasize individual agents or collective/corporative agents (family, class, organization, neighborhood, state) as “owners” of social capital. Resources are the second important aspect of social capital, and these can differ widely: financial, cultural,
psychological, social, political. The third component includes relations among agents. This is probably the central locus of the concept, because it helps distinguishing definitions of social capital. It follows that social capital can be limited to a more or less closed network (class, family, the individual) or it can have effects beyond the visible network of individual and collective agents (settlement, city, state).

This generalized representation of the concept suggests the conclusion that many of these aspects enumerated have already been considered in classical theory. As precursors of contemporary discussion one might list Tocqueville, Durkheim, Marx, Weber and Toennies. Social capital encompasses many elements of the concepts of class, solidarity, anomie, association, community. This pre-history of the contemporary concept of social capital was described as the “concept without a term” (Farr, 2004). It is interesting that social capital has another line in its history, as a “term without a concept”. What is meant by this is the usage of the term with no connection with the contemporary meaning of the concept. For example, theoreticians of mutualism used it to mark a cooperative or socialized labor, or aggregated capital. Such a meaning is closest to the modern meaning of “social ownership” from the period of socialist self-management economics. Today, in the Serbian academic community the usage of this alternative meaning does come up, with social capital marking the “capital of the society”, with the connotation “the overall potential of society”.

According to Putnam and Woolcock, the concept of social capital was first mentioned in 1916 in a report by an American educational inspector, Lyda Hanifan:

“Social capital... refer[s] to... those tangible assets [that] count for most in the daily lives of people: namely good will, fellowship, sympathy, and social intercourse among the individuals and families who make up a social unit” (Lyda Judson Hanifan, according to Woolcock, 1998: 192).

Halpern emphasizes that Hanifan’s concept is different from the contemporary meaning, as it encompasses “everyday habits of friendship and common civility - the informal and comforting social norms of everyday life” (Halpern, 2005: 10). However, Halpern is not entirely right, as the rest of Hanifant’s text indicates elements from the contemporary concept of social capital which bring it closer to Putnam’s definition:

“The individual is helpless socially, if left to himself... If he comes into contact with his neighbor, and they with other neighbors, there will be an accumulation of social capital, which may immediately satisfy his needs and
which may bear a social potentiality sufficient to substantial improvement of living conditions in the whole community” (Lyda Hanifan, according to Putnam, 2000: 19).

From the above quote follows that Hanifan conceptualized social capital in a way similar to the understanding of Putnam, the most popular contemporary theoretician of social capital. Hanifan speaks of the potentials of the accumulation of social capital, emphasizes the meso-level of sociability (neighborhood) and the multiple positive effects of social capital on society. It therefore comes as no surprise that Putnam quotes Hanifan’s definition as the first official mention of the concept. In addition, Hanifan compared social capital to economic capital: the accumulation of social capital is a precondition for the development of society, just as accumulated capital is a precondition for the development of business (Hanifan, according to Farr, 2004: 11). This comparison is similar to the second contemporary idea that social capital can be transformed into an economic form, in particular under circumstances where social capital is strong, while economic capital is scarce (for example, in developing economies with strong close, familial or local ties).

There are opinions that John Dewey was the first theoretician of social capital and that Hanifan relied on his early works (from 1902 to 1915)(Farr, 2004: 14). Dewey is certainly one of the important figures in the discussion on social capital as he was the first to emphasize the instrumentality of social capital in public policy. The idea was born within the progressivism movement which staunchly supported “social engineering”. This aspect of the concept is likewise important in the modern phase of the development of the concept, in particular in theories which had an influence on academic discussion and public policy (Putnam, Woolcock, and Halpern). Following the 1920s, only a few authors used the concept of social capital, for example, Jane Jacobs in urban sociology (in the 1960s).

A new phase of the development of the concept of social capital began in the 1980s. There was an “epistemological leap” which was brought about by Bourdieu’s and Coleman’s sociological theory of social capital. The third phase is the appearance of Putnam’s texts (Making democracy work 1993; The prosperous community, 1993; Bowling alone revisited, 1995; Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America, 1995). An increased popularity of the concept has followed the book Bowling alone (2000), in academic discussion and in public policy.
Key authors: Bourdieu, Coleman, Putnam

Bourdieu is the author of the first sociological theory of social capital. Bourdieu was the first to mention the concept of social capital in 1980 in a text for the journal *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, and then in 1983 in the book *Soziale Ungleichheiten*. It was, however, the English edition of the text (*The forms of capital* from 1985) which brought international popularity to Bourdieu’s concept.

The concept of social capital is part of Bourdieu’s theory of capitals, which was developed as part of his theory of social reproduction. According to Bourdieu, the dynamics of social structure is structurally defined and determined by relations among positions. One of the key concepts is *field*, which is defined by Pierre Mounier as the “space of social action” (Mounier, 2001: 56). The field is an area in which agents are “united by mutual struggles” and it is marked by the struggle around different types of capital, as the “currency of domination” in a particular field (money, scientific capital, status) (Bourdieu, 2001: 93). In Mounier’s terms, the distribution of capital results from relations of domination among agents for redefining the legitimate types of capital in the field (Mounier, 2001: 58). Therefore, the concept of field and the concept of capital are important for understanding the social structure. The struggle between the “dominant” and the “dominated” agents for the acquisition of capital is the main mechanism of production and reproduction of social structure.

Capitals function under the same principles, but they have a different degree of “stability and convertibility” (Bourdieu, 1993: 33). The central place has economic capital which is expressed in monetary terms, while all other capitals – social, cultural – can be converted into economic form. The diversification of types of capital represents an important innovation that provided a better explanation of reproduction than the one which takes place primarily via economic capital (Bourdieu, 1985: 252). By introducing this addition to the basic Marxist matrix, Bourdieu developed conceptual tools for the explication of specific areas of social action (for example, education).

The second type of capital is *cultural capital* which includes some aspects of Becker’s concept of human capital. Bourdieu argues that his concept is somewhat wider and encompasses predispositions which are marked by habitus (for instance, aesthetic taste of the members of a particular class), materialized forms (for example, the ownership of works of art) and institutionalized forms (for instance, level of education) (Bourdieu, 1985: 243). All forms of capital have a symbolic level which is named *symbolic capital*. 
This is the form of “pre-capital” which marks the symbolic currency of exchange for different types of capital: titles represent symbolic capital for social capital, educational degrees for cultural capital, and money for economic capital. Within a particular field, a struggle is waged between the dominant and the dominated agents for the value of the currency which will be the valid one in that field (Mounier, 2001: 88). The position of symbolic capital is therefore in some respects higher than that of other forms of capital and similar to that of economic capital (as the flip side of one and the same process).

Social capital was mentioned in Bourdieu’s early papers on domination and its meaning has changed somewhat over time. The first definition of social capital refers to “a social network and the resources which are available to each agent who is a part of the network”, while a second definition emphasizes “groups and individuals who have access to resources” (Bourdieu, according to Halpern, 2005: 7). It is only in the third definition that social capital is fully defined in the following manner:

“Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group – which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a “credential” which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word” (Bourdieu, 1985: 248-249).

An important aspect of social capital are the acts of symbolic and material exchange which serve as a kind of guarantee for the expectation of a certain kind of behavior, thus shaping the behavior of agents themselves. One of the materialized forms of social capital are the names of particular social forms: group, family, school, and they serve as a “social bill” and “guarantee”. Although social capital functions in the same way as do other forms of capital, for Bourdieu it has a lower chance of survival and renewal (Anheier et al., 1995: 859). A critical position is the maintenance of reciprocity in respecting the norms. Therefore, social capital is more prone to “erosion” than other forms of capital (Bourdieu, 1985: 254). By linking the agents, the social networks provide the access to different resources possible, but they are very risky and potentially expendable. For example, respect for the institution of kinship must be constantly reproduced through an established system of reciprocity in social relations, regardless of whether it concerns the returning of an important favor or just a visit to one’s relatives. The same mechanism functions in the “production” of social capital in all types of relations: familial, friendship or neighborhood ties. If the
system of reproduction of social institutions functions well, it is possible to create, maintain and increase social capital. This aspect of social capital is very similar to Coleman’s understanding of the concept.

**Coleman** defined the concept of social capital within a theory of social action, in order to overcome two problems. The first is the gap in sociology between two social levels – the macro and the micro (Coleman, 1988: 101). The second problem is the irreconcilability of the sociological perspective, which starts from the hypersocialized actor and the economic perspective, which is founded on a subsocialized actor. Coleman defines the concept thus:

“Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity but a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors – whether persons or corporate actors – within the structure(...) Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible. Like physical capital and human capital, social capital is not completely fungible but may be specific to certain activities. A given form of social capital that is valuable in facilitating certain actions may be useless or even harmful for others. Unlike other forms of capital, social capital inheres in the structure of relations between actors and among actors. It is not lodged either in the actors themselves or in physical implements of production. Because purposive organizations can be actors (“corporate actors”) just as persons can, relations among corporate actors can constitute social capital for them as well...” (Coleman, 1988: 98).

Secondly, Coleman defines social capital in relation to human capital (the educational achievement) of children:

“(...) the norms, the social networks, and the relationships between adults and children that are of value for the child’s growing up. Social capital exists within the family, but also outside the family, in the community” (Coleman, according to Field, 24).

Social capital can be an unintended consequence of social relations which are formed for some other purpose. For example, one type of relations in the social structure which represents social capital are obligations, expectations and trustworthiness. An example for obligations is a wealthy family in a rural area whose “head of the household” is connected to a large number of people who are indebted to him, by means of which he is able to acquire more opportunities (greater power) to realize his intentions. Another form of social capital are information channels which provide less costly information for agents who would otherwise have to spend time on checking certain things which they are interested in (for example,
scientists who read secondary sources). The third form are norms and effective sanctions which have two different effects. On the one hand, they can prevent the undesirable phenomenon of free riding in social relations (for example, the use of the advantages of a good neighborhood without any kind of personal contribution). On the other hand, they can rigidly obstruct certain innovative activities. These examples indicate that Coleman does not view social capital as a social phenomenon which has exclusively positive ramifications.

Coleman focused more on the relations between social and human capital, that is, the influence of social capital on the educational achievement of students. Coleman compared three types of schools and school environments: Catholic, public and private schools (non-religious). In this research the operationalization of the concept of social capital is very successfully carried out, although this is often a weak point in the majority of theories of social capital. Coleman differentiates social capital of the family and social capital of the environment. The first was measured by the indicators of parents’ presence, additional children, mother's expectations for children's education. The social capital of the environment was measured by indicators such as relations among parents in school, normative closure in community, relations between parents and community. The key factor for success among students was an effect of closure of social networks between Catholic schools, parents and community, which provides the most effective norms. Coleman showed that this “circle” or social capital can compensate for an unfavorable predisposition in some children (the family’s financial standing or low educational level of the parents).

Putnam is the most influential and most criticized theoretician of social capital today. The rapid increase in the popularity of social capital came about after Putnam published his text *Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital* in 1995, and especially with the publication of the book *Bowling Alone* from 2000. Putnam’s definition of social capital has changed over time.

1 Coleman is the author of the well-known “Coleman report” which dealt with racial segregation in schools during 1970s and its effects on education of African-American children. It was suggested the transportation to be organized for children (schoolbusing) to “white” schools in order to achieve the effects of a favorable influence of the environment of middle class children on the aspirations and achievement of children from deprivileged communities. The project was not a success because it caused the following effect: members of the middle classes had left the areas where it was applied (white flight). The significance of the project is in the fact that it can be considered a precursor of introduction of social capital in public policy in the 1990s and 2000s.

2 The title of the book is paradigmatic of Putnam’s ambivalence towards the concept of social capital. The title was chosen by Putnam to draw attention to the increase in “lonebowlers” in the United States and the decrease in bowling league numbers. This
For example, in the previously mentioned text from 1995, Putnam states: “‘Social capital’ refers to features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, 1995: 20). In the book Bowling alone from 2000, Putnam uses the following definition: “Social capital refers to connections among individuals - social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them” (Putnam, 2000:19).

Putnam distinguishes between two types of social capital: bonding social capital and bridging social capital which were introduced by Ross Gittelland Avis Vidal. The first type of social capital is exclusive and links the agents who have close relations (for example, the family members), while the other type is inclusive because it bridges relations between socially distant agents (for instance, national associations). Putnam’s “ideal” examples of social capital are associations and organizations of civic society. However, there are differences among them depending on whether they are founded on “thin” or “thick” trust. Associations founded on thin trust have an advantage because agents have the expectation that norms will be respected in a community, above and beyond the group of close and familiar people. In this way bridging social capital is created. An example of this type of organization is the American national organization PTA (Parent-Teacher Association). Conversely, support groups are founded on exclusivism and thick trust, hence they generate bonding social capital. This means that they are not particularly useful for society overall and they can have direct adverse effects.

Putnam became famous with his thesis of the decline of social capital in the United States in the past decades. He explains this process of decapitalization as being due to the following factors: demographic change, the participation of women in the labor force, mobility, technological transformation of leisure activities (mass media). These factors have led to a change in family life, weakening of neighborhood ties and friendship ties. The main indicator of this decline of social capital is the weakening of political participation and civic activism. The number of citizens’ associations is on the decline, and the existing ones are becoming professionalized. Putnam also states that the level of willingness for volunteer activity is declining and that the center of political activity has moved to Washington (Putnam:2000).

is one of the indicators of the decline of social capital on the global social level. Thus, bowling leagues are for Putnam the ideal type of social capital (active participation by agents, strengthening of cohesion on a widerscale). On the other hand, paradoxically, they are a symbol of the negative side of social capital. Putnam himself give the example of the terrorist attack which took place in Oklahoma City in 1996: Timothy McVeigh and his associates had been members of a bowling league. They took part in a desirable activity according to Putnam’s model, but this “accumulation of social capital” enabled them to engage in a socially destructive activity.
Putnam’s thesis has been criticized as the data indicate that the level of voluntary activism is not declining, that new forms of association have replaced the old ones, that political participation (for example, measured by the turn out at elections) has varied over the decades and that the reasons for these changes are not necessarily negative (Ignjatović, 2011). Still, Putnam has had a great influence on the popularization of the concept of social capital, especially in public policy. His political role models are the Progressive Era, Dewey and the communitarian model of wide participation of the citizens in a democratic community.

**Economic and development theories of social capital**

The concept of social capital contains the economic concept of *capital*. However, economic theoreticians are ambivalent in relation to this. Kenneth Arrow believes that social capital is not capital but a “bad metaphor”, as it cannot be transferred nor can it be converted into other types of capital (Quibria, 2003: 27). Baron and Hannan have pointed out that social capital should not be qualified as real capital because the opportunity cost of its usage cannot be calculated (Woolcock, 1998).

However, many economic theoreticians have incorporated the concept of social capital into their theories. The concept has been used in dealing with the issues of economic transformation, especially that of postcommunist economies. In this context, the concept of social capital is most often equated with the “sociocultural determinants”, that is the informal framework of the economic system which can be a stimulus, but also a hindrance for economic development. The greatest part of the discussion focuses on the influence of informal capital on economic activity (Ignjatović, 2007).

Gary Becker integrates the concept of social capital into the utility function which explains the behavior of the individual agent on the market. Personal capital (experience and consumption) and social capital (networks) are defined as endogenous variables (Becker, according to Van Staveren, 2002: 9). The individual activates his/her networks in order to maximize their utility. The urban economist Edward Glaeser developed a more complex model of social capital, by introducing the concept of the “economy of social capital” (Ignjatović, 2011). Social capital is defined at the individual level, but also at the level of local community (settlement). The definition states that the social capital of a community represents a set of resources which increase wellbeing in that community. The following factors affect
the level of social capital in a settlement: the life stage of the agents, the level of human capital, interpersonal complementarity, mobility of agents and distance (population density). Glaeser also engaged in searching for practical solutions which would improve the social capital of settlements: the increase of ownership over housing units would decrease mobility, and therefore increase the readiness of agents to invest in social capital. Jonathan Temple links social and human capital, using level of trust as an indicator of social capital.

Institutional and neoinstitutional economics deal with the sociocultural factors of economic institutions. Their object of study is the context of economic activity and social capital is equated with informal networks, norms and trust.

Socio-economics theory is more of a paradigm than a separate theory and it encompasses an economic, sociological, anthropological approach to economic phenomena. Authors who belong to this group are Giddens, Solow, Rostow, Etzioni. They start from the concept of economic development, unlike neoclassical economists who speak of economic growth. Etzioni stated that this is a different approach which is aimed at changing preferences in economics as opposed to accepting them as given (Etzioni, 1992: 15). The main premise is that criteria for public policy planning should be defined as a joint effort on the part of members of society and the state. Social capital has appeared within their manifesto, the proceedings created by the Social Capital Interest Group. They argue in favor of an interdisciplinary study of social capital, and they rely on Putnam’s and Bourdieu’s theories (SCIG, 2000).

Social capital is also used in development programs. For example, in the UNIDO project Putnam’s model was combined with the neoclassical model. In this program the goal is to create a leap from bonding social capital towards bridging social capital. The problem is particularly noticeable in developing economies, where economic activity rests on the principle of shared identity which has effects only up to a certain level. At this point meso-level structures need to be introduced (organizations based on association) which would make possible a better economic effect (Knorringa, Van Staveren, 2006: 23).

Fukuyama’s theory does not strictly belong to economic theories of social capital. He has been included in this group as he deals with the influence of socio-economic factors on the economy. His study Trust appeared precisely at the time when the popularity of the concept of social capital began (1995). Fukuyama indicate that there is 20% of phenomena in economy that cannot be explained by neoclassical theoreticians (Fukujama, 1997: 23). The
concept of social capital is used in his explanation of differences among countries in regard to economic development:

“Social capital is an instantiated informal norm that promotes cooperation between two or more individuals. The norms that constitute social capital can range from a norm of reciprocity between two friends, all the way up to complex and elaborately articulated doctrines like Christianity or Confucianism. They must be instantiated in an actual human relationship: the norm of reciprocity exists in potentia in my dealings with all people, but is actualized only in my dealings with my friends. By this definition, trust, networks, civil society, and the like which have been associated with social capital are all epiphenominal, arising as a result of social capital but not constituting social capital itself” (Fukuyama, 1999).

Fukuyama states that social capital cannot be equated with trust, but often uses the two terms interchangeably. Social capital functions at the level of the collective agents which can be families, cultural communities (with the meaning “American culture”, “Chinese culture”) or state communities (for example, the states within the United States of America). In both cases, social capital has an accumulative nature, similar to what is argued by Putnam: it spreads from the level of the family to the level of the state. As for types of social capital, Fukuyama distinguishes between two types, “familial” and “spontaneous”. This distinction corresponds to the model of bonding-bridging or relations of trust which appear among close individuals (thick trust) and the trust towards unfamiliar agents (thin trust). Fukuyama has introduced a culturalist explanation of economic phenomena: every type of social capital creates corresponding types of economic institutions. Therefore, the “American culture” creates corporations that are based on spontaneous (thin) trust, while the Chinese culture rests on familial trust, hence Chinese economy is dominated by small companies. At the same time, Fukuyama has a slight preference for the spontaneous type of social capital and economy founded on corporations. Fukuyama has been criticized over weaknesses in his methodology. He oversimplifies the structure of the studied economic systems relying only on the dominant company size as an indicator and for using random criteria for chosen case studies (Ignjatović, 2008).

Woolcock has a significant contribution both in theoretical and practical development of the concept of social capital. He was an expert in the World Bank (Development Research Group). His understanding of social capital is integrated into his theory of development. Woolcock has applied two concepts used in the “new sociology of economic development”: embeddedness and autonomy. The main premise of this approach is that economic processes
are inseparable from the social framework (embeddedness) and that it is important to take into account the degree of autonomy (autonomy) of the members of society in relation to the outer framework, that is, in relation to agents who are not part of the social community. Woolcock elaborates this concept, applying it on postcommunist societies and developing economies. Woolcock develops a theoretical model that combines the informal and formal, society and the state, citizens and institutions. (Ignjatović, 2011).

Woolcock’s greatest contribution to the theory of social capital is the introduction of, so-called, linking social capital:

“We would define ‘linking’ social capital as norms of respect and networks of trusting relationships between people who are interacting across explicit, formal or institutionalized power of authority gradients in society. This refinement seeks to incorporate a distinction among all those social relationships that would otherwise be grouped together in the ‘bridging’ social capital category (...) that connect people across explicit ‘vertical’ power differentials, particularly as it pertains to accessing public and private services that can only be delivered through on-going face-to-face interaction, such as classroom teaching, general practice medicine, and agricultural extension...” (Woolcock, Szreter, 2004: 655).

Linking social capital explains the relations between the formal and informal domains, especially public institutions and individuals. Woolcock acknowledges that this capital has a dark side in the form of corruption. Woolcock advocates for the optimization of social capital in society, which means that different types of social capital should be balanced (see Halpern, 2005 on the “vitamin model”).

Network theories of social capital

As forwarded by John Field, Nan Lin”(...) has argued for a marriage of rational choice theory with network analysis as a basis for investigating social capital”(Field, 2003: 142). Lin’s paradigm framework combines network theory, rational choice theory, and social exchange theory, and he has defined himself as a “Weberian” (Lin, 2001). His important contribution is methodological instrument for measuring social capital: position generator. Lin’s epistemological framework is methodological individualism, which means that individual is owner of resources that become available through networks. Social capital is not a collective asset. Unlike Putnam, Lin does not take a catastrophic position on social capital “decay”, nor does he promote political intervention in order to “regenerate” social capital.
Like Coleman, Lin is trying to close the gap between the “macro” and “micro” levels of societal reality. Macro perspective is related to social structure (social positions, authority, rules, agents; different levels of formality). Hierarchical social structure is based on the ranking of valued resources. In Weberian terms, there is a congruence and transferability of hierarchies. Occupants take different positions (higher the position-fewer occupants). Micro perspective is more directly linked to social capital. Lin has defined social networks as less formal aspect of social structure. They are flexible and permeable, and social actor has access to social networks. The sum of available resources is based on agent’s position in social structure and access to social networks (Ignjatović, 2011).

Social agent’s purposive action is key element of dynamics of social capital. Lin’s definition of social capital is based on RCT premises: investment in social relations with expected returns in the marketplace (Lin, 2001: 19). Social capital represents resources available through social networks, but not these relations per se. Lin has provided an example: a friend’s bicycle is social capital, because the agent has access to this bicycle through his network, although he does not possess it. The process is based on a mutually recognized norm of reciprocity/compensation. Another definition of social capital is more specific:

“Network-analysis based definition – “resources embedded in social networks accessed and used by actors for actions” (...) components: 1) resources are embedded in social relations... 2) access and use of resources reside with actors” (N. Lin, Social Capital, 2001: 25).

Lin has pointed out that not all the networks are of the same quality. It depends on many factors: the agent’s original position, other agents’ social capital, type of interaction between two agents, and the location of the tie in the network.

Social capital in public policy

Social capital has been popular since the mid-1990s not only in the academic community but also in public policy. The history of the concept of social capital indicates that the concept has always had a political connotation. In 1916 Hanifan indicated that the accumulation of social capital should be stimulated because social capital has the potential to improve the living standard of the entire community. This was the period of progressivism (Progressive Era), based on faith in the strength of “democratization and civic activism” as the foundations of the development of society (Dewey, 1916; Putnam, 2000: 383;
Stiglitz, 2006: 19; Dionne, 1996). Dewey argued for a Durkheimian “religion” of civic participation which would mean that individuals (citizens) would be authentically interested in participation in all important issues, including decision-making at the level of the entire society (Dewey, 1916).

During the 1990s, the idea of social capital became part of public policy changes of the time. The authors who were engaged in the academic community and in public policy (Putnam, Woolcock) contributed to this. There was a shift from the Washington consensus to the Post-Washington consensus in development policy at the international level. The second change was the appearance of new political ideologies. One was neo-progressivism, as a centre-left orientation, which dominated in Great Britain from 1997 (the Labor Party’s program “The Third Way”) and the United States during Clinton administration (1992-2000). The third change marked the conservative political spectrum, at the time of the administration of G. W. Bush (2000-2004), and also the British Conservative Party. Social capital has been introduced in all the above trends and political orientations. It is almost possible to speak of a paradigm of social capital in the course of the 1990s.

All of the above political orientations are based on the belief that there exists a “stock of non-contaminated sociability” that could correct the deviations of the public sector. This model was applied at the international level in development programs. The post-Washington consensus focuses on the “20 percent” of inexplicable factors in economic equations. Many projects were implemented in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Social capital was understood as alchemic resource which is available to all, and can easily be converted into other resources, because it is free and “democratic” (Light, 2004: 149). One example of the practical application of these principles is the project Grameen bank in Bangladesh, founded in 1976. The system was based on the mutual co-dependence of the creditors and self-policing, but it turned out that these networks do not function as was expected. The assumption that a high level of trust in a community necessarily leads to good functioning of the system (thanks to internal control) proved to be wrong (Ignjatović, 2011).

As for political ideologies, an “epistemological community” was created from the members of related “public policy elites”. Pierson discusses this aspect in his analysis of the Labor Party (Pierson, 2003: 94). In Great Britain, two political options – the conservative and labor – created two similar public policy models. The idea of “stimulating social capital” can also be found in Giddens’ “state which invests in society” (Social Investment State) with the concepts such as “social entrepreneurship” and “investing in society” (Field, 2003: 127). The type of social capital on which neo-labor
policy is based on includes in equal amounts “strong” and “weak” ties. The conception of social capital can be found likewise in the programs of the British Conservative Party, in the form of the concept of community which encompasses the following elements: family, local schools, voluntary organizations and the church (Sixty Million Citizens, 2002: 13). The Conservatives’ plan argue for the “investment in social capital”, similar to Labor’s “social investment”. The convergence is also evident in the United States between the program transformations of the Democratic and Republican Parties (Ignjatović, 2011).

The concept of social capital has linked academic discussion and public policy with a shared expectation of a powerful heuristic, that is, political instrument. At the same time, many doubts have followed these expectations concerning its usefulness for theory and practice. For example Field argues that social capital is just “simply reinventing — or even just renaming — the wheel” (Field, 2003: 138). On the other hand, there is the legitimate question of the reason for such great popularity of an “empty concept”. A humorous explanation is offered by Bowles and Gintis, who state:

“Perhaps social capital, like Voltaire’s God, would have to have been invented if it did not exist. It may even be a good idea. A good term it is not. Capital refers to a thing that can be owned—even a social isolate like Robinson Crusoe had an axe and fishing net. By contrast, the attributes said to make up social capital describe relationships among people. As with other trendy expressions, “social capital” has attracted so many disparate uses that we think it better to drop the term in favor of something more precise” (Bowles, Gintis, according to Quibria, 2003: 28).

Even if social capital is abandoned as a concept, it will certainly still have its place on the sociological agenda as an intriguing case of conceptual “crossover” between academic and public policy discourse.

References


The significance and meaning of expressive and instrumental social capital for young people from different social strata

Framework

The high proliferation of the concept of social capital in social research and policy from 1995 to 2005 has also been reflected in youth studies. Despite the debate on the utility of the approach of youth transitions (Roberts, 2007; Wyn and Woodman, 2006; 2007), social capital has been considered to be one of the key resources in transitions to education and to employment. The role of social capital is particularly significant in “risk” societies of late modernity, where young people have to develop various strategies of coping with the uncertainties of transitions to adulthood. Although it is still significant, the pluralisation of family forms makes family support more complex and less self-evident for young people (Biggart and Kovacheva, 2006). On the other hand, state support is becoming more and more conditional in neo-liberal, previously welfare, and post-socialist societies. While their need for support grows, the ability to access support seems to have become more and more difficult, which leads an increasing number of young people to conditions of semi-dependency (Walther et al., 2005: 222). In those circumstances, social capital stemming from social networks becomes even more important for young people in pursuing their life trajectories and in the shaping of their social biographies.

Classical theories of social capital have been criticized for not being sensitive enough to different social groups and phenomena, such as women, children, young people, minorities, etc. (Morrow, 1999; Baron, Field, Schuller, 2000). Nevertheless, researchers and theorists who pursue the use of the concept of social capital with children and young people can be seen as
falling into the two broad strands: collective action and cohesion, following Coleman and Putnam, or social justice and inequality, following Bourdieu.

Within Bourdieu’s theory, social capital is understood as a function of economic capital and its role in the social reproduction of inequality by sustaining privilege and power across generations and maintaining exclusion and oppression has been stressed (Allatt, 1993; Bourdieu, 1986; Reay, 2000).

As opposed to a communitarian notion of social capital, of Coleman for instance, some scholars within youth studies stress individualized systems of social capital, based on notions of structured individualization, chains of mutual dependence, habitus (Raffo, Reeves, 2000: 150). But, they also stress individualized differences in young people’s world views, as opposed to Bourdieu, who suggests that there is homogeneity of group or class habitus because of the homogeneity of the conditions of existence (Ibid.: 152).

The overall conclusion would be that social capital theories are overstressing the instrumental role of social capital (particularly linking), but underplaying the role of expressive role of social capital (particularly bonding). Even the studies relating social capital and well-being of young people, focus on educational achievement and other instrumental outcomes of social capital, while the concept of well-being is very broad and unfocussed (Bassani, 2007).

The distinction between expressive and instrumental social capital introduced by Nan Lin has a particular heuristic value, especially where particular social groups that are low in instrumental but high in expressive social capital are concerned - e.g. children, young people, minorities, etc. (Morrow, 1999; 2001). Nan Lin talks about two effects of social capital – expressive and instrumental (1999: 36): “Instrumental action is directed towards acquiring the resources that the actor does not possess, while expressive action is directed towards sustaining already acquired resources” (Ibid.: 40). Expressive social capital includes: physical health, mental health, life satisfaction (sense of belonging, trust, support, etc.) and psychological well-being, while instrumental social capital includes: wealth, power and reputation.

A number of studies point at stratification differences in amount and use of social capital by young people from different social strata families (Eggerton, 2002). The difference is relevant in educational transitions, which are significant as education produces human capital and desirable life-chances for middle-class children. Research from the UK suggests that middle-class families are better able to deploy their social, economic and cultural resources to gain advantage in the process of getting places for their children in better-regarded and resourced schools (Holland,

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1 Lin also names them types of agency - action (op. cit.)
Other studies, from West Germany for instance, indicate that informal networks have a high potential with regard to very uncertain transitions to work, which are, however, strongly differentiated according to class and education (Walther et al., 2005). Stratification differences in the social capital of young people have been also evidenced in the studies from post-socialist societies, such as Bulgaria (Kovacheva, 2004) and Serbia (Tomanović, 2010).

The studies gave evidence that even young people with the least social capital invent different combinations to develop and use social contacts (Raffo, Reeves, 2000), thereby contesting the social capital deficit thesis of unprivileged youth (Holland et al., 2007). While explicitly rejecting underclass theory with its tendency to blame the victim, some of the studies are concerned with valorising the social networks and support that are available in disadvantaged neighbourhoods and communities (e.g. Shaefer-McDaniel, 2006).

The focus of this paper is on contacts, networks and social capital stemming from young people’s primary relations: their families and friends. The networks of “significant others” are still of primary significance for the young people at the studied age: 17 to 21.

The paper draws evidence from the results of a longitudinal qualitative study with two groups of young people, from working class backgrounds from the outskirts and middle strata background families from the central zone of Belgrade. The first wave of the research was carried out when the children were 4 to 7, through structured interviews with parents in 100 families in both locations and 12 case studies in worker’s families in 1993/94 (Tomanović – Mihajlović, 1997). The second wave, based on case studies in 21 families from both social strata, was carried out when the children were 11 to 14 – in 2000 (Tomanović, 2004), and the third wave through case studies was carried out in 20 families when the young people were 17 to 21 in 2007 (Tomanović, 2010). The evidence for the case studies was obtained through separate interviews with the children and the parents (in pairs when possible) and through observation.

It is argued that the two types of social capital - both expressive and instrumental – have particular significance for all young people, regardless of their social backgrounds. On the other hand, the meaning and usage of instrumental social capital is diversified, and it is related to other forms of capital and particularly to family habitus, and, therefore, related to their social biographies.
Social capital with *expressive effect* is of huge importance for all the young people because it provides psychological wellbeing: a sense of belonging, integration, trust, support. Expressive social capital is derived from primary social settings of the young person – the family and the peer group.

The family, including the extended one, was singled out by young people as a source of both expressive (support, belonging) and instrumental effects (material security, help), so that in a sense the family comprises social capital in itself. This is congruent with the findings from other youth studies which argue that “family remains a crucial resource where available”, since “weak” as well as ‘strong’ ties are necessary and the same is true for bridging as well as bonding capital” (Walther *et al.*, 2005: 234).

Six of the young people live in extended three-generational family households and for them they are the source of intergenerational solidarity – instrumental help and emotional support. The grandparents’ generation is also considered to be a resource of cultural capital for children and young people – they are transferring useful knowledge and information to their grandchildren:

> Grandfather helps me a lot: he made me this ship, and taught me various things. When I was three, he taught me about dinosaurs. Every time when I learn about animals, grandfather told me about them. I also like to draw them, he helped me. He told me about wars, while we were watching TV. And when Grandma was still alive, she told me what was going on when I was born and before that. They helped me a lot – Grandpa and Grandma. (Dusan, 2000)

> What I mean is that they (two sons °- S.T.) grew up with him (grandfather - S.T.), they have been together from the first day. Grandpa is a living encyclopaedia, so everything you need to ask – you go ask Grandpa. He knows things from every area; there is nothing he doesn’t know. (Dusan’s mother, 2007)²

Family members and relatives sometimes provide a “safety net” for the young person in troubled times. The most apparent example in the study is the care, support and stability provided to Branko by his maternal and paternal grandmothers during his parents’ turbulent divorce.

The next significant source of expressive social capital is friendships that are distinguished by endurance, intimacy and trust:

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² This kind of interregenerational transfer of cultural capital, as well as of support and help, among members of four-generational families, but who do not live together, was also documented in a qualitative study in Great Britain (Brannen, 2006)
It’s almost like that from the first grade, when we started to get to know each other and since then we have been best friends. So, I have those two great friendships, well really long term relationships. (Jovan)

Well, those two girlfriends ... We were together in primary school. We have known each other from an early age; we lived near each other since we were two or three. This is the friend to whom I can tell everything, who never let me down or I her. We know each other’s family problems. We are together when we have money and when we don’t. (Maja)

The particular significance of friendships based on reciprocity is frequently stressed by the young people in the study:

I would give everything for my friends, nothing less. I would do anything for my friends, literally everything. Because friends are there for you when others are not, when others cannot and when others won’t. (Mirko)

Friendships create a basis for not just emotional support as expressive social capital, but some of them supply contacts that assist or may assist in pursuing interests as actual or potential instrumental social capital:

I: Tell me, could you rely on your friends?
M: Always, on real friends – always.
I: In what sense, in what way?
M: In any way – whether it is money, or about employment, or some favour or to meet some people that could do something for me, I mean in any sense. (Mirko)

Besides the expressive effects, friendships are a valuable source of social capital, in the sense that they provide an entry into wider social networks, which is particularly significant: “Apart from the importance of being embedded in what is most often a homogeneous scene, the heterogeneity of networks is crucial. This demands being open to contact with people who are ‘different’, because only with such openness can relevant mixtures develop.” (Walther et al., 2005: 226).

Instrumental social capital is of particular importance for young people in the transition from education to employment. It includes valuable information, contacts, recommendations, etc.

Social contacts are a resource and mechanism that is relied upon in the process of school to work transitions more in working-class families. It has been mediated by the family habitus – ethos of working-class families, which is focused on materialistic values - towards providing economic security for the children, and thereby it orientates the investment of material and social capital. Accordingly, education has an instrumental value for
most working-class parents in the study (Tomanović, 2008). Nevertheless, given the lack of fit between secondary education with actual employment opportunities, education has lost its instrumental function. Therefore, employment strategies of working-class young people are more flexible, more pragmatic, but also more uncertain. They depend to a great extent on information, contacts, connections provided by parents and their social networks. Relatives, colleagues or neighbours comprise ties and networks that parents count on to find jobs for their children:

He's found employment at his uncle's. He helped us a lot just by employing him. (Mirko's mother)

I: To whom would you turn for help if you would need someone to help with Jovan's employment? Do you have someone?
F: I have friends at work. Or, say, my brother has his old friends from work, although he has retired. He has plans now to try to get him into his previous work place. (Jovan's father)

These relations and networks have to be nurtured by sustaining the frequency and quality of contacts. They are also based on obligations stemming from reciprocity of help, favours and support:

Our connection (to help Tamara get employment ST), so to say, is our neighbour. My husband also did favours – he got one of them employed. So, tomorrow, she would do a favour for us. And also because we are friends and so on. (Tamara's mother)

On the one hand, it has been evidenced that family social ties provide valuable mechanisms for the transitions of young people, which are sometimes necessary as compensation for system/institutional deficit. On the other hand, they could be perceived as a compensation for lack of cultural capital, i.e. knowledge and skills that are not acquired through vocational schooling.³ Family habitus and ethos of middle strata families in the study is oriented towards post-materialistic values: self-expression, career development, etc. Education has an intrinsic value and it is perceived as cultural capital per se that plays the crucial role in social strata reproduction (Tomanović, 2008). Family social contacts comprising instrumental social capital for their children are, therefore, mainly oriented towards providing a better education in a broader sense.

Although they are seldom mentioned by middle strata respondents, this does not mean that parents do not have contacts, but that they take

³ There is ongoing debate within youth studies on the extent to which a lack of economic and cultural capital can be balanced by social capital (Walther et al., 2005: 222).
them for granted. Due to the so-called “strength of weak ties” (Granovetter, 1973), “weak ties” and networks of people in higher social positions are saturated with important information, so that they do not have to put any extra effort into their maintenance and activation:4

_Not to be modest, we are well-liked in our circles. We, as a family, are highly appreciated by our friends. And they have a nice opinion of us because we are very independent. We are not the people who would ask someone for something. There are situations when people tell us about a job and ask whether we were interested. So, people provide us with information themselves._ (Bojan’s mother)

There are young people who follow their parents’ professional trajectories, thereby using their resources, social as well as material. Stefan is planning to become an architect like his father, who runs his own small business of designing, investing in and building housing and who has plans to employ both his sons and to provide them with apartments in his buildings. These plans are taken for a certainty and incorporated into Stefan’s projection for his future at the age of 25:

_S: At 25, I will probably live in that apartment I’ve mentioned that I could get in two years. At 25 – education - let me see ...I should have finished university, if I’m on time... Concerning partner relations and family - at 25, I would probably live with a girlfriend. Job – an architect. I wouldn’t look for a job, since, as I said, I would have one in my father’s firm._ (underlined by S.T.)

Middle strata parents who care about the distinction of their habitus emphasize, nourish and transfer to their children the social contacts with distinctive groups as a form of **symbolic capital**. The parents belong to distinctive social groups:

_F: We are in some organizations, my wife and I. My wife is in Minerva, which is an international association like Rotary club for men (the club he belongs to - S.T.). And there is a circle of people who meet at the club, from various professions. That is a dispersion of professions, and they were chosen by in accordance with those criteria. There are doctors, people from the airport, managers, I don’t know, artists and so on. We see those people, weekly, every fortnight. We invite people very often to our house, the circle of people outside our branch._ (Sava’s father)

This special kind of sociability has been carefully nurtured by those and then strategically transferred as social capital to their children:

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4 The effect described by Nan Lin as the “invisible hand of social capital” (Lin, 2000: 792).
F: We are trying to introduce our child and get him close with a circle of people that we are close to, that’s one of the methods. We do visits at weekends and go on holidays together, so he socializes with children from our social milieu. Apart from that, at a certain point, we would send him to holidays with certain groups of children from similar cultural strata. And then, I suppose that the time he starts high school, there will be schools with a particular structure of children. (Father of Sava, when Sava was 10).

Apart from the symbolic function of distinction, bonding with prestigious social groups is a significant resource for linking social capital – contacts with holders of power, which is providing bases for privileged status to young people from those families.

Concluding remarks

The significance of both forms of social capital - expressive and instrumental – in shaping young people’s social biographies is indisputable, regardless of their social background. On the other hand, the meaning and function of instrumental social capital in the process is related to a complex interplay of other forms of capital – material and cultural – mediated by family habitus.

One of the key findings from the study is that the social reproduction of the working class is taking place through the reproduction of job positions (Tomanović, 2008; 2010). The mechanism of social reproduction is incorporated into the dominant working-class family habitus oriented towards the materialistic values of economic security. Thereby it directs the use of instrumental social capital for and by children and young people towards developing mechanisms that would provide them with secure jobs and standard. On the other hand, since education is the main mechanism of the self-reproduction of middle strata (Ibid.), the instrumental social capital provided by parents from these strata is directed precisely at enhancing the cultural capital of young people.

Nevertheless, for transitions to work, it is crucial that the socio-spatial structure of contacts extend beyond the immediate context of everyday life and contain exit options from social backgrounds. This significance has been underlined particularly in the context of difficult transitions into the labour market, where bridges to other milieus and social spheres are necessary (Walther et al., 2005: 234). This structural aspect of social networks is, however, socially diversified and it is the place where social inequalities do matter. Widespread network relationships are common for young people from middle class backgrounds, contributing to processes of self-assurance.
and personal development in the shaping of their “choice biographies”, which is not the case for young people from less advantaged backgrounds (Raffo and Reeves, 2000). Since a great part of the social contacts and ties of the young people in our study come from their families, one mean of “bridging” to new contacts and relationships, information and options would be if the networks of their parents were socially diversified. The other way would be through young people’s own friendships and contacts made through participation in youth culture and organizations.

The relevance of social capital inequalities for young people’s biographies as well as for social stratification in Serbia has yet to be explored and interpreted by more qualitative and quantitative studies.

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Apart from Sava’s parents above, who strategically develop their social networks, there are parents from working class families who also use their work contacts (e.g. Ivan’s father’s informal job in flooring) to broaden their networks for the future benefit of their children.


The Application of the Concept of Social Capital in Understanding Marriage and Family in Contemporary Serbia

Abstract

The paper tackles the application of the concept of social capital to the socio-demographic analysis of marriage and family in contemporary Serbia (without Kosovo and Metohija). In the first part of the paper an analytical framework is introduced. The author adheres to Bourdieu’s and Coleman’s standpoints. These are complemented with Becker’s paradigm of new economics of households, all of which has proved to be a solid theoretical basis for demography. By that token, paradigms of social and human capital have been related to the demographic discourse. Demographic processes and structures are interpreted by way of exchange of capitals and resources (biological, economic, social, cultural and symbolic) among individuals and social networks (relatives, family group) based on values of trust and reciprocity and aimed at bio-social and reproduction of habitus. Individuals are treated as actors acting both rationally and irrationally in a very sensitive domain of personal life in which both objective structures (positions) and disposition/choices are overlapping.

The empirical evidence is twofold, consisting of demographic statistics and empirical findings derived from four surveys carried out by the Institute for sociological research, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade. Field research on socio-demographics, gender and intergenerational relations and value profiles indicate to the dominance of bonding capital to the expense of bridging and linking ones, due to uncompleted social transformation, low living standards and insufficient democratic culture, individualization and mistrust in state and institutions. Therefore private sphere is overwhelmingly strengthened but at the same time it is highly risky (conflict). Results highlight that gender relations are
persistently patriarchal, asymmetrical and complementary ("the rule of male"), but some shifts are nevertheless evident. Lack of welfare state combined with structural barriers slower emancipation, females’ in particular and challenges the separation of youth. Young generations delay transition into adulthood and union formation. They even choose to reject them instead of performing some major shifts. Combined stalled social and demographic transformation produce great demographic losses (negative natural growth, emigration and depopulation) and social disadvantages as well.

In conclusion the revitalization of demographic regime is shortly considered. It is perceived through the democratization of gender and intergenerational relations as well as by way of readjustment of social institutions to the change of demographic regime in the 21st century.

Key words: social capital, social demography, marriage, family, Serbia

Introduction

This paper is an attempt to apply the social capital paradigm in social demography. Social capital is a concept which has already been well received in the humanities (sociology, economics, political sciences, disciplines of medicine), as well as in practical policy (urban and regional planning, social services, criminology, business studies, social and economic geography and history, studies of the World Bank and the UN in Third World countries, etc.) (Field, J, 2008).

The paper deals with the contemporary demographic regime of marriage and birth, that is, intimacy and intergenerational relations in Serbia.1 Methodologically the paper makes use of complementary data sources: demographic statistics, secondary analysis of relevant demographic studies, as well as qualitative and quantitative analysis of the results of four representative studies of households in central Serbia and Vojvodina.2

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1 This paper is a result of work on the project “Challenges and actors of new social integration in Serbia: concepts and actors”, no. 179035, supported by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Serbia.

2 Of which one was devoted exclusively to families and was published in the proceedings ISI FF, Vreme Porodica, Sociološka studija o porodičnoj transformaciji u savremenoj Srbiji, Milić, A, editor, 2008, then one was devoted to attitudes towards gender equality of citizens, representatives of the local community and the nongovernmental sector, (Bobić, M, i Sekulić, N, 2010), while the remaining two, realized by the ISI FF team, contained as part of a large survey questionnaire a set of questions concerning the marital-family sphere (blocked transformation of marriage, economic strategies in marriage and the like), and these were published in two proceedings of the ISI FF, Milić et al, (2004) Društvena transformacija i strategije društvenih grupa: Svakodnevica Srbije na početku trećeg milenijuma, and Čvejić et al, (2010) Suživot sa reformama. Građani Srbije pred izazovima “tranzicijskog” nasleda.
In the first part of the paper an analytical framework is constructed in which, due to limited space, general concepts and theories of social capital are not discussed, which are, basically, linked to the work of three authors: P. Bourdieu, J. Coleman and R. D. Putnam (cf. Ignjatović, 2011). Instead, we directly proceed to the application of theory and paradigm to the demography of marriage and family. Having established that the family is the main source of social and all other types of capital and resources of individuals in contemporary Serbia, in the conclusion we pose the question why demographic, that is, biosocial reproduction is unfavorable. A possible explanation emerges in the persistence of gender asymmetric relations, female self-sacrifice, that is, in very close intergenerational solidarity, which in the absence of adequate social and political measures, services and support leads to persisting unfavorable population trends (Bobić, 2011).

Analytical framework

Social capital is one of a number of very popular and widely applied contemporary concepts, such as globalization, postmodernism, civil society, etc, which has been intensively used in the past decades in scientific theory, research and political analysis. Its reception in demography is, however, of a more recent date. In the prestigious demography journal *Population and Development Review* Bourdieu’s analysis of marital strategies was published, which relates to premodern French families (Bourdieu, 2002). Bourdieu treats entering into marital relations as a type of transaction between individuals which serves overall biological, cultural and social reproduction, through which a group aims to transfer its power and privileges to future generations. The marital prospects of an individual depend on the family’s position on the social ladder, that is, above all, on its economic capital, and by means of the “good marriage” strategy families aim to increase profit, that is lower the economic and symbolic expenses which the family of a bride/groom must bear. For the groom, in particular the eldest son, it was not wise to choose an heiress wealthier than himself as the dowry would, in the case of marital failure, have to be returned to her family. Such a marriage posed a threat to the patrimonial order in another way as well. The mother-in-law would find it difficult to impose her authority onto a woman from a higher class, which would further complicate other relations, work processes in the household and the overall household atmosphere. The dowry, in addition, served to “pay off” younger siblings, once they were ready to marry, so that the inheritance need not be divided, so that the
“family tree” remained intact. Conversely, if the family were poor and with many children, the chances of younger siblings to marry were significantly lower, hence they were forced to remain in the household of the brother who was the heir as servants, apprentices, workers on the family estate, unmarried aunts, etc.

Similarly to Bourdieu, another well-known author, Coleman, considers the family the prime generator of social capital (Tomanović, 2006; Field, 2008). Coleman studies family social capital in relation to children’s success in school, with the premise that two of its dimensions are of key significance, the physical presence of adults in the home and the amount of attention children receive in the home. The social capital of a child will differ depending on whether it lives with one, that is, with both parents, as well as depending on the number of children in the family. A child who is forced to change schools and environments because, for example, the parents have to move will build a richer social environment. The socio-centric perspective, however, comes to the fore most in the work of the third well-known author, Putnam, who considers social capital to be civic grouping in the aim of realizing a social goal – the development of national democracy and a progressive society: Social capital here refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency to by facilitating co-ordinated actions (Putnam, 1993, prema Adam and Rončević, 2003: 160).

As for the science of population, starting with demographers of family (Scanzoni, 2004), continuing with neoclassical economists (Becker, 1981), to anthropological demographers (Greenhalge, 1995, Kertzer and Fricke, 1997), all agree on one thing – that all demographic phenomena, regardless of their commonality and the laws of statistics, are the result of targeted rational (individual) behavior, which is structurally limited. Critics of this standpoint cite utilitarian, that is, the limitedness of perspective in understanding exchanges and relations within families, between sexual partners, siblings, parents and children. The inclusion of norms and values into the explanatory framework serves to overcome this shortcoming, yet it still remains unclear how they come into being, then how differences related to various social groups, ethnic, racial, cultural, class and gender characteristics are to be understood, and finally how we should explain changes and mutations of values over time. These shortcomings can be overcome solidly by studying the formation of social capital, which demographers of family consider a better scientific approach compared to studying its vol-
ume and type. This goal is realized by diverting demographic research and analyses of data collected into two important hypotheses:

1. Investing in capital represents the main motivation of human behavior in the context of the theory of social exchange;
2. Forming sexual bonds, giving birth to and raising children, as well as generational relations and the transfer of goods and services represent the main forms of investment in social capital in all societies, therefore, universally (Astone, 1999:1).

In developing a theory of social capital, Nan Lin underscores two main motivations in its creation: 1) defense and maintenance of resources, which leads to minimization of loss; and 2) enlargement and conquest of new ones, which leads to maximization of gain. The first source of capital motivates the individual to form and strengthen his/her family as the main primordial group, and the second motivates cooperation with others, that is, the extension of social networks outside the family and kin (Lin, 2004). Lin’s theory of social action starts from two basic demographic prerequisites which shape action: the limited nature of life and bioreproduction. Reproduction, that is, having children is a way of avoiding for everything an individual created during his/her lifetime to be lost after his/her death, that is, to pass into another’s ownership, from which Lin draws the conclusion that defense of resources and protection of the primary group are main motivations for action.

Including the formative dimension makes it possible for demography to give its full contribution to the scientific discourse surrounding social capital by indicating how the desire itself to come into possession of and possess capital shapes individual action.

There are three main dimensions of social capital: 1) number of relations which an individual or a group maintains; 2) quality of these relations (types of interaction, shared activities, affect and sentiment which develop in the course of these relations); 3) value of resources which are potentially activated (employment, furthering one’s career, resolving home ownership, etc.). The question of source of social capital is one of its theoretical controversies. Are these social networks, (moral) norms, trust, or all of these combined (Tomanović, 2010)? By links the authors mean stronger, significant bonds among people, which make up the core or cement of social capital, while the “building blocks” are “amount of time, the emotional intensity, intimacy (mutual confiding) and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie” (Granovetter, 1973:1361). Portes differentiates four sources of social capital, which are linked to two different motivations, that is, its functions: shared
values and the duty to solidarity (expressive), reciprocity and the duty to trust (instrumental) (Portes, 1998). Similarly actions also can be linked to the expressive character of capital, the function of which is to maintain existing resources (physical health, psychological wellbeing, group membership, group protection) or with its instrumental character, the purpose of which is to reach resources, which are not initially possessed (wealth, prestige, or just survival) (Lin, 1999, cited in Tomanović, 2010a:24).

Let us take as an illustration the birth of a child, which is one of the three key demographic events, in addition to marriage and death. This event requires change of all extant relations in the familial networks of both partners, because all endeavor to include the new member in their circle. Relations with the baby in this way strengthen the wider family community. This “watershed” in one’s biography (Tomanović, 2010a) can be particularly important for partners from the lower classes or marginalized groups who were previously not welcome at their in-laws, so the activation of biological resources reveals itself as a good investment and marital strategy, as it capitalizes at both the expressive and the instrumental level. Another example is the long term investment in marital capital as instrumental, but with uncertain gain. Let us take the example of a woman who gives up her personal development, education and other opportunities, perhaps even the birth of a child, in order to be the breadwinner while her husband gets an education and develops professionally. This readiness for “sacrifice”, apart from being more frequent with women, stems from a “calculation” that in the end it will pay off, through the attainment of a better position and the partner’s career building that is through of cultural into economic and social capital, from which the entire family will profit. If, however, divorce comes to pass, this investment capsizes for the party which took the risk, a topic on which well-known movies have been made, based on real-life events, with a tragic epilogue.

In particular cultures, peoples and societies, there are crucial differences in relation to gender practices and generational habitus, which shape relations of solidarity. In most Asian populations, sons are of greater significance to parents, not only as the heirs of their father’s estate, but also as emotional support to mothers, so that patriarchy has a great influence on differential fertility. Sex-selective abortions are used to this end, that is,

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3 In any case, from ethnographic studies it is known that, for example, in impoverished villages in our region (Vojvodina but elsewhere as well), young women are taught by their mothers to become pregnant with a young man from a house of better material standing, and in this way ease the burden of their parents’ poverty stricken family (Erlich, V. S., 1971).
parents are more inclined toward the birth of male children, which leads to the notorious phenomenon of “missing girls” in China and other populations in the region (Bobić, 2010). In the United States, conversely, elderly parents, who have spouses, siblings, that is, daughters, are less likely to go into homes for the elderly as compared to those who have no children or who have sons, hence daughters are “more valued”. Other authors, such as Cherlin and Furstenberg, interpreting ethnographic data and survey results on relations of grandparents and grandchildren in the United States, construct a paradigm of “intimacy from afar”. This relates to the fact that if grandparents assess that their grandchildren are exposed to stress in the family of their parents (due to divorce, conflict, moving or other stressors), they involve themselves in family interactions in order to protect the children’s psychological welfare. This lasts until the crisis is past, at which point they withdraw, until the next event (Cherlin and Furstenberg, 1986).

The afore-mentioned Nobel laureate, G. Becker, within his paradigm of the “new household economics” developed a heuristically fertile microeconomic theory of fertility (Mijatović, 2000). It is based on rational behavior of marital partners, who in the course of their lives aim to maximize gain, that is, lower risk and expense (loss). In contemporary economy human capital is the most important tool of development, hence in this sense in the family two aims are in conflict: investing in one’s own development (education, career) and/or in children. Then, when is the most optimal time to have a child and how many children is one to have ideally? Considering parents’ opportunity expenses (missed chance for alternative activities, on the labor market), of the mother, primarily, it is better for her to have a child earlier in life, that is when her earnings are at their lowest, that is, to put off giving birth if her earnings are high and she has an open professional future. In this way, potential losses are minimized, under the assumption that the husband’s earnings are high enough, so that the woman can devote some time to the small child. Lowering fertility rates, conditioned by the exchange of quantity of children by their quality, which was come by through modernization and demographic transition, means that parents have given up having many children in which little was invested, that is, who began working at a young age. In contemporary society a child has become very expensive goods which requires high, in addition to the above-mentioned, emotional investments and an adequate family habitus which makes it easier to fit into the society of the successful and adaptable (Tomanović, 2010a). In an attempt to explain negotiating and making decisions in the family, microeconomic theory is linked with economic game theory. It, in
short, boils down to marital partners not being solidary or altruistic, but that each starts from his/her individual strategies with the aim of getting the greatest good out of a shared life together. This is, of course, a constant source of tension and conflict, and the “breaking point” comes when the wife/husband comes to realize that in their present relations she/he is the “loser”, that is that their opportunities increase outside the existing relationship (the point of divorce), because their position on the “marital market” is good (Mijatović, 2000:74). Although this sounds like a marketing of intimacy, it is a fact that sociologists of family are aware of the highly rational behavior of young people in the process of dating and selecting a marital partner, today when much is written about intimacy, just as before, when arranged marriages were standard practice (Milić, 2001).

No matter how hard people try to appear rational even in the most intimate relations, the afore-mentioned formal approaches can hardly give due credit to all the complexity of personal relations, that is, to “capture” the fullness of everyday life. Why do some obviously disharmonic unions continue, even though the partners have a high standing on the “marital market”? This type of relation, especially when we are talking about dissatisfied women who are capable of living on their own but still remain married, cannot be interpreted from the standpoint of Becker’s theory. Studies of divorce show that it can have numerous adverse consequences for the partners, in particular the woman and children, increasing risk of poverty, social exclusion and the like, hence another marriage is a strategy of choice intended to lessen the damage of such scenarios (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). Unlike Coleman’s, the research of Oppenheimer and other authors indicate that with the processes of economic growth, that is, social modernization, the family and marriage do not lose on their significance, instead the only thing which changes is “the attributes of a desirable spouse (from one that is complementary to one that is substitutable” (Oppenheimer, 1994), that is, the authoritarian, patriarchal and asymmetric, gender complementary community is replaced gradually by a more democratic, egalitarian and gender flexible one. Instead of the patriarchal, absolute authority of the male, that is of older generations, new communities are established based on negotiation and agreement, with a more equitable distribution of responsibility and duties among all

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4 By this we mean the chances of a man or woman to find a "better" partner outside the existing relationship, and this is measured on the basis of sociobiological resources: economic, social and cultural capital, as well as natural potentials related to age, gender, marital status and the number and age of children from previous relationships. Positioning on the marital market is also the foundation of authority practice in the family (Bobić, 2010)
The next important topic of demography of the family is family solidarity, that is, inter- and intragenerational cohesion, which is an important source of social capital (both expressive and instrumental). There are two prerequisites for close intrafamily solidarity: 1) family size and 2) reliance on own strengths in order to ensure the welfare of the group, especially in conditions of lack of action on the part of social institutions or their vacuity, as is the case in the postsocialist transformation of Serbia in the 1990s. In premodern societies, high fertility served not only as a reservoir of labor force, but also as support for parents in their old age, in the absence of pension funds, hospitals and social security at the end of life. Caldwell formulated a famous theory in relation to this on the intergenerational flow of goods. In the pretransitional phase, the net flow of transfer of goods in the course of life was such that it favored the parents, but when the large family was replaced by the small one, the course was diverted from the parents to the children, which resulted in a lowered birthrate (Caldwell, 1976). The Balkans are well known for how widespread collectives (zadruge) were, that is, extended and complex households, patrilinear, that is, agnatic kinship lines, made up of the father and married sons, that is, of brothers, which were maintained for a long time, from the Middle Ages until the beginning of the 20th century (Bobić, 2001; Milić, 2004, 2001). In the phase of intensive industrialization of the 1950s and 1960s, both normatively and in practice we see the rise of the small, nuclear family, the wider family is on the downturn, with the caveat that the largest households were mixed households, where the older members were active in farming, the middle generation worked in the nearby towns, while the younger generation was being schooled and preparing with a definitive break with village life (Milić, 1981). In the postsocialist transformation of society Serbia is witnessing a revival of the extended and complex family (Miletić-Stepanović, 2011), on which more will be said later.

The marital-familial habitus in Serbia

Following a conception of the analytical framework, we move on to the interpretation of biosocial reproduction. We will begin with a summary analysis of the demographic situation in contemporary Serbia in order to progress to the interpretation of the behavior of individuals/groups to the extent to which available data from research studies undertaken in the 2000s make
this possible. The present demographic picture of Serbia can be assessed as very dire, as is the increase of population and since 1989 in Vojvodina, that is, since 1992 in central Serbia, depopulation has also been registered. Natality has been low for several decades, so that each new generation of women is one third smaller than the previous one. Lowered fatality and a longer life in combination with low fertility lead to the aging of the population, a phenomenon in which Serbia is among the ten leading world populations. Migrations, for now, do not represent a dynamic component of population development because Serbia is not an attractive destination considering its unfavorable economic ambiance, low activity rate and employment rate, low standard of living. These structural variables, as in other countries undergoing postsocialist transformation, are considered the main reasons for putting off marriage and an increasingly low birth rate, unlike Western countries, where the reasons for the same phenomenon are cited as being variables related to individualization (Stankuniene, V, and A. Maslauskaite, 2008). Unlike EU and North American countries, as well as many other ex-socialist countries, such as Slovenia, the Russian Federation, the Czech Republic, Estonia and others, the divorce rate in Serbia is low, for several decades, as are alternative unions (1-2%). Birth outside of marriage has, conversely, been on the rise since the 1990s, so that lately almost one fifth of all children are born out of wedlock, which, according to some authors, is not a postmodern phenomenon (Penev i Stanković, 2010), but a continuation of tendencies from the 1950s, while others surmise it leads to the beginning of individualization, that is, the acceptance of postmodern values of self-actualization (Bobić i Vukelić, 2011), or at least a more permissive attitude of parents toward postadolescents, their sexual freedoms, etc. Lately there has been a noticeable rise in divorceability, which together with the above-mentioned changes may mean a “deblocking” of the transformation of marriage, that is, a gradual change in the direction of detrationalization and pluralization of lifestyles (Bobić, 2003, Tomanović, 2010a).

In the following segment we will deal with several dimensions of the marital-familial habitus, which have been the subject of research, and we will, wherever possible, indicate the processual nature of change.

A qualitative study of cohabitation among the younger population was undertaken as a case study in Belgrade. The sample was made up of members of the urban intelligencia, the so-called “modernization yeast”. Couples were selected who were identified as actors of change in marital behavior, and in the previously developed theoretical framework the dimensions according
to which it was established whether, and to what extent, the transformation was initiated from (traditional) marriage to an individualized, postmodern relationship, as a reflexive project. The case study showed that cohabitation in Serbia, just as in many other environments in the West, is a premarital phenomenon, as once the couple reaches a decision on childbirth, marriage is entered into. As long as they live extramaritally, the young are inclined to experiment freely in relation to: choice of partner, their own sexuality and traditional gender regimes (Milić, 2001). They, both normatively and in practice, accept gender equality, are open to change in everyday routines (cooking, grocery shopping, cleaning), and they inclined to negotiate about their feelings, sexuality, conflicts, social networks, free time, and so on. At the normative level, partners commit to a “pure relationship” or love as the goal of life together. However, the anticipation of the birth of a child marks not only a turning point in form, from cohabitation to marriage, but also a true regression of partner relations, with which traditional values (male authority, “male wage”, gender complementarity and parenthood as the pillar of the system) begin to be established. One possible interpretation is that young people are so dependent on the family which they come from as far as key capitals and strategies are concerned (housing, work, support for the standard of living, childcare, etc), that this “pushes” them into a pre(modern) matrix. The next study of cohabitation was realized within a national, representative research study of transformational strategies of individuals and households in Serbia in 2003. The analysis of the results confirmed the important findings of the case study, but also provided some new insights. First, it was established that alternative unions in Serbia are globally marginalized, that is, that martial life continues as the dominant practice (63,3%). Only 4,1% of extramarital unions were registered, of which the greatest number were LAT (1,9%), followed by premarital and post-divorce cohabitations (1,4%), while there were only 0,8% of extramarital

5 The sample consisted of 30 couples, aged from 20 to 35, highly educated, professionals, with at least one of the partners employed. The interviews were conducted in 2002 for each partner separately. More on the study, its theoretical framework on the transformation of marriage and the research results on three types of consensual unions can be found in Bobić, M (2003) Brak ili/i Partnerstvo: Demografsko – sociološka studija. Beograd: ISI FF

6 Another point of evidence in favor of the conservation of patriarchy are results indicating endemics of abortion in Serbia as the traditional method of birth control, that is, a very low usage of modern contraception (18,6%), (Rašević, 2008).

7 By LAT unions we mean partner relations where each of the partners maintains a separate household. In the national study, these are, in the main, couples who live with their respective parents, not bachelors/bachelorettes, while in the case study participants were selected who lived on their own, that is, separately from their parents.
families. As for general sociodemographic characteristics, the results of the qualitative study were confirmed, that is, these are styles of the young, urban population, middle or higher class. LAT unions are more frequent with the youngest generations, 18–29, equally for men and women, with middle and higher education levels, with the unemployed and students. Cohabitations are more frequent among those aged 30 to 44, individuals in possession of middle or higher cultural capital, equally among students and the unemployed, businesspeople, experts and lower ranking managers and workers. A half of respondents live in their own apartments, others in those owned by their or the partner’s parents. The few extramarital families (with a child born out of wedlock) are more frequent among the female population, of middle or higher education, women who are mainly unemployed (including homemakers).

We will present the analysis of the everyday of cohabitations and marital unions together, with comparative specificities underscored. In our research for this purpose the paradigm of the “sex gender system”, which incorporates the complex practice of joint living in couplehood, which is built over time by joining resources, human and social capital, combining individual and collective strategies (the “partnership process”) (Bobić, 2003, 2004). The operationalization of this concept is undertaken on the basis of individual characteristics and resources of men, that is, women (sociobiological), gender practice (in relation to the household budget, authority, work in the home, emotional investment, care in parenthood and care of the elderly).

While in most marital families the household budget is formed as a shared fund, where the man makes strategic decisions on spending and investments and the woman about everyday smaller purchases (traditional model), with alternative unions this is the case in less than half. The individualized model is dominant in cohabitations, so that from 40 to 50% of these money is kept for individual use, with an agreement regarding shared expenses. Therefore in the latter type of union male domination is significantly lowered (to 50.5%). In marital families, on the contrary, the individualized type of budget was registered in every tenth family (10%), but over time a rise has been registered (from 9.5% to 14.3%) (Babović, 2009). This finding might indicate greater freedom of partners in cohabitation in relation to marital partners, that is, the democratization of alternative unions, but also their fragility, that is, a lower degree of cohesion, with

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8 National statistics note about 2% of such unions, but the difference can be interpreted as the ISI FF study being aimed at family households and excluding other households (single, collective, that is, non-family).
fewer shared goods. Work in the home is mainly a female duty in 2/3 of cohabitations, which corresponds to marital families, not only in this, but also in all later studies (Babović, 2009, Bobić and Sekulić, 2010), while the option of sharing household work (cooking, washing, cleaning, ironing, caring for the elderly, helping children with their schoolwork, etc) appears only in 5 to 9%. With marital families, over the years, there is a noticeable increase in the inclusion of men in traditionally “female work” (cooking, washing, cleaning and ironing), while duties to do with care of small children and help with schoolwork are still predominantly “female” (Babović, 2010). Yet, as Babović claims, there is still a disbalance in the distribution of household work, as in the great majority of households, these jobs are performed by women/mothers. In other words, the household is the central place of reproduction of patriarchy. Transformation of gender practices is very slow, even where the woman on her own supports the family financially, that is, where she is professionally very highly positioned. A more in-depth study of relationships revealed that the main determinant is the value preferential, related to male and female roles, that is, the degree of so called patriarchality of couples (ibidem).

The social capital of cohabitations and extramarital families, on the whole, is very low, lower than that of marital unions. In more than half of these communities, partners have no one to turn to when it comes to resolving key issues: finding work (56.7%), health care (54.4%), enrolling a child in school (87%), resolving housing issues (79%), administrative tasks (in the municipality, police and courts 69.9%), and help in the household (52.8%). Only 35.7% partners have no one to turn to for emotional support that is 42.5% cannot count on loans of money, so the situation is slightly better there. The most frequent activity is socializing with members of the family, relatives and friends, in private, in the home, while watching television (94.8%). The low social capital of these unions can probably be understood in the context of their social marginalization. A legalized marriage is the “safer” option for survival, it possesses higher levels of social capital, while the questioning of the quality of relations apparently must wait.

Research of the social capital of families from 2008 revealed that sociability, relationship networks and exchange of resources are very high in marital families in Serbia, not only among younger couples, but also among older couples (Tomanović, 2004, 2010). The family is definitely the main support of sociability, not only because it makes possible the bringing together of different types of resources and capital, hence the solid functioning of members, but it also gives them a feeling of belonging
and togetherness. An overwhelming majority (78.2%) of respondents in Serbia today does not feel lonely, therefore, because they are surrounded by their family or other persons close to them. Contacts are mainly maintained with relatives (parents and cousins) and then with friends. Class differences were registered in all studies during the 2000s and they are of the expected direction. The lower the status, the greater the frequency of socializing with household members and neighbors, while the higher up on the social ladder you go, the greater the importance of friends and colleagues. The most common forms of help and exchange which are secured through these networks are, as with extramarital unions, in the form of psychological support (without which is only a quarter of unions), and is mostly practiced among friends. Money is most often borrowed from parents (36.6%), then from relatives, and only then from friends, while help around the house (repairs and the like) is mostly exchanged with parents. As the author concludes, although it is undoubtedly positive that people are so “cozy” in their closes surroundings under existing social conditions, in the long run, this kind of practice cannot be considered desirable as it frustrates individualization, strengthens nepotism in the public sphere, clogs the healthy channels of promotion and competition and, therefore, acts in a destimulating manner on orientation toward achievement and personal accomplishment (ibidem).

Here we would also like to underscore another important phenomenon of family transformation in contemporary Serbia. Blocked and delayed social change following the breakdown of socialism caused the maintenance of a large segment of extended and complex family households in all social classes. Although there are, logically, more of these families in villages, every fifth household in urban areas is also of the extended or complex type (around 20%). Findings show that the vertically extended family, mainly on the male side, is in and of itself, a capital good, as it makes everyday survival easier, provides protection for its members and emotional and psychological wellbeing (Milić, 2004). Similarly, in her longitudinal research of the social biographies of young Belgraders during the past two decades, S. Tomanović (2010a) had the same findings, with all of the good points of this type of household revealed. However, a previous study of children in Rakovica by the same author (Tomanović – Mihajlović, 1997), as well as other national studies have shown that a multi-family community can carry systemic risk, as everyday tensions and conflicts are maintained among younger and older spouses, parents and offspring, without any developmental potential (Miletić-Stepanović, 2010, 2011). V.
Miletić-Stepanović established that conflicts are mainly to be found in relations of older and younger women/wives/mothers (mother-in-law and daughter-in-law), which she explained by the action of one or more sources of conflict (on the relational, educational or labor market plain). This creates overall confusion and makes the social integration of both generations of women more difficult (Miletić – Stepanović, 2010:205), creating a vicious circle of self-sacrifice and the perpetuation of patriarchy. In these communities with large numbers of members, often in very limited space, with intertwined familial, generational and gender identities, disharmonic, malign triangulations and coalitions of grandparents with grandchildren, that is the older couple (parents) with a daughter or son, at the expense of the son- or daughter-in-law, that is the younger family, are not uncommon.

In summary, research of the habitus of families in the first decade of the 21st century has revealed conservation of patriarchy and domination of traditional forms of sociability. Structural limitations contribute to the strengthening of the binding, that is, primordial at the expense of the weaker, bridging and lining social capital, which is a consequence of long term social disintegration and isolation of Serbia, slow recovery and inclusion in EU and world trends, the fragmented nature of its classes and social groups, basic lack of trust in the state and its institutions (courts, police, education, health care, etc.), therefore, in everything that extends beyond the boundaries of personal environment, and which is characteristic of Fukuyama’s “low trust” communities (Italy, the Balkans, Russia, Latin America), (Adam and Rončević, 2003).

Concluding remarks

As our research findings clearly lead to the conclusion that the family is the main source of social capital in contemporary Serbia, the question persists as to why bioreproduction is not at a higher level, that is why is the birth rate so low and insufficient so that each new generation of women is one third smaller than the generation of their mothers. Newer, anthropological demography or microdemography shows that the stronger the family is, fewer children will be born (“too strong family too few children”), (Livi Bacchi, 2001), that is, that female self-sacrifice appears as a barrier to greater biological reproduction (Blagojević, 1997). Empirical research of low fertility in the Mediterranean, but also in the Far East (China, Japan, Taiwan) confirm the close link between intergenerational solidarity, with strong reliance on female resources and overprotection of children even when they should have become self-reliant a long time ago, is not fertile
ground for the rehabilitation of fertility, that is, the birth of more than one child (Livi Bacchi, 2001). The maintenance of patriarchy, in other words, is not compatible with demands of (late) capitalism, that is, economic globalization and strong pressure on limited human resources. Hence gender equality and democratization of family relations, among generations, are some preconditions for increase in birth rate, as demographic research shows that a woman who is happy, satisfied with her partner and existing child will want to continue to bear children (Bobić, 2010, 2011).

A third way toward resolving the problem on the microdemographic and individual plain lies in making social institutions, education, employment, pensioning, health care, the welfare state compatible with the new demographic regime at the beginning of the 21st century, which is notable for its marked aging of the population, intensive migrations, but also the pluralization and diversification of life styles of individuals and couples, with an increase in divorced, one-parent families, singles, widow(er)s and the like in all countries of the developed West. In Serbia, an intensification of immigration trends is expected in the future, but some world experiences in the domain of transformation of the private sphere and gender equality would be of use, certainly with a more pronounced activation of social and population measures.

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Two Faces of Social Capital in Structural Trends: Bonding and Bridging

Social capital can be analyzed from several different points of view. One of them involves the distinction between bonding and bridging. This distinction differentiates between social networks which bind together those who have some similar characteristics, created in order to protect their particular interests, and social networks which connect people with different social characteristics bridging their differences and creating a net of stakeholders able to solve specific problems of wider social significance. A major feature of the former type is exclusion and of the latter inclusion. This means that the former can have a negative social impact, if observed at the level of social structure, because it homogenizes and closes the ranks of a group while excluding those who do not belong. On the other hand, the social effect of the second type could be positive, because it builds trust between members of different groups. On the basis of these differences it can be assumed that social capital essentially carries the potential for overall development, but also the potential for social pathologies, such as discrimination, nepotism, corruption, organized crime and the like. The aim of this paper is to highlight the possible negative dimension of social capital that has especially come to the fore in societies with closed social structure and an incomplete legal system, societies beset by development problems, high concentration and centralization in the distribution of social power and generally, societies that are going through some kind of transition.

**Key words:** social capital, social power, social structure, discrimination

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1 This paper was written as part of the project "Tradition, Modernization and National Identity in Serbia and the Balkans in the Process of European Integration" (179074) which is implemented by the Centre for Sociological Research, Faculty of Philosophy in Niš, and funded by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Serbia.
The idea of social capital is quite old, dating from the 18th century. Its first serious theoretical analysis was given by Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1986), but the concept received full recognition in the early 1990s in the writings of Robert Putnam.2

Social capital becomes relevant when social interaction based on shared values is realized and social networks are built, which have a value not only on the emotional level, but also in terms of very concrete benefits resulting from the trust, reciprocity, information exchange and cooperation related to these networks. Thus, social capital is usually understood as a system of social networks (and norms) brought into being by regular social interactions that facilitate the action of individuals and groups within the wider community or society. It can be seen as a social (common) resource that makes access to other resources easy/difficult and, potentially, increases the comparative advantage of network members over non-members. Social capital, in principle, is available to the individuals linked to different social networks. Ultimately the concept of social capital is an expression of personal (and social) trust and it represents a link that allows group coordination and cooperation for achieving individual (or group) benefits.

According to Putnam, social capital has three components (Putnam, 1993, 1995, 2000): *reciprocity*, *network connections* and *trust*. Under reciprocity, Putnam implies continuous cooperation and exchange relations involving the mutual expectation that what we give today will be returned in the future. When talking about network connections, the importance of horizontal relationships among individuals of equivalent status and power should be emphasized. If mutuality and horizontal networks exist, then fertile ground for the development of mutual trust is created.

Trust emerges as a result of norms of reciprocity and is built of expected normative behavior and cooperation. On this basis, stable relations of mutual connection are established and out of these, successful cooperation through which common interests are achieved. These norms of behavior are at the same time a form of social control which makes the need for institutionalized legal sanctions unnecessary. Trust therefore enables the establishment of social capital, while the existence of social capital in turn enhances trust. Generalized trust is confidence between strangers carrying the capacity for collaboration, independently of personal interests. On this basis a network of civic initiatives can be built (Matić, 2000).

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2 The term was first mentioned in 1916 (Hanifan, 1916) but it was introduced in the second half of the twentieth century by Canadian sociologists working in the field of community and racial inequality research (Farr, 2004, 7). Pierre Bourdieu within his theory of capital provided the first serious theoretical elaboration (Bourdieu, 1986).
Key characteristics of social capital are that it deems all types of relationships between individuals, all private networks and connections with friends and family important, while the emphasis is on abstract normative and value aspects of mutual trust. Different forms of solidarity can be the basis of trust: familial, political, ideological, religious, interest-based, intra-group in any sense of the word. This means that trust can be built at the expense of outsiders, and this leads to differentiating ingroups and outgroups. In this way social capital can be conceived as a resource of an insider group that sets clear and firm boundaries marking insiders off from the rest of society. This opens the possibilities for closed, ingroup action which sometimes may transgress the boundaries of legality and/or depart from socially acceptable standards. In order to produce a socially valuable impact, trust must go beyond the boundaries of the group; otherwise the trust ends at intra-group solidarity, insuperable group boundaries and the exclusion of outsiders.

Essential factors related to the significance of social networks for the formation and functioning of social capital are the number of active members and how the network relates toward public goods and other networks in the environment. An important issue here is the extent to which social capital is public or private, i.e. whether it is available to everyone interested in solving a problem.

Putnam’s conception has rightly been criticized for ignoring the negative dimension, the “dark side” of social capital (Portes and Landolt, 2001). Social capital enables social relationships, information sharing and ultimately social integration, but the quality of mutual relationships must also be taken into account. The very idea of social capital essentially refers to the fact that social networks or relationships between people not only have emotional and personal significance, but also bring tangible benefits as a result of mutual trust, reciprocity, information exchange and cooperation between persons who stand in some type of relationship to one another.

Contemporary researchers and theorists of the concept of social capital can be divided into two groups (Grix, 2001). The first follow Putnam, adopting his conception, along with methodology and operationalization. The second group consists of authors believing there is a danger that this concept, if applied uncritically, may be distorted into its opposite; consequently, they advocate the need for contextual analysis of social capital (Foley and Edwards, 1997). The development of trust and reciprocity among members of social networks almost lawfully entails discrimination and marginalization of outsiders. Developing mutual trust and reciprocity carries a large potential for conflict
In this regard Foley and Edwards (1997, 1998) call for paying special attention to the social structure and institutional framework since these set the frameworks for potential capacity for cooperation and mutual trust. Misuse of social capital for achieving personal gain opens the channels of corruption, visible particularly at higher levels of social hierarchy. Moreover, corruption becomes especially evident in closed class structure societies in which self-reproduction of social groups is the dominant pattern. Such a social-structural context opens the doors to nepotism, corruption, ethnic, social or other enclosure, mafia connections, or various forms of social control based on dogmatic ideology. This can be explained by Coleman’s understanding of social capital (Coleman, 1990, 305) which includes the total sum of claims an individual commands on the basis of previous services rendered. In other words, a previous violation of the principle of impartiality in decision-making becomes the basis for future claims (the so-called tit-for-tat mechanism). The network of social connections formed in this way builds a system of long-term liabilities in the form of debts and receivables for services rendered earlier (Coleman, 1988, 102-104). Mutual trust may facilitate exchange of confidential information and establish (often tacitly accepted) specific norms and standards of conduct, including sanctions for norm violation. Of course, what we have here is the corruptive potential of social capital.

In general, the issue of social capital impact should be linked to the dominant forms of social capital, especially bonding and bridging social capital (Baron, Field and Schuller, 2000, 11). Bonding social capital consists of intense social relations that are usually generated inside small, homogeneous and very often closed communities. Such relations connect individuals whose social identity is similar and who establish common interests that they then pursue through mutual trust, reciprocity and intra-group solidarity. On the other hand, bridging social capital is a set of relations and connections between heterogeneous groups and individuals of different social, economic, political, religious and ethnic backgrounds and in general of different ideological value orientation. Bridging social capital develops in heterogeneous, pluralistic societies and is important for maintaining harmony between various and often conflicting social groups (Putnam 2000, 22-24). The linking factor is usually embodied in a common interest the importance of which exceeds the individual interests of the people implicated. Linking interest serves as a bridge that connects different people, both in the horizontal and in the vertical sense, in meeting the interests and needs of the community. Practically, bridging capital is a link which makes specific social actions more feasible than they would have been without it.
Coleman forwards that social structure becomes social capital when actors use it effectively to achieve their own interests (Coleman, 1990, 305). The form and scope of social capital are determined directly by the concrete institutional structure and functioning of a society. Accordingly, effectiveness of social capital should always be viewed within a given social context, because it has the capacity to foster cooperation towards achieving personal goals, although on the declarative level public goals are aimed at. In other words, individuals who occupy positions of social power, by the nature of their position, connect into networks of reciprocity and trust to achieve personal gains. In this context, the available institutions and organizations serve them as a framework within which they realize personal interests and direct the way in which social capital is used. Social capital then develops in channels parallel to official institutions and thereby disguises its non-institutional constitution. Individuals who are part of official institutions, in carrying out their regular work activities use these institutions as bases of their social power. They associate with their status peers in non-institutional groups to form powerful and informal networks which operate parallel to the formal structures and institutions. In this way, social capital becomes the main force in the gray area of society in which discrimination is legalized through the exclusion of outsiders and unfair competition. In this way possession of social capital determines about the distribution of other resources, like jobs, material gain, sharing projects and part-time jobs, enrolling children in school or referral for treatment at respectable health institutions and the like.

This insight is echoed in Bourdieu’s theory of capital, according to which members of different social groups have different starting positions that are the result of unequal volume and quality of the capital they have at their disposal. Bourdieu (1986) distinguishes three types of interrelated forms of capital which individuals and, through them, also social groups can possess: economic, cultural and social capital.

In countries with a tradition of real socialism (where Serbia belongs) social capital can be institutionalized through a system of nomenclature. During the transition period, it can be converted directly into economic capital through easier access to economic resources in the process of privatization, whether legally or illegally (Bolčić, 1994), as well as through higher chances of getting better jobs.

These three types of capital are not evenly distributed among classes, strata and status groups. Of course, this holds globally, but in societies with a closed structure, such as Serbian society, there is the additional tendency
for all three types of capital to concentrate in one place, i.e. in the higher class and status positions. As a result, under circumstances of inadequately developed markets and market relationships, social capital comes to be a resource of manifold importance. Instead of overall societal development, it produces multiple negative consequences resulting from mechanisms of unfair competition for social promotion. Therefore, one of the strategic social and developmental tasks should be the redesigning of social capital, so that it functions to promote global development, transparency in public affairs, respect for rights, and democratization of society as a whole.

Whether social and cultural capital will be used for development depends primarily on the socio-structural context of each society. Open-structure societies will, in principle, try to use the potential for innovation and any other democratic potential of this capital so as to improve their own performances. Closed-structure societies will channel this capital into individual benefits for their carriers. Such societies favor the functioning of linking social capital at higher levels of social hierarchy, in places with a high concentration of social power, coupled with mechanisms of discrimination and marginalization of outsiders.

Studies of social structure and mobility in Serbia show that social mobility in the postwar period was a mass phenomenon, dominated by structural (coerced) and upward mobility. Intergenerational mobility has most commonly amounted to a “single step” (e.g. from farmer to worker or from industrial worker to office worker). Movement from the other strata into farmers was negligible, as well as from experts into the lower strata. The extent of mobility seems to have been significantly reduced since the mid-eighties (Miladinović, 1993). A recent study shows that the channels of vertical mobility, particularly for members of the younger generation (those born after 1965), are practically closed (Cvejić, 2001). What is generally regarded as a rule is that there are social barriers that hinder the rise of the lower classes and strata along the social ladder. Moreover, the barrier is increasingly higher as one descends down the social hierarchy.

In the research conducted in 1993 and 1997 the results are even more drastic. In a 1997 study, a continuation of the closure of social structure for mobility was registered (Cvejić, 2004). The assumption is that these trends continued into the 21st century due to high unemployment and economic stagnation, which is conducive only to the maintenance of a closed social structure. Virtually all social strata are becoming more self-directed and the three-class structure (lower/manual workers and farmers, middle/experts, and upper/political and economic leaders) is becoming increasingly apparent.
Social classes are clearly profiled and the differences between the classes are increasing. The importance of the educational channels has declined lately. Practically all those who have a higher education tend to self-reproduce rather than to change position. Education (cultural capital) gains importance as a social mobility channel only when it is connected with political power and class position of one’s family (their social capital) (Cvejić, 2004).

There has been a dramatic closure of the class structure during the 1990s which has reduced the chances of lower social strata for upward social mobility, that is, for entering not just the upper but also the middle class. The data (Cvejić, 2004) clearly indicate that under equal conditions, the possession of social capital in its bridging variant (family and political background, familiarity with the centers of power, in a word, adequate networking) has been more important for social promotion than the personal effort of the individual to acquire appropriate expertise and competence (cultural capital). The data also point to the tendency of cultural capital to be inter-generationally self-reproduced, that is, to remain in a family at the level achieved in the previous generation (Cvejić, 2004). There are, of course, exceptions to this trend, but they remain marginal.

Serbia is one of the post-socialist countries with high rates of class self-reproduction in intergenerational mobility. A specific problem is the fact that middle class (experts) self-reproduction is one of the highest in the region (Central and Eastern Europe) and that class closure is particularly evident among younger generations. On the basis of comparative research from the nineties, it can be concluded that Serbia is among the countries that have the most rigid social structure (Ericson & Goldtrope, 1992). This is evidenced by increase in barriers to entry into the managers’ stratum, moderate increase in barriers to entry into the stratum of small entrepreneurs for descendants of non-manual workers and a large increase in barriers for the descendants of all blue-collar strata. This is followed by lowering of barriers to entry into the strata of experts and decrease in barriers between farmers and workers (return to agriculture for many who continue to have ownership of land, but have failed to acquire permanent employment outside of agriculture) (Cvejić, 2004).

3 Divided into social layers, the ratio of the odds between the expert layer and upper manual worker layer (data from 1997) shows that the descendants of experts have a 36.4 times bigger chance than descendants of the higher strata of manual workers, while the chances of experts in relation to the members of manual worker strata (unskilled and semi-skilled workers) are 77 times higher. When this data is split into generation cohorts the chance for children of experts (20-39 years old) increases 80 times more than the chance of children of manual workers (for the generation of 35-54 year-olds, the odds ratio is 33.2) (Cvejić 2004).
The rigidity of the social structure is the result of political domination over the economic subsystem of society, which has also caused the destruction of the local economy and enabled the formation of social capital, particularly in the form of bonding social capital. In Serbia, bonding social capital is set up at the level of individuals of equal status and it hardly goes beyond social class boundaries. These processes are accompanied by a high degree of nepotism, cronyism and corruption. Authoritarianism, patriarchal traditionalism and collectivism are still the dominant value orientations, while inadequate technological and economic development are additional factors hindering the formation and functionality of bridging social capital that would allow members of upper and lower social groups to join together in addressing general and common interests. This would also provide some opening of social structure for upward mobility of the lower classes and vice versa. This clearly shows that bonding social capital of the social strata occupying positions of social power has as one of its primary functions the maintenance of the existing system of social relations.

In recent years a key argument of analysts of social mobility in explaining these trends was status determination. These analyses, however, did not go more deeply into the issue of what components of social status may be considered a generator of empirically tracked movements. The specific findings of the dynamics of mobility of individual classes and strata are reduced to the dynamics of status groups, which are explained by the existence of social barriers and stimulating moments, without questioning what this means.

Status determination coupled with the (authoritarian and undemocratic) nature of social systems and the dynamics of technological development, was often taken as the answer to questions such as: “Why does self-reproduction of social groups dominate in the structure of social mobility?”, “Why was there in the past (perhaps even up to the early 1980s) large upward mobility, especially of the lower hierarchical social groups?”, or “Why does downward mobility (social decline) have the character of an excessive situation and not of the normal tendency in the structural trends?”, etc.

Most of these studies were carried out in socialist times, and it was simply not common to think about the role and type of capital that particular social groups possessed. It was even less common to observe the concept of capital beyond its economic significance. However, concepts of social and cultural capital are very effective in research of structural movements and, in particular, research of vertical mobility, so that the distinction between bonding and bridging social capital should be introduced into these analyses.
The concept of status consistency (Lazić, 1988, 17-18) was on the verge of pointing out the significance of social capital. However, this small step, which would make visible the idea of social capital in studies of social structure and mobility, was not made. The idea of status determination was reduced to a desire to preserve the given status position through status homogenous marriages and friendships, establishing a network of people with the same or similar status, and acquisition of higher education for younger generations. The idea of testing the significance and impact of social networks and their maintenance for achieving the personal, family or social interests of a particular class was not activated, which means that the close link between the notions of social mobility, status consistency, and social capital was not established.

Although, on the level of empirical research, the social class structure can be recognized as the sum of individuals who share the same or similar social characteristics, which is, among other things, reflected in a common lifestyle, still we must not neglect the family as an important mediator of the individual’s class position. In this context, one of the consequences of technological development is the tendency to increase employment, which structurally opens up new questions and problems. First of all, this may result in problems in defining the status of individual family members (individual position, place in division of labour, economic status, educational level, social power, prestige), since families consists of individuals with different professional statuses.

Several empirical studies indicate that, for a long time now, there has been a prominent tendency towards the equalization of status positions of family members in Serbian society (Lazić, 1988; Miladinović, 1992 and 1995; Vuković, 1993). The analysis of channels of social mobility has remained at the level of registering the extent to which education, political activity and, possibly, marriage open channels of social promotion.

Education and political activity may have strong significance for the social promotion of individuals. However, a large number of people who completed secondary and tertiary education during the 1950s and 1960s climbed social hierarchy largely because the development of the economy increased the need for a qualified and highly educated workforce.

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4 The concept of status consistency in sociological research of (structure and) mobility of Serbian society was introduced by M. Lazić, who derived it directly from the notion of class homogenization, as a process of harmonization of the basic features of lifestyles within large social groups (classes). This implies increasing differences between these groups and it (consistency) means the association of social status within the family - as a consequence of class determination of individual/family status positions (Lazić: 1988: 17-18).
Similarly, the ruling party had the character of mass parties during the socialist period, which means that a large number of people were members. This did not, however, mean that they had a chance to use political channels for social promotion. On the contrary, in most cases, it is not possible to speak of the political determination of social success. We can, instead, talk about the creation of centralized social capital among key members of the ruling party, government and commercial managers. This had a transmission role in starting and accelerating mass mobilization to carry out tasks meted out from the top of the hierarchy, while reducing the costs of collective action and increasing confidence in political institutions. We cannot talk about the social capital that could be activated in order to satisfy individual interests of the masses or of individual members or the party. On the contrary, this type of social capital was possessed by a minority of managerial position holders in the party and labor organizations. They regularly used bonding social capital for (operations and) maintenance of institutions that were under their control and to maintain their own status in the ideologized system. The maintenance of their own status meant the maintenance of the family status and its multi-generational class self-reproduction.

In the 1980s and especially in the 1990s and later, the economic and political situation deteriorated so much that social mobility flows almost stopped. To explain this closure by status determination would be superficial compared to delving into structural developments. The question now is whose higher education has the character of mere academic qualifications (not to say void diplomas) and whose has the character of cultural capital; accordingly, whose political activism should be seen as mere political affiliation and whose should be viewed as a form of social capital. In other words, what needs to be distinguished is simple presence in the world of politics, from inclusion in social networks that open the channels of movement within the structure of society.

Seen in this context, the position of the dominant class (power elites) is very interesting as this class, among others, due to the configuration of the social and cultural capital of its members, could be seen as a generator of social crisis. One of the important features that can explain both the instability of the social system which resulted in the disintegration of the state and instability of the dominant class itself, was the fact that the dominant class in the former Yugoslavia was not formed as a formal and legal owner of the means of production based on civil law with the right of descendants to inherit economic resources. In practice, members of the dominant class had the opportunity to dispose of and control the means
of production in state/social ownership, but only during a part of their career, during which they gained immense social power. The social power they possessed gave the dominant class as a whole the ability to dispose of economic capital absolutely.

Practically, this lead to a creation of a network of the dominant class characterized by extremely high social power, members of which carried out the proprietary powers within the social production process, even if they did not legally own the means of production. They were all important members of the only (ruling) party and they were all part of the unique governing elite. That network had the form of bonding social capital and the relationship itself was based on a shared ideological background, on the one hand, but no less important was the possibility, that is, ability to render services and maintain debtor-creditor relations on the basis of services rendered, which strengthened mutual trust. Therefore, even though they differed on many grounds and, above all, on the basis of background, education, expertise, ethnicity, etc., their relationship had the primary character of bonding, but not bridging social capital. Their primary goal was to sustain their own leading positions and associated privileges, as well as inter-generational self-reproduction. At the phenomenal level their goal was to preserve the ideological system and only secondarily to maintain the economic functionality of society. Hence, here we can speak of bonding social capital as a primary form and bridging social capital as a secondary form with the proviso that it appeared to be bridging capital of the wider community - a party or the state and their entities. The external impression of the primacy of bridging capital is based on the fact that this group consisted of individuals with very heterogeneous characteristics. Their similarity was founded on personal interests which were concealed by ideological mechanisms.

The point is that the dominant class as a whole, due to the nature of the social system, permanently disposed of state-owned economic capital. From the standpoint of individual members of the dominant class the access was possible during a certain part of their careers. Unlike capitalists, who own economic capital, members of the dominant class in Serbian society, through the ruling party, control the entire process of social reproduction, as well as institutions for system protection.

The ideological and structural needs of the dominant class to be filled in from below slowed down its class homogenization (as viewed from the perspective of social origin, financial status, lifestyle, perception of class interests, the establishment of class consciousness, etc.). Instead of devel-
oping class homogenization, an interest-based network was created. The basis of these connections was twofold: class and private. This means that members of the dominant class included their spouses, parents, children, close and distant relatives and friends (who, mostly, already belonged to this class) in the developing social network. This created bonding social capital as a substitute for economic capital. In our conditions, the goal in creating such networks was to establish monopoly of control over certain resources, such as attractive (and not-so-attractive) jobs, information on financial and other economic trends, and the like. We should not ignore the trend towards concentration of social power within the family or circle of friends and the creation of networks of bonding social capital, as a set of separate but inter-related networks, that had the form of dominant class/managerial elite in the final instance.

This property helped in forming the core of the future class of private owners from the last socialist political elite during the disintegration of the socialist system (Bolčić, 1994). It utilized its historical chance and undertook a distribution of confidential information among themselves and, further, used these information as a first impulse of insider privatization. This was the mechanism by which a single, albeit smaller, part of the previous ruling elite passed into a new class of private owners of the means of production.

In the end, instead of the activities of the dominant class being directed by rational economic interests, which it is logical to expect in the case of legal ownership of the means of production, the activities of the dominant class were directed by personal, group, family or clan interests. This further means that global economic interests (expanded reproduction and profits) were replaced with the partial interest of a clique which established a structural monopoly in a particular segment of society, supported by bonding social capital, whose fertilization resulted in benefits for members of an interest clan, rather than in general benefit.

Excluding rational economic interests from the production process has resulted in long-term economic downfall and the development of social networks has enabled a further closure of the social structure which has been registered in the latest research on social mobility (Cvejic, 2004). The answer to the question “which are the most closed classes” is particularly important. These are the middle and upper class.

The social and cultural capital of the upper class and upper middle class were substantially formed during the socialist period and the period of post-socialist transition. This capital is indicated in the long-term as a comparative advantage in inter-generational class mobility. Practically,
the social networks that were built during the past decades now serve as primary channels of mobility, while cultural capital materialized through the possession of school qualifications plays a secondary role. Former political activity (social capital) that had opened the doors of moral-political suitability (a sort of cultural capital) is now transformed into a network of social contacts and friendships that can be easily activated when the need arises. Family and neighborhood connections are left to lower strata and their range usually ends at the level of immediate support and assistance on the principle of solidarity rather than on the interest principle, while a higher education degree, to the extent that the individual members of these groups possess it, is used more or less to bolster family pride.

The social networks of the higher and middle classes are based on professional contacts in which emotions, in principle, are not implicated. A much more important item than emotional connections are interest connections because they build chains of informal influence and form an informal power structure. The possibility of rendering (and revocation of) service is what provides these networks with a special quality. Precisely this feature opens the door for the social promotion of the next generation of the current members of the higher social classes (upper and middle class).

In explaining specific flows of social mobility arguments relying on social networks as a form of social capital may be used. Considering that members of lower social strata encounter numerous social obstacles in their rise into upper strata, we must ask whether those barriers are intentionally or consciously placed or planned and directed by some of the key social actors of economic or political life. As the constitutional and legal framework excludes any legal social discrimination the possibility remains that the social structure generates discrimination. The question is through what mechanisms it does so.

The answer should be sought primarily in informal relationships from which the lower social strata were excluded. Excluding outsiders is one of the central features of bonding social capital. The absence of developed market mechanisms discriminates at the outset against a number of qualified members of the lower classes. The fact that they do not own social capital, although they often have higher education which is not converted into cultural capital, makes them outsiders, underprivileged groups in the social system.

We need not stress that social deprivation is another face of social promotion. Social deprivation is emerging as one of the many characteristics of stagnant society. Just as social ascent can be seen from the point of view of the possession of social capital, so can social deprivation be seen from
the perspective of its non-possession. Social deprivation can be empirically analyzed from several angles: through reduced possibility of intergenerational mobility, difficulty in acquiring a first job and even retaining it and lessened intra-generational opportunity for promotion.

In summary, the foregoing confirms the initial view that Bourdieu’s idea of social and cultural capital undoubtedly has great value in theoretical elaborations of the social structure and especially flows and channels of vertical social mobility. Adopting these concepts may bring high heuristic benefits, since they explain many problems and processes that are otherwise simply registered as individual differences of individual members of different classes and strata. Precisely such individual differences may point to the nuances of structural development. It is therefore necessary in further theoretical elaborations and especially in empirical research to develop methodological tools for the detection of elements of cultural and social capitals, and in particular to distinguish bonding and bridging social capital, and to recognize their role in specific structural trends.

References


Social Capital as a Basis for Collective Action – the Case of Environmental Activism in Two Towns in Serbia

It is often argued that social capital can foster cooperation among citizens and produce more effective solutions to collective problems, enhancing the attainment of common goals (Putnam, 1993, 2000). Namely, if communication is well developed, if people express solidarity and have trust in each other, successful shared endeavours and joint solving of problems would be more probable. On the other hand, in the societies that lack the tradition of cooperative efforts of citizens (bridging capital is not developed), it is much harder to start a collective action (Putnam, 1993).

Based upon the results of an empirical study conducted in two Serbian towns with significant environmental issues – Pančevo (N=450) and Bor (N=350) – the aim of this paper is to test the hypothesis of connection between social capital and environmental activism. Answers will be sought to the following questions: what is the level of development of social capital in these two towns, to what extent is environmental activism developed (taking into consideration the seriousness of environmental problems) and in what way does (under)developed social capital influence (impede) the possibilities for environmental collective action?

**Key words:** Social Capital, Collective Action, Environmental Activism

**Introduction**

Throughout Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the collapse of state socialism has in many cases revealed the alarming state of the environment, caused by intensive industrialization and urbanization and not supported by proper environmental management. The recently established regimes, struggling
with the transformation of economy and political institutions, lack capacities to deal with serious environmental problems. Thus, ecological issues (considered less important) were shifted into the domain of non-state actors, such as environmental organizations. In such circumstances, citizen environmental activism could have played a vital role in environmental renewal. However, empirical findings show that throughout the CEE region, the overall level of citizen engagement in this field is rather low (Fagan, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2010, Cisar, 2008, 2010).

Environmental sociologists have proposed many different explanations of the phenomenon of weak environmentalism in CEE countries (Fagan, 2004, 2010, Howard, 2003). The list of possible reasons is quite long, including factors such as the lack of environmental awareness, underdeveloped civic culture, unfavorable political opportunity structures and deficiency of necessary resources. However, in this article we do not intend to examine all possible factors impeding environmental activism in Serbia. Conversely, following the general assumptions of the public choice theory (namely - collective action dilemma and the impact of ‘social capital exemption’), we wish to explore the effects of existing levels of social capital on environmental activism. For these purposes we will analyze data collected in two case studies conducted in two Serbian towns that face serious ecological issues. Of course, we do not imply that social capital is the only or the most important factor influencing the overall level of environmental activism in one country (on the contrary, we accept that many other factors play significant roles). However, we believe that social capital represents important infrastructure for collective action and a possible solution to the ‘free-riding’ problem that often occurs in relation to environmental issues.

In the next section we will briefly outline the general theoretical assumptions of rational choice theory, with a special emphasis on the collective action dilemma. Then we will try to explain the possible role of social capital in overriding this dilemma. After that, we will present our empirical findings and test the hypothesis of positive correlation between the level of one’s social capital and one’s environmental activism. If the connection proves to be positive, we will assume that undeveloped social capital is one of the factors impeding the development of environmental activism and, therefore, making ecological problems persistent. The theoretical background of the assumption of the existence of a positive connection between social capital and environmental activism is the ‘small groups/ social capital exemption’ to the ‘free-riding’ problem (Ostrom, 2000, Rydin, 1998).
Collective Action Dilemma and the Environment

For as long as people have managed natural resources, they have been engaged in different forms of collective action. From joint work on crop fields to the construction of irrigation systems, out of necessity for collective involvement, many different forms of local associations and cooperatives were created, thus enabling long term protection of common interests. However, on many occasions, people failed to connect and cooperate, with a negative effect on the environment. As the scholars of rational choice theory argue, this failure was often a result of the so called ‘collective action dilemma.’

Skeptical about the possibility of un-coerced collaboration, in his famous publication *The Logic of Collective Action* (1965), Mancur Olson developed the “zero contribution thesis”, asserting that “unless the number of individuals is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve common or group interests.” (Olson, 1965:2). Similarly, in the well known “Tragedy of Commons” (1968), Garret Hardin developed the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ assumption, arguing that rational individuals were not likely to cooperate in certain settings, even when such cooperation would be to their benefit.

The underlying assumption of public choice theory is that individuals cannot overcome the collective action dilemma without externally enforced rules (Ostrom, 2000). Following classical cost-benefit analysis, Mancur Olson argued that in the situation where everyone can benefit from the collective good (it is non-excludable), where the individual impact is not visible and where no sanctions against non-participation exist (or are too costly to impose), a ‘rational’ individual will use the opportunity to free-ride on the efforts of others. If the majority decides to follow the same logic, eventually there will be no protection of a public good. Thus, there is an imminent danger that the common resources will cease to exist because of the insufficient maintenance and overexploitation. This problem is well described in Hardin’s ‘Tragedy of Commons’ (1968).

Models of environmental activism developed within socio-environmental studies often neglect the logic of collective action, suggesting that perceived environmental risks, socio-demographic characteristics or environmental

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1 The prisoners’ dilemma is based on the situation of two prisoners locked in separate rooms and offered incentives to share guilt, rather than blame each other. Both of them have to decide whether or not to limit his/her own benefits risking that the other prisoner would not do the same.

2 Common good resources are in most cases non-excludable, meaning that it is impossible or very difficult to restrict access to them (e.g. clean air).
awareness (e.g. people who are environmentally aware are more likely to act) provide a satisfactory explanation of this phenomenon (Elliot, Seldon & Regens, 1997, Jones & Dunlap, 1992, Rohrschneider, 1990). However, these studies do not take into account the calculations of individual decision-making in collective action settings (Lubell, 2002). Environmental activism entails a free-riding problem since the benefits of actions are generally non-excludable and individual contributions non-perceptible. For example, clean air is a typical public good that no one can be excluded from enjoying. Consequently, actions such as air pollution abatement will have to deal with the collective action dilemma. This is especially the case in the urban areas with a numerous and generally atomized population. In the large group context (such as the population of a town) where the contribution of anyone’s actions is minimal and not “observable” and shirking almost anonymous, every rational individual will pose the question whether it is worthwhile to join in – for example to reduce the use of vehicles, give money donations to environmental organizations or take part in environmental demonstrations. Following the propositions of public choice theory, in these circumstances environmental activism is very unlikely to happen (Rydin, 1998). However, from time to time people get involved in environmentally inspired actions. In the next section, we will try to explore one of the possible exceptions to the general theory of collective action.

The ‘Social Capital Exemption’ to Collective Action Dilemma

We will open this section with two short stories. The first one occurred a while ago. In the building where one of the authors used to live, an enthusiastic resident, supported by a few elderly tenants, initiated a large week-end clean-up of the courtyard. It was a lovely Saturday morning, ideal for outdoor activities. The author was on the door step, going out to meet some friends (shirking the announced clean-up activity), when a neighbor knocked on the door informing her that the action was about to start. Two or three neighbors stood behind him with ‘strict’ looks on their faces, prepared to tell off anyone who dared to avoid the cleaning event. Feeling a bit ashamed, the author had no other option but to drop running shoes and take a broom into her hands. Probably most readers had a similar experience and accompanying dilemma whether to join in or to evade, and finally gave in to the pressure.
The other story is of an event that occurred a few months ago. The Ministry of the Environment had initiated a large campaign with the catchy motto ‘Let’s clean Serbia!’ The goal of this initiative was to mobilize a large number of people to clean Serbia’s most polluted places. Despite the massive TV campaign, lots of commercials and celebrities involved, a well informed and generally supportive audience, the turnout was rather disappointing. Only the core members of environmental organizations and a very limited number of volunteers got involved. As could be expected, the results were poor.

Both cases are examples of environmentally inspired collective actions. While in the first case the outcome was quite successful, in the latter the overall level of engagement and consequent environmental improvement was unsatisfactory. The obvious question to ask is why the first case was a success story and the second one a failure? How did the actors in one situation overcome the ‘collective action problem’, while in the other they did not? Finally, these examples lead to a more general question – what can motivate/push people to overcome Olson’s problem and to avoid Hardin’s tragedy?

In her renowned piece *Governing the Commons* (1990), Elinor Ostrom analyzed the conditions in which the ‘tragedy of commons’ could be avoided. Under certain institutional arrangements, she argued, groups can use and maintain a common resource on their own — that is, without interference from external authorities (1990: 184). She describes how in small-scale communities, where individuals frequently communicate and interact with each other, rich social networks can be built in order to overcome collective action problems. The ways in which information, relationships and trust are articulated through social networks, and the extent and density of these networks are of particular importance. Norms of reciprocity and interpersonal trust develop within these networks work as a specific glue, keeping people together in joint actions. Besides that, the desire of an individual or group to maintain their reputation in a close-knit social context may lead to the development of a specific behavior and thus facilitate cooperation. In addition, repeated interaction and communication in small-group settings allows individuals and groups to monitor one another and to execute sanctions on non-cooperative behavior.

Going back to the examples given at the beginning of this section, we can draw a conclusion that the jeopardized reputation in the first case (because the avoidance of duties would be visible to the other members of community), was what finally stimulated participation. However, in the second case, there was no strong small-group pressure to join the collective activity. Atomized individuals without links within the wider community
did not participate, because their omission could neither be monitored nor sanctioned. The key difference was made by the social bonds that made ‘free-riding’ visible and enabled sanctioning.

As Putnam (1993) notes, the existence of social capital can facilitate the achievement of certain common goals that in its absence would not be possible. Further on, when individuals are able to overcome the collective action problem in small settings, they may also be able to deal with more complex dilemmas. Following Putnam’s (1993, 2000) and Ostrom’s (1990, 1996) claims about the potential for social capital to embed participation practices, some authors emphasize the role of social capital as a mechanism for maintaining community involvement and problem solving over time and on a larger scale (Brown & Ashman, 1996).

A growing body of literature shows the positive impact of social capital on environmental activism (e.g. on the level of group membership, number of donations given for environmental causes, number of complaints on environmental issues to authorities, level of participation in public meetings and demonstrations, and signing petitions) (Birner & Wittmer 2003; Lubell 2002; Sønderskov, 2008; Wakefield et al. 2006). Other researchers found that social capital could increase participation in public-private environmental programs where participation is not mandatory, thus raising the effectiveness of such programs (Lubell, 2004, Lundquist, 2001, Krishna & Uphoff, 2002, Cramb, 2005, 2006, Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002, Edwards & Onyx, 2002, Wakefield et al, 2006, Sonderskov, 2008 etc.).

Nevertheless, an important distinction has to be made. Although both the bonding and the bridging type of social capital3 can induce higher levels of environmental involvement, only the bridging type of social capital proves to have positive environmental impact on the whole. As the research of Rodríguez & Pascual (2004) points out, bonding social capital does not lead to higher levels of overall cleanliness, since it often imposes negative externalities on outside communities. While bonding social capital can bring about environmental changes in the local settings, thus stimulating NIMBYism (potentially at the expense of other local communities), bridging social capital could bring benefits to the general state of the environment.

As we have seen so far, exceptions to the logic of public non-participation tend to occur in small-group settings, where the potential participants know one another, have some respect and self-esteem to lose, and where internal pressure to comply with group interests is strong. Under such

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3 Bonding social capital refers to ties within relatively homogenous social groups (e.g. family, friends, neighbors) while bridging social capital refers to the connections between heterogeneous social groups or communities.
circumstances, the increased possibility of monitoring and punishing free-riding behavior may make participation more likely. In an environmental context, these forces may lead to greater ability of local residents and neighborhood associations to form relatively effective cleaning campaigns or, for example, to oppose development proposals. However, small group pressure usually induces only localized action, which, as previously mentioned, brings improvements only to the local environment, but not necessarily to the environment taken as a whole. Only when local groups are linked with each other (thus building the bridging social capital) the general improvement of environment can be expected.

Empirical Findings - Case Studies of Pančevo and Bor

More than two decades after the collapse of state socialism, the countries in Central and Eastern Europe still have to deal with serious consequences of 40 years of irresponsible environmental management. In Serbia, the negative impact of the socialist period was further aggravated by the transitional economic crisis and NATO bombing in the 1990s. The main environmental problems in our case studies are the consequences of exactly this critical combination of the socialist legacy (large industrial sights placed very near the residential areas, outdated technology and lack of care for the environment) and the negative effects of transition, economic recession and war.

The data presented in this article were collected in the course of a wider study aiming to explore the main characteristics of public participation in environmental decision-making in two Serbian towns – Bor and Pančevo, both towns facing persistent and alarming ecological problems. In both communities, citizens’ opinions were elicited through a survey on representative samples (Pančevo N=450 and Bor N=350).

Pančevo and Bor were chosen for the case studies as renowned ecological “hot spots”, facing alarming problems of air, water and ground pollution. In each of the local communities the main polluters are positioned in the close vicinity of town centers and residential areas. The most important ecological problems in Pančevo (located near Belgrade) stem from the huge, 50 years old, petro-chemical complex with outdated technology. Bor is a

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4 The research was conducted by the Institute for Sociological Research, Faculty of Philosophy University of Belgrade, within the Regional Research Program Promotion, funded by University of Freiburg, Switzerland. The field research was conducted in Pančevo by the end of 2010 and at the beginning of 2011 in Bor.
peripheral town (located in east Serbia) with a giant metallurgy complex (RTB Bor) constructed during socialism with technology now rather obsolete, which thus produces considerable pollution (e.g. high emission of SO₂). In both localities, the natural environment and public health are under serious threat. In such conditions, a certain level of citizens’ environmental activism is necessary for any serious attempt to improve the overall state of the environment.

Environmental Activism in Pančevo and Bor

*Environmental activism* represents a political act of individuals and/or groups with the intention to influence public policies in the area of environmental protection. In our research this concept was seen as the engagement in the following activities: participation in public meetings, lectures and educative seminars on environmental issues, petitioning, participation in protests, boycott, donating money to environmental organizations, campaigning and meeting local politicians (Table 1.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Environmental activism in Pančevo and Bor</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lectures and educative seminars on environmental issues</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signing petitions</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in protests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boycott of ecologically irresponsible companies and their products</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial support for environmental organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in environmental campaigns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Meeting local politicians</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 reports the levels of personal participation in various forms of environmental activism. The findings indicate that more than two-thirds of
respondents from both towns have never participated in any of the listed activities. The average respondent both from Bor and Pančevo was most likely to sign a petition (about 40% in both towns). On the other hand, in activities such as meeting local politicians or giving financial support to environmental organizations, around 90% of respondents have never got involved.

In order to get a more accurate picture of the overall level of environmental activism in the two communities, we have constructed the index of environmental activism\(^5\) based on the participation in the abovementioned activities (Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Index of environmental activism (%)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pančevo</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bor</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In both towns, more than half of the participants in the survey demonstrated a low level of environmental activism, while more than one third (34.4%) of respondents from Bor and more than one fourth (26.4%) from Pančevo showed a moderate level of environmental activism. On the other hand, less than 10% of citizens in both communities displayed a high level of environmental activism (Table 2).

The intended activism (measured in the declared readiness for future participation in the listed activities) is also considerably low in both communities. About 85% of respondents from Pančevo and 75% from Bor do not plan to get engaged in any type of environmentally inspired actions in the near future. As the data indicate, despite serious environmental problems, a large majority of citizens in both local communities is not active and does not intend to get more environmentally involved.

### Social Capital in Pančevo and Bor

Although there are many different definitions of social capital, in this paper we rely on the Putnam’s formula which equates social capital with generalized trust, norms of reciprocity and networks (Putnam, 2000). The

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\(^5\) The index of environmental activism is calculated taking into account citizens’ participation in the listed activities (participation in public meetings, protests, boycotts, signing petitions, etc) in the last three years.
rationale for this particular choice of definition is based on the fact it has been largely used in empirical researches with well developed research tools (thus enabling comparisons).

(a) Social trust is a belief that people are generally trustworthy and that most people share the same basic norms and act accordingly. Relations of trust make co-operation much easier, since instead of having to monitor others, individuals are able to trust them to act as expected. The distinction could be made between two types of trust: we have specific trust in particular individuals whom we know; and we have generalized trust in those we do not know, but which is still there because of our confidence in a known social structure. While specific trust can reduce the problems of collective action between people who know each other, generalized trust can be expected to foster cooperation between actors who do not know one another.

Empirical findings show that more than 60% of survey participants from Bor demonstrated a low level of generalized trust in the people in their community, around one third of respondents expressed medium levels of trust, while only 2.8% claimed a high level of trust. In Pančevo, nearly half of the respondents (46.7%) stated a low level of generalized trust, while about one third demonstrated a medium level of trust. In comparison to respondents from Bor, citizens in Pančevo are slightly more trustful regarding their community members. However, the overall conclusion is that both communities seriously lack generalized trust.

(2) Norms of reciprocity give individuals more confidence to invest in collective activities, knowing that others will do the same. Reciprocity also increases trust and develops long-term obligations between people, which could assist in achieving positive collective outcomes. However, both in Pančevo (62.2%) and Bor (54.3%), the majority of the survey participants declared disbelief in the existence of reciprocity norms in their communities.

(3) Networks are usually considered a vital aspect of social capital. They function as channels for provision of information and also as means of mobilization, participation and cooperation. Survey results suggest that almost two-thirds of the respondents from Pančevo (64.7%) have weak ties; about 30% established moderate connections with other community members, while less than one-tenth claimed to have strong ties. In the case of Bor, particularly interesting is the fact that no one claimed to have strong relations with other community members. Moreover, more than two thirds of the respondents claimed to have weak ties (69.4%), while less than one third stated having moderately strong ties.

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6 The strength of the networks was measured on the basis of a composite index with three levels: weak, moderate and strong.
As we can see, all three components of social capital are underdeveloped in the examined communities. In order to obtain a complete picture, we have constructed a composite index of social capital.7

Table 3. Index of social capital (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Social capital (%)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pančevo</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bor</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results displayed in Table 3 show that the social capital is generally low in both communities, although the situation is somewhat better in Pančevo. Almost two thirds (64.3%) of the respondents living in Bor and nearly half (49.7%) of those residing in Pančevo declared having low levels of social capital. Further, almost one third (32.8%) of respondents from Bor and slightly above one quarter (27.2%) from Pančevo had a medium level of social capital. Finally, a high level of social capital in Pančevo was claimed by 17.5% of respondents, which is double the number of the respondents from Bor (8.6%) who claimed the same amount of social capital.

So far, we have seen that environmental activism and social capital are underdeveloped in both communities. The next step is to determine whether there is a positive relationship between the two phenomena. We have hypothesized that citizens who have more social capital are also more likely to participate in environmental activism. To test this idea we have conducted correlation analysis in which we investigated the interaction of social capital and environmental activism. The analysis found a statistically significant link between the variables of social capital and environmental activism (\( \rho = 0.311, p < 0.001 \)). The positive correlation indicates that the higher level of social capital is followed by a higher level of environmental involvement. In other words, more social capital is related to a higher level of intention to become engaged in environmental activities.

Further, we wanted to investigate whether there is a difference in effect of social capital on environmental activism in the two researched communities. For this purpose we have employed the two-way between-groups analysis of variance (table 4).

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7 The index of social capital was calculated taking into account citizens’ trust, norms of reciprocity and networks. The index of social capital is a scale with three levels: low, moderate and high.
Data presented in Table 4 show that there are no statistically significant differences in environmental activism between Bor and Pancevo ($p = .914$), meaning that the place of residence does not have effect on the level of environmental activism. The results also indicate that there is no statistically significant interaction between the social capital and the town variable ($p = .320$). However, at the $p = 0.00$ significance level, there is enough evidence to conclude that there are statistically significant differences in mean value of environmental activism among respondents with different levels of social capital (figure 1).

8 The graph illustrates how respondents with the higher levels of social capital also tend to be more environmentally active. The differences between the Pancevo and Bor samples are not statistically relevant.
Once we have determined that differences in environmental activism exist among the group means, post hoc pairwise and multiple comparisons are utilized to determine which means differ. These tests systematically compare each of the pairs of groups and indicate whether there is a significant difference in the means of each (Table 5). The results indicate that there is a significant difference in environmental activism between all three groups (levels) of social capital, meaning that each group of social capital is accompanied with a different level of environmental activism.

**Table 5. Tukey’s HSD test of mean value of the environmental activism for different levels of social capital**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(I) Social capital</th>
<th>(J) Social capital</th>
<th>Mean Difference (I-J)</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lower Bound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>-2.8226*</td>
<td>.70158</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-4.4741 -1.1711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>-6.5564*</td>
<td>.97857</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>-8.8599 -4.2529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>2.8226*</td>
<td>.70158</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.1711 4.4741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>-3.7338*</td>
<td>1.05400</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>-6.2149 -1.2527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>6.5564*</td>
<td>.97857</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>4.2529 8.8599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>3.7338*</td>
<td>1.05400</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>1.2527 6.2149</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on observed means. The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 33.890.

* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.

**Conclusion**

Many different factors shape the characteristics of environmentalism in a particular country. However, this paper focuses solely on the possible effects of social capital on citizen activism in environmental issues. The findings suggest that social capital does matter - those individuals who have more social capital (stronger social ties, more generalized trust and belief in the existence of mutual reciprocity) are also more likely to engage in environmentally inspired action. This allows us to assume that one of the reasons for underdeveloped environmental activism might be lack of social capital. Broken ties, lack of interpersonal trust and disbelief in readiness of the others to follow the norms of reciprocity, impede people to join collective initiatives. Lack of trust automatically raises the risks/costs of participation, since people believe that they could easily be betrayed and left alone. On the other hand, underdeveloped interpersonal and intergroup networks and isolation do not offer adequate mechanisms
for mobilization and environmental causes, nor for the proper monitoring and sanctioning of free riders. Additionally, as could be expected, in the context of inefficient state mechanisms for environmental management, lack of citizen environmental activism reduces possibility of systematic environmental change.

However, any generalizations of these findings, due to the rather limited samples, have certain limitations. Nevertheless, the results highlight the importance of social capital when trying to understand why citizens might or might not get engaged in environmental protection. In addition, the limitations of this analysis provide fertile ground for future research based on larger samples and more refined statistical techniques (which surpasses the scope of this text).

Bibliography


Women’s Groups and Networks as a Source of Social Capital

**Introductory remarks.** The gender perspective introduces into the analysis of the concept of social capital the dimension of gender inequality, which has not been taken into account by leading theorists of social capital, such as Robert Putnam. In his later texts, R. Putnam expresses the opinion that the level of participation in social groups and networks has generally dropped in the USA, which is particularly dangerous for women, since they have already had a much lower level of social inclusion. The position taken by theorists who introduce the gender perspective into the analysis of social capital (I. Brougel, R. Lister) has inspired us to place the focus of the analysis, in this text, on the women’s groups and networks, as well as types, functions and output of the social capital that they produce. The organization of civil society connects women who are very different and the similarity that bonds them together is that women as a social group share the same social experience as well (Iris M. Young 2002, 41). In that

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*This paper is the result of research on the project “Protection of human and minority rights in the European legal space” no.179046, funded by the Ministry of Science and Technology of the Republic of Serbia.*


2 Analyzing the concept of social group, Iris Young says that discrimination relates to the structural phenomenon which makes the social group weak and passive. In fact, we differentiate among people in society itself according to social groups, such as men and women, age groups, racial and ethnic groups, religious groups and so forth. However, “such social groups are not simply mere sums of people, they are essentially intertwined with identities of people that are described and who belong to them. They are a special type of collectivity, with special consequences depending on how they understand themselves and how others understand them. Social groups comprise individuals which are different from at least one other social group in cultural norms, way of life. Members of a group possess a special affinity towards each other due to their similar experience or way of life, which bonds them more among themselves than to those who do not identify with the group. Groups are an expression of social relations; a group exists only in relation to at least one more group.” More on this in: Young, M. Iris, “Five Faces of Oppression”, in Asumah, Seth and Johnston-Anumonwo, Ibipo, ed., *Diversity, Multiculturalism and Social Justice*, Global Publications Binghamton University, New York, 2002.
sense, we can talk both about bonding and bridging as the functions of social capital of women gathered in women’s groups.

The basic issue of interest is whether women, organized into groups and networks, produce general social and cultural capital or work on the empowerment of the “women’s world”. The second important issue is whether such groups and networks bond women and men through interests of the community to which they belong, changing the common social milieu, or separate them and enclose into male and female networks, which promote their own, particular interests?

The gender dimension of social capital

In sociology, social capital is regarded as a medium for networking individual and common good. Social capital is recognized as the source of solidarity and welfare for all individuals regardless of their participation in its production. R. Putnam, J. Coleman, and F. Fukuyama speak of the social capital as a necessary requirement for the integration and raising the democratic capacity of the contemporary society. Social capital is made operative through the concepts of trust, norms and networks. For Putnam, social capital is defined as "connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them" (Putnam 2000, 19). Most importantly, this is understood as both a structural phenomenon (social networks) and a cultural phenomenon (social norms). In this study we focus primarily upon the social networks generated through the participation of gender associations, acknowledging that this is only one form of social capital, which may contribute to generating other forms of capital. Bourdieu’s theory, through burning questions of our time, offers various points of contact with the contemporary feminist theory; among many other, it is the question of the relation between social movements (above all, women’s movements) and social changes. P. Bourdieu’s analysis of social capital can also be understood in this context. Namely, Bourdieu says: “Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition or, in other words, to membership in a group which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them

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to credit, in various senses of the word” (Bourdieu 2002, 286). Considering that the capital is made operative through diverse kinds of capital (social, cultural, symbolic), all forms of capital are in men’s possession due to men’s prevalence. Ever since the second part of the 20th century, women have been fighting against “the causality of the possible”, which is deeply rooted in the women’s habitus. Men have priority in: formal education, income, skills, human and social lifetime, social networking. A big step in the perception of social capital was made by the feminist theory when it redefined the major points of the concept of social capital, emphasizing its gender dimension and relationships of power. We find significant the approach to social capital employed by I. Bruegel and R. Lister, who define social capital and its influence on the position of women from different standpoints. For I. Bruegel, the key moment of the analysis is how social capital can empower women to change the status quo in the society which relates to their position. “The women used their social capital to provide resources for the wider community. A highly individualistic form of analysis might conceptualize this as exploitation; it is probably more helpful to regard it as an extension of an ethic of care beyond the family, and an illustration of how social capital is gendered, with both positive and negative connotations. In place of an individualistic framework, a more gendered approach to social capital would emphasize connectivity and the social structuring of individual wants and desires” (Bruegel, 2005:4). Furthermore, R. Lister focuses on the power of women’s networks and their capacity to initiate social and political change (Lister, 2005). In her text, V. Lowdens poses the questions important for the interpretation of relations between women and social capital: Do women have as much social capital as men? Is women’s social capital the same as men’s? Do women use their social capital in the same way as men? R. Inglehart and P. Norris in the text *Gendering Social Capital: Bowling in Women’s Leagues?* (Lowdens, 2003). In their texts, Inglehart and Norris provide answers to some of these questions, which open the problem of contribution of women’s groups and networks to opportunities in life, public and private good. Certainly, as they say, the specific position of women during the development of civilization is obvious and significant, that is, the important fact is that women belong to groups bonded to home, friends, local community, which are all without a major economic and political impact. “Today in many countries certain types of organizations remain disproportionately male, including political parties, sports clubs, the peace movement, professional groups, labor unions, and community associations. By contrast women continue to predominate in
associations related to traditional female roles, including those concerned with education and the arts, religious and church organizations, and those providing social welfare services for the elderly or handicapped, as well as women’s groups” (Inglehart and Norris 2003a, 2). This type of association can have positive effects (bonding capital) on the same-sex members, but can also, as authors note, intensify gender division and enclose women into those spheres of social life which do not have social power at their disposal. “In a perfectly sex-segmented society, the problem is not that women are not bowling, but rather that they are bowling in women’s leagues” (Ibid, 5).

The end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century show that the position of women in modern society is undergoing a significant change. However, the difference in the level of participation, power and social influence between women’s and men’s groups is still obvious and maintained. Inglehart and Norris provide convincing evidence for this gendered pattern of civic participation which corroborates the assumptions that women participate less in political parties, unions, and professional associations which are male-dominated, while they tend to join organizations associated with education, the arts, religious institutions, and care-oriented activities. This pattern holds across the countries of the developed West, while they emphasize that there are certain specificities present in other parts of the world, post-communist parties or Latin America (Ibid, 2003, 11).

The specific difference between social capital possessed by women and social capital possessed by men lies in the gender peculiarity of social capital for M. Moulinaux, because “[n]etworks reflect social relations. They are governed by gendered social divisions and these affect the ways they access resources such as time, money and status. For all their forms of engagement, there are some common features of ‘women’s social capital’ and these tend to differentiate it from men’s. Women’s social capital generally: is based close to home, in the locality rather than in the public world of work; involves exchanges of time and skills rather than money; includes a significant proportion of voluntary and caring work; often involves affective or ethical issues, a degree of altruism, and frequently mobilizes sentiments associated with motherhood; can bridge across community divisions but is often ‘bonding’ rather than ‘birthing’” (Molineaux, 2005: 6).
women, we can now direct our interest towards the question of the types of social capital produced by female networks. Thus, the basic question is which type of social capital comes from their activities and who possesses the newly-created capital, whether it is only women or women’s groups working for the public good. Hypothetically, the danger that exists is that the male-female world will remain divided and that that division will become a huge gender gap. Despite the extensive literature on social capital and its increasing visibility in public policy, there is a surprising absence of attention paid to the role women play in creating and maintaining social life through their own networks and forms of solidarity.

Bridging social capital refers to social networks that bring together people of different sorts, and bonding social capital brings together people of a similar sort. This is an important distinction because the externalities of groups that are bridging are likely to be positive, while networks that are bonding (limited within particular social niches) are at greater risk of producing externalities that are negative. This observation leads to the issue at the heart of this study: in particular, does associational life serve to widen social equality between women and men, thereby expanding the ‘bridging’ social capital, or does it serve to reinforce the bonding of the same-sex networks which promote either women’s or men’s interests?

When related to issues of gender equality, bridging groups are essentially inclusive across the sexes, reflecting the composition of the general population by bringing together a fairly even distribution of women and men. By contrast, bonding groups reinforce close-knit networks among people sharing similar backgrounds and beliefs, generating an uneven distribution of women or men. “At the most extreme, a male-only bonding group would be the Augusta Golf Club, which excludes any women from membership. A female equivalent would be a battered women support group that excluded any male participants, even the victims of domestic violence” (Inglehart and Norris 2003a, 2). “Linking” capital implies vertical links which enable the access of women, minority groups and rural population to diverse information, common good, or include them in decision-making processes. Different types of capital, as P. Bourdieu observes, determine life strategies and capabilities of people, those who possess them or those who do not. According to all indicators in the world, and especially in Serbia, economic capital (in “cooperation” with political capital), as well as social, cultural, and even symbolic capital of the Serbian society, is still on the side of men. The analysis of history textbooks shows that they contain a small number of female artists, scientists, rulers – it seems that the Serbian
history is exclusively male. Women’s groups and networks have increased the level of capital possessed by women, but also the public good as the universal capital of the Serbian society.

The development of women’s groups and networks in the world and in Serbia.

The feminist movement or the second wave of women’s movement was formed in the late 1960s and 1970s. As a social movement it encompassed a wide area and posed the question of gender equality as a political issue in all Western democracies. Feminism was focused on the description of the system of relations (structures) where subordination of women was taking place, trying to explain how differences between men and women occur, and why women were discriminated in the whole array of social institutions. In fact, it changed the dichotomies private/public, paid/unpaid labor, and equality/difference. Thus, the women’s movement was simultaneously a social theory and a worldview, that is, it was a set of ideas and specific action/engagement. The backbone of women’s activism was the fight against women subordination and socially prescribed/appointed gender roles. The feminist movement/women’s movement is the most important social movement of the 20th century (LeGates 2001, ix-x), which today encompasses and indicates all those people who take active participation, at different social levels, in various women’s groups and networks, achieving women’s rights. Today, feminism is in its third phase in America and Europe, and in that context it “belongs to a free individual aware of her various identities (sexual,

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4 The second wave of women’s movement/feminism (neofeminism) was created on the basis of the suffragette movement in the 1960s. In the beginning, neofeminism of Western Europe and America had to fight for the most elementary civil rights. In America, England, France, Italy and other countries of Western democracy, it gathered a population of educated, middle-class women, who asked for equal family rights equal pay for men and women, the abolition of sexist opinions in public, free contraception and abortion, free child care, as well as equal opportunity in education and profession. The National Organization of Women – NOW was established in America in 1971 with 10,000 members, the Women’s Liberation Movement was formed in Great Britain in 1970, Mouvement de liberation des femmes – MLF began its work in 1970 in France, while Italian feminists issued their manifesto Rivolta Feminile in 1970. Later on, in the coming years of the 20th century, women managed to become present through their work and constant action with their ideas, demands, activities, organizations and groups in all parts of the society, thus changing the sexist institutions and customs. Today, there is a vast network of women’s organizations and groups (of various orientations, currents, irreconcilable beliefs, but with the same goal), departments of women’s and gender studies at universities, research institutes, journals, publications and books, as well as a great number of female (and male) researchers, theorists, and activists.
racial, territorial), with the right to her own choices” (Jarić, Radović 2010, 57). Today, the third-wave feminism, which focuses on the “politics of identity”, is directed towards queer theory, post-colonial theory and/or critical theory.

The introduction of feminist ideas in Serbia was connected with the activity of a small number of highly educated women, who were aware of the challenge of emancipation of women in this region and the conflict with the “Balkan syndrome” in the gendered system of values. However, despite the general retraditionalization of the society and various adverse social circumstances, women in Serbia managed to substantially change the picture of social reality after the downfall of socialism and its ideology. Women’s groups and networks in Serbia dealt with the fundamental issue of life of women, increasing the public good, both for men and women. Belgrade associated its feminist activity in the beginning with public discussions held in the Student Cultural Center (in the period from 1970 to 1992). Women gathered in that building in an informal manner, unorganized, without a firm academic framework, rather propagating a “specifically feminist” lifestyle. The first feminist group in Belgrade, Woman and Society, was founded by several women, the “female pioneers” of women’s movement. This group encompassed highly educated women, who through

5 Female intellectuals in socialist countries also managed to articulate feminist ideas in their “niches”. The international conference Comrade-ess Woman – Women’s Issue – Women’s Approach was held in Belgrade in 1979, promoting the contemporary feminism in this region. The aim of this gathering of women was to present feminism, then still a taboo in that region and media. The official policy, through the organizations of women within SSRN, assessed this “new approach” to the women’s issue negatively. From that point on, modern feminism entered media and scientific journals, sometimes slowly, sometimes barely visibly. The first Yugoslav feminist congress was held in Ljubljana in 1987, the second in Zagreb in 1989, and the third and last feminist meeting in the second Yugoslavia was held in March 1990 in Belgrade. More on this in: Božinović, Neda, Žensko pitanje u Srbiji u XIX i XX veku, Feministička 94, Beograd, 1996, pp. 219–222.

6 The group dealt actively with problems of discrimination, violence against women, gender stereotypes, etc. It initiated and supported the establishment of many other groups: SOS Telephone for Women and Children, Victims of Violence – 1990, groups Women’s Lobby, Women’s Parliament, Women in Black Against War – 1991, while the Center for Women’s Studies, Research and Communication was established in 1992. During the war, the feminist group participated in the formation of the Center for Anti-war Action and a number of peace actions. The group continued its activity within Center for Women’s Studies, Research and Communication, while aiming to develop a wider feminist network in SRY since 1996. The feminist group Woman and Society was registered under the name Association for Women’s Initiative in 1997, continuing to work on spreading its basic idea – the improvement of the quality of life of women – by strengthening the women’s activism, creating new groups, and organizing women. More on this in: Vušković, Lina i Trivunac, Sofija, “Feministička grupa Žena i društvo” u: Blagojević, Marina, pr., Ka vidljivoj ženskoj istoriji – Ženski pokret u Beogradu 90-tih, Centar za ženske studije, istraživanja i komunikaciju, Beograd, 1998.
debates and lectures explained and understood the patriarchal institutions of the society from a “women’s perspective”, in an attempt to initiate and develop feminist activism. The group dealt actively with various aspects of discrimination and violence against women. They were also the founders of the first SOS telephone in Belgrade, in 1990, offering help to women and children – victims of violence. Belgrade has been a fertile ground for ideas, research and actions of the women’s movement – since 1990 until today, later joined by Novi Sad and Niš.

Feminist ideas and practice have created an alternative cultural space in Serbia with a number of different groups,7 such as women’s groups fighting against violence: SOS-telephone for Women and Children Victims of Violence, Autonomous Women’s Center Against Sexual Violence, Safe Women’s Houses, Counsel for Women Victims of Violence, SOS-telephone and Center for Girls, Incest Trauma Center, Sara – Center for Youth; political women’s groups: for the promotion of women’s political rights, fight against war and violence, and support of the creation of a civil society: Women’s Party – ŽEST, Women’s Parliament, Women’s Lobby, Women in Black, Voice of Difference; women’s groups which deal with double discrimination of women: groups offering help to refugees, Swallow – Safe House for Women from Krajina; groups offering help to disabled women, Support Group for Disabled Women Who Have Survived Violence, and lesbian group: Arcadia / Labris – group for lesbian human rights; there are, also, legal groups: Group for Women’s Rights of the European Movement in Serbia, Women’s Legal Group and Women’s Lawyer Center; as education groups: Center for Women’s Studies, Research and Communication8. There is a women’s publishing house “94”, while feminist theory and women’s movement are visible in the publication of journals: Feminist Notebooks, Women’s Studies, Pro Femina, Temida, which are intended for women’s action and practice, feminist theory and research, human rights and gender, as well as female artistic creation. Also organized are women’s groups engaging in feminist artistic creation (literature, film, painting). Furthermore, there is a group


8 The alternative, non-academic program of women’s studies within the women’s movement in Serbia was first introduced by the Center for Women’s Studies, Research and Communication in Belgrade in 1992. Later, at the initiative of the women from the University, who were part of the women’s movement in Serbia, academic programs of women’s studies were introduce, the first in 1993 at the Faculty of Philosophy in u Beograd. The institutionalization of women’s studies and gender studies continues at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade and the Faculty of Philosophy in Novi Sad at master’s and doctoral studies. Women’s/gender studies are today present in all universities in Serbia in various forms.
of women, feminist researchers in certain institutions (institutes and faculties), who work on legal, criminal, sociological, and psychological research.

Following Belgrade, and with the help of female volunteers from Belgrade women’s groups, the establishment of women’s groups began all over the country. First, SOS-telephones were set up, and later other women’s groups were founded. The SOS-telephone for women and children victims of violence was set up in Niš in 1993, and the Women’s Research Center for Education and Communication was established in 1998. Today, women’s groups based on self-help and self-organization of women exist in: Niš, Pančevo, Užice, Čačak, Prijepolje, Kragujevac, Kruševac, Kikinda, Sombor, Novi Sad, Subotica, Zrenjanin, Vršac, Vlasotince, Leskovac.

Women’s initiatives

At the very beginning of the establishment of a visible women’s movement in Serbia, at the third women’s meeting in March 1990, feminists demanded from the state and social institutions an adequate solution to problems of violence against women and children, that the violence be treated as a social problem, not as an individual-pathological phenomenon and private matter, as well as the legal rights of women victims of violence be respected and ensured. They also suggested the amendments to the Criminal Law (incrimination of the criminal act of marital rape), the Law on Criminal Procedure (criminal acts of light bodily injury and endangering safety should be processed under official duty, and not on the basis of a private legal action), and the Marriage and Family Law (child and spouse alimony should be determined by percent of the personal income, depending on the age of the child and the needs of the divorcee). Feminist groups Women and Society, Belgrade Women’s Lobby and Women’s Party addressed the presidential office of the former SFRY in 1991 concerning the relation between the state of Yugoslavia and its republics and the documents of the UN and other international organizations dealing with women and defining women’s rights in various areas of society (Ćetković, 1998: 63–82).9

9 It is the case of the following Conventions: UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, ILO UN Convention no. 111 on discrimination in employment and occupation, ILO UN Convention no. 100 on equal remuneration for male and female workers, ILO UN Convention no. 156 on workers with family responsibility, ILO UN Convention no. 89 on night work of women, ILO UN Convention no. 103 on maternity protection, and ILO UN Convention no. 45 on prohibition of underground work for women. The idea was to form national committees and ministries for women, similar to the developed countries of Western democracy, to enable a swifter realization of goals presented in the above UN Conventions.
Petitions, requests and appeals of feminist groups were submitted to the highest state institutions and bodies from the 1990s in order to amend the articles of the law that violate human rights of women. First it was demanded from the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia to establish the *Ministry for Women* and *Women’s Parliament*. Women’s groups offered an amendment to the proposal of the *Constitution of Serbia* in 1990, demanding: equal two-gender addressing, free decision making by women concerning childbirth, violence in the family to be treated as a social problem, and that a victim of violence be appointed a prosecutor in the criminal procedure under official duty. Women’s groups filed a petition in 1990 concerning the passing of the *Resolution on the Basis of the Unified Policy on Population Renewal in Serbia*, protesting against the violation of constitutional rights to the freedom of decision making by women concerning if, when and how many children they would have. Women’s group also offered amendments to the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia in 1992 to Articles 16 and 17 of the *Housing Law*, demanding that both spouses made decisions on the buyout of state-owned apartments, that both spouses signed the contract with the apartment owner as equal contracting parties, that is, equal bearers of residential rights. When the *Draft of the Law on Conditions and Procedure for Termination of Pregnancy* was passed in 1994, women’s groups addressed the President of the Republic of Serbia and offered an amendment to the proposal of the Law. The Law was returned to the Assembly for revision, and the final text included the amendments proposed by the women’s groups, among others.

Women’s initiatives coming from legal groups were directed towards promotion, protection, and improvement of human rights of women. In 1995, the Group for Women’s Rights of the European Movement of Serbia called for the UN to fulfill their obligations from the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, which protected everyone “regardless of the differences in their race, color, gender, language... and other.” They also demanded the compliance with the *Vienna Declaration of the World Conference on Human Rights* which stated that human rights of women and girls – children are an indefeasible, constituent, and inseparable part of universal human rights. The Group for Women’s Rights filed a petition that same year to the National Assembly of the RS and the Government of the RS for the amendment of the Criminal Law of the RS through incriminating the marital rape of women and violent behavior against women in marriage and family. The Women’s Legal Group was formed in 1996 as part of the project Empowerment of Women’s Legal Groups in the countries of Eastern
Europe and USSR, with the aim of conducting a feminist analysis of laws and their application.

The feminist group *Women in Black* is the oldest peace group in Serbia, whose members demonstrated every Wednesday in the center of Belgrade against war, during the 1990s. Since 1991 until today, they have been protesting against war, ethnic cleansing, and violation of human rights. Feminist groups in Serbia held an organized protest against wartime rapes of women, interment in camps, as well as the unregulated refugee status. Women from feminist groups unambiguously advocated peace against war, and they were against all of those who supported war in this region. Three women’s organizations: Women’s Parliament, Belgrade Women’s Lobby, and Women’s Party organized together the first anti-war demonstrations in front of the Serbian House of the National Assembly.

Alternative political space was formed by women’s feminist groups in the wartime and transition Serbia. In the period of creation of a multi-party life in Serbia during the 1990s, several feminist groups were formed – *Women’s Party, Belgrade Women’s Lobby,* and *Women’s Parliament.* Belgrade Women’s Lobby directed its activity towards the status of women in political parties, organizing election campaigns in the light of women’s political rights and advocating women’s interests in politics. Numerous political parties had female members, but the level of representation of women in the Assembly was at its lowest since World War II.

Activists of women’s groups participated actively in the civic resistance movement against the regime of Slobodan Milošević. Whistles and walks were the characteristics of the movement which was used by women’s groups Autonomous Women’s Center, SOS, Feminist 94, and Belgrade Women’s Lobby to initiate the campaign *Women Whistle* (Blagojević, 1998: 356–365). The women’s group for the promotion of women’s political rights, the Voice of Difference, was established in 1999. The Voice of Difference started working intensely and vehemently from its very beginning on the promotion of greater presence of women in public and political life.

At the beginning of 2000, the idea of women’s participation in the forthcoming political process was clearly delineated. Under the patronage of the Working Group on Gender Equality within the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, the Palić Conference was held in February 2000.¹⁰ It gathered women from four different spheres – media, politics, unions, unions,
and non-governmental organizations. The entire process of consultation and organization of the campaign was directed towards women-voters. The idea of the need for a greater participation of women in politics at decision-making positions was clearly articulated at the conference.

The network Women Can Do It (initiated by AŽIN together with the Working Group on Gender Equality within the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe) conducted the program “Knowledge for Democracy” in 43 towns in Vojvodina and Serbia, whose task was to educate female members of democratically oriented political parties, local NGOs and unions activists. That same year, during the pre-electoral period, the conference “Women’s Political Perspective” was held in Palić in organization of UNIFEMA and Women’s Political Action, where women from parties, NGO, media, and union representatives clearly stated their demand for an equal treatment of women in the political sphere. Women organized four pre-electoral campaigns at the national level, six regional and numerous local ones. The Voice of Difference organized the campaign Your Vote, the Voice of Difference intended for female voting population, during which the campaign Door to Door was also conducted, where 45,000 women were interviewed in 28 towns (Višnjić, 2011: 7–8).

One of the results of Palić Conference was the formation of the Women’s Political Network. Female members of all DOS parties participated in its work without any difference. WPN exerted several types of pressure on its party structures during its existence – primarily on the preservation of the unity of DOS, and also on the nomination of a greater number of women of the lists. The leaders of DOS were offered to sign a document agreeing to do everything in their power to provide more than 30% of women in DOS lists.

Women in Serbia voted for social and political changes in great numbers, 69% of women voted for democratic changes. Bonding and coordinated activity of female politicians, union members, journalists, and women from women’s groups led to such an effective vote casting by women.

At the elections in September 2000, women won only 8 out of 178 seats in the Federal Assembly. There were no female ministers in the Federal Government. That was why women’s groups continued to transform the political and public space. After the September election of 2000, the activity was directed towards increasing the participation of women in system institutions. The immediate goal was to create a normative framework for a greater participation of women in assemblies as representative bodies. The long-term goal was to create a precondition for active engagement of women in the work of system institutions, developing the policy, and mak-
ing social decisions. To achieve those goals, it was necessary to establish and adopt special measures (measures of positive discrimination), which would contribute to the increase in the number of women in assemblies.

Within the area of political rights of women, the activists of women’s groups participated in the writing of comments and amendments to laws, analyzed the compliance of the laws with EU standards, commented upon and monitored state strategies and implementation of laws, organized training for education of female politicians and state service representatives, organized conferences and public discussions, connected female NGO, union, political party, and media representatives, wrote textbooks, training guidelines and publications on political participation of women (Ibid, 9).

Furthermore, the contribution made by women’s networks in the fight against violence in the family has been of utmost importance, both for individuals and the society. The network Women against Violence was formed in 2005, as part of the fight for the reduction of violence against women in Serbia. The network of specialist women’s non-governmental organizations has been focused on providing services to women who had survived violence through SOS telephones, counsels, centers, shelters, safe houses, or crisis centers. The change in the socio-cultural context of family violence has taken place through research, advocating women’s rights to life without violence, permanent education at all levels, lobbying for laws on protection from violence, and other. It is certain that women’s NGOs have conceived a holistic approach to this problem which includes a comprehensive institutional support to women victims of violence. Their two-decade work, at first marginalized and later socially accepted and institutionalized,11 shows that women have, after all, succeeded in achieving a certain massiveness and synergy in this area, which have resulted in the institutionalized solution of this problem, as well as significant public and media presence. Since 2001, the National Campaign Against Gender Violence, organized by the Autonomous Women’s Center and women’s non-governmental organizations, has been conducted every year in 40 Serbian towns (within the international campaign 16 Days of Activism Against Gender Violence).

11 The total number of respondents included 1512 people: 791 women and 694 men. From the total number of respondents involved in the study, there were only 27 respondents (19 women and 8 men) who declared to work for some women’s group (1.8%). European Value Study, 2008.
Women’s groups and women’s networks: production of social capital

R. Putnam drew attention to the hugely important role of volunteer groups and networks for increase in the level of trust in society and development of the community on democratic foundations. The classic example of volunteer groups are women’s networks, which appear as a type of organization of women, against numerous men’s groups with long tradition, that have presupposed better social positions with employment opportunities. The activity of women’s groups and networks in Serbia has led to the changing position of women and the increasing chances that social capital, as well as the one embodied in political networks, institutional, cultural/education capital, and even symbolic capital, will be more in the hands of women. Actions and initiatives of this, not that massive, gathering of women’s groups and networks, have led to a change in the dominantly traditional nature of the society we live in. The fundamental values concerning human rights of women, promoted through the women’s movement, have become part of the general social values, which can be seen in the nature of newly-established and improved institutions, as well as enacted laws.

If we pose the question “Are women’s groups enclosed within a group or gender (bonding), thus preserving the “cult” of fighting for women’s right, or do they contribute to the overall democratic capacity of the Serbian society by changing the nature of the Serbian society with the aim of democratization”, the answer that we promote is that there is no doubt that women’s groups and networks have contributed to the increase of social resources and democratic values in Serbia by:

1. Political participation in decision-making processes;
2. Democratic normative system in the family and politics;¹²

¹² Constitution of the Republic of Serbia – guarantees the equality between men and women and the development of the policy of equal opportunity. Labor Law – prohibits gender discrimination, as well as sexual harassment at work. Election Law – prescribes a system of 30% share for less represented sex in the parliamentary, provincial and local election. Criminal Law – sanctions family violence and marital rape; trafficking is defined as organized crime (most common victims of trafficking are women). Family Law – regulates relations between partners, protects children’s rights, introduces special measures against violence and improves adoption procedures, as well as the dissolution of marriage. Law on Gender Equality – creates conditions for conducting the policy of equal opportunity, provides measures for the removal of discriminations and the procedure of legal protection. Law on Prohibition of Discrimination – regulates the general prohibition of discrimination and procedures for protection against discrimination.
3. Level of education, Women’s/Gender studies;
4. Women’s artistic work;
5. Emotional capital and cultural patterns;
6. Groups against violence, political groups and legal groups, that have largely contributed to the bridging of social capital by promoting the concept of female values and turning them into accepted cultural norms and social patterns; and
7. Care ethics as an accepted manner of social organization of women.

The women’s movement has been initiated and organized/led by a small group of educated and enthusiastic women. We would like to say that women’s groups, regardless of the inner dissonance and unfavorable, total, social context, have been more stable and have shown a higher degree of inner solidarity than other NGOs in Serbia. The output of this movement is great, because it has managed, among other things, to participate in the socialization of important civic attitudes and behavior. Even though it is not a massive movement in Serbia, it influences the organization of women from deprived or marginalized groups – women victims of violence, Roma women, single mothers, and other. Its bonding dimension becomes apparent at that level within the “female solidarity”, but the bridging dimension of social capital appears also, bridging the different types of social realities of women, segmented through their families, ethnic groups and layers in transitional Serbia. The activity of women’s groups and networks in Serbia has, to a great extent, created public good, which has substantially influenced the positive steps in designing the modern Serbian society.

Bibliography


Abstract

The aim of this article is to investigate social and political determinants of trust towards democratic institutions in the Western Balkans as part of the wider European region.

Trust has been considered a vital element of social capital by i.a. F. Fukuyama (1995) or R. Putnam (2000). In democratic regimes citizens’ decisions in the process of delegating power are made under conditions of uncertainty about motivations and future actions of political leaders. Trust in state institutions is therefore one of the key principles providing sustainability and legitimacy of political systems. Although a certain level of “healthy distrust” is needed to keep control over democratic institutions, trust is essential to maintaining a democracy and ensuring its appropriate and satisfactory quality of operations. But trust depends on an already achieved level of democracy.

Building on a study of structural determinants of trust in public institutions by Slomczynki and Janicka (2009) in countries included in the European Social Survey, this paper provides a quantitative analysis of the relationship between trust in institutions, on the one hand, and democracy and level of economic development, as well as individual-level variables related to socio-economic status, on the other. I use data from recent waves of the World Value Survey to allow extension of the set of studied countries to the Western Balkan region.

Findings of the current analysis confirm already identified patterns in ESS countries with regard to the strong interrelation of declared trust in democratic institutions with the assessment of democratic functioning, as well as with the
“objective” quality of democracy in a country, as measured by one of the democracy indices used worldwide, and the relatively weak, although statistically significant dependence of confidence in democratic institutions on the socio-economic stratification position most countries. The paper also reveals significant differences in determinants of trust in institutions in East European and Balkan states.

Key words: Western Balkans, trust, democracy, social capital, institutions

Introduction

The aim of this article is to improve understanding of social and political determinants of trust towards democratic institutions in European countries, with a special focus on the Balkan region. Drawing on prior research, I want to verify if the relations between confidence in democratic institutions, such as political parties, parliament and judiciary, and certain country-level and individual-level variables, identified in some European countries, mainly EU and EFTA, hold for the rest of Europe. I argue that the South-East European region is a crucial case for understanding the interaction between country-level and individual level determinants in public institutions. Balkans constitute a special case in recent history of Europe due to their experience of instability of economic and political transformation, which they share with the whole “Eastern Block”, intertwined with state-initiated violence and long-lasting armed conflicts of ethnic and political background.

This paper will provide an analysis of quantitative data on trust in Balkan countries as compared to the rest of Europe, abstaining from individual, in-depth analyses of each unique country-case, as an attempt to encourage discussion on similarities and differences in the Western Balkan region.

Theories and hypotheses

Trust has been considered a vital element of social capital as one of those “features of social organization”, along with norms and networks, “that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action” (Putnam 1993: 167). According to Fukuyama, trust could be defined as “the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest and co-operative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of that community” (Fukuyama 1995, 26).
Since in democratic regimes citizens’ decisions in the process of delegating power are made in conditions of uncertainty about motivations and future actions of political leaders, trust in state institutions, understood as “judgment of the citizenry that the system and the political incumbents are responsive, and will do what is right even in the absence of constant scrutiny” (Miller and Listhaug 1990, 358), is one of the key principles providing sustainability and legitimacy of political systems.

Although a certain level of “healthy distrust” is needed to keep control over democratic institutions, trust is essential to maintain a democracy and ensure its appropriate and satisfactory quality of operations. At the same time trust depends on already achieved level of democracy.

The problem of determinants of trust in democratic state institutions among European countries has been formulated, among others, by Slomczynski and Janicka (2009). They demonstrated some clear patterns of the relationship between trust, on the one hand, and democracy and level of economic development, on the other, individual-level variables keeping constant. However, their choice to use European Social Survey III (ESS-III) data from 2006 essentially limits the scope of their conclusions.

The patterns of the relationship among variables presented by Slomczynski and Janicka (2009) are simple. Firstly, they have shown that trust in democratic institutions is strongly interrelated with the assessment of democratic functioning, as well as with the “objective” quality of democracy in a country, as measured by one of the democracy indices used worldwide.

In his considerations about the links between trust and democracy Sztompka talks about the “particularly intimate link between trust and state institutions in democratic societies arguing that the culture of trust is more likely to emerge in a democracy than in any other regime, due to its mechanisms of promoting responsibility, accountability and self-restrain, and the role of clear and stable constitution guaranteeing continuity and persistence of a political system (Sztompka, 2007).

Secondly, referring to individual-level characteristics, they argue that controlling for assessment of democratic functioning, the dependence of confidence to democratic institutions on socio-economic stratification position in most countries is statistically significant, although relatively weak. What is more, among countries studied, the impact of stratification

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1 Here is the list of countries included in ESS-III: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, United Kingdom.
position on trust in institutions growth is positively correlated with the level of economic development indicated by GDP per capita.

In explaining the last observation, the authors resorted to the mechanism involving the fulfillment of group interest, with people located higher in the system of social inequalities and possess greater economic and social capital being able to more efficiently articulate their interests and thus drawing larger benefits from a well-functioning democracy. At the same time, countries which had experienced sudden and radical changes in the social structure in the course of the post-communist transformation reveal a weaker impact of social status than in grounded democracies with stable economies and high national product (Slomczynski, Janicka, 2009: 14-15).

The current analysis will use data provided by the World Value Survey programme, allowing for an extension of the set of countries to all European states in order to identify similarities and differences between the Western Balkan region and rest of Europe.

The aim is to find out to what extent declared trust and trust in democratic institutions of the home country is determined by individual characteristics, such as age, education, and socio-economic status, on the one hand, and how it is related to country characteristics, like the level of democracy and economic development, on the other.

For countries already studied by Slomczynski and Janicka (2009), I do not expect to observe important differences in relations between variables. Thus, I expect that their conclusions hold for a sample of countries enjoying stable democratic systems, high levels of economic development and benefits of European integration. However, I expect quite different patterns in the rest of European countries, which are on average much poorer and have diverse historical and political experience including post-communist transformation and/or armed conflicts.

My general hypothesis is that taking into account all European countries, relations observed by Slomczynski and Janicka (2009) do apply, but are weaker, with the difference caused by larger irregularities in the sub-set of post-socialist countries. I expect countries with a higher democratic index to confirm the strong relationship between quality of democracy and trust in institutions, with the relation weaker or non-existent among countries with lower values of the democracy index.

Hence I expect that the relation of the quality of democracy and trust in state institutions is stronger in countries with higher democratic index.

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2 Average GDP per capita in the sample chosen by Slomczynski and Janicka amounts to USD 28,411, while for all European countries the value drops to USD 24,055; World Economic Outlook database – October 2009, International Monetary Fund, www.imf.org.
This could mean that in European countries which enjoy a higher level of democratic development, popular sentiment towards state institutions is to a greater extent shaped by “objective” factors. In less democratic polities - being at the same time “newer” democracies or semi-democratic regimes - public trust in institutions may show relatively stronger dependence on individual-level variables. The crucial test for testing this hypothesis will be the Balkan region and whether it displays similarities to either of the groups or presents yet a different pattern.

Differences between the Balkans and other European countries with similar wealth level could mean that features unique to that region have a large impact on determining confidence in democratic institutions. Such factors could include cultural background, recent experience of armed conflict and general regional instability, advancement in EU integration process, or other.

Should Balkans confirm the general European pattern, this could mean that they have reached a general level of perceived political stability and accountability as in other countries with economic development, or that the turmoil in 1990s had no decisive effect on the level of confidence to democratic institutions, which in turn could have further implications on the character or reasons for declaring confidence.

Data and methods

The analysis aims at finding out to what extent declared trust in democratic institutions of the home country is determined by individual characteristics, such as age, education, and socio-economic status, on the one hand, and how it is related to country characteristics, like the level of democracy and economic development, on the other.

I used the methodological approach proposed by Slomczynski and Janicka (2009) while extending the set of countries to all European countries and using data provided by the World Values Survey instead of the European Social Survey. My purpose was to see whether patterns observed in the previous study also apply to the wider set of countries, particularly the Balkans region.

The World Values Survey is an international survey project conducted since 1981 in three to five year waves, of which the most recent waves 3, 4 and 5 were carried out in 1996-1998, 1999-2004 and 2005-2008 respectively. WVS is administered in face-to-face interviews to nationally representative samples, and consists of a wide array of questions grouped in ten catego-
ries. Sample sizes vary from 900-1200 in most countries to 1800-2000 in Germany and the Russian Federation.

Trust in democratic institutions, being a latent concept, has been constructed, with help of factor analysis, by three variables reflecting confidence in the parliament, political parties, and justice system. The parliament, political parties and justice system represent fundamental institutions of democratic regimes.

As independent variables I used individual-level variables as provided by the World Values Survey from Wave 3, 4 or 5, as well as country-level variables: quality of democracy, as measured by the Democracy Index developed by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Corruption Perception Index (CPI) constructed by Transparency International, as well as GDP per capita.

The Democracy Index is one of most comprehensive measures of the quality of democracy, based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of the government, political participation, and political culture. Each of the components is measured on a 0-10 scale, with the final figure being calculated as an arithmetic average of the five sub-results.

CPI measures the perceived level of public-sector corruption and is based on 13 different expert and business surveys.

Findings

General trust

Before going over to declared trust in democratic institutions, it is worth having a look at differences in levels of interpersonal trust across European countries. For the purposes of the current analysis interpersonal trust was measured using answers to the standard World Values Survey question “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”

It is visible that there are significant differences between average trust levels in various countries (Fig. 1, App. Table 2). Generally speaking, Eastern Europe ranked lower than Western Europe, with most Balkan countries included in the dataset, i.e. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia being among the least trusting.
Trust in democratic institutions

For the purpose of the current analysis, trust in democratic institutions is constructed as an index of declared level of trust in main democratic institutions, i.e. the justice system, national parliament and political parties. The exact survey questions are formulated as follows: “I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all” (WVS 2005 Codebook, 2005: 443) and the institutions in questions are “Justice System”, “The Political Parties” and “Parliament”. The question about the justice system comes directly after a question about confidence in police, which should likely point the respondent’s attention to the fact that those are two distinct institutions.

In WVS variables for confidence in various institutions are coded on a 1 to 4 scale with 1 for “great deal [of confidence]” and 4 for “none at all”. To make this variable more intuitive, I have reversed the coding to 4 indicating most trust and 1 for no trust at all.

When looking at weights calculated for individual variables it is visible that correlations of components and the construct are much lower in case of “Trust in justice system” than those for “Trust in political parties” and “Trust in national parliament” – both measured as a mean value of individual...
country factors, and factors calculated for the sample as a whole, and also lowest for each country. As a result lower for “Trust in justice system” are also factor weights, which amount to 0.696 as mean of country weights and 0.684 for the whole sample, compared to 0.824 and 0.822 for “Trust in political parties” and 0.861 and 0.862 for “Trust in parliament respectively”. The factor explains from 53 to almost 74 percent of variance of indicators (for details on factor construction see App. Table 3).

In each of the considered countries “Trust in democratic institutions” factors weighted with country specific weights are significantly (at 0.01 level, single-tailed) and highly correlated with factors weighted by weights calculated for the sample as a whole. The lowest correlation coefficient has been observed in case of Azerbaijan in the 3rd WVS wave, and amounted to 0.972 (see App. Table 4).

In the course of this analysis I will be using factor weights calculated for the whole sample, which allows to include countries that lack “Trust in justice system” data (countries surveyed in WVS Wave 4) by replacing missing values with averages for the purpose of factor calculation.

Trust in democratic institutions vs. quality of democracy

On the country level and for the subset of European countries represented in the 5th wave of WVS, average trust in democratic institutions is significantly negatively correlated with the level of perceived corruption as measured by CPI, the quality of democracy indicated by the Democratic Index and the countries economic development or wealth (GDP per capita).

The relation is strongest in case of CPI (0.657) and GDP per capita (0.641), which would mean that in countries with lower perceived corruption level and more wealthy states, citizens tend to express higher trust in institutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WVS Wave 5</th>
<th>CPI</th>
<th>GDP</th>
<th>Democracy index in 2007</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Correlation coefficient</td>
<td>.657**</td>
<td>.641**</td>
<td>.493*</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

3 Bulgaria, Cyprus, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine.
A closer look at the data collected during WVS Wave 5 reveals, however, that the relation between average trust in democratic institutions and corruption, democracy and wealth levels is only significant among EU/EFTA countries4 (Table 3). In non-EU/EFTA countries included in the subset, i.e. Georgia, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Serbia and Ukraine, trust in democratic institutions is low and below average regardless of e.g. the quality of democracy, with the exception of the outlier, Turkey, where declared trust is among the highest with low Democracy Index.

**Table 3. Correlation between Average Trust in democratic institutions and CPI, GDP and DI.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country group</th>
<th>CPI</th>
<th>GDP</th>
<th>Democracy index in 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-EU/EFTA</td>
<td>Correlation coefficient</td>
<td>0.768</td>
<td>0.427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU/EFTA</td>
<td>Correlation coefficient</td>
<td>.697**</td>
<td>.729**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

4 In this case: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland.
Hence, to the extent that the current analysis overlaps with that conducted by Slomczynski and Janicka, it confirms that trust in democratic institutions is strongly interrelated with the “objective” quality of democracy in a country, as measured by the Democracy Index. It shows however that this pattern doesn't apply to all European countries, and specifically not to those outside EU/EFTA structures.

Chart 2. Relation between Average trust in democratic institutions and Democracy Index among non-EU/EFTA countries.

Chart 3. Relation between Average trust in democratic institutions and Democracy Index among EU/EFTA countries.
Trust in democratic institutions vs. individual assessment of quality of democracy

Individual satisfaction with the functioning of state institutions has been measured in different ways in recent WVS waves. In the 3rd and 4th wave respondents were asked to rate their political system for governing the country, while in wave 5 they were supposed to assess the quality of democracy in their country. Both variables are similar in character to the satisfaction with how democracy works from ESS. In WVS both are coded on a 1 to 10 scale with 1 being the weakest and 10 – the best result.

Correlation of individual assessment of institutions and trust in democratic institutions is statistically significant in all countries (see Appendix 4), which confirms the findings of Slomczynski and Janicka (2009) and extends this observation to countries not included in ESS.

High correlation of above 0.4 for wave 3 and 4 (i.e. variable “rate their political system for governing the country”) has been observed in Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, Norway, Slovakia, led by Sweden with 0.547. Lowest relations – below 0.2 - can be seen in Russia, Belarus, Azerbaijan and Albania with 0.062.

From among countries represented in wave 5, highest correlation of assessment of democraticness and trust in institutions was in Netherlands – 0.423, and below 0.2 in Moldova and Spain. The relation is generally weaker in least economically developed and democratic countries.

This could mean that the perceived quality of country governance or satisfaction with democracy’s performance respectively are determinant for the individual’s confidence in state institutions, with the impact dependent on the level of country’s democratic and economic development.

Trust in democratic institutions vs. social status

The most important individual level characteristic in the analysis of determinants of trust in democratic institutions is stratification position. According to a standard procedure, it is usually constructed with the help of three complementary indicators which reflect the social status of an individual: education, profession and income. Due to weak reliability and accuracy of the last of three indicators, I have chosen to consider only two, i.e. education and profession.

Education has been measured as highest education level attained and coded into eight categories, where 1 stands for “inadequately completed
elementary education” and 8 for “university with degree/higher education – upper level tertiary”.

In WVS profession/job is coded into twenty categories from “employer/manager of establishment with 500 or more employed” to “never had a job”. I have recoded professions into five categories: employers/managers, non-manual workers, manual workers, farmers and unemployed and others, where 5 represents the highest and 1 the lowest category.

For the social stratification construct factor weights range from 0.742 to 0.854, and the constructs explains 55 to 72% of the indicator variance (see Appendix 5).

Another individual level variable added to the analysis is religiousness measured in WVS on a 1 to 3 scale with 1 for “religious”, 2 for “not religious” and 3 for “convinced atheist”.

Results presented in Table 7 of the Appendix show the influence of individual level characteristics on trust in democratic institutions for selected countries. Age plays a role in almost half of the countries from 5th wave, and higher age has generally a negative effect on the level of trust.

Personal attitude towards religion influences trust in democratic institutions in 24 of the 55 countries studied, with the influence negative in all cases except for Moldova in Wave 5. This would mean that on average atheists tend to declare less trust in democratic institutions than those who consider themselves as religious.

Stratification position is significantly related to trust in 8 out of 21 countries from the 5th wave and 13 out of 34 countries from wave 3 and 4, and in some countries the impact in negative while being positive in others. The impact is negative in Belarus, Cyprus, Georgia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Turkey and Ukraine. A positive relation is seen in Finland, France, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. It strikes the eye that a negative correlation is generally observed among poorer, post-communist countries, while stratification position has a positive effect on trust in best developed democracies.

When adding the impact of social stratification position on interpersonal trust, it is visible that positive and statistically significant correlation is present in almost all Western European countries (with the exception of Spain) for both kinds of trust, which leads to the identification of a consistent regularity. Meanwhile, in the Western Balkans neither interpersonal nor institutional trust are determined by social status (App. Table 8).

Among countries, where the relation between social status and declared trust in democratic institutions proved to be significant, there is
also a clearly positive relation between strength of dependency of trust in democratic institutions on stratification position and the country’s wealth (Chart 4). The beta coefficient is strongly and significantly correlated (0.01, 2-tailed) with GDP per capita (PPP) with the correlation coefficient of 0.838.

Chart 4. Impact of stratification position (beta) on trust in democratic institutions vs. GDP per capita

Table 4. Correlation of beta regression coefficient of stratification position on trust in democratic institutions and GDP, CPI and DI.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GDP</th>
<th>CPI</th>
<th>Democracy index in 2007</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beta regression coefficient of stratification position on trust in democratic institutions</td>
<td>.838**</td>
<td>.841**</td>
<td>.758**</td>
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</table>

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Conclusions

The current study confirms that observations made using ESS data are valid for the equivalent set of countries as studied by Slomczynski and Janicka (2009). It shows that the average level of trust in democratic institutions is strongly related to the “objective” quality of democracy in member-countries of EU/EFTA. The analysis shows however also the absence of this relation in non EU/EFTA countries.
It has also been shown that higher assessment of institutions or quality of democracy of a country goes together with higher trust to democratic institutions in all European countries represented in WVS.

As for individual level characteristics, most important seems to be the difference in the direction of impact of stratification position on trust in institutions, which clearly divides countries into two groups according to the level of economic development and at the same time quality of democracy.

The analysis also showed that higher trust is generally observed among younger people and those considering themselves as religious.

Leaving aside disputes about the validity of the WVS instrument for measuring trust (Sapienza et al. 2007, Glaeser et al. 2000, Fehr et al. 2003), the current study revealed significant differences in the strength of determinants of trust in democratic institutions between in countries of Western and Central Europe on one hand, and Eastern Europe and the Balkans on the other, which creates the need for further in-depth analyses both on the country and cross-country levels.

Selected Bibliography


### Table 1. List of countries included in the analysis

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*Wave 4 has been excluded due to lack of “Trust in justice system” data*
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** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Trust and Legitimation – The Case of Serbia

Abstract

Social capital purports a certain “moral density” in the society which implies trust and establishing relations with others – individuals, groups and institutions, that are, in turn, a benchmark for the formation of one’s own habitus, living strategies and behaviour. Serbia shares much of the experience of the post-socialist, transition countries both in the region (Western Balkans) and wider surroundings (Eastern Europe). However, it seems that some particular factors (war in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s, the break-up of the SRY and Montenegro’s departure, as well as the declaration of Kosovo as an independent state) and the general social and economic crisis, which have resulted in a “delay” in transition processes, have a specific impact on the recorded level of trust. The data also shows a very low level of civic participation, which can be interpreted as the final chapter in the post-October 5th era and the disillusionment with the new political elite, but in the political system in its entirety as well.

Starting from this data, we would like to identify the values upon which the citizens of Serbia legitimize their behaviour and establish relations with other people based on the analysis of empirical (quantitative and qualitative) data in this text. We would like to observe whether collectivistic or individualistic values guide people in their social actions. On the basis of the findings we can perceive whether the values adopted by our examinees induce traditionalistic social relationships or may encourage democratic empowerment of the society.

The text is based on the analysis of the results obtained in the research “Social and Cultural Capital in Serbia” (2011) (questionnaire and focus group interviews).

Key words: values, legitimation, trust, Serbia, social capital
The question of trust is definitely not a new one in social theory. It was dealt with by the forefathers of sociology themselves. One can recall Durkheim’s celebrated phrase that ‘in a contract not everything is contractual’ (1984: 158), which states the position that stable collective life must be based on more than calculations of self-interest and that an element of trust is essential for a smooth flow of social interactions.

In a similar, perhaps a bit more dramatic manner, Georg Simmel states that without trust ‘society itself would disintegrate’ (2004: 177-8). Weber can also be mentioned in this context regarding his considerations in *The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism* on the higher level of trust that is put in the American businessmen who belong to a particular protestant sect.

As far as contemporaries are concerned, Francis Fukuyama followed Weber in his exposition of trust as the indispensable ingredient of viable economic systems. Diego Gambetta, Piotr Sztompka, Shmuel Eisenstadt, Bernard Barber, and Anthony Giddens can be mentioned amongst others of the modern theoreticians who, at least at one point, made trust a central subject of their deliberations.

Giddens defined trust as a ‘confidence in the reliability of a person or system, regarding a given set of outcomes or events, where that confidence expresses a faith in the probity or love of another, or in the correctness of abstract principles’ (1990: 34).

As noted earlier, trust becomes one of the chief resources of integration in the modern society. In a time when ‘old allegiances’ lose their strength, when ‘mechanical solidarity’ is no longer the dominant principle which ‘holds us together’, a situation of *anomie* can be diagnosed. As Durkheim states in his *The Division of Labour in Society*, the problem with trust and solidarity stems from the difference which is caused by the more developed division of labour in his concept. Modern society is based on the high division of labour, and on the high level of interdependence, thus making the trust in another a precondition of social life.

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1 Simmel gives one sort of a definition of trust when he writes: ‘To ‘believe in someone’, without adding or even conceiving what it is that one believes about him, is to employ a very subtle and profound idiom. It expresses the feeling that there exists between our idea of a being and the being itself a definite connection and unity, a certain consistency in our conception of it, an assurance and lack of resistance in the surrender of the Ego to this conception, which may rest upon particular reasons, but is not explained by them’ (2004: 178).

2 A good overview can be found in Sztompka’s: *Trust: A Sociological Theory* (1999).

3 See Giddens’ *The Consequences of Modernity* (1990: 102) for a comparative display of the environments of trust in pre-modern and modern cultures.

4 In Durkheim’s words: ‘a rule that is a lack of rule’ (2002: 218).
The issue of the level of trust which exists in a single society has particularly become relevant through the notion of social capital, and especially the part of it which comes from Robert Putnam. For Putnam, the cause of the compromised trust in a society lies in its differences, with special attention directed towards the ethnic ones. A higher difference present in a society is, according to Putnam (2007), in correlation with a lower level of trust. The second reason for the decreasing level of trust that Inglehart (1997) talks about lies in the great changes that societies have been faced with in recent decades.

In this paper we will try to determine which values (‘abstract principles’) the people of Serbia find to be ‘the correct’ ones – those that are usually labelled collectivistic or those often referred to as individualistic. Values, in their turn, give legitimacy, moral grounding, to human behaviour and establishing of specific types of relations between people. By identifying the dominant values, we can assess the type of the stimulus that is at work in contemporary Serbia – the one towards the traditional relations of the community or the one that leads to a democratic empowerment of society.

A state of turmoil which is characteristic of the post-socialist societies, such as the Serbian, also engenders anomie, a social interregnum in which, at least, two value conceptions struggle for hegemony. In our case, the one being oriented towards the national, local and suspect of everything and anything that bears the label of ‘Western’ or ‘European’, and the other striving for the civic, cosmopolitan, and embracing liberal principles which originate from the tradition of enlightenment.

Such conditions are the background for the debate on the relation between the traditional and modern elements in social reality, the wish for modern social relations and the longing for traditional ones. This debate exists in the expert circles, as well as in the public opinion. The Serbian public opinion often contains the discourse that sees the approach to the EU as part of the sovereignty of Serbia and national identity, and this debate fits into the existing debates that render the modernization and globalization processes as dangerous for the traditional forms of life – “the Serbian way of life” (Gavrilović & Zaharijevski 2011: 209).

Inglehart’s study *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies*, begins with the debate on the nature of modernization, poses the question of multiple modernizations and identifies post-modern elements in contemporary societies, while in Serbia the debate concerning traditional-modern, and individualistic values
as the precondition for the democratization of the society vs. collectivism as the dominant value, is still relevant.

Serbia: an attempt at diagnosis

Serbia shares much of the experience of transition countries, both within the region (Western Balkans) and the wider surroundings (Eastern Europe). However, some specific factors, such as the war in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, split with Montenegro, and the proclamation of Kosovo’s independence, as well as the overall social and economic crisis, resulting in a ‘delay’ of transition processes, are likely to have also influenced the level of trust in Serbia. The data also shows a very low level of civic participation, which may be interpreted as the final chapter of the post-October 5th era and the disillusionment with the new political elite and the political system in general. To this picture, one should add the enormous economic problems encountered by the citizens of Serbia as transition losers. Analyzing 43 societies, Inglehart observes that the connection between the economic development and identified values exists. In poor and transition countries, his research shows, the connection between the age and value orientation is much more explicit than in the case of developed societies which have had a continuous evolutionary development. It is to be expected having in mind the fact that a re-evaluation of values has occurred in former socialist countries, and that new generations are being socialized in completely different circumstances (Inglehart 1997).

The great majority of people in Serbia share one common feature. This social situation reflects on their psychological, as well as physical, health. Every second person in Serbia does not feel well, or suffers from some mild depression symptoms, and in 4.4% of women and 2.4% of men depression was identified as a disease, according to a survey of The Batut Institute. More than half (55.8%) of the people feel anxious, depressed, sad, exhausted and tired. On the other hand, only 4.4% feel enthusiastic, serene, calm, happy and energetic, in a word: well. Most of them are citizens of Belgrade who have enough money to live (s.n. 2010). The Gallup Balkan Monitor survey reports that Serbia is among 5 countries with the most depressed population, thus depression can be regarded a national disease.

Inglehart (1997) finds a positive correlation between the level of trust and the level of satisfaction with life. If the abovementioned is to be taken into account, Serbian people do not have the basis that is required for the
high level of trust. The data from the 2008 *European Values Study* (EVS) confirm this: only 11.6% of examinees think that the majority of people in Serbia deserve their trust, while 86.2% of them believe that in Serbia one should ‘have eyes in the back of one’s head’. This level of trust positions Serbia among the countries with the lowest level of trust in Europe (Adam, 2007: 189).

To identify the social networks in which a certain level of trust exists and which represent the social environment of our examinees, therefore, the citizens of Serbia who ask for help in difficult situations, we put the question “Do people ask you for help?” The analysis shows that 19.5% of examinees from Serbia answer ‘often’, 49.7% ‘sometimes’, and 17% ‘rarely’. This data does not speak much unless we determine the contents of that interaction. Table 1 shows the distribution of answers ‘often’ and ‘sometimes’ depending on who asks people for help.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who asks for your help?</th>
<th>Often</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relatives</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>49.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Godfather/Best man</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countrymen</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbours</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>49.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends from the neighbourhood</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends from school</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-workers</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business friends</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of their party</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of a religious community</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those who were done a favour</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>34.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most often, it is the people that we come into face-to-face relations (friends from the neighbourhood, neighbours, co-workers) or who are part of the larger family (relatives). Sometimes they are countrymen or those that need a favour returned.

To make a more complete picture of interpersonal trust, we present the data on how many and which people can our examinees rely upon in difficult situations.

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5 The research “Social and Cultural Capital in Serbia” conducted in 2011 by the Centre for Empirical Cultural Studies.
Table 2: How many people can you rely upon?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relatives</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Godfather/Best man</td>
<td>21.0%</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countrymen</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbours</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends from the neighbourhood</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends from school</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-workers</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business friends</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of their party</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of a religious community</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here, we also find the same social network which comprises closest relations, mainly specific for a traditional society, such as relatives and neighbours.

As for the civic activism, as yet another indicator of trust, EVS findings show that the level of activity and voluntary work within the civil society is very low. Only 2.3% of examinees participate in associations which deal with various forms of social care, 4.4% in cultural activities, 5.7% in unions, 2.1% in local community actions, 1.1% in associations for the protection of human rights. The situation is similar with the participation in associations for environmental protection, and women’s or peace movements. No less than 77% of examinees claim that they do not belong to any group or association. The individual action through associations of like-minded people is not a form of activity which is greatly present in Serbia. Serbia is not a country of active citizens which fight for their interests. Although we are about to see (Chart 1) that politics occupies the last position based on the importance attached by the citizens, the “usual political behaviour” is still the dominant form of activity, despite the fact that the membership in political parties due to one’s own interest is stigmatized.

When it comes to the trust in institutions, Serbia fares low. The influence of institutions on the level of trust is limited, and it is further weakened in Serbia because of the weakness of institutions themselves. The research conducted in July 2010 on the territory of the Western Balkans (Gallup Balkan Monitor) showed that the military and church were the institutions most trusted in Serbia since 2008. However, the military has taken over the first place from the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) in the last
three years. The trust that the military enjoys has increased from 63% to 77%, while at the same time the trust in church has decreased from 75% to 66%. The church is followed by the police that enjoys the trust of 59.6% examinees in Serbia, while significantly lower numbers of citizens trust the media (41.6%), the judiciary (38%), and the government (33%). This case, of military and church being the most trusted institutions, points to the prevalence of traditional consciousness, in which order, stern hierarchy and unquestionable authority, being spiritual or corporeal, are emphasized as chief merits. Inglehart’s research shows that in the developed Western countries the trust in institutions is also diminishing, but that such a state implies the activity of the individual on the improvement of social life conditions. The data presented here, which deals with Serbia, shows the lack of trust in institutions such as the Serbian Government, president of the state, yet it does not result, as we can see, in personal activity within civil associations, but in the return to the nearest surroundings and turning to “remote institutions” such as the SOC, which have a relatively small influence on the real life.

On the other hand, elections turnout, as one of the indicators of trust, in the Presidential elections in Serbia in 2008 was 68.14%, and in the Parliamentary elections in 2008 – 61.35%. Both figures are rather high. This data could imply the existence of hope that something could still be done in Serbia. The other reason is that every election in Serbia is connected with a great danger that in the situation of profound value dividedness between “two Serbias” the other value option which is in complete opposition to the one that the examinees choose might win.

When asked ‘What is important in your life?’, by far the greatest number of people (85.5%) put family first, as shown in Chart 1. This is an indicator, albeit a weak one, of the prevalence of the traditional values. However, deeper research into this phenomenon (the family is dominant in the life of the citizens in Serbia as an identification marker and that has been maintained for a number of years) shows that it is not the case of the traditional patriarchal family, but of the family which interiorizes various “modern” elements. It appears that people in Serbia are tired of “great stories” and that they turn to their families through which they live their collective life and identities.
It is interesting that only 17.5% of examinees state that religion is important in their lives. This to some extent contradicts the findings that the church is one of the most trusted institutions in contemporary Serbia. Finding that only 6% of them state that politics is important corroborates the thesis of general disillusionment with the new Serbian political elite and common ways of ‘doing’ politics in Serbia. This is a very unusual finding for a country where politics dictates the basic conditions of every-day social life. With the fall of socialism, re-traditionalization and repressive forms of the processes of social transformations and confined socio-institutional framework drastically jeopardize the family by imposing on it the consequences of long-lasting repressive tendencies. Family relations, family structure and family functions undergo moments of crisis in the midst of negative events which produce high level of traumatization in individuals and families (Milić 2004). The family is now more than ever left to its own. Impoverished and burdened by numerous problems it necessarily goes back to obsolete forms of community in order to secure survival. Hence, there is no surprise in the findings of sociological research: in the situation of social transformation, the family is seen as a domain with the central spot in everyday life and it represents the greatest value (Zaharijevski 2005). The “awakening” of old models of marital and family fellowship with already established models of family relations is a specific answer to the challenges of social changes.

Politics is marked as the least important area in the lives of the citizens of Serbia, the ones engaging in politics are usually addressed derogatorily and associated with dishonesty. It is shameful to enter politics in Serbia.
today. However, the citizens of Serbia cannot allow themselves the luxury of not participating in elections, because all of them are fateful and politics determines every aspect of their lives to a great extent.

Value discourses in focus groups

In the course of the project Social and Cultural Capital in Serbia (2010), conducted by the Centre for Empirical Cultural Studies of South-eastern Europe, a total of 8 focus groups were implemented. Participants were chosen depending on their gender, age and education levels, with the aim of providing the equal number of males and females, young and old, and more and less educated. The research was conducted in Novi Sad, Belgrade, Niš and Novi Pazar, cities which differ in size, ethnic and religious composition, and which were chosen as regional centres, and Belgrade as the capital. Themes for the discussions – ‘What is appreciated/valued in Serbia today?’, ‘What is the formula for success in Serbia?’, ‘How do you think things should be?’, ‘What is the right kind of upbringing, what should children learn, who would you like to see as a role model for your children and why?’ … – were devised in order to pinpoint the dominant value discourse of the participants.

The first impression one gets when listening to the recorded discussions in focus groups is that the most of the participants spoke from the position of ‘humiliated and insulted’ – bitter feelings of betrayal, abandonment, and deceit surfaced during the sessions. Money and material values, along with resourcefulness (in a negative sense – carelessness), fast success, condescension and having (political) power, were listed as most appreciated in present day Serbia. Diagnosing what is wrong in society usually centred around the existence of clans, corruption, party state and mass rip-off. All these characteristics summed up, indeed, do not paint a pretty picture of the contemporary Serbian society.

That is why it is not surprising that almost everyone showed deep distrust. One participant depicted people around him as ‘uncaring, dishonest, rude’. The other stated that ‘the only thing that’s left for a man is to turn to oneself, to take care of himself… and to a few people around himself… literally to close himself in his own world’. One woman from Novi Pazar said: ‘I no longer believe in anyone or anything!’.

6 With two focus groups in each of these cities.
7 Originally in Serbian, this sentence contains triple negation: “Ником више ништа не вјерујем!”. 

darity was often mentioned, as well as too many ‘hypocrites’, ‘selfish’ and
‘shrewd’ people, and along with this went the lamentation for the ‘good
old days’ of socialist past.

The disillusionment with the political, as well as moral order, soon fol-
lowed from the feelings of distrust, and was thus formulated: ‘We have
entered democracy too soon’; ‘I think that today all those who do not act
according to the moral code fare well. That, I think, is the definition’; ‘I gath-
ered that the worse you are, the better you fare’. This entailed mentioning
of the typical pre-modern categories of ‘Fortuna’ or ‘destiny’, which is not
hard to understand since in a situation of anomie one cannot ‘calculate’
and ‘forecast’, but must rely on ‘the Lord’s intervention’.

It is puzzling, then, why the participants stated that they appreciate
and pass on to their children ‘the right values’ – values that do not enable
a person to succeed in society that was depicted as tainted and corrupted.
Those being: values of education, good company, fellowship, friendship,
good manners, humility, non-aggression, kindness, being prepared to help,
to sacrifice, ‘to be honest and hardworking’, honourable. Participants also
stated that they encouraged their children to be ‘creative’, ‘individualists’
and ‘professionals’ – which are all par excellence modern characteristics.

Some specifics of the groups became visible. Poorer and less educated,
for instance, proved almost obsessed with the tycoons and politicians, and
finding and keeping a job. They showed pronounced criticism and distrust in
institutions, as well as heavy reliance on relatives and friends. On the other
hand, more educated participants clung to individualistic values, reliance
on individual, not on institutions8. Older people more often showed deep
commitment to the collective – ‘I would never betray my people’ – while the
younger took a more ‘pragmatic’ approach: ‘I would betray anyone’; ‘Life on
the West, so much work, that is not a life for me!’. Furthermore, in groups
from the capital city, having origins from Belgrade was highly appreciated.

Concluding remarks
We can conclude by giving some provisional answers to four questions.

‘Who’ creates/produces trust? The trust that is generally low is based on
the trust in the inner circle of people – relatives and friends. Since trust
is the basis for connecting to the future, as we conduct this research we

As one participant stated: ‘So the question what does it mean to be well is for me very,
very individual, and it’s pretty hard to talk about it, I can confirm only specific ex-
amples... of persons who I think are well’.
come to the conclusion that people live in a ‘day-to-day’ mode, rely on good fortune, and do not believe in institutions.

*What are the sources of legitimation of behaviour?* The behaviour is, according to the participants of the focus groups, legitimized by ‘the good old values’, which are not held in high regard today and do not lead to success in society, yet they are still passed on to children.

In the matter of ‘collectivism vs. individualism’ – collective values prevail, primarily that of the family.

And in the matter of ‘traditional vs. modern’ – older participants recall tradition and collectivist values, while individualism and professionalism are appreciated among the educated and the younger.

Inglehart speaks of the culture of trust and interpersonal trust as its consequence being the necessary preconditions for the development of democracy.

Democratic institutions depend on the trust that the opposition will accept the rules of democratic processes. One must view one’s political opponents as a loyal opposition who will not imprison and execute them if they surrender political power to them, but can be relied on to govern within the laws, and to surrender power if one’s side wins the next election. (Inglehart 1997)

Similarly, the mass legitimation must exist for democratic institutions, which might, at first, be imposed by the elite or even external forces, as is the case in Serbia, but for the democratic institutions to have a stable life they have to become part of the legitimation field of the population. The findings revealed in our research speak of the undeveloped Serbian civil society and the lack of the culture of trust in individuals and institutions, but also in one’s own strength.
References


The State as the Great Classifier

Abstract

Based on data collected through focus group interviews within the project “Social and Cultural Capital in Serbia”, this paper aims to analyze how “the state” is constructed in discourses by ordinary people in today’s Serbia. Starting from a Bourdieuan theoretical platform that introduces the concepts of social classifications and classification struggles, it is argued that in spite of the many criticisms the state in Serbia is subjected to by the citizens, it still remains in their eyes the only really legitimate classifier of people, capitals, and practices. The numerous negative judgments of the state’s failures and malfunctioning in a wide variety of areas ironically result in a confirmation of “the State” as a kind of Leviathan which perhaps should be tamed and reeducated, but which no one wishes to remove or replace with an alternative set of social arrangements. The ambiguous political potential of this attitude is discussed in the concluding section.

Key words: state, politics, Serbia, transition, Pierre Bourdieu

The research project “Social and Cultural Capital in Serbia”, exemplified in a number of contributions to the present volume, also involved a segment based on the method of focus group interviews.1 Starting from Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of “social classifications” and “classification struggles” (Bourdieu 1979, 1987, 1997), the aim of this part of the project was to record, and analyze, discourses of social classification operative in today’s Serbia: to reconstruct ways in which people in Serbia see, value, and rank themselves and others; to identify types of social groups being rejected or accepted; to examine how such classifications are justified; and to explore whether,

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1 Eight focus group interviews were conducted in March 2011, in four Serbian cities (Novi Sad, Belgrade, Novi Pazar, Niš). In each site two groups were set up distinguished by educational level, one consisting of participants with secondary education or less, and the other of participants with college degrees. The number of participants was 5-9 per group, 57 altogether (29 men and 28 women). They came from a variety of social and ethnic backgrounds, professional experiences and personal situations.
and how, these classifications are connected with the speakers’ differential possession of various kinds of capital – in other words, whether “classification struggles” in the strict Bourdieuan sense have been instantiated.  

In this framework, political topics, or the state specifically, where not an explicit focus of study. The questions used to launch the discussions concerned primarily the criteria the participants used in evaluating and ranking people around them, and the criteria they felt predominated as the prevalent “rules of the game” in current Serbian society. Yet political issues imposed themselves immediately, by the very way people discussed the questions that were posed. Rather unexpectedly, instead of any recognizable social stratum or class, defined in the usual sociological (and Bourdieuan) terms of wealth, occupation, cultural distinction, or symbolic capital, a specific group was singled out as the main winner in the current situation: politicians. These were, at the same time, the chief collective “Others” for most respondents – people they shun and would rather not socialize with. Political topics in general came up repeatedly in the citizens’ accounts, as the apparently inevitable source of explanation of any and all social processes in Serbia today, especially those processes that deserve criticism and condemnation. Within such heavily politicized discursive framework, “the state” was mentioned very often, and in widely varying contexts; it was invested with so many affects, charged with so many powers and responsibilities, and rendered as the bearer of so many fears and hopes, that it deserves to be spelled with a capital S: the State. Stretching between an all-powerful super-agent that can save us and a villain that destroys all that is worthy and virtuous in Serbia nowadays, the State emerged in the discussions as a pivotal point deserving special analysis.  

Hence this paper sets out to analyze images of the State in the discourse of our research participants: the traits attributed to it, the functions and roles ascribed to it, the ways it is perceived to act – and how it ought to be acting, in an envisaged normative mode. Given that the theoretical background of the project was Bourdieuan, it is only proper that we begin by theoretically resituating the topics of politics and the state within Bourdieu’s sociology.

Bourdieu on politics and the state

Bourdieu conceptualizes politics in ways significantly different from the receptions customary in political science and the more conventional po-

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2 Main findings of this analysis have been reported in: Spasić, Birešev (2011).
political sociology. Basically, he undertakes a reframing of politics that goes in two apparently contrary directions: towards a stronger independence, and away from it. Differently put, it is a simultaneous re-socialization and de-socialization of politics as a sphere and practice.

On one hand, against the artificial autonomization of politics as a specialized subject of specialized scholarship, cut out of its social milieu, Bourdieu reembeds politics within the social (especially stratificational, hierarchical, inequality-ridden) context. Especially innovative is his forging of, and insistence on, what Wacquant (2005b: 14) calls the “culture-politics link”, and his constantly reminding us of the importance of symbolic dimension in domination, whereby he sought to found, again in Wacquant’s words, “a generative anthropology of power in its most diverse manifestations” (Wacquant 2005c: 133). On the other hand, he builds new concepts to theorize the specificity of the political, seeking ways to grasp at once the stabilizing structural effects and the processual dynamism of political life in real, empirical societies. He thus views politics through three kinds of “fields”, caught in a complex web of mutual relations of demarcation, difference, and intertwining: the political field, the bureaucratic field, and the field of power.

The “political field” is the semi-autonomous microcosm within which parties and politicians compete to offer their services to the citizenry (Wacquant 2005a: 3). It emerges during the 19th century, when the relations between individuals and institutions involved in political work through parties and elections became stabilized, the structure of the field was outlined, and the specific “philosophy” and behavioral codes (political culture) came gradually to regulate political action. Politics thus became synonymous with competition among professionals for winning positions (administrative and representative), for defining legitimate roles (political capital or reputation), and for imposing a particular worldview (Pinto 2002: 217). The relative autonomy of the political field is reflected in its operation independently from centers of economic, religious or other kinds of power, as well as in the fact that during their tenure politicians are engaged in a struggle with their political opponents, and their strategies are determined by the strategies of their competitors in the field rather than by the expectations or demands of their constituency. Still, the strength of parties and individual politicians depends on the degree of acceptance of their ideas and the relative strength of the social groups supporting them, as well as on the capacity of political agents to enlist support, if necessary, from outside the field. This aspect makes political field different from
other kinds of field, especially the scientific and the artistic ones, where turning to non-professionals is considered useless, even counterproductive (Thompson 2001: 46).

The concept of “bureaucratic field” is used by Bourdieu to reframe the state as an arena of struggles over the definition and manipulation of public goods (Wacquant 2005a: 3). The historical roots of this field are found in the gradual historical autonomization of court lawyers from the Crown (the state was initially identical with the king’s household) and their espousal of the principles of disinterestedness, impartiality, generality, calling – in a word, *universality* (Bourdieu 1994: 99-133). The bureaucratic state was thus “constituted as a field of forces and a field of struggles oriented towards the monopoly of the legitimate manipulation of public goods” (Bourdieu 2004: 16). The gradually emerging social role of “civil servant” was, at the same time, creating the state it was supposed to serve – by producing a modern theory of the “state” as we know it today (ibid.). The history of the state is, hence, marked by the conflict between bearers of bureaucratic power and representatives of administrative bodies over various policies of accumulating and principles of redistributing the capital flowing into government coffers. On the other hand, the role/image of “independent agency” and arbiter which “after all, is less opposed to the interests of the dominated and to what we may call justice” (Bourdieu 1997: 151) has been inscribed into the history of the state. This two-pronged image of the state – as a battleground of the struggle for power, and as the service of all its citizens – may also be recognized in the discussions of our research participants.

The “field of power” was developed through the differentiation of forms of capital and the corresponding social microcosms and mechanisms. Bourdieu elaborated the concept in his studies of the genesis of the artistic field (Bourdieu 2003), and of institutions such as the Catholic church, judiciary, state apparatus, elite schools (Bourdieu 1989) and corporations. Seeking to escape the substantialism and misplaced realism of concepts such as the “ruling class”, “Bourdieu sketches the interlinked institutions within which the holders of various species of capital (economic, religious, legal, scientific, academic, artistic, etc.) vie to impose the supremacy of the particular kind of power they wield” i.e. the “dominant principle of domination”, which results in shifting balances in the sharing of powers (Wacquant 2005b:16). Unlike Foucault, power for Bourdieu is not diffuse.

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3 Bourdieu in Contre-feux (1999) distinguishes between the state’s “left hand” which redirect resources into agencies in charge of welfare, culture, and education, and its “right hand”, which reinvests resources in instruments of domination – judiciary, economy, military, police.
and spreading through the capillaries of the social body but rather “concentrated in definite institutional sectors and in given zones of social space: the field of power is precisely this arena where the ‘social energy’ constitutive of forms of capital accumulates and where the relative value of diverse species of power is contested and adjudicated” (Wacquant 2005c: 145). Or, in Bourdieu’s words: “The field of power (which must not be conflated with the political field) is not a field just like any other: it is the space of the relations of force between different forms of capital or, more precisely, between the agents that ... dominate specific fields, and whose struggles intensify each time the relative value of various forms of capital is brought into question” (Bourdieu 1994: 56).

For Bourdieu, the state is the “central bank of symbolic capital guaranteeing all acts of authority”, situated at the center of the field of power (Wacquant 2005b: 17). Its historical emergence is tied to the process of unification of various social fields (economic, cultural, scholastic, political) and of the gradual establishment of the state’s monopoly of legitimate physical and symbolic violence. Due to the fact that it concentrates a multitude of material and symbolic resources in its hands, the state is capable of regulating the functioning of various fields (Bourdieu 1994: 55). The state is therefore “the arbiter of the conflicts between contending capitals”, ultimately vouchsafing the complex circuits of legitimation (Wacquant 2005c: 145).

The state defines the framework in which diverse constructions of reality emerge and in which the principle for measuring their legitimacy is determined. By the same token, the state influences the course and content of struggles for symbolic power in all fields: “the state as the possessor of the monopoly over legitimate symbolic violence, by its very existence, sets limits to the symbolic war of all against all for this monopoly” (Bourdieu 1997: 222). In pursuing this, the state employs a variety of means, the most important of which is institutional regulation of the activities of social agents, especially by recourse to legal acts. In this process of delegation of authority, competencies are transferred to institutions of the system (legal, educational, scientific, academic, artistic). In addition, the state prescribes who and what officially exists (this is the performative power of speech in the name of the state); secondly, through naming and classifying the state establishes the identity of people and things (e.g. ID cards); thirdly, by issuing certificates, confirmations, titles etc., it ascertains who is, and who isn’t, entitled to what (welfare, permission to engage in a profession etc.) (ibid., 222–223).

Yet, Bourdieu believes, although the state has an overarching position in symbolic production the political discourse can break through the limits
it imposes. The political field is for Bourdieu the “high place of symbolic dominance”, where legitimacy of a certain relation to the social world obtains official confirmation in the form of electoral results and the number of voters standing behind it. In other words, political struggle is essentially a cognitive struggle for the power to impose the legitimate vision of the social world, that is, the power to (re)make reality by preserving or altering the categories through which agents comprehend and construct that world (Wacquant 2005a: 3).

In studying politics in modern democracies, Bourdieu finds that the key antinomy of political process is the act of delegation, whereby professional politicians are entrusted with expressing the will of their constituents, while they largely pursue strategies oriented towards each other, within the political field (Wacquant 2005b: 14; Bourdieu 1984). This is a good initial description of what is going on in Serbian political life, in the eyes of our citizen-respondents. It is only that the dilemma built into the very nature of democratic politics manifests here in an exacerbated and destructive form.

The state as Leviathan: the bad, and the good, but a Leviathan nonetheless

Let us return to our focus group data, with the foregoing theoretical instructions in mind. Talking about construals of “politics” and “the state” in the accounts of our respondents, the first thing to be noted is that professional politicians, and politics as an activity, are painted in extremely dark colors. Almost consensually, they are designated as the main evils of transitional Serbia. Politicians are seen as a class apart, a closed, self-serving, egotistical group increasingly detached from ordinary people and their interests and concerns; parties and incumbents in power are described as worrying incomparably more about positioning themselves as against their rivals in the world of politics than about making a difference in the real social world.

As for the state, the participants relate to it in a way that is deeply paradoxical. On one hand, the state as it is hic et nunc, as a set of concrete institutions animated by living and breathing people – from the bureaucratic rank-and-file to the leaders – is described in extremely negative terms. Its performance in virtually all areas, from political efficiency, to quality of policies, to services it provides to the society, to interface with the citizens, is judged as very bad. Yet on the other hand – and in a sense precisely because of the former – this miserable, skewed “actually existing state” is seen as just a bad edition, a counterfeit version of the idea of
“State”, the state as it should be. This idea-ideal does not suffer at all as a result of previous negative judgments: on the contrary, it is still the same State which is considered to be the solution to the many problems cited, and the target of many hopes and expectations.

The numerous functions, purposes, tasks and causalities ascribed to the state may be illustrated by excerpts from focus group discussions. The state is blamed for all sorts of social ills, and its responsibility is identified in a whole range of social and political issues besetting Serbia today. For instance, the State is seen as responsible for the pervasive vulgarity of media contents where, research participants claim, reality shows and populist entertainment dominate, lowering the general cultural and moral level of society:

- The state allows this. If it didn’t suit them, they wouldn’t allow.
- It’s the same in the developed countries, they have the same crap on TV. The problem here is that we don’t have a system that would try to prevent it, that would act as a counterweight. The state, as the most powerful apparatus, should take charge of it. It should take pains to save the people of all that.

It is also the State’s fault that young people choose wrong role models:

- For the young, Arkan and like characters are idols. They brag about all these bad things. And why? Because the state has brought this in.

The State is responsible for the protection of the Cyrillic alphabet and national tradition:

- If the state doesn’t take care of the preservation of language, heritage, culture, no one will. All this will simply disappear.

for keeping public parks tidy:

- Why do people root out fir trees in parks? Because the system doesn’t work. In the Fruska gora National Park, visitors just come and take what they want, and nobody gives a damn. The keepers are not doing their job.

and for the future of sports:

- Such a great deal of support is needed on the part of the parents, to take kids to all the trainings, to insist on sports, but also financially. And this, unfortunately, depends on the state.

The discrimination against the Roma minority is not a concern of their fellow citizens but of the State:

- As for Roma people, this is again a problem for the state. The state should deal with it, to try to solve this problem. For, you see, I’m a citizen of this
state, I ask it to enable me to live of my own work, to sustain my family. 
And if the state is unable to provide for this, then I have a problem.

Also, as the foregoing phrases indicate, the State is our creditor, our care-
taker, the one who decides how much money we have:

_We no longer have a salary, we have a loan: the state gives us our 20,000 
dinars at the beginning of a month, and immediately takes it back through 
the bills it collects._

_The state says that 8,000 is enough to live through the month, which is 
nonsense. ... The state says the food basket costs 60,000, while we only 
have 35,000._

The state is to blame for the low quality of school education:

_The state prevents you from educating these kids._

and for morally dubious business practices:

_Who is creating these conditions? It’s obvious: the state. For someone to sell 
such [low-quality] windows to a hospital – the state makes this possible._

The state is, then, seen as performing extremely poorly. There was hardly any 
sphere of social life where the institutional record was judged in anything 
but the most negative terms.⁴ This was topped by the general complaint that, 
simply, “the system” doesn’t work.⁵ Yet at the same time, the State retains a 
strange aura and fascination, of being the absolutely most consequential agent 
on the scene. For example, it is viewed as the fount and origin of any change:

_In my mind, it all starts from the state._

_I think that change in society ought not to start from the individual, not 
from the bottom up but the other way round, from the top down._

_If only the system was set up in a just, hardworking way, within six months 
the whole people would turn around and start behaving the same._

Or even more generally, it all depends on the state:

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⁴ Compare recent data presented by Slavujević (2010), indicating that the level of 
trust in institutions in Serbia is the lowest since the introduction of the multiparty 
system twenty years ago.

⁵ For instance: “In our society any system is lacking. ... We are playing at the state. 
We don’t have a serious state”; “The corruption comes from the state”; “When in 
your daily contacts you see how the state treats you, it contradicts everything you 
believe in, and you feel so miserable”; “An old saying goes: there is no state without 
a hard road and a strict court. We have neither”; “Here, the state doesn’t function. 
Our system, our apparatus doesn’t work”.

Essentially, it is from them that everything stems. They are the chief motor that can get people moving. Serbia is in a sort of collective depression, people have become inert. We need collective therapy. And who else, it’s the state that should stop and think about it.

In one of the groups there happened a telling moment of concurrence: when one participant declared that, in order for something to change in Serbia, “the system must be changed, as it now is”, the others jumped in immediately: “I think the keyword is system change”, “In my opinion, the system is they key.” This points to a widespread view of possible social change as springing from above, “from the head” as some participants said. Collective mobilization for social change are not seen as a concern of the citizenry, of their organizations, labor unions, or grassroots initiatives. It is not, so to say, “our” but “their” business.6

When the prospects of Serbia’s European integration was discussed, the same view of the State was transposed, so to say, one level up: the EU was viewed as a kind of “super-state” to upgrade and rectify our own little and strayed state:

I’m not very much in favor of EU, but it’s still better for us to join, and get the system they have, than to have all these things coming in slowly, through the back door. ... The system is OK if I can pay for all that is required of me. Everything is regulated, but I get my salary.

When we join EU, the government will become a service of citizens, and we’ll become what we are – bearers of sovereignty.

I’ve lived in West Europe, and what I would like EU to bring us, it is the system. There, everything is in order. The state is ordered in such a way that you don’t have to worry about silly things, like here.

I don’t support joining EU, but I do support their welfare program, it’s much better than ours, we should get that.

In sum: although the State’s current operation is described as very bad, it is still seen as the main actor, the place for establishing the rules of the overall social game. Such focus upon the state as a salient feature of ordinary political discourse in Serbia has been found in other recent studies as well.7

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6 True, there appeared some individual respondents who defended this more individualistic, liberal vision of social dynamics and political responsibility. They almost invariably faced united opposition from their coparticipants.

7 For instance, in a comprehensive quantitative study of the public opinion on Serbian transition one of the authors argues: “Our research confirms that Serbian citizens see the state as the key agency, organizer, and allocator of inducements, supports, programs and services. ... The state continues to be taken as the key distributive
The State and the effect of “social blockade”

In participants’ accounts there often appears a sense of gap between what they themselves, and “people” in general, think, value, and respect, on one hand, and what is seen as currently dominant in Serbian society, on the other. We have termed this strange discrepancy “the paradox of social action” or “sense of social blockade” and discussed it elsewhere (Spasić, Birešev 2011). It points to the paradox that the respondents report on many right-minded, honest, and hardworking people living in Serbia today, including themselves, their families, and their entire social circles, while at the same time life in Serbia in general is said to be driven by a completely different set of guidelines. For example:

* I want to raise my kids by instilling in them all the right values ... but I’m not sure the system would support this kind of behavior on their part.

* In the people, there is this right sense. ... But thanks to the media, we’ve turned everything upside down. Systemically, these values, material values, are put above all else. ... We have a tradition, all the nations in this region, but we are slowly losing it.

* My social circle, people I associate with, they all espouse these right values, but false values are imposed from above: money, cars, status, material things.

We have elaborated on the discursive mechanisms of this disconnect between “people” and “society” – in a different terminology, perhaps “lifeworld” and “system” – as well as on its negative ramifications for action potentials of Serbian society, in the previous text quoted above. Here the paradox may be rephrased in terms of Bourdieuan theory. For Bourdieu, as has been said, the state ultimately arbitrates between various contending versions of how much particular forms of capital ought to be valued, and guarantees the legitimacy of the currently stabilized (always provisory) overall scale of valuation that is dominant at a given moment. It is the state, therefore, that provides the legitimating background to classifications of social agents, their assets (capitals), and their practices stemming from the latter.

At this point, like in most other parts of his theoretical edifice, Bourdieu primarily has in mind advanced, Western societies such as France, with a more or less consensual structure of symbolic power and domination, and

agency and the chief actor in redirecting transition, managing the economy, as well as finding a way out of crisis” (Ružica 2010: 38-41).
free of deep cleavages between opposed symbolic subworlds. He had very little to say about societies that are torn apart by intense conflicts, including symbolic ones. We do not wish to continue here the critical discussion of applicability of Bourdieu’s concepts of distinction and symbolic violence to the Serbian data in general, but rather to point to a perhaps surprising reaffirmation of Bourdieuan ideas in this case. Namely, when our research participants insistently claim that they and their friends still hold the right values – as the most frequent phrase went – it can be retranslated as them, within their private circles, embracing legitimate values. But as soon as they step out of these small private social worlds – it is argued – into the large, societal world, which is the only place where they can get a job (or not), earn money (or, more often, fail to do so), send their kids to school, get medical treatment, and generally succeed or fail in life, in this other, broader world, illegitimate value scales reign. The broader world is run by the State; it is the State. In other words, there is a chasm between “our” and “the State’s” classifications; the State classifies wrongly, using wrong criteria and doing injustice to worthy people and their endeavors. And yet: the State’s authority to perform the operations of evaluation and classification is not questioned as such. There is no attempt to alter radically the division of symbolic labor. The participants do not try to discursively justify a comprehensive alternative, parallel classification system; to displace the State – performing so poorly as it does – from its towering position, to oust it from its throne of chief arbiter, and replace it with a more decentralized, civil legitimation of classifications that would then become normatively binding throughout society.

Rather than the state being disputed in its role of authorized classifier, it seems that a reconnection is desired between the two, that is, between “our” and “the State’s” classifications. The former, “lifeworldly” classifications, although clearly seen as the correct/right ones, are equally clearly seen as insufficiently strong and authoritative, incapable of imposing themselves on the whole of society and becoming dominant. Instead, the State should be reeducated and made to accept “our” valuations. In the end, after all the severe criticisms it is subjected to, the State remains in the eyes of our respondents the authoritative agency for ascribing relative values to

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8 The problems this assumption of homogeneity causes in theorizing and researching cultural taste, as well as applying Bourdieu’s concepts in societies removed in time and/or space from the society Bourdieu was analyzing in Distinction have already been widely discussed in the literature (see e.g. Grignon et Passeron 1989; Bennett et al. 2009).

9 An example of such discussion may be found in Spasić (2006).
capitals and agents. The state is, to put it in a more literary manner, seen as the Great Classifier.

Conclusion

For Bourdieu, the task of politics is to articulate what ordinary people, lacking sufficient political competence, cannot do. Our respondents however describe the political field in Serbia as 1) abnormally and unproductively autonomized from society, hence 2) functioning only in relation to itself, that is, self-referentially, rather than being a channel for expressing and crystallizing concerns and aspirations stemming from the society; for this reason 3) the State is expected to perform the role of the political field. This, we may add, is not its proper task in the democratic division of political labor.\textsuperscript{10} If we return to Bourdieu's “key antinomy” of democratic politics – that the politicians should reflect, or, in Eyal’s (2005) words, “transpose” social processes,\textsuperscript{11} but at the same time they are necessarily oriented towards each other within the political field, we may say that in Serbia the latter pole of the antinomy hypertrophied and ate up the former. No reflection is apparently at work, and the political field has gradually torn itself apart from any anchoring in society. When a research participant exclaimed: “Our state has been hijacked!”, this statement can be read as describing this colonization of the State, as fundamentally relying on a more or less selfstanding bureaucratic apparatus, by the political field, which in normal conditions – and in the normative projections of our respondents as well – should be kept separate.

While politics is seen as having become the center of collective life, having penetrated all other spheres, it is at the same time received with extreme repugnance, witness the repeated mention of “politicians” as the universal bad guys of Serbian transition. A consequence of this revulsion has been that the bitter discontent, amply demonstrated in our respondents’ accounts, has not produced an initiative, not even an idea, to launch a new political party, social movement, or any other form of collective action that would

\textsuperscript{10} Compare the discussion of the pervasive language of depoliticization and apathy in: Greenberg 2010. An earlier diagnosis of political passivization, stemming from a strong wave of post-2000 disillusionment has been offered in: Golubović (ed.) 2007.

\textsuperscript{11} In Eyal’s rendition of Bourdieu’s theory of politics, the concept of transposition refers to the relation between political field and social space – or, “how the oppositions and similarities between social interests are transposed onto the plane of political actors and their struggles” (Eyal 2005: 154). This relation, Eyal warns, should always be taken as an empirical variable rather than a category fixed a priori, and he suggests its four basic types: reflection, inversion, condensation, and polarization.
publicly voice what they complain about. Again, the State is looked upon as the solution: as a participant said in one of the discussions, “it is rather easy to improve things in Serbia – we only have to turn the switch around, and everything will fall into place”. The “switch” is, obviously, located in the State.

To conclude, what we find in these discourses is a formidable critical capacity on the part of Serbian citizens, since they prove to be rather unsusceptible to the lures of political ideologies, worldview dogmas, official discourses or other forms of indoctrination. Yet they lack the ability to articulate new possibilities, to expand the limits of the possible – and this is supposed to be the essence of politics. Viewed from this angle, in Serbia we do not really have “politics” at all, but only the “State” over which a variety of groups and forces are fighting. The democratic promise of such an attitude is, at best, ambiguous. While criticism of the wielders of power in principle speaks of civil maturity, by fiercely attacking the “system” for its many wrongdoings and failures, the citizens ironically only perpetuate the traditional reliance on the state that has long plagued Serbia’s political culture and slowed down its full democratization.

References:


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The generation of five capitals of volunteering through volunteer programs in museums: A case study of the National Museum Belgrade

Abstract
The main aim of this paper is to explore developmental and transformative potentials of museums based on volunteer programs through suggesting a framework for the assessment of the generation of five capitals (physical, human, economic, social and cultural) for all key actors involved in the process. Furthermore, in order to offer insight into the current situation related to the five capitals of volunteering in museums in Serbia, it discusses the data collected in the course of a wider study on volunteering in Serbian museums and focuses on the case study of the National museum in Belgrade. A special focus is put on the case of the National Museum in Belgrade since I argue that, even though the museum has not developed successful tools for managing volunteers, the volunteer program has succeeded in generating five capitals to a greater extent than in other museums because it was designed in a way that is in accordance with the definition of volunteering.

Key words: five capitals of volunteering, museum’s outreach, community participation, sustainable development

Volunteering in museums: a brief history of the practice
Volunteering is one of the most important pro-social behaviours which encourages active citizenship, builds social awareness and self-initiative, raises peoples competencies, enhances lifelong learning and through that develops
the whole society. There are four key criteria which characterize a certain form of work as “volunteering”: it is a free choice; a non-remunerated service; takes place in a formal setting; and the beneficiary is not the volunteer directly.

The practice of volunteering in museums in an organized way has been developing since 1960s, particularly in the United States and Great Britain. On the one hand, this was caused by the change of social attitudes and reduction of deference to traditional institutions. On the other hand, increase in relative affluence and growth in car ownership, provided a pool of people with the attitude, income and mobility to participate in the conservation and protection of their heritage.\(^1\) With theories and practice of eco-museums, neighborhood museums and integral museums and their reliance on the local community, the practice of volunteering became one of the substantial concerns of theoreticians of new museology.

This model of volunteering differs significantly from the model practiced since the 1960s in museums in Anglophone contexts. Volunteers in traditional museums in the United States were mainly well-to-do, WASP citizens whose volunteering was seen as socially desirable because of the prestige in dealing with “high culture”. By deploying such volunteers, museums provided them with quality leisure time and desirable knowledge, and got volunteers’ expertise and enthusiasm as well as increased donations and sponsorships.\(^2\) Conversely, volunteers in eco-museums, neighborhood museums and integral museums are common citizens whose identity is endangered, or very vulnerable and marginalized communities in one society who do not visit traditional museums.\(^3\) Their volunteer engagement is aimed at increasing of their access to culture and at mediation to other members of their community. The ultimate goal of such practice is the social, cultural and economic development of the community.\(^4\)

Today, in the majority of traditional museums, these two forms have merged to a certain extent so that many museums do think about volunteer program as both a way of attracting additional workforce and material support, and a way of participating in realization of broader cultural,

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2. The aspect of getting donations and sponsorships through volunteers and friends of museum was particularly relevant in the US. In some of prestigious museums, it is, even today required to pay a fee in order to become a volunteer, which immediately filtrates higher social strata of society who are seen as desirable to volunteer


social and economic policy. Furthermore, due to repeated calls - coming from governments, professionals and society - for museums which would facilitate responsible growth and improvement of communities they serve, many museums have recognized volunteer programs as a tool which helps in meeting those requirements. Therefore, in the last ten years, governments and independent researchers have been undertaking substantial effort to map and quantify the activity and impact of volunteering in museums.

Mapping the Serbian situation related to museum volunteering

In this paper I will focus on the situation in Serbia and show conclusions that we can draw by applying the framework of five capitals of volunteering for measuring the impact of this practice. In doing this, I will rely on the research *Volunteering in museums in Serbia: between social contribution and misunderstanding*, which I conducted during the summer of 2010. A part of this research was a cross-sectional design targeted at museums in Serbia aimed at mapping and assessing much broader set of issues related to volunteer practices than the impact in terms of five capitals. However, questions number 14, 15 and 16 were designed in such a way as to access the impact of volunteering: in terms of generation of physical, human, economic, social and cultural capitals.

A special focus will be put on the case of the National Museum in Belgrade since I argue that, even though museum has not developed successful tools for managing volunteers, the volunteer program has succeeded in generating the five capitals to a greater extent than in other museums because it was designed in a way that is in accordance with the above mentioned four criteria of volunteering. In proving this hypothesis I will first use results

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7 The research involved a survey to 89 museums in Serbia. A total of 57 museums completed the survey, representing a return rate of 64%. In order to have satisfying response rate, research was done with the support of the Centre for Research of Cultural Development (CRCD) and sent as its official questionnaire to all 89 museums from Centre’s data base. It was electronic based, sent via email to directors of 89 museums. See V. Kisić, *Volunteering in museums in Serbia: between social contribution and misunderstanding*, 2010.
8 V. Kisić, 131-143
delivered from the questionnaires related to average level of generation of five capitals in all surveyed museums and compare them with the results of the same questionnaire conducted with the National Museum in Belgrade. Then, in order to test these quantitative questionnaire results, I will use interviews with museum staff, focus groups with volunteers and impressions book of visitors to assess what all key actors in the volunteer program have defined as the positive impact of the program.

Measuring the impact of volunteer programs: the five capitals of volunteering in museums

The Institute for Volunteering Research, a focal point for research on volunteering in England, has patented a Volunteer Impact Assessment Toolkit, a set of tools which organisations can use and adapt in order to measure and assess the impact and value of volunteering. Even though it is not aimed at museum volunteering specifically, I found the theoretical framework of this toolkit the most comprehensive and relevant for the identification of the key groups which are affected by volunteering, and classification of major ways in which they may be affected. Therefore, adapted and developed in a way to fit the context of museums in Serbia, this framework has served as a reference point for all questions related to impact of volunteering.

The toolkit recognizes four main key groups which are affected by volunteering: the organization (museums), volunteers, users/beneficiaries (user is museum audience, while beneficiaries are schools, civil organizations and associations who benefit through the programs museum offers because it complements their work) and wider community.

The major ways in which key groups may be affected by volunteering are grouped into five types of “capital”. “Capital” here is thought of as “capacity” or “stock”, because understanding impacts in this way allows people to visualize how volunteering might generate or build up capital, or supply a resource bank from which to draw. These five capitals are physical, human, economic, social and cultural.

Physical capital refers to the product or output achieved through volunteer effort, e.g. the number of new programs, guided tours, etc. offered by the museum; access to more museum services for audience; and access to training, literature, and collections for volunteers. Human capital relates to the acquisition of skills and personal development (of museum staff,
volunteers, and audience and community groups). Economic capital relates to financial and economic effects that result from volunteering, actually putting a market value on the work done by volunteers. Social capital moves beyond physical outputs and individual development to capture social impacts. It refers to creating a more cohesive community through building relationships, networks and bonds of trust between people, while cultural capital refers to assets such as a shared sense of cultural and religious, ethnic, national, local identity, acquisition of intercultural competencies, etc.  

The extent to which five capitals are generated varies significantly from museum to museum. On the one hand, this is due to different legal frameworks and cultures of volunteering which exist in different countries and regions. On the other hand, effects differ because of differences in mission, organizational culture, level of openness, policies and management of volunteers in different museums.  

Cross sectional design and results related to generation of five capitals of volunteering in Serbian museums

In the survey conducted with museums in Serbia, each of these capitals was assessed by a set of statements related to impact of volunteering on museums (question no. 14), volunteers (question no.15) and external beneficiaries - audience and local community (question no. 16) which museums should value on five grades value scale: from totally non existing impact to total impact. When analyzing data related to five capitals a traffic-light scoring method was used.  

Physical capital generated to volunteers in

10 For more detailed categorization and indicators of five capitals of volunteering in museums see V. Kisić, 2010, 42-49


12 The number of respondents for each value (1 for most negative up to 5 for the most positive) of the statement was multiplied with this value, these multiplied numbers of all values were summarized and divided by the number of overall respondents in order to get an average value which would identify the average score for each statement of whole population of museums in Serbia. Results with value from 1 to 2.5 are marked red; results from 2.5 to 3.5 are marked yellow, while results from 3.5 to 5 are marked green. Red color indicates the underdevelopment of this aspect of volunteering and poor generation of capital and points out that substantially more has to be done on this aspect in order to achieve positive results. Yellow indicates an average generation of capital and tells that it is necessary to work more on this aspect in order to achieve positive results. Finally, green indicates good/satisfying generation of capital and indicates that work has been done correctly.
terms of rewards and recognition aspects, training, as well as social events for volunteers was rated according to data of the questions no. 6 and 10, which indicate existence of management practices and policies related to volunteering.

This research has shown that “volunteering in museums in Serbia is underdeveloped due to underdeveloped culture and recognition of volunteering in Serbia, misunderstanding of the concept of volunteering among museums in Serbia, low level of focus of museums on community and poor management of volunteers which causes the lack of implementation and exploitation of this practice and fails to generate five capitals to key actors and beneficiaries”\(^\text{13}\). During the research it became clear that “volunteering” is misunderstood by the majority museums as pre-employment training\(^\text{14}\) or as unpaid work in public institutions instead of serving in the military. Furthermore, part of this misunderstanding was the fact that museums accept very tight and specific volunteer profiles to which biggest part of population does not fit.\(^\text{15}\) Overall picture shows that there is a poor management of volunteers, seen in lack of positions of volunteer coordinator, lack of planning of deployment of volunteers, lack of recruitment strategies, lack of policies and practices related to volunteers, lack of system of support and recognition to volunteers and lack of sustained, numerous and long-term voluntary programs.\(^\text{16}\)

This misunderstanding and poor management of volunteers has visible impact on the generation of the five capitals and is readable from tables with traffic light scoring which shows the average level of generation of five capitals in surveyed museums in Serbia (the third column of tables 1, 2 and 3)\(^\text{17}\).

As seen from the third column of Table 1, which demonstrates the impact of volunteering on museums, volunteering in museums in Serbia, averagely affects generation of physical (quantity, quality and innovation of services)

\(^{13}\) V. Kisic, 2010

\(^{14}\) Pre-employment training is a year long, full time engagement undertaken by graduates of Art History, Archaeology, Ethnology and Anthropology and History without or with minimal reimbursement in order to pass the curatorial exam and receive the title of curator.

\(^{15}\) “88% of respondents require university degree and 80.8% of those said ask for a degree of certain departments of the Faculty of Philosophy (particularly art history, then archaeology, ethnology and history)” see V. Kisic, 2010, 68

\(^{16}\) “In 2009 in all 57 surveyed museums there were a total of only 16 volunteers engaged for more than a year, 19 engaged for a year and only 16 for up to 6 months. Total number of volunteers deployed for short term projects is much higher, 151, but it has to be noted that only five museums succeed in deploying 15 and more volunteers for projects”, see V. Kisic, 2010, 69-70

\(^{17}\) See Appendix I
TABLE NO. 1. THE IMPACT OF VOLUNTEERING ON MUSEUM:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Museum</th>
<th>All surveyed museums</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Value</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Physical Capital</th>
<th>National Museum</th>
<th>All surveyed museums</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Innovation in services which museum offers</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of services which museum offers</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Capital</th>
<th>National Museum</th>
<th>All surveyed museums</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Innovation in services which museum offers</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of services which museum offers</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural Capital</th>
<th>National Museum</th>
<th>All surveyed museums</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Connection with local communities and their needs</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment and retention of quality volunteers</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Capital</th>
<th>National Museum</th>
<th>All surveyed museums</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase in museum's profit</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment of quality staff</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Capital</th>
<th>National Museum</th>
<th>All surveyed museums</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase in museum's reputation</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in museum's income (sponsorships, donations)</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Value</th>
<th>National Museum</th>
<th>All surveyed museums</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table No. 2: The Impact of Volunteering on Museum.
and human (diversity of workforce and organization’s development) capital of
museums. These are aspects which are most likely to have impact on museum
even if not much is done in terms of good volunteer management, because
the additional workforce which volunteers provide has to affect quantity and
quality of services as well as diversity of workforce. Volunteering, however,
does not generate human capital in terms of development and progress of
museum staff, does not increase museums financial sustainability, does not
increase museum’s reputation, connection with community and their needs
nor in significantly helps to offer culturally relevant and adjusted contents
and services to local community. This is so because there are no planned
and organized numerous long-term volunteer programs which would in-
clude much diverse volunteer workforce in terms of age, profession, level of
education, background, and be able to generate visible impact.

From Table 2, which relates to impact of volunteering on volunteers,
it is clear that museums valued much more positively the impact which
volunteering has on volunteers than on museum. Among the most posi-
tively ranked is human capital, particularly acquisition of new skills and
knowledge related to profession, communicational skills, and feelings of
enjoyment and doing something useful. Social capital such as making new
friends and networking seem to be one of highest rated impacts. However,
poor management is visible in the fact that physical and economic capitals
are not being generated, since museums do not use their resources for train-
ing, recognition and rewards or reimbursement of volunteers’ expenses.

Third table which relates to the impact of volunteering on audience
and local community shows that all potential capitals are valued as poorly
generated and without any significant impact. If one looks at key groups of
volunteering this group should actually be a beneficiary, while the museum
and volunteers should profit only indirectly.18 The current situation in Ser-
bian museums is reversed: volunteers profit the most in terms of personal
development (human capital), museum profits in terms of quantity and
quality of services (physical capital), while there is no significant impact in
terms of bringing closer the museum and its visitors and community. This
is the ultimate result of volunteering which is realized as pre-employment
training or very sporadic, innumerable and non-sustained long-term volun-
teering, with volunteer programs organized and managed only for short-
term projects by a relatively small number of volunteers, who are mainly
from the museum profession.

18 Museum is an organizer of volunteering so when volunteers affect positively its work
and capitals, they do this with the final goal to deliver better services to those to
whom these are aimed (audience, tourists, local community)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Value</th>
<th>National Museum</th>
<th>All Survied Museums</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
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**Contribution to their cultural activities and hobbies**
- Better understanding of other cultures
- Better understanding of national/local culture
- Increased feeling of their cultural identity

**Economic capital**
- Increased possibilities for employment after the finished studies

**Human capital**
- Increased feeling of self-confidence and trust in their own capabilities

**Social capital**
- New contacts and networking
- New friends and social activities
- Increased level of trust in other people
- Increased level of trust in museums

**Cultural capital**
- The feeling of belonging to local community
- Improved level of communication and social skills
- Feeling of enjoyment and fulfillment

**Physical capital**
- Access to training

**Rewards and Recognition aspects**
- Access to museum support

**Access to volunteer events**
- Reimbursement of travel, food and other volunteer-related expenses

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The National Museum Belgrade: impact of volunteer program

I have chosen to compare the generation of five capitals in National Museum in Belgrade because in summer 2009 museum recognized that it can benefit from the deployment of volunteers and initiated a volunteer program which is in accordance with all four criteria of the definition of volunteering and which is, as such, different from the practice and understanding of volunteering in the majority of Serbian museums. Since museum does not have a permanent display and mostly exhibits its collection outside museum building, volunteers were engaged during two exhibitions which took place from autumn 2009, “One hundred years of Serbian painting: 1850-1950” and “Paja Jovanovic: 1859-1957”.

Volunteers were recruited among students of the final years of art history since the museum recognized they will have the most interest and motivation to volunteer. Furthermore, the museum wanted to keep a certain level of professionalism and assumed that these students are responsible and knowledgeable enough to perform required duties properly, which confirms the general tendency of “playing safe” in terms of volunteer profiles.

Once they applied, 15 volunteers were prepared for their tasks through the electronic version of the exhibition catalogue, one general meeting with museum’s PR who manages volunteers and a curator’s guided tour through the exhibition prior to the opening with responses to all volunteers’ questions and doubts. Volunteers were given much freedom in terms of interpretation of the catalogue and the exhibition. Communication and coordination was conducted by an email-list. Each volunteer was required to be in the gallery twice a week for four hours so that all working hours of the gallery were covered. During that time, they delivered tours to scheduled groups, gave one advertised daily tour and responded to visitor’s questions. Every second Saturday two volunteers were asked to assist with kids workshops.

Even though the museum has not developed training, policies and motivational and reward system related to volunteers, there were few crucial aspects of this program which came closer to more effective use of volunteering. First of all, students applied based on their free will and motivation, without expecting university credits or remuneration. Secondly, their tasks were clearly defined. Thirdly, they acted as a “face” for the museum and were given the responsibility of visitor services which allowed for volunteers to make the impact on the audience. Finally, they
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Physical &amp; Human capital</th>
<th>National museum Average value all surveyed museums</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>museums’ activities</td>
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provided constant service and guided tours for which, otherwise, some of the museum staff would have had to be engaged.

The analyses of the impact which the volunteer program has had on the National Museum in Belgrade show slightly different generation of five capitals. The values in the second column of all three tables are the answers of this museum to the same questionnaire which was sent to other museums during the study.

Firstly, physical capital in terms of quality and quantity of services has been generated to a larger extend and reached the highest level. However, innovation was less than average, because all tasks were designed in advance, leaving no space for new ideas. Secondly, human capital in terms of diversity of the workforce and development and progress of museum reached a higher value than average. On the other hand, since the interaction of volunteers was limited to audience, there was no influence which they had on museum staff and its progress. Economic capital was perceived by museum as not being generated, which is the case for the other museums as well. Social capital, however, showed to be much higher than average in terms of improving museums reputation and connecting with local communities and their needs. Not surprisingly so since the audience has received much more attention and services due to volunteer engagement. Cultural capital has also been delivered to a significantly higher degree than average, particularly when it comes to reaching diverse audiences.

A comparison of capitals generated for volunteers does not differ significantly. The main differences are seen in the generation of human capital, particularly improvement of communication and social skills, since the volunteers’ main task was to communicate the message of the exhibition to the visitors.

The largest difference in generated capitals is related to the impact which volunteering had on the audience and local community. The museum thought that the community has felt that the museum is more accessible and that content has been adjusted to different groups of visitors, including tourists. Importantly, these three are valued among the highest impacts generated during the overall process, showing that the volunteer program was primarily aimed at the benefit of the audience and community.

Even though useful for the comparison, questionnaire results give a limited picture of the impact of volunteering as they represent official perspective of museum management. In order to get more holistic view, it was necessary to take in consideration opinions of all parties involved. This was done through interviews with museum management and staff that
cooperated with volunteers, focus groups with volunteers and impressions book of the audience. For analyzing these qualitative statements related to impact of volunteering, a method of coding was used. All statements coming from interviews, focus groups and impression book were assigned to some of five capitals according to the theoretical framework of Volunteer Impact Assessment Toolkit. The calculation of economic capital generated by volunteering was assessed by putting the market value on the number of hours given by volunteers.\textsuperscript{19} These coded statements were then summed up in terms of generation of five capitals in Tables 4, 5 and 6.

Interviews with museum staff showed results very similar to those obtained by means of the questionnaire. The main impact which all museum staff have underlined is a significant increase of quantity and quality of services (physical capital) which museum was able to offer to audience. Furthermore, the staff saw as important impact more diverse workforce (human capital) which succeeds in offering a new image of museum to visitors: younger, more enthusiastic and more adjusted to communication with non-experts and thus improving museum’s image (social capital). As a result of these, the museum increased communication and relationship with audience and local community (in terms of school visits) and succeeded offering relevant content to diverse groups of visitors (human capital). Museum staff perceived volunteer program as important professional development tool for volunteers, who improved their communication skills and received practical experience related to their future profession. As in the questionnaire, the museum staff did not think that economic capital was generated. However, when generation of economic capital is counted according to the above mentioned formula, a sum of 194,640 RSD makes clear that the economic aspect was an important gain and that it should not be underestimated. This is the sum which the museum would have had to pay for guides, if it had not engaged volunteers.

\textsuperscript{19} For this, I used the formula suggested by Volunteer Impact Assessment Toolkit. According to this formula, economic capital (EC) equals the value of volunteering (V) minus the cost of volunteering (C). I measured the economic value of volunteering as number of volunteer hours per week multiplied with number of weeks multiplied with a market value of a working hour (average national monthly wage divided by number of working hours in a month). The cost of volunteering was measured by calculating all costs museum have had related to volunteers. See Institute for Volunteer Research, Volunteer Impact Assessment Toolkit, http://www.ivr.org.uk/booksandlibrary/Impact%20Assessment%20Toolkit
TABLE NO. 4, IMPACT OF VOLUNTEERING ON MUSEUM, NATIONAL MUSEUM BELGRADE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Physical</th>
<th>Human</th>
<th>Cultural</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Economic</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased quantity &amp; quality of services</td>
<td>Diversified workforce</td>
<td>New image of museum</td>
<td>New image of museum</td>
<td>194640 rsd</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Improved reputation</td>
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<td>Improved communication and relationship with audience</td>
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The volunteers had a slightly different and more in-depth view on the program and its impact. Most of them confirmed the statement by the museum staff but added new points as well. For them, it was clear that the museum has had economic gain from their engagement, particularly because it had unpaid workforce without having to reimburse them for volunteer related expenses. They underlined the fact that not much physical capital was generated for volunteers, since they did not receive detailed training, rewards, etc. Talking about benefits of their engagement volunteers highlighted a chance to get a practical experience unavailable at the faculty, enhance their communication skills, enhancement of knowledge related to that specific thematic. For some volunteers improving communication skills was their primary motivation. Three female volunteers explicitly said they were told by a professor after the exam to go somewhere and practice rhetoric. One girl was too quiet and shy so she wanted to test herself in front of an audience and see whether she would ever be able to do this kind of job. For all four female volunteers this method worked out and has generated necessary human capital. Many underlined that this engagement is a good reference in a CV for the future. For some volunteers talking publicly was like advertising yourself as an expert. This was important because all of them are without a job currently and they were giving their best on these tours because they never knew who is listening to them. There is the example of a volunteer being heard by the director of the National Museum in Kruševac and who was invited afterwards to give a lecture in that museum, but for a decent honorarium, which shows that volunteers have seen their engagement as generating economic capital. For many volunteers the reactions and satisfaction of the audience and comments after the tour were of great significance. This gave them the sense they were doing something
good and useful and served as a motivation in times they already got bored with repeating the same story a few times per week.

**TABLE NO 5, IMPACT OF VOLUNTEERING ON VOLUNTEERS, NATIONAL MUSEUM BELGRADE**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Physical</th>
<th>Human</th>
<th>Cultural</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Economic</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>exhibition</td>
<td>sensibilisation for working with kids and school groups</td>
<td>increased employability</td>
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<tr>
<td>catalogue</td>
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<tr>
<td>guided tour</td>
<td>access to values and knowledge surrounding museum artefacts</td>
<td>honorary engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>practical</td>
<td>increased their sense of cultural identity</td>
<td>created new contacts</td>
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<td>experience</td>
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<tr>
<td>communication</td>
<td>enhanced inter-cultural competencies</td>
<td>spread network of cooperators</td>
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<tr>
<td>and public</td>
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<tr>
<td>speaking skills</td>
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<tr>
<td>increased</td>
<td>felt useful, needed and integrated in the community</td>
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<td>confidence and self-esteem</td>
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The majority of them said that there was no tour which they guided after which people would come to them and say how “thankful they were to learn something”, how “it was a totally different experience when someone talked about the artworks than when you looked at the exhibition on your own”. Many visitors came to ask more questions after the tour, which meant that a volunteer succeeded in creating interest for the topic among the audience. Volunteers also said there were people who asked when they were giving a tour next time so that they could come and hear it again with some friends. Some visitors gave candies and even offered money for the tour to volunteers when they heard that they were delivering tours on a volunteer basis. Others asked whom they could tell that the tour was great, while some left impressions in the impression book. One more insight which volunteers gained is that there were so many lonely people who needed someone to talk to. Some older people came regularly to the exhibition and asked questions but then after a while started talking about their own problems and the volunteers felt glad that they could make somebody’s day better. The majority of volunteers agrees that after a while
when their motivation related to personal development decreased, because they saw they can manage their tasks properly, the comments and support they received from the audience were the biggest motivational factor. Since there was not enough supervision and empowerment from museum staff, the audience was what made the volunteers feel like they were doing something worthy and useful. All this shows that making bonds and understanding among people, increasing the quality of communities life and enhancing learning was important aspect of the impact of volunteer program that succeeded generating social and human capital.

Comments in the book of impressions show that the majority of visitors were very satisfied with the work done by volunteers. If one has in mind that for these two exhibitions there was only one comment related to a curator’s tour, more than twenty comments related to volunteers is a significant number, and shows that volunteers did affect audiences positively. It should also be noted that there were numerous comments which could be understood as implicit mention of the positive effect of tours and volunteers (those which mention that the overall experience was wonderful, that the museum succeeded in making this exhibition closer and more understandable to them, etc).

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<th>Physical</th>
<th>Human</th>
<th>Cultural</th>
<th>Social</th>
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The lack of experience in volunteer management and lack of awareness about the need for existence of reward and motivational systems, training, communication with museum staff, support and supervision, resulted in lower generation of physical capital and for volunteers, innovation and develop-
ment of museum staff. Therefore, the biggest flipside of the program was the fact that volunteers underlined that their trust in museum and its work has decreased because they did not receive enough attention and support and felt like museum should have been more professional in coordinating and training volunteers, instead of totally relying on the responsibility of individuals. Most volunteers stayed until the end of exhibition because the response from audience was motivating, not because the museum motivated them to stay. For this reason recruitment and retention of quality volunteers part of social capital which has not been generated and many volunteers did not continue their engagement after those two exhibitions. The positive thing is that museum is aware of the benefits which volunteering brings and eager to improve volunteer program as they learn.

Conclusion

The case of the National Museum shows that even though there were numerous shortcomings in terms of volunteer management, the overall effect was significant, particularly for the audience which got constant mediation services during these exhibitions, for volunteers in terms of improving their skills related to the profession and for the museum in terms of increase in quantity and quality of services, economic impact and improvement of its image. Through engaging a large number of volunteers during the whole exhibition period and giving them audience-oriented tasks, the volunteer program was particularly important for generating capital for final beneficiaries, the audience and community, which was not the case in the majority of other museums in Serbia.

Finally, the volunteer program is not a priority of the National Museum since the museum does not have its own exhibition space and has been awaiting reconstruction for more than five years. This situation of the redefinition of the museum’s concept and/or museum’s reconstruction is what many museums in Serbia are experiencing or are going to experience in the years to come. Without a clear strategy for the overall development of a museum it is hard to expect that these museums will come up with ideas for the development of a sustained program for volunteers, which puts volunteering low on its priority list. However, this short overview of the possible impact of volunteer programs should suggest that more attention should be dedicated to the implementation of this practice since it might be a way to offer more relevant content and services to audiences and communities, participate more actively in its social, cultural and economic development and attract a broader network of supporters.
Bibliography


Constructing a Cultural Map of Serbia

In this article our aim is to identify the main dimensions of the cultural map of Serbia and explore the relationship between social and cultural stratification in Serbia. To accomplish this we have relied on data from two surveys “Cultural Needs, Habits and Taste of Citizens of Serbia and Macedonia” (2005) and “Cultural Practices of Citizens of Serbia” (2010). Both were based on a national proportional stratified random sample with face-to-face interviews. In the first study 1364 respondents were interviewed (the sample was made of 1485 respondents, hence the realization percentage was 91.9%). In the second study out of 1600 sampled respondents, 1490 were interviewed (93.1% of realization). The article first reconstructs, using Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA), the cultural map of Serbia from 2005. The basic axis which structure this field of cultural practices and types of cultural practices which are shaped by the influence of these “forces” are identified. Then supplementary socio-demographic variables (education, age, income, wealth, occupation) are projected onto this map, which makes possible the consideration of the interrelatedness of cultural practices and social factors. In the next section, the results of these same analyses of data from the 2010 survey are presented. The final section compares the cultural maps of Serbia from 2005 and 2010 and the relations between cultural and social factors in them. We conclude by pointing to specificities of the field of cultural practices in Serbia and deviations from Bourdieu’s model of homology between the social and cultural order.
fied by authors such as Pierre Bourdieu, Anthony Giddens, Bruno Latour, Charles Taylor and Theodor Schatzki, in our article cultural practices have been considered as routinized forms of behavior which consist of a large number of elements which are indissolubly interrelated (bodily activities, mental activities, ways of using things, prereflexive knowledge, skills, motivation, etc). As stated by A. Reckwitz in “Toward a Theory of Social Practices. A Development in Culturalist Theorizing”; “A practice – a way of cooking, of consuming, of working, of investigating, of taking care of oneself or of others, etc. – forms so to speak a ‘block’ whose existence necessarily depends on the existence and specific interconnectedness of these elements, and which cannot be reduced to any one of these single elements” (Reckwitz: 2002: 249 – 250). In this indissoluble unity of cultural practices, we have considered five of their aspects: 1) cultural needs (the potential aspect of cultural participation); 2) cultural habits (actual cultural participation); 3) taste (aesthetic preferences); 4) knowledge of culture; 5) ownership of cultural goods (books, paintings, sculptures, cultural equipment).

In the construction of the field of cultural practices in Serbia indicators of cultural needs, cultural habits, tastes, knowledge and ownership of cultural goods and objects were considered in 129 modalities.

In the application of Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA), the first task is to identify the axis which structure the space constructed. In order to assess how many axes need to be interpreted, the percentage of variance (inertia) explained by each axis is considered. The first 6 dimensions are sufficient to explain the variance in the data (89% cumulative variance). The first axis explains the most variance (73%), whereas each of the remaining axes explains less than 10% but more than 1% of the variance. Our discussion of the results refers to the first three axes which together explain 84.25% of variance.

Table 1: Eigenvalues and percentages of inertia:

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<th>F1</th>
<th>F2</th>
<th>F3</th>
<th>F4</th>
<th>F5</th>
<th>F6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eigenvalue</td>
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<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.052</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inertia (%)</td>
<td>13.326</td>
<td>5.077</td>
<td>3.899</td>
<td>3.402</td>
<td>2.806</td>
<td>2.603</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cumulative %</td>
<td>13.326</td>
<td>18.403</td>
<td>22.302</td>
<td>25.704</td>
<td>28.510</td>
<td>31.113</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adjusted Inertia</td>
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<td>0.002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adjusted Inertia (%)</td>
<td>72.999</td>
<td>7.559</td>
<td>3.694</td>
<td>2.475</td>
<td>1.332</td>
<td>1.023</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cumulative %</td>
<td>72.999</td>
<td>80.557</td>
<td>84.252</td>
<td>86.727</td>
<td>88.059</td>
<td>89.082</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.1. Interpretation of the axes

According to Benzécri (1992, p. 405), “[i]nterpreting an axis amounts to finding out what is similar, on the one hand, between all the elements figuring on the right of the origin and, on the other hand between all that is written on the left; and expressing with conciseness and precision, the contrast (or opposition) between the two extremes.” To interpret the axes, we retained only the modalities whose contribution is greater than the average contribution (100/129=0.775%).

1.1.1. Axis 1 ($\lambda_1=0.7299$)

We retained 59 modalities (14 needs, 15 habits, 15 tastes, 13 artist preferences, 2 cultural possessions) which, together, account for 80% of the variance on Axis 1.

As can be seen from Map 1, on the right side of the map (upper right quadrant - I) modalities of inclination towards listening to classical music in free time (LikeClassical+) i visits to theaters, art galleries and museums as favorite ways of passing leisure time (LikeTheatre+ i LikeArtGal+) are concentrated. In terms of cultural habits, on the right side of the map are indicators which show an intense commitment to attending cultural institution programs (GoTheatre++; GoArtGal++; GoLibrary++). Likewise, in this region of the map we also have indicators of passionate readers (Books 8+) and ownership of large home libraries (Library200+). Of the indicators of taste in the upper part of the map are only preferences for listening to classical music (Classic+).

To the left of axis 1, when programs of cultural institutions are used as units of measurement, there are practically no positive indicators of participation – either at the level of cultural needs or at the level of cultural habits. Only listening to folk music appears as a favorite way to pass the time. This is accompanied by indicators of taste linked to folk music in its various guises: authentic folk music, newly-composed folk music, turbo-folk music. In the upper left corner of the map (quadrant II) there are indicators of preferences for authentic folk music (Folk+) and a positive attitude towards the music of the first generation of performers of newly composed folk music in Serbia Lepa Lukić (Lukić+) and Predrag Živković – Tozovac (Tozovac+). In the lower part of the map, to the left of axis 1 (quadrant III), we find positive preferences in relation to newly composed folk music (NewFolk+) and turbo folk music (Turbo+) and an inclination towards songs of turbo folk diva Svetlana Ceca Ražnatović (Ceca+).
1.1.2. Axis 2 ($\lambda_2=0.0756$)

We retained 48 modalities that, together, account for 78% of the variance on Axis 2. The second axis extends from the bottom to the top of the map and the method of interpretation is similar to the previous one.

An overview of the grouped modalities indicates that in the upper part of the map there are concentrations of mainly indicators of cultural participation and taste linked to traditional art forms. Hence, as we have already noted, in the upper right quadrant (quadrant 1) there are groupings of cultural needs and habits related to participation in programs of traditional cultural institutions (such as the theater, art galleries and museums, symphony orchestras and libraries). Further, among indicators of taste there are those which better exemplify traditional elite art (such as love of classical music). Likewise, in the upper part of the map, on its left (quadrant II), there are indicators of traditional, this time folklore forms – listening to authentic folk music in one’s free time and an inclination towards the songs of Lepa Lukić and Predrag Živković-Tozovac.

On the other hand, at the bottom of the map are groupings of mainly indicators connected to participation and taste for contemporary, popular art. In the lower right quadrant (quadrant IV) there are positive modalities of taste linked to rock, jazz, heavy metal, dance/house music, rock bands such as Partibrejkers and Darkvud Dab as the embodiment of this orientation. As well as indicators of cultural habits which show an intense usage of the computer and Internet and attendance at concerts. On the opposite side, also at the bottom of the map (quadrant III) there are modalities of inclination toward newer forms of folk music (new folk and turbo folk) and their stars.

1.1.3. Interpretation of the first two axes of the cultural map of Serbia

As shown, at the right side of axis 1 there are indicators of cultural practices (cultural habits, needs, knowledge, ownership of cultural goods) which are linked to global cultural forms (traditional and contemporary). On the opposite, left side, mainly indicators of taste which are linked to the local cultural tradition – authentic folk music, new folk and turbo folk, etc. – again, both traditional and popular - are grouped. These results point out that the most significant axis in the field of cultural practices in Serbia is, not the one between elite and popular culture, but the one which stretches between the poles of global and local culture. This axis also explains the largest part of the variance (73%) in the field of cultural practices. What
also becomes visible from the results obtained is that along the second axis indicators are grouped depending on whether cultural practices belong to traditional or contemporary popular culture.

The interpretation of indicator groupings and their modalities in the field of cultural practices in Serbia has led us to the conclusion that these two axes, which explain 80% of the variance together and conclusively structure relations in this field, extend between the poles of global and local culture (axis 1) and between traditional and contemporary, popular culture (axis 2).

1.1.4. Types of cultural practices of the citizens of Serbia

In the cross-section of these “forces” five types of cultural practices are constituted, the contours of which can be seen in Figure 2.

In the upper right corner of the map (quadrant 1) practices are constituted which are shaped by global cultural influences and traditional culture. This type of cultural practices have been termed traditional elite cultural practices and they are characterized by cultural needs and habits linked to programs of cultural institutions (such as theatrical plays, art exhibitions, classical music concerts, etc). This type also includes positive preferences for classical music, as well as being involved in art, intensive reading and ownership of large home libraries (within blue ellipse).

In the lower right corner of the map (quadrant 4) are groupings of modalities of practices near the pole of global culture (on axis 1) and the pole of contemporary popular culture (axis 2). This type has been termed contemporary global cultural practices or urban cultural practices. Characteristic of it are tastes linked to contemporary popular music (rock, heavy metal, techno, dance/house), visits to concerts and intensive use of computer and of the Internet (within red ellipse).

In the upper left corner are indicators of absence of participation in programs of cultural institutions and of taste linked to authentic folk music. Cultural practices organized in this pattern have been termed traditional folklore cultural practices (brown ellipse). Finally, the type of cultural practices which is shaped in the vicinity of the poles of local culture (axis 1) and contemporary popular culture (axis 2) has been termed neo-folklore cultural practices (marked by a dark green ellipse).

Apart from these “pure” types of cultural practices - between traditional elite cultural practices and contemporary urban cultural practices - there is a “mixed” type of elite omnivores which breaches the boundary between traditional and popular culture. Their cultural practices include both visits
FIGURE 2 - FIELD OF CULTURAL PRACTICES (AXIS 1 & 2)
to theaters, art galleries, concerts of classical music and listening to jazz, rock, blues, passionate use of the Internet and computers (purple ellipse).

What should also be noted, is the absence of indicators which indicate ambivalent attitudes towards certain types of leisure (e.g. LikeTheatre +/-); certain types of music (e.g. RockPop +/-) and certain artists and performers (e.g. Ceca +/-); and indicators of average levels of cultural habits (e.g. Books 1-7) or ownership of cultural goods (Library 26 – 199). As a consequence of what is termed the “Guttman effect” or “Oslo effect”, these insufficiently differentiated forms of practices sometimes disappear from the map, in the center of which they should otherwise be found. However, they frequently appear on some other axis which defines the field of cultural practices.

1.1.5. Axis 3 \((\lambda_3=0.0369)\)

We retained 44 modalities that, together, account for 81% of the variance on Axis 3. Map 3 introduces a third main dimension of the univorous and omnivorous cultural consumption. Modalities in the first quadrant include the exclusive consumption of contemporary pop culture forms (such as techno, dance/house, hip-hop) and intensive use of computers. The respondents whose cultural styles are concentrated here do not like contemporary folk music and are not familiar with the stars of folk music from earlier periods (Lepa Lukić and Predrag Živković Tozovac), but they also dislike contemporary representatives of pop production in Serbia (such as Željko Joksimović or Goca Tržan). On the other hand, the modalities grouped in the fourth quadrant were designated as “local univores”, but it would be equally correct to say that they are cultural inactives.

In contrast, on the second pole of axis Z one finds a grouping of modalities which practically cover the entire specter of taste and cultural participation (from classical music to turbo-folk). However, it seems that what dominates these respondents’ cultural preferences (tastes) and cultural participation is a lackadaisical attitude towards culture and cultural activities in their lives. The respondents grouped here like dance/house, jazz and blues, classical music, rock and pop music, (turbo-)folk music, but they have no marked preference for any of these genres; the only exception looks like to be easy listening music. Taking into consideration this variety in taste and cultural participation, we have termed the cultural styles grouped in the second and third quadrant omnivorous – but have made a distinction between global omnivores (those who seem to have a slight preference for jazz, blues and rock, who like Danilo Kiš) and local omnivores, whose preference seems to lean in the direction of
Serbian pop production (Joksimović, Tržan) and the stars of folk music in the 1960’s and 1970’s, but also in the 1990’s and 2000’s (Ceca Ražnatović).
1.1.6. The field of cultural practices in Serbia (2005)

The final result of our analyses of cultural practices in Serbia can be seen in Figure 4. Three basic axes structure the field of cultural practices in Serbia: the central axis, the poles of which are global and local culture, the secondary axis at the poles of which are traditional culture and contemporary popular culture, and the third axis which discriminates between omnivore and univore cultural practices.

In the cross-section of these axes seven types of cultural practices are formed: traditional elite cultural practices which are the product of global and traditional culture; 2) contemporary global cultural practices which are linked to activities and art forms characteristic of popular global culture; 3) traditional folklore cultural practices, which are based on traditional, local cultural forms; 4) neo-folklore cultural practices, which are an expression of contemporary local cultural forms and activities.

In addition to these “pure” types of cultural practices on the cultural map of Serbia three groups of omnivore practices can be noted. We have treated omnivores as those who “cross” symbolic boundaries in a society, in this case, Serbian society. Cultural practices which characterize the crossing of boundaries between traditional and popular culture (in the vicinity of the pole of global culture) have been marked as 5) “elite omnivore”. Those who in their practices cross the boundary between local and global culture (in the vicinity of the pole of traditional culture) have been termed 6) “rurban omnivores”. Finally, we have a type of cultural practices which are characterized by crossing both of these cultural boundaries, these have been termed 7) “conformist omnivores”.

FIGURE 4
1.2. Projection of socio-demographic variables onto the field of cultural practices in Serbia

One of the most significant features of MCA is that in the construction of a field of cultural practices assumptions of their social determinants are not included; instead, patterns are constituted, as are links between them, solely based on data on cultural factors. What this type of analysis does make possible, however, is the projection of socio-demographic variables onto a cultural map constructed this way as “supplementary” variables, in order to establish what is the inter-relation of cultural patterns and social factors. These social factors are applied as a separate “layer” over the cultural map, without changing relations between variables which constitute the map.

As in the field of cultural practices in Serbia over 80% of the variance is explained by the first two axes, we projected socio-demographic variables onto the map which these two axes structure. We projected eight types of socio-demographic variables (education, age, income, wealth, occupation, gender, place of residence and region of residence); the first four exerted a more significant effect. In addition to this, we projected onto the map the respondents’ results on the “scale of nationalism”, which also revealed a discriminatory effect along the first axis (local vs. global culture). It is a rule that the difference between coordinates of modalities of supplementary (passive) variables is considered to be large, which indicates a stronger influence, if it is greater than 1 (in the coordinate system of the map) and smaller if it is lesser than 0.5. At the end of this segment of our study, wanting to follow the influence of class factors in the narrow sense, we presented the distribution of occupational groups in the cultural map of Serbia from 2005 using “clouds of modalities.”

1.2.1. Education

Education was revealed to have a strong discriminatory effect along both axes: global vs. local culture, and traditional culture vs. contemporary popular culture (see Figure 5). Respondents belonging to the folklore cultural practices are also the least educated – concentrated here are those who either have incomplete elementary education (4 years) or have only completed their elementary education (8 years). Respondents who belong

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1 The results of the multivariance correspondent analysis appear in the form of two outputs: the form of “clouds of modalities” and in the form of “clouds of individuals”. In the first instance, they reveal the distribution of modalities and their relations within the map, in the second, they provide the positioning of the individual within the map (according to various characteristics – sex, age, education, occupation…), with the coordinates of the map – in the sense of distribution of modalities – remain unchanged in both cases.
to the cultural practices of rurban omnivores and the global urban cultural practices are mainly positioned where the concentration of those with no more than a secondary education (12 years), while the concentration of respondents with 14 or 16 years of education (tertiary education) mostly matches with the group of elite omnivores. Finally, modalities characteristic of the traditional elite cultural practices are located in the same space as respondents with postgraduate degrees - MAs (18 years of education) and PhDs (19+ years of education).

1.2.2. Age

Like education, age also discriminates strongly along both axes (Figure 6). In areas where the concentration of the oldest respondents (60+ years) is highest, we also find representatives of the traditional folklore cultural practices and the traditional elite cultural practices. Respondents in the 40 to 60 age group are most frequently found among those belonging to the conformist omnivores and elite omnivores, while respondents aged between 25 and 40 were most frequent among representatives of neo-folk cultural practices and contemporary global urban practices. The youngest ones (<24 year of age) are concentrated in the part of the map which is characterized, in addition to global urban practices, by the cultural practices of rurban omnivores.
1.2.3. Income

As the “composition” of cultural practices includes, in addition to taste, variables of cultural participation, it is to be expected that economic factors (income and wealth) also bisect the field of cultural styles in ways which seem understandable. The results of the analysis show that the influence of income is not linear (see Figure 7). Respondents whose monthly income per member of household were under 25 EUR are equidistant in relation to modalities of traditional folklore cultural practices and practices of conformist omnivores. Among the modalities characteristic of rurban cultural practices there are two groups of respondents: those whose income per household member are between 25 and 50 EUR and those whose income per household member are twice as large, from 50 to 100 EUR. Average monthly income per household member between 100 and 250 EUR is concentrated on the border where practices of conformist omnivores, contemporary urban cultural practices and culturla practices of elite omnivores overlap. The modalities characteristic of the cultural practices of elite omnivores are concentrated in the space which overlaps with the points where monthly income per household member are higher than 250 EUR, and in some cases higher than 500 EUR, so that the carriers of these cultural practices are revealed to be the segments of Serbian society which are the strongest earners. What the results of these analyses seem to show is that at the same levels of monthly income several types of cultural practices develop (e.g. traditional folklore cultural practices and practices of conformist omnivores) or cultural practices of conformist omnivores with much higher monthly income (such as that of elite omnivores). That is, they testify that economic factors have only a indirect influence on cultural practices.
1.2.4. Wealth

As for wealth (Map 7), operationalized through the overall value of respondents’ property (real estate, automobiles and other means of transport, farming machinery), the line which indicates the diffusion of property stretches from the most disadvantaged (who are grouped on the boundary between modalities making up the traditional folklore cultural practices and the neo-folk cultural practices), the underprivileged and those of average means (among the modalities of the rurban cultural practices), to those whose wealth is slightly above average (among the modalities of the global urban cultural practices), and, as in the case of income, the wealthy and very wealthy, among the modalities which define the cultural practices of elite omnivores.
1.2.5. The nationalism scale

In the questionnaire, one of the questions in the Likert-like scale asked respondents to express their attitudes within the range “do not agree at all” (coded as 1) and “agree completely” (coded as 5) in relation to eight clearly nationalistic statements (such as “All Serbs should live in the same state”; “Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land and factories in Serbia”; or “It should not be allowed for the President of the Republic or the Prime Minister of Serbia to be of an ethnicity other than Serb (Croatian, Bulgarian, Hungarian…”). In the recoding of the answers received, we treated the codes as points, so that respondents who agreed with these statements had high scores (the maximum was 40), while those who disagreed had low scores (the minimum was 8). We coded those who scored 16 or less as non-nationalists, those who scored between 16 and 24 (those who were mainly neutral in relation to these radical opinions) as moderate nationalists, and those who scored 25 or higher as nationalists. As can be seen in Figure 8, the score on the nationalism scale extends almost linearly along the axis the poles of which are local and global culture. Maximal results on the nationalism scale (31 – 40) are found in the vicinity of the pole of local culture, the middle of the map is reserved for average scores (21 – 25 and 26 – 30), while the minimal score (between 8 and 15 points) is located precisely on the pole of global culture.

**Figure 7**

![Diagram showing the nationalism scale (Axes 1 and Axes 2)]
1.2.6. Occupational groups

We used respondents’ occupation – measured in the survey with a scale of 27 occupations – to construct nine basic groups of occupations on the basis of the type and volume of resources used by respondents in work and life strategies. Care was also taken to ensure that respondents who belong to each of the nine, have comparable levels of education and income and that their work conditions are also comparable. These nine occupational groups include: (1) farmers; (2) unskilled and semiskilled workers; (3) highly skilled workers; (4) lower-level experts; (5) clerks and lower management; (6) small entrepreneurs; (7) experts; (8) big entrepreneurs, CEOs and upper management; and (9) politicians and high ranking military and police officers.

What Figure 8 reveals is that with the exception of the farmers’ group (they are located on the left side of the map, in the vicinity of the pole of local culture) and to an extent the group of experts (who are concentrated on the right side of the map, near the pole of global culture), all other occupational groups do not have clear cultural profiles, stretching instead nearly across the entire map, incorporating within them carriers of the most diverse types of cultural practices.

In general the results of the analyses reveal a clearly structured nature of cultural practices. We have seen that the field of cultural practices in Serbia is organized at the cross-section of three axes, the poles of which are local culture and global culture (axis 1), traditional and contemporary, popular culture (axis 2) and omnivore and univore approaches to culture (axis 3).

At the same time, the distribution of indicators of age, education, occupation of respondents, as well as income and wealth of their families, in the cultural map of Serbia shows close links to certain types of cultural practices. Likewise, attitudes which indicate the degree of national attachment correspond to preferences for local, that is, global cultural forms. This shows that the cultural practices of citizens of Serbia are also socially structured. On the other hand, the cultural profiles of occupational groups are quite diverse, an indication that these types of groupings do not have a particularly significant influence on the differentiation of cultural practices.
Figure 8
2. Cultural map of Serbia (2010)

The study “Cultural practices of the citizens of Serbia” of the Department for the Study in Cultural Development was realized in the course of 2010 and 2011. The survey fieldwork was undertaken in the period from September to December 2010. Of the planned 1600 respondents in Serbia, 1490 were surveyed (93.1% of the planned sample). A standardized questionnaire with 95 questions, segmented into ten thematic units, was used.

As in the previous study, we first used indicators of cultural practices to construct a cultural map of Serbia and establish its basic dimensions. In presenting the cultural map of Serbia in 2010 we have limited our analysis to the interpretation of the first two, most significant axis. Then we projected socio-demographic variables onto it: gender, age, education, occupation, and place of residence.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Axes</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eigenvalues (λ)</td>
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<td>0.0925</td>
<td>0.0671</td>
<td>0.0572</td>
<td>0.0555</td>
<td>0.0465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw inertia</td>
<td>9.66%</td>
<td>4.67%</td>
<td>3.39%</td>
<td>2.89%</td>
<td>2.80%</td>
<td>2.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modified inertia</td>
<td>41.52%</td>
<td>11.11%</td>
<td>5.85%</td>
<td>4.25%</td>
<td>3.99%</td>
<td>2.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative inertia</td>
<td>41.53%</td>
<td>52.64%</td>
<td>58.49%</td>
<td>62.74%</td>
<td>66.73%</td>
<td>69.53%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2010 data six dimensions explain most of the variance in them (69.53% cumulative variance). The first axis explains the most variance (41.53%), the second 11.11%, whereas the remaining four axes explains less than 10% but more than 1% of the variance, each. Our discussion of the results refers to the first two axes which together explain 52.64% of variance.

2.1 Interpretation of axes

What first draws the eye in Figure 9 is that the basic dimensions of the cultural map of Serbia from 2010 are practically identical to the ones from 2005. It is only the axes of traditional and contemporary popular culture (axis 2) that have changed places (which has no effect on the interpretation of results).

Likewise, already familiar types of cultural practices are evident. In the 2010 map in the bottom right corner we find indicators of cultural needs for listening to classical music in one’s leisure time (LikeClassic), frequent visits to art museums and galleries (ArtGallery++), intense book reading (Book8+), and extensive home libraries (Lib200+). In this part of the map are located the modalities which unify into traditional elite cultural practices.
On the right side of the map, in its upper part, we find modalities of indicators suggesting membership in global popular cultural practices. Here the favorite music genres are house and techno, pop and rock, among the favorite bands are Partibrejkers, while the most common possession of cultural apparatus of this group of modalities are smart phones.

Between these types of cultural practices one finds the group of “elite omnivores” which, as we have already had occasion to mention, remains near the pole of global culture but crosses the boundary between traditional
and contemporary popular culture. In this group of modalities one finds listening to classical music (Classic+) and heavy metal (Metal +), frequent purchases of books (BuyBooks+), and intense use of the Internet (Internet++). This is the type of cultural practices the carriers of which speak two (Foreign2) or three foreign languages (Foreign3), own plasma televisions (PlasmaTV+) and lap-top computers (laptop+).

On the opposite side of the map there are modalities pointing to dominance of local culture in its traditional and popular guise. In the upper left corner one finds grouped the modalities of neo-folklore cultural practices. Favorite types of musical taste are linked to newly-composed folk music and turbo-folk music, favorite singers are the divas of “turbo-folk” Svetlana Ceca Ražnatović (Ceca+) and Jelena Karleuša (Karleusa+). In this group of modalities, there are negative attitudes toward leisure time visits to the theater (LikeTheatre-) and to listening to classical music (Classic –), while a favorite activity is going to fairs (Fair+)

In the bottom part of the cultural map, on the right side, one finds positioned the modalities of traditional folklore cultural practices. Listening to authentic folk music appears as a favorite way to spend leisure time, while favorite artists are the already mentioned representatives of the first generation of singers of newly-composed folk music (Lepa Lukić and Predrag Živković-Tozovac). In this group of modalities there are indicators of not buying books (BuyBooks0), not reading books (Books0), not using the Internet (Internet0), lack of computers (PC0) or lap-tops (laptop0) and presence of needlepoint (Needlepoint) as embellishment in apartments and houses.

At the end, it should also be pointed out that the presence of traditional, local cultural practices (celebrating the family slava, baptism, traditional weddings, etc). Our expectations were that these would be distributed primarily along the local-global axis, in the vicinity of the pole of local culture. Secondly, we expected that they would be characteristic of older age cohorts. The results of the analysis revealed that the modalities which indicate traditional, local cultural practices are distributed primarily along Axis 2 – traditional and contemporary popular culture and that contrary to all expectations they were characteristic of younger respondents.

2.2. Projection of socio-demographic variables onto the cultural map of Serbia (2010)

The results of the projection of socio-demographic variables also follow the already noted trends. Figure 10 shows that respondent age strongly discriminates along both axes taken into account, in particular, between
the poles of traditional and contemporary popular culture. Respondents aged from 18 to 30 were generally located in that part of the cultural map in which we find grouped modalities of global popular taste, while, on the other hand, respondents older than 65 are predominantly close to the pole of traditional and local culture.

Respondent education (see Figure 11) also quite clearly distinguishes between respondents who are close to the pole of local culture (elementary school or lower education) and those who have a tertiary education or higher and whose cultural practices mainly belong either to the type of traditional elite cultural practices or the practices of elite omnivores. Respondents with a high school education or lower tertiary education are located in the middle of the map.

Respondent income also indicates a certain regularity. Respondents with the lowest income and the majority of respondents with an average income are located in the vicinity of the pole of local culture. It is only respondents with the highest monthly earnings per household member (I≥250 EUR) who are located on the other side of the cultural map.

There is a quite clear and interesting match with the distribution of the results of the scale of nationalism. Those with the highest scores on the scale are located in that part of the cultural map where we find modalities of neo-folk cultural practices, while those with the lowest scores are positioned in the space of “elite omnivores”.

Also interesting is the clear differentiation of female and male respondents along the axis of traditional – contemporary, popular culture. Females have a greater inclination toward traditional cultural forms, while contemporary, popular cultural practices (in their local, neofolk, or global form) are more characteristic of males.

Although the central points of the occupational group ellipses in Figure 11 are seen as to a large extent separate, Figures 12, 13, and 14 in which the results of the analysis of the distribution of occupational groups are given in the form of clouds of individuals, show that this is not the case.

Figure 12 provides the distribution of respondents from the ranks of the farmers, unqualified workers and qualified workers. We note that the ellipses (within which we find positioned 86% of group members) of farmers and unqualified workers overlap to a considerable extent, and that they are located at the pole of local culture and mainly neo-folk cultural practices. On the other hand, respondents belonging to the group of qualified workers are distributed practically across the entire map, taking up mainly its central section.
Respondents who traditionally belong to middle class occupational groups – small entrepreneurs, clerks and lower-level experts (see Figure 13) – similarly occupy the central parts of the map, with hardly any difference to made among them.
Despite being partly located in the space of contemporary popular global cultural practices and practices of elite omnivores, members of the group of experts, politicians and managers, and large-scale entrepreneurs, also mainly occupy the central part of the map. The somewhat more homogeneous group of experts should be noted, as should their partial overlap with the group of politicians and managers. The group of large entrepreneurs is one of the culturally most heterogeneous, incorporating both those who belong to traditional folklore cultural practices and those whose cultural profile is closest to contemporary global cultural practices.

**Figure 14**

**Discussion and conclusion**

According to Bourdieu, the two basic organizational principles of social space – overall volume of capital and its composition – determine both the structure and changes in cultural consumption and, more generally, the entire cosmos of lifestyles. Clearly mirrored here is his understanding of the homology between social and cultural stratification, namely, that the same principles structure both social and cultural life. In cultural consumption, the main opposition, formed on the basis of overall volume of capital, is present between practices marked for their rarity as distinguished and refined, which are linked to fractions richest in both economic and cultural
capital, and practices which are socially identified as vulgar due to being simple and common and which are linked to fractions poorest in both of these types of capital. The position in-between is occupied by practices which are socially perceived as pretentious due to an obvious disproportion between ambition and possibility.

This fundamental opposition is specified in relation to composition of capital. Therefore, for example, the dominant class, which is in possession of a large volume of capital, is characterized by the “taste of freedom” (aesthetic disposition) – an inclination for the stylization and formalization of natural functions, which are thus transported to a plain higher than vulgar materialism. This is simultaneously an indication of the distance of the life of these classes from the immediate actions of economic and social necessities. Within this class the dominant fraction (the bourgeoisie), which owes its position to ownership of economic capital, prefers art characterized by a denial of the social worlds, hedonism, and ease. The subordinate fractions of the dominant class (intellectuals and artists), on the other hand, who owe their position to the ownership of cultural capital, oppose the bourgeois predilection for embellishment and gasconade in the name of an ascetic aesthetics of simplicity and purity. In opposition to the taste of the dominant class stands the “taste of necessity” of the working classes (agricultural laborers and laborers). Lacking ownership of either economic or cultural capital, they find themselves in a constant struggle with economic and social necessities, which shape their habitus and develop an inclination toward that which is functional, informal, natural, and sensual. Between these contraries we find the parochial strata characterized by “pretentious taste”. These strata would like to distinguish themselves from the working classes and portray themselves as part of the dominant class, but lack both capital and an appropriate habitus. Therefore, they attempt to acquire the trappings of the lifestyles of the dominant classes, aiming to portray themselves as something they are not.

In the British study “Culture, Class, Distinction” (Bennett et al: 2009), results of analyses of cultural participation, taste and knowledge have revealed that the field of lifestyles in Great Britain is structured along four axes. Unlike Bourdieu’s findings, on the first axis (which explains the greatest part of the variance) the opposed poles one finds on the cultural map of Great Britain are not elite and popular culture. It was, instead, revealed that the basic cultural division in Great Britain is that between active participation in events of both elite and popular culture and non-participation (or limited participation) in cultural activities, with the exception of watching television.
Unlike the first axis, on which cultural participation plays the most important role, the second axis primarily relates to differences in preferences (tastes). It separates, on the one hand, the preferences of established, traditional forms of culture and, on the other hand, an inclination for contemporary cultural forms, especially in the sphere of music.

The modalities on the third axis are primarily distinguished in relation to tastes. At one end of the map we find concentrated preferences for romantic films, soap operas, portrait art, and television drama. On the opposite end we find grouped preferences for landscape art, television programs dealing with nature and history, documentaries, war films, sports and news. The British authors have marked this division as the division between inwardly and outwardly oriented cultural dispositions.

Finally, the fourth axis is structured both by participation and by taste, although modalities of participation dominate. At the poles of this axis we find, on the one hand, intense participation in activities related to the visual arts and music (a large number of visits to art galleries, museums, orchestra concerts and the opera) and highly infrequent watching of television (less than one hour a day, work days and weekends). The preferences grouped here concern inclinations toward modern art and literature, Renaissance art and world music. The opposite pole of this axis is characterized by relatively infrequent visits to museums, concerts and the theater, a neutral attitude toward opposing musical styles (such as classical music, urban music, and country and western music) and a partiality for landscape art. If the first axis distinguished volume of participation and cultural activity, then divisions characterizing the fourth axis could be characterized as differences in intensity and frequency of cultural participation. On one side we find those characterized by enthusiasm in relation to art, frequent visits to cultural events and intense bonding to works of art. British authors have termed this approach, following the paper by Sullivan and Kac-Gero, voracious cultural consumption. Its opposite has been termed moderate cultural consumption, characterized by occasional visits to cultural events combined with amicable tastes in relation to various frequently mutually exclusive art forms.

The first and obvious difference which the cultural maps of Serbia reveal in relation to Bourdieu’s analyses of French society in the 1960s and 1970s is that the basic axis which structures the field of cultural practices in Serbia is not the one the poles of which are elite and mass culture. Instead,
the most fundamental cultural division is that between cultural practices belonging to local culture and those belonging to global culture. In an earlier paper (Cvetičanin & Popescu: 2011) we put forward the hypothesis that this polarization is not specific solely of Serbian society, that, instead, «in societies that were at some point in history «Westernized» – either through colonization (e.g., India, China, Indonesia, Mexico, or Algeria) or through the activities of their own elites (e.g., Serbia, Romania, Russia, or Turkey) – there is a constant tension and struggle between global and local culture for the status of legitimate culture. In these societies, this tension is more important than the one between high culture and popular culture».

It is in these terms that the cultural map of Serbia differs also from the cultural map constructed in Great Britain. Let us remind that the basic cultural division in Great Britain is that between active participation and non-participation (or limited participation) in cultural activities. Perhaps the hypothesis could be put forward that in Serbia (as in other cultures which have been westernized) lower social classes in local culture have found sanctuary and the basis for their cultural identity. And that In Great Britain, as in other developed countries of the West, the basic cultural division – that between the culturally active and the culturally inactive – is, in fact, a result of the disappearance of a distinctive working class culture.

The third specificity of the cultural map of Serbia and probably the most important one, is the one which points to social stratification and cultural stratification in Serbia being determined by different types of factors. Our analyses of social space in Serbia (Cvetičanin & Popescu: 2011) indicate that Serbian social space is structured by overall volume of capital and a specifically understood principle of the composition of capital. Analyses of the field of cultural practices presented in this paper, however, show that fundamental cultural divisions in Serbian society are those between local and global culture and between traditional and contemporary popular culture. Whereas the opposition between local and global culture overlaps to a significant extent with the dimension of the overall volume of capital2, the division between traditional and contemporary popular culture is determined primarily by age of the respondents and, to a somewhat lesser extent, their gender. Moreover, the results of the analyses show that among occupational groups which should, if in possession of the same overall volume of capital, differ in terms of composition of capital, differences in respect of culture are largely absent, hence these cannot function as a basis for distinguishing cultural practices. Therefore, as social and cultural

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2 See in this paper how education, income, wealth clearly discriminate along the first axis of the field of cultural practices in Serbia in maps from 2005 and from 2010.
stratification are determined by different principles, we can conclude that in society and in culture in Serbia – Bourdieu’s principle of homology does not apply.

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